docs: ADR-298..317 — 20 child ADRs of the perception-substrate program

Phase 1 (certificate spine, initial implementation planned): ADR-298 calibration certificate, ADR-299 OOD KNOWN/DEGRADED/UNKNOWN gating, ADR-301 evidence engine, ADR-302 authenticated sensor identity, ADR-303 canonical spatial ontology, ADR-314 multi-domain benchmark scorecard, ADR-315 capability certificates, ADR-316 witness chain. Phase 2 (Proposed): ADR-300 ground truth, ADR-304 tracking, ADR-307 802.11bf-native, ADR-308 fusion, ADR-313 fleet, ADR-317 HAL. Phase 3 (Proposed): ADR-305 placement, ADR-306 active sensing, ADR-309 spatial memory, ADR-310 counterfactual, ADR-311 info-gain, ADR-312 RF twin. Each references ADR-297 and cross-references its dependencies; phase-1 ADRs carry implementation intent, phase-2/3 are design-intent Proposed. Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015TcKegTS7QqhWPC2L2SzaS
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 # ADR-298: Automatic domain calibration — signed, versioned, invalidatable room fingerprint
 - **Status**: Accepted — initial implementation planned (ADR-297 phase 1)
 - **Date**: 2026-08-11
 - **Deciders**: ruv
 - **Tags**: calibration, provenance, drift, evidence, honesty, substrate
 ## Context
 This ADR is primitive 1 of the perception-substrate program (ADR-297) and the
 first brick of that program's "certificate spine" (ADR-297 phase 1). It depends
 on the canonical spatial ontology (ADR-303) to name *which space* it
 characterizes, on authenticated sensor identity (ADR-302) to bind a fingerprint
 to *which signed device* produced it, and on the witness chain (ADR-316) to
 anchor the resulting artifact. Its output is consumed directly by
 out-of-distribution detection (ADR-299).
 WiFi sensing is only reproducible inside the environment it was tuned for.
 Multipath, furniture geometry, transceiver placement, and AP channel all shape
 the CSI distribution, so a model that reads a room correctly one week can drift
 silently the next. RuView already has the raw ingredients for room-aware
 sensing but not a single portable, signed, expiring artifact that says "this is
 the room, here is when it was measured, and here is the evidence that it is
 still the same room."
 Existing scaffolding to build on, not rebuild (`v2/crates/wifi-densepose-calibration`):
 - `enrollment` / `anchor` — guided human anchors with an adaptive quality gate.
 - `bank` / `specialist` / `runtime` — a versioned bank of small specialist
  models and a confidence-gated mixture runtime (`RoomState`), including the
  crate's existing honest `STALE` degradation when the ADR-135 empty-room
  baseline drifts.
 - `geometry` / `geometry_embedding` — transceiver-geometry record and its
  fixed-length conditioning featurization (ADR-152).
 What is missing is (a) an *automatic* observe-only characterization phase that
 does not require a human enrollment ritual, (b) empty-vs-occupied baseline
 separation as a first-class pair, (c) a signed, versioned, comparable
 `CalibrationCertificate` artifact, and (d) explicit invalidation on drift rather
 than a soft `STALE` flag buried in the runtime.
 ## Options considered
 1. **Keep calibration internal to the runtime (status quo).** Rejected: the
   room characterization exists only as in-process state; it cannot be signed,
   shipped, compared across time, or presented as evidence to ADR-299/ADR-315.
 2. **Build a new calibration crate.** Rejected: `wifi-densepose-calibration`
   already owns enrollment, the specialist bank, geometry embedding, and the
   baseline-drift concept. A parallel crate would fork the room model.
 3. **Extend `wifi-densepose-calibration` with an automatic characterization
   phase and a signed certificate artifact.** Chosen.
 ## Decision
 Extend `v2/crates/wifi-densepose-calibration` with an `autocal` characterization
 phase and a `certificate` artifact module. The target UX is:
 > install → observe (~10 min) → room fingerprint → calibration certificate →
 > sensing.
 ### 1. Automatic characterization (`autocal`)
 - An observe-only pass (default ~10 minutes, configurable) that collects CSI
  without requiring guided human anchors, reusing the `anchor` quality gate to
  reject frames it cannot trust. It layers on the existing ADR-135 empty-room
  baseline rather than replacing it.
 - Produces a `RoomFingerprint`: a bounded, fixed-length statistical summary of
  the room's CSI distribution (subcarrier amplitude/phase moments, multipath
  structure, occupancy-band energy), plus the `geometry_embedding` when a
  geometry record is present. The fingerprint is the distance-comparable object
  ADR-299 measures against; its schema is versioned.
 ### 2. Empty / occupied baseline pair
 - Characterization establishes a paired baseline: an **empty** distribution
  (no occupant motion) and an **occupied** distribution (motion present),
  separated by the existing occupancy signal rather than a manual label. Both
  are stored on the fingerprint so downstream OOD gating can distinguish "the
  empty room changed" (furniture/geometry drift) from "occupancy statistics
  changed" (different subject dynamics).
