# RuView / WiFi-DensePose -- QE Executive Summary

**Date:** 2026-04-05
**Analysis:** Full-spectrum Quality Engineering assessment (8 specialized agents)
**Codebase:** ~305K lines across Rust (153K), Python (39K), C firmware (9K), TypeScript/JS (33K), Docs (71K)
**Fleet ID:** fleet-02558e91

---

## Overall Quality Score: 55/100 (C+) -- QUALITY GATE FAILED

| Domain | Score | Verdict |
|--------|-------|---------|
| Code Quality & Complexity | 55-82/100 | CONDITIONAL PASS |
| Security | 68/100 | CONDITIONAL PASS |
| Performance | Borderline | AT RISK (37-54ms vs 50ms budget) |
| Test Suite Quality | Mixed | 3,353 tests but heavy duplication |
| Coverage | 77% file-level | FAIL (Python 30%, Firmware 19%) |
| Quality Experience (QX) | 71/100 | CONDITIONAL PASS |
| Product Factors (SFDIPOT) | TIME = CRITICAL | FAIL on time factor |

---

## P0 -- Fix Immediately (Security + CI)

| # | Issue | File(s) | Impact |
|---|-------|---------|--------|
| 1 | **Rate limiter bypass** -- trusts `X-Forwarded-For` without validation | `archive/v1/src/middleware/rate_limit.py:200-206` | Any client can bypass rate limits via header spoofing |
| 2 | **Exception details leaked** in HTTP responses regardless of environment | `archive/v1/src/api/routers/pose.py:140`, `stream.py:297`, +5 others | Stack traces visible to attackers |
| 3 | **WebSocket JWT in URL** -- tokens visible in logs, browser history, proxies | `archive/v1/src/api/routers/stream.py:74`, `archive/v1/src/middleware/auth.py:243` | Token exposure (CWE-598) |
| 4 | **Rust tests not in CI** -- 2,618 tests in largest codebase never run in pipeline | No `cargo test` in any GitHub Actions workflow | Regressions ship undetected |
| 5 | **WebSocket path mismatch** -- mobile app sends to wrong endpoint | `ui/mobile/src/services/ws.service.ts:104` vs `constants/websocket.ts:1` | Mobile WebSocket connections fail silently |

## P1 -- Fix This Sprint (Performance + Code Health)

| # | Issue | File(s) | Impact |
|---|-------|---------|--------|
| 6 | **God file: 4,846 lines, CC=121** -- sensing-server main.rs | `crates/wifi-densepose-sensing-server/src/main.rs` | Untestable, unmaintainable monolith |
| 7 | **O(L*V) tomography voxel scan** per frame | `ruvsense/tomography.rs:345-383` | ~10ms wasted per frame; use DDA ray march for 5-10x speedup |
| 8 | **Sequential neural inference** -- defeats GPU batching | `wifi-densepose-nn inference.rs:334-336` | 2-4x latency penalty |
| 9 | **720 `.unwrap()` calls** in Rust production code | Across entire Rust workspace | Each is a potential panic in real-time/safety-critical paths |
| 10 | **Python Doppler: 112KB alloc per frame** at 20Hz | `archive/v1/src/core/csi_processor.py:412-414` | Converts deque -> list -> numpy every frame |

## P2 -- Fix This Quarter (Coverage + Safety)

| # | Issue | File(s) | Impact |
|---|-------|---------|--------|
| 11 | **11/12 Python modules untested** -- only CSI extraction has unit tests | `archive/v1/src/services/`, `middleware/`, `database/`, `tasks/` | 12,280 LOC with zero unit tests |
| 12 | **Firmware at 19% coverage** -- WASM runtime, OTA, swarm bridge untested | `firmware/esp32-csi-node/main/wasm_runtime.c` (867 LOC) | Security-critical code with no tests |
| 13 | **MAT simulation fallback** -- disaster tool auto-falls back to simulated data | `ui/mobile/src/screens/MATScreen/index.tsx` | Risk of operators monitoring fake data during real incidents |
| 14 | **Token blacklist never consulted** during auth | `archive/v1/src/api/middleware/auth.py:246-252` | Revoked tokens remain valid |
| 15 | **50ms frame budget never benchmarked** -- no latency CI gate | No benchmark harness exists | Real-time requirement is aspirational, not verified |

## P3 -- Technical Debt

| # | Issue | Impact |
|---|-------|--------|
| 16 | 340 `unsafe` blocks need formal safety audit | Potential UB in production |
| 17 | 5 duplicate CSI extractor test files (~90 redundant tests) | Maintenance burden |
| 18 | Performance tests mock inference with `asyncio.sleep()` | Tests measure scheduling, not performance |
| 19 | CORS wildcard + credentials default | Browser security weakened |
| 20 | ESP32 UDP CSI stream unencrypted | CSI data interceptable on LAN |

---

## Bright Spots

- **79 ADRs** -- exceptional architectural governance
- **Witness bundle system** (ADR-028) -- deterministic SHA-256 proof verification
- **Rust test depth** -- 2,618 tests with mathematical rigor (Doppler, phase, losses)
- **Daily security scanning** in CI (Bandit, Semgrep, Safety)
- **Mobile state management** -- clean Zustand stores with good test coverage
- **Ed25519 WASM signature verification** on firmware
- **Constant-time OTA PSK comparison** -- proper timing-safe crypto

---

## Reports Index

All detailed reports are in the [`docs/qe-reports/`](docs/qe-reports/) directory:

| Report | Lines | Description |
|--------|-------|-------------|
| [00-qe-queen-summary.md](00-qe-queen-summary.md) | 315 | Master synthesis, quality score, cross-cutting analysis |
| [01-code-quality-complexity.md](01-code-quality-complexity.md) | 591 | Cyclomatic/cognitive complexity, code smells, top 20 hotspots |
| [02-security-review.md](02-security-review.md) | 600 | 15 findings (0 CRITICAL, 3 HIGH, 7 MEDIUM), OWASP coverage |
| [03-performance-analysis.md](03-performance-analysis.md) | 795 | 23 findings (4 CRITICAL), frame budget analysis, optimization roadmap |
| [04-test-analysis.md](04-test-analysis.md) | 544 | 3,353 tests inventoried, duplication analysis, quality assessment |
| [05-quality-experience.md](05-quality-experience.md) | 746 | API/CLI/Mobile/DX/Hardware UX assessment, 3 oracle problems |
| [06-product-assessment-sfdipot.md](06-product-assessment-sfdipot.md) | 711 | SFDIPOT analysis, 57 test ideas, 14 exploratory session charters |
| [07-coverage-gaps.md](07-coverage-gaps.md) | 514 | Coverage matrix, top 20 risk gaps, 8-week improvement roadmap |

**Total analysis:** 4,816 lines across 8 reports (265 KB)

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*Generated by QE Swarm (8 agents, fleet-02558e91) on 2026-04-05*
*Orchestrated by QE Queen Coordinator with shared learning/memory*