 ### 3. `CalibrationCertificate` artifact
 - A serializable `CalibrationCertificate` binding: the `RoomFingerprint`; a
  space identifier from the ADR-303 ontology; the signing sensor identity from
  ADR-302; `captured_at_unix_s`; a monotonic `version`; a schema version; the
  calibration `tier`; and an `EvidenceLevel` (L0–L5, ADR-282) — an automatic
  characterization on real captured CSI is at most L1/L2 and is labelled as
  such, never L3+.
 - The certificate is **signed** using RuField provenance/signature types
  (ADR-260/262/277/279) and anchored in the witness chain (ADR-316). Signature
  and witness anchoring are mandatory: an unsigned certificate is not a valid
  certificate.
 - Two certificates for the same space are **comparable**: `distance(a, b)`
  returns a bounded fingerprint distance, which is the primitive ADR-299 uses
  to gate KNOWN → DEGRADED → UNKNOWN.
 ### 4. Invalidation and continuous drift compensation
 - A certificate carries an explicit validity policy: it is invalidated when
  fingerprint distance against live traffic exceeds a threshold, when the AP
  channel or transceiver geometry changes, when the signing device identity
  changes, or on age expiry. Invalidation is an explicit state transition that
  emits a witness record (ADR-316), not a silent `STALE` flag.
 - Continuous drift compensation runs as a bounded online update of the
  fingerprint within a **compatibility envelope**: small drift is absorbed and
  logged; drift beyond the envelope invalidates the certificate and forces
  re-characterization. Compensation never silently rewrites a signed
  certificate — it produces a new version, preserving the append-only history.
 ### Provenance and honesty discipline
 - No accuracy number is claimed by this ADR; it delivers the artifact and the
  distance/invalidation machinery. Any certificate produced from generated CSI
  is L0/`Synthetic` by construction; the constructor rejects labelling
  synthetic characterization as measured (ADR-279 invariant 6, ADR-282 ladder).
 - Certificates never leave the edge except through the governed control plane
  (ADR-277); a room fingerprint is treated as potentially sensitive spatial
  data, not free telemetry.
 ## Consequences
 - Room characterization becomes a portable, signed, versioned artifact that
  ADR-299 (OOD), ADR-315 (capability certificates), and ADR-314 (benchmark)
  can consume without re-deriving room state.
 - The automatic observe-only path lowers deployment friction (no mandatory
  enrollment ritual) but yields a weaker evidence level than guided enrollment;
  the certificate states which path produced it so consumers can weight it.
 - Explicit invalidation means RuView will sometimes refuse to sense a changed
  room until re-characterization. That refusal is the intended honest behavior,
  surfaced by ADR-299, not a regression.
 - The existing enrollment/bank/runtime path is preserved; `autocal` is an
  additional entry point that produces the same `RoomFingerprint` object the
  guided path can also emit.
 ## Validation
 - `cargo test -p wifi-densepose-calibration` — fingerprint determinism from
  fixed synthetic CSI; empty/occupied separation on synthetic occupancy;
  certificate signing/verification round-trip and tamper rejection;
  `distance()` monotonicity on progressively perturbed fixtures; invalidation
  transitions (channel change, geometry change, age, drift-envelope breach)
  each emit the expected witness record; constructor rejects synthetic→measured
  mislabeling.
 - Cross-ADR: an ADR-299 test consumes a certificate and asserts the gating
  state transitions on a drifted fingerprint.
 - Real-silicon characterization (ESP32 capture over a real 10-minute window)
  remains a follow-up requiring hardware evidence per CLAUDE.md; a successful
  build or synthetic run is not hardware evidence.
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 # ADR-299: Out-of-distribution detection — KNOWN / DEGRADED / UNKNOWN gating
 - **Status**: Accepted — initial implementation planned (ADR-297 phase 1)
 - **Date**: 2026-08-11
 - **Deciders**: ruv
 - **Tags**: ood, calibration, uncertainty, quality, evidence, honesty, substrate
 ## Context
 This ADR is primitive 2 of the perception-substrate program (ADR-297) and part
 of the phase-1 certificate spine. It sits directly downstream of automatic
 domain calibration (ADR-298): the `CalibrationCertificate` and its
 `RoomFingerprint` are the reference distribution this ADR measures against. It
 reuses fusion-layer quality scoring (ADR-137) as one of its inputs and feeds
 its state into the evidence engine (ADR-301) and capability certificates
 (ADR-315).
 The central unsolved problem of WiFi sensing is cross-domain generalization: a
 model trained (or calibrated) in one room degrades unpredictably in another, or
 in the same room after furniture moves, the AP changes channel, or the radio
 hardware is swapped. A model that keeps returning confident classifications
 under these conditions is the single most misleading failure mode in the field,
 and it is the failure the strategic assessment (ADR-297) named explicitly.
 Confidence alone is insufficient: a softmax head is perfectly capable of being
 confidently wrong on out-of-distribution input. RuView must be able to say
 "I do not recognize this situation" instead of guessing.
 Today RuView has partial signals but no unified gate:
 - ADR-298 produces a comparable `RoomFingerprint` and a `distance()` metric.
 - ADR-137 `QualityScore` carries fusion coherence, evidence references, and
  contradiction flags per fused frame.
 - Model heads emit confidence/uncertainty, but nothing combines domain
  distance, signal quality, calibration compatibility, and uncertainty into a
  single decision, and nothing forces a model to stop emitting confident labels
  when it leaves its calibrated domain.
 ## Options considered
 1. **Threshold on model confidence alone.** Rejected: confidently-wrong OOD
   predictions are exactly the failure mode; confidence is necessary but not
   sufficient.
 2. **A per-model bespoke OOD check inside each task head.** Rejected:
   duplicates logic, cannot be audited uniformly, and does not compose with the
   calibration certificate or the evidence engine.
 3. **A shared OOD gate that every inference passes through, fusing four signals
   against the ADR-298 certificate.** Chosen.
 ## Decision
 Add an out-of-distribution gate — implemented in a shared crate consumed by the
 task-head runtime (`wifi-densepose-calibration::runtime` and the model serving
 path) — that attaches a `DomainState` to **every** inference.
 ### 1. Four inputs, one decision
 Each inference carries four measured quantities:
 1. **Domain distance** — fingerprint distance (ADR-298 `distance()`) between
   live traffic and the active `CalibrationCertificate`, split into the
   empty-baseline and occupied-baseline components so geometry drift and
   occupancy-statistics drift are distinguishable.
 2. **Signal quality** — reuse the ADR-137 quality scoring signals (fusion
   coherence, contradiction flags) plus per-frame SNR/validity.
 3. **Calibration compatibility** — is a valid, non-invalidated certificate
   present for this space (ADR-303) and this signed device (ADR-302)? An
   expired, invalidated, or device-mismatched certificate is itself a
   compatibility failure.
 4. **Uncertainty** — the model head's own predictive uncertainty.
 ### 2. State machine: KNOWN → DEGRADED → UNKNOWN
 - **KNOWN** — domain distance within the certificate's compatibility envelope,
  quality above threshold, certificate valid and compatible, uncertainty low.
  Confident classifications are returned.
 - **DEGRADED** — one or more signals crossed a soft threshold (e.g. moderate
  fingerprint drift within the envelope, elevated uncertainty, a tolerated
  ADR-137 contradiction flag). Classifications are returned but flagged
  degraded with the specific reason; downstream consumers must treat them as
  lower-evidence.
 - **UNKNOWN** — the room changed materially (empty-baseline drift beyond the
  envelope, AP channel change, transceiver-geometry change, hardware/device
  change, or an invalidated/absent certificate). RuView **stops returning
  confident classifications** and returns UNKNOWN with the triggering cause.
  This is the required behavior, not an error.
 State transitions are hysteretic (separate enter/exit thresholds) so the gate
 does not flap on noise. The state, the four input values, and the triggering
 cause are all reported — never a bare label.
 ### 3. Certificate-bound, honest by construction
 - The gate is meaningless without a certificate: with no valid ADR-298
  certificate for the current space/device, the default state is UNKNOWN, not
  KNOWN. Absence of evidence is treated as absence of capability.
 - The `DomainState` and its inputs are emitted to the evidence engine
  (ADR-301) as part of every inference record, and are an input to the ADR-315
  capability certificate (a model's capability is bounded by the domain it can
  hold KNOWN in).
 - No accuracy number is claimed here; the ADR delivers the gating machinery.
  The gate's own thresholds are calibration parameters, reported with each
  decision.
 ## Consequences
 - RuView gains a uniform, auditable answer to "should I trust this inference?"
  that combines domain, quality, calibration, and uncertainty rather than
  confidence alone.
 - Deployments will see more DEGRADED/UNKNOWN results than a
  confidence-only system, especially right after a room changes. That increase
  is the product working: it is the difference between honest RF perception and
  confidently-wrong output.
 - Every task head that opts into the substrate must route through the gate;
  heads that bypass it cannot claim a KNOWN state or earn an ADR-315
  certificate.
 - The gate couples model serving to the presence of a live calibration
  certificate, making ADR-298 a hard dependency of confident inference — the
  intended coupling.
 ## Validation
 - `cargo test` on the OOD crate — state-machine transitions on synthetic
  fixtures: in-envelope drift stays KNOWN; soft-threshold breach → DEGRADED;
  empty-baseline drift beyond envelope, channel change, geometry change,
  device mismatch, and invalidated/absent certificate each → UNKNOWN;
  hysteresis prevents flapping under injected noise; missing certificate
  defaults to UNKNOWN.
 - Cross-ADR: consumes an ADR-298 certificate and asserts a drifted fingerprint
  drives the expected transition; asserts the `DomainState` is present on every
  emitted inference record consumed by ADR-301.
 - No confident classification is emitted in the UNKNOWN state in any test —
  enforced as an assertion, not a convention.
 - Real-silicon OOD behavior (moving furniture / changing AP channel on a live
  ESP32 capture and observing the transition) remains a follow-up requiring
  hardware evidence per CLAUDE.md.
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 # ADR-300: Ground-truth synchronization — reference sensors as a formal validation plane
 - **Status**: Proposed (ADR-297 phase 2)
 - **Date**: 2026-08-11
 - **Deciders**: ruv
 - **Tags**: ground-truth, validation, fusion, evidence, benchmark, honesty, substrate
 ## Context
 This ADR is primitive 3 of the perception-substrate program (ADR-297), authored
 as **Proposed** in phase 2: it is design intent and a validation plan, not
 implemented by the phase-1 swarm. It sits on top of the phase-1 certificate
 spine and feeds the evidence engine (ADR-301) and the real benchmark service
 (ADR-314). It generalizes the vitals ground-truth rig (ADR-290) from a single
 measurand to a modality-agnostic plane.
 RuView's evidence discipline (CLAUDE.md; ADR-282 ladder) requires MEASURED
 accuracy claims to be backed by an independent reference. ADR-290 built exactly
 this for vitals: reference-series ingest, time alignment (cross-correlation
 lag + optional clock-drift fit), and agreement statistics (MAE/RMSE/bias/
 Bland–Altman/within-tolerance), with an `EvidenceGrade` that is only
 constructible as `Measured` when a real reference, non-zero paired samples,
 minimum coverage, and a reproducer are present. That machinery is measurand- and
 device-shaped: it knows about heart rate and breathing rate.
 The substrate needs the same discipline for *every* phenomenon RuView senses —
 presence, count, localization, pose, posture, activity — and for reference
 sources of many modalities (cameras, mmWave, pressure mats, wearables, pulse
 oximeters, microphones, manual labels). The critical design decision is that
 these reference sensors form a **validation plane**, not additional inference
 inputs.
 ## Options considered
 1. **Fuse reference sensors as extra inference inputs.** Rejected on principle:
   folding cameras/mmWave into the estimator would make RuView's RF claims
   unfalsifiable — the reference would be training the thing it is meant to
   check, and a camera-fed result is no longer a camera-free RF result. It
   would also violate the ADR-282 layering (RuView is probabilistic
   exteroception, never ground truth) and the honesty rule against presenting
   fused-with-camera output as WiFi sensing.
 2. **One-off rigs per measurand (extend ADR-290 ad hoc each time).** Rejected:
   duplicates alignment/agreement code per phenomenon and never yields a shared
   validation surface for the benchmark.
 3. **A first-class, modality-agnostic `GroundTruth` API that is strictly a
   validation plane.** Chosen.
 ## Decision
 Introduce a `GroundTruth` API — a modality-agnostic validation plane that
 compares RF inference against independent observation and never feeds it.
 ### 1. Modality-agnostic reference ingest
 - A `ReferenceObservation` generalizing ADR-290's `ReferenceSeries`: a
  timestamped, typed observation of a `Phenomenon` (presence, count,
  localization, pose keypoints, posture, activity, heart rate, breathing rate)
  from a `ReferenceModality` (camera, mmWave, pressure, wearable, pulse
  oximeter, microphone, manual label), with device/source metadata and the
  measurement principle recorded.
 - Untrusted reference files are validated at the boundary (row-numbered
  rejections, non-monotonic timestamps are errors), reusing ADR-290's ingest
  discipline. Camera/mmWave references arrive as exported label/keypoint
  streams, not live model feeds.
 ### 2. Synchronization
 - Generalize ADR-290's time alignment (bounded-lag normalized cross-correlation
  + optional linear clock-drift fit) to arbitrary measurands on a common
  resampled grid, with no interpolation across gaps beyond a configurable
  limit. Alignment parameters are always reported, never silently applied.
 - Spatial synchronization where relevant: reference observations are expressed
  in the ADR-303 spatial ontology so an RF localization/pose result and a
  camera/mmWave observation are compared in one coordinate frame.
 ### 3. Agreement as validation, not fusion
 - A modality-appropriate `AgreementReport` per phenomenon: continuous
  measurands reuse ADR-290's MAE/RMSE/bias/Bland–Altman/within-tolerance;
  categorical/detection phenomena (presence, activity) report confusion-matrix
  metrics; spatial phenomena report localization error percentiles and pose
  PCK **with the mandatory mean-pose baseline and leakage-free split**
  (CLAUDE.md; ADR-288).
 - Session scope is mandatory metadata (subject count, motion state, LOS/NLOS/
  through-wall, distance band) — a report without scope cannot be constructed,
  as in ADR-290.
 ### 4. Evidence and isolation guarantees
 - The plane is one-directional by type: the inference path has no read access
  to `GroundTruth` at runtime. A build/test-time isolation check (and the type
  boundary) prevents a reference observation from becoming an estimator input.
 - Reports carry an `EvidenceLevel` (ADR-282) and an `EvidenceGrade`
  constructible as `Measured` only with a real reference, paired samples,
  coverage, and a reproducer (ADR-290 rule). Reports feed the ADR-301 evidence
  engine and are the substrate ADR-314 scores against.
 ## Consequences
 - Every phenomenon RuView senses gets the same MEASURED-vs-independent-observer
  discipline vitals already has, in one shared surface.
 - Keeping references strictly as validation preserves the falsifiability and
  the camera-free identity of RF results; it costs the (tempting) accuracy a
  camera-fused estimator would show, which is the correct trade.
 - Reference capture is an operational burden (a camera/mmWave rig per validated
  session); acceptable because it is a validation activity, not a runtime
  requirement, and it is what turns CLAIMED into MEASURED.
 - Because this is Proposed (phase 2), the API shape may be revised once the
  phase-1 spine (ADR-298/299/301/303) lands and the benchmark (ADR-314)
  exercises it.
 ## Validation
 - Unit tests (planned): modality-agnostic ingest rejection cases; alignment
  recovery of known synthetic offsets/drifts across measurands; agreement math
  per phenomenon against hand-computed fixtures; pose PCK path requires a
  mean-pose baseline and rejects leaky splits; evidence-grade constructibility;
  the isolation check fails a build that wires a reference into the inference
  path.
 - Cross-ADR: an ADR-314 benchmark scenario consumes `GroundTruth` reports as
  its scored reference; ADR-301 ingests the agreement reports as evidence
  records.
 - Real-session validation (RF capture synchronized with a real camera/mmWave/
  pressure/wearable reference) is the phase-2 exit and requires hardware
  evidence per CLAUDE.md; a synthetic run is not hardware evidence.
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 # ADR-301: Evidence engine — MLflow for physical sensing
 - **Status**: Accepted — initial implementation planned (ADR-297 phase 1)
 - **Date**: 2026-08-11
 - **Deciders**: ruv
 - **Tags**: evidence, provenance, ledger, accuracy, drift, benchmark, honesty, substrate
 ## Context
 This ADR is primitive 4 of the perception-substrate program (ADR-297) and a
 central pillar of the phase-1 certificate spine. It consumes the domain state
 from out-of-distribution detection (ADR-299) and the calibration age from the
 calibration certificate (ADR-298), it is the store that capability certificates
 (ADR-315) are minted from, and it is the accuracy source the real benchmark
 service (ADR-314) reads. In phase 2 it ingests agreement reports from the
 ground-truth plane (ADR-300).
 The strategic assessment (ADR-297) judged this primitive **more commercially
 important than another pose architecture**: what unblocks OEM and integrator
 conversations is not a higher headline number but a defensible, auditable record
 of how a model actually performs, per room, per device, per subject, over time.
 MLflow made ML experiments trackable; physical sensing needs the equivalent for
 deployed accuracy, drift, and evidence level — an append-only ledger, not a
 dashboard that overwrites yesterday's number.
 RuView already has the constituent evidence types; what is missing is the ledger
 that unifies them per deployment context:
 - RuField provenance/signature types (ADR-260/262/277/279) — the signed,
  provenance-bearing record types to reuse rather than reinvent.
 - The AetherArena witness-ledger pattern (ADR-149) — an append-only,
  witness-anchored ledger of scored results, the structural template here.
 - `frame::EvidenceLevel` L0–L5 (ADR-282) — the mandatory evidence tag every
  record carries.
 - ADR-299 `DomainState`, ADR-137 `QualityScore`, ADR-298 certificate version
  and age — the per-inference signals to accumulate.
 ## Options considered
 1. **Log accuracy to flat files / metrics dashboards.** Rejected: mutable,
   un-signed, un-scoped, and not comparable over time — the exact gap.
 2. **Reuse a general experiment tracker (MLflow itself).** Rejected: it is
   experiment-time, not deployment-time; it has no notion of room/device/
   subject context, calibration age, evidence level, or signed provenance, and
   it would add an external service dependency contrary to the substrate's
   edge-first, dependency-light direction.
 3. **A native append-only evidence ledger reusing RuField record types and the
   AetherArena ledger pattern.** Chosen.
 ## Decision
 Build an **evidence engine**: a per-`(room, device, subject)` append-only
 accuracy ledger that every model automatically writes to.
 ### 1. The evidence record
 - An `EvidenceRecord` keyed by context — space id (ADR-303), signed device id
  (ADR-302), and subject id where consented and available — carrying: model
  version; calibration certificate version and **age** (ADR-298); the ADR-299
  `DomainState` (KNOWN/DEGRADED/UNKNOWN) and its four inputs; the ADR-137
  quality signals; predictive uncertainty; and, when a reference is present
  (ADR-300), the agreement result (accuracy, false-positive rate). Each record
  carries exactly one `EvidenceLevel` (L0–L5, ADR-282).
 - Records are **append-only** and signed with RuField signature types
  (ADR-260/262/277/279); the ledger is anchored in the witness chain (ADR-316),
  following the AetherArena witness-ledger pattern (ADR-149). No record is ever
  mutated in place — a correction is a new record.
 ### 2. Per-context accuracy accounting
 - The engine maintains, per `(room, device, subject)` context: measured
  accuracy (only where an ADR-300 reference backs it — otherwise the record is
  CLAIMED/SYNTHETIC, never MEASURED), false-positive rate, drift trajectory
  (fingerprint distance over time from ADR-298), the fraction of inferences in
  each domain state, calibration age distribution, and model-version history.
 - Aggregation is a pure function over the append-only log at a queried time —
  the ledger is the source of truth; summaries are derived, never authoritative
  (mirroring CLAUDE.md's "source over summaries" rule).
 ### 3. Honesty enforced in the record
 - The engine cannot upgrade an evidence level; a level is set by the record's
  provenance at write time (synthetic input → L0/`Synthetic`; no reference →
  CLAIMED; reference + reproducer → MEASURED), reusing the ADR-282/ADR-288/
  ADR-290 constructor discipline. A benchmark or certificate reading the ledger
  gets the honest level, not an optimistic rollup.
 - No benchmark numbers are invented by this ADR; it delivers the ledger and the
  accounting. Empty contexts report "no evidence," which downstream (ADR-315)
  must treat as no capability.
 ## Consequences
 - RuView gains a single auditable answer to "how well does this model actually
  work, here, on this device, for this subject, and how fresh is the
  calibration?" — the artifact OEM/integrator diligence actually asks for.
 - ADR-315 capability certificates become derivable (a certificate is a signed
  attestation over a slice of the ledger) and ADR-314 gains a real accuracy
  source per PR instead of self-reported numbers.
 - The append-only, signed design has storage and key-management cost; bounded
  by per-context retention policy and by reusing the existing RuField/witness
  infrastructure rather than a new store.
 - Some contexts will show sparse or unflattering evidence. Surfacing that is the
  point; the engine must never paper over a thin context with a global average.
 ## Validation
 - `cargo test` on the evidence-engine crate — append-only invariant (no
  in-place mutation; corrections are new records); per-context aggregation math
  against fixtures; evidence-level is set by provenance and cannot be upgraded;
  signature round-trip and tamper rejection; witness anchoring; empty-context
  queries return "no evidence" not a fabricated number.
 - Cross-ADR: ingests ADR-299 `DomainState` and (phase 2) ADR-300 agreement
  reports; an ADR-315 test mints a certificate from a ledger slice and an
  ADR-314 test reads accuracy from the ledger.
 - Real-deployment evidence (a populated ledger from live ESP32 captures with
  ADR-300 references) is the maturity milestone and requires hardware evidence
  per CLAUDE.md; a synthetic ledger is L0 by construction.
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 # ADR-302: Authenticated sensor identity — RF chain of custody
 - **Status**: Accepted — initial implementation planned (ADR-297 phase 1)
 - **Date**: 2026-08-11
 - **Deciders**: ruv
 - **Tags**: security, identity, provenance, sensor-ingest, attestation, phase-1
 ## Context
 This ADR is a child of **ADR-297** (perception substrate program) and owns
 primitive #5, *authenticated sensor identity*. In the ADR-297 dependency DAG it
 is a spine root that, together with **ADR-303** (canonical spatial ontology),
 feeds **ADR-298** (calibration certificate) and **ADR-316** (witness chain).
 RuView's inference outputs are only as trustworthy as the measurements that
 produced them, yet today a measurement's origin is essentially assertional. The
 UDP data plane accepts frames from any reachable host: **ADR-293** shipped step
 one — a loopback-default bind (`--udp-bind`) and an optional source
 IP/CIDR allowlist — and explicitly deferred to a follow-up ADR "per-device
 provisioned keys, MAC/AEAD, device identifiers, monotonic sequence numbers,
 freshness window, and replay rejection." **This ADR is that step two.** ADR-293
 correctly documented that an IP allowlist does not stop LAN spoofing; a
 cryptographic device identity is what closes that gap.
 Foundations already exist in the tree and must be reused rather than rebuilt:
 - `wifi-densepose-rufield` provides `DeviceId`, `Signature`, `SignatureBlock`,
  `FrameProvenance`, `ProvenanceClass`, and `SignatureVerifyError` — the type
  vocabulary for a signed frame.
 - `wifi-densepose-bfld` provides `CapabilityAttestation` and
  `PrivacyAttestationProof` (BFLD attestation, ADR-141) — the device-side
  attestation surface.
 - **ADR-292** defines the source-provenance state machine and freshness
  (`SpatialStateFreshness`); a monotonic sequence and freshness window slot
  into that machine rather than duplicating it.
 The gap is not new primitives but an **end-to-end chain of custody**: a frame
 must be traceable as `device → signed measurement → sequence → timestamp →
 calibration → inference → signed event`, with every link verified at the
 ingest boundary per CLAUDE.md ("validate untrusted input at every network,
 hardware, and FFI boundary; default to least authority").
 ## Options considered
 1. **Stop at ADR-293 (bind + IP allowlist).** Rejected: ADR-293 itself names
   this insufficient on a trusted LAN; any on-subnet host can still spoof a
   device.
 2. **TLS/DTLS transport authentication only.** Rejected: authenticates the
   *channel*, not the *measurement*. It does not survive store-and-forward,
   does not bind a sequence number into the signed object, and gives the
   downstream evidence/witness layers nothing to re-verify offline.
 3. **Per-device signing keys with a signed measurement envelope, monotonic
   sequence, and freshness window, reusing the RuField/BFLD types.** Chosen.
 ## Decision
 Introduce an **authenticated frame envelope** carried through the sensing
 server, built from existing RuField/BFLD types.
 ### 1. Per-device provisioned identity
 - Each radio (ESP32-S3/C6 node or adapter) is provisioned with a keypair; the
  device holds the private key, the server holds the enrolled public key bound
  to a `DeviceId`. Provisioning is an explicit, authorized enrollment step — a
  device is untrusted until an operator enrolls its public key. Private keys are
  never logged or committed (CLAUDE.md credential rule); the ESP32 side follows
  `firmware/esp32-csi-node` key-handling notes.
 - The enrollment record binds `DeviceId → public key → capabilities`
  (via `CapabilityAttestation`, ADR-141), so a device can only assert
  measurements for phenomena it is attested to sense. This is what **ADR-315**
  (capability certificate) later consumes.
 ### 2. Signed measurement envelope
 - A frame on the wire becomes a `SignatureBlock` over the canonical
  serialization of `{DeviceId, sequence, timestamp, measurement-hash}`. The
  measurement itself (CSI/CIR payload) is covered by the hash so tampering is
  detectable without embedding the whole payload twice.
 - Verification uses `Signature`/`SignatureVerifyError` from
  `wifi-densepose-rufield`. A frame that fails signature verification is
  dropped and counted, exactly as ADR-293 drops disallowed sources — an `Err`
  at the boundary, never a warning that proceeds.
 ### 3. Monotonic sequence + freshness (replay defense)
 - Each device maintains a strictly monotonic per-device sequence number. The
  server tracks the last accepted sequence per `DeviceId`; a non-increasing
  sequence is rejected as a replay.
 - A freshness window bounds `timestamp` against the server clock skew budget;
  stale frames are rejected. This reuses ADR-292's `SpatialStateFreshness`
  rather than inventing a parallel notion of staleness, and composes with
  ADR-294's stale-node handling.
 ### 4. Chain of custody into the event
 - On successful verification the frame's `FrameProvenance` records the verified
  `DeviceId`, sequence, and timestamp. Calibration (ADR-298) and inference
  annotate their transforms, and the emitted spatial event (ADR-303 ontology)
  carries a signed provenance lineage. `ProvenanceClass` still enforces the
  synthetic/measured invariant from ADR-282/ADR-279 (invariant 6): a measured
  chain of custody can never be aliased to synthetic and vice-versa.
 - This end-to-end signed lineage is the substrate the **ADR-316** witness chain
  serializes and the **ADR-315** capability certificate points at as evidence.
 ### Compatibility
 - The envelope is **opt-in per deployment** and negotiated at enrollment. An
  un-enrolled single-node desktop deployment keeps working unauthenticated
  behind ADR-293's loopback default; a routable, multi-node, or fleet
  deployment (ADR-313) requires enrolled identities. The startup security log
  (ADR-293) is extended to state whether frame authentication is active.
 ## Consequences
 - LAN spoofing and replay — the residual risks ADR-293 named plainly — are
  closed for enrolled deployments. The measurement, not merely the channel, is
  authenticated, so the guarantee survives store-and-forward into the witness
  chain.
 - Enrollment/key-management is now an operational responsibility (provisioning,
  rotation, revocation). This is documented as a deployment step; key rotation
  and revocation lists are specified here but their fleet distribution is
  owned by ADR-313.
 - Signature verification adds per-frame CPU cost at ingest; bounded and
  measured in validation below. It is a deliberate cost for a verifiable chain
  of custody.
 - A schema addition to the frame contract; un-enrolled deployments are
  unaffected, and the migration accessor mirrors ADR-294's approach.
 - **No spoof-resistance claim is MEASURED until validated on real silicon**
  (CLAUDE.md hardware rule): a passing unit/integration suite demonstrates the
  logic, not the fielded device path.
 ## Validation
 - Unit tests (`cargo test -p wifi-densepose-sensing-server`,
  `-p wifi-densepose-rufield`): valid envelope accepted; bad signature
  rejected and counted; non-monotonic sequence rejected as replay; out-of-
  window timestamp rejected; un-enrolled `DeviceId` rejected; measured/synthetic
  provenance aliasing rejected (ADR-279 invariant 6).
 - Integration test: a captured/synthesized multi-frame stream produces a
  verifiable `device → … → signed event` lineage that ADR-316 can serialize and
  re-verify offline.
 - Benchmark (`cargo bench`): per-frame verification cost, to bound ingest
  overhead.
 - **Real-silicon evidence required** before any deployment-grade
  authentication claim: a captured boot/runtime log from an enrolled ESP32 node
  signing frames end-to-end. A successful build or simulator run is not
  hardware evidence.
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
 # ADR-303: Canonical spatial ontology — one Site→…→Event model for every surface
 - **Status**: Accepted — initial implementation planned (ADR-297 phase 1)
 - **Date**: 2026-08-11
 - **Deciders**: ruv
 - **Tags**: ontology, worldgraph, schema, mqtt, matter, rufield, phase-1
 ## Context
 This ADR is a child of **ADR-297** and owns primitive #6, *canonical spatial
 ontology*. In the ADR-297 DAG it is a spine root alongside **ADR-302**
 (authenticated identity) and feeds every downstream primitive that must speak
 about *where* and *what*: **ADR-298** (calibration), **ADR-304** (tracking,
 consumes `Track`/`Person`), **ADR-316** (witness chain), and every external
 surface named in the ADR-297 consequences (MQTT, REST, WebSocket, RuField,
 Matter, agents).
 RuView currently expresses "where something is" in several overlapping,
 per-surface schemas: the MQTT/Home-Assistant mapper has its own node/room
 shapes (**ADR-294** just introduced `NodeInference`/`RoomInference` to
 disambiguate node vs. room state); the `worldgraph` crate models a spatial
 graph; RuField carries `SemanticProvenance`; Matter/HomeKit has its own area
 model. The same physical fact — "a person is in the kitchen" — is re-encoded
 differently on each surface, and the review called for "one canonical
 `NodeInference`/`RoomInference` contract" (ADR-294 consequences). Without a
 single semantic model, every new surface multiplies the translation matrix and
 each translation is a place where provenance and evidence level (ADR-282) can
 be silently dropped.
 Substantial scaffolding already exists and must be **reused/extended, not
 rebuilt**. `v2/crates/worldgraph/wifi-densepose-worldgraph` already defines:
 - `WorldNode` variants including `Room { area_id, name, bounds_enu, floor }`,
  `Zone { parent_room, … }`, `Wall { rf_attenuation_db }`, and `Doorway`.
 - `WorldEdge` variants including `Observes { quality, last_seen_unix_ms }`,
  `LocatedIn { since_unix_ms }`, `AdjacentTo { via_doorway }`, and `Supports`.
 - `WorldGraph`, `WorldGraphSnapshot`, `WorldId`, `SemanticProvenance`,
  `PersonPosition`, and a HomeCore `area_id` linkage join key (ADR-127).
 The `worldgraph` crate is therefore the natural home for the canonical model.
 What is missing is (a) the full `Site → Building → Floor → Space → Zone`
 containment spine above `Room`, (b) first-class `Sensor`, `Object`,
 `Observation`, `Track`, and `Event` node types, (c) one canonical serialization
 that every surface consumes, and (d) a documented migration path from the
 existing per-surface schemas.
 ## Options considered
 1. **Leave each surface with its own schema; add adapters pairwise.** Rejected:
   O(surfaces²) translations, and provenance/evidence loss at each hop.
 2. **Invent a new top-level ontology crate.** Rejected: `worldgraph` already
   models rooms, zones, walls, doorways, observation edges, and HomeCore
   linkage; a parallel crate would fork the world model.
 3. **Extend `worldgraph` into the canonical ontology and make every surface a
   projection of it.** Chosen.
 ## Decision
 Adopt **one canonical spatial ontology**, hosted in the `worldgraph` crate,
 that every RuView surface reads from and writes to.
 ### 1. The containment spine and entity types
 Define the full node taxonomy as an extension of the existing `WorldNode`:
 ```
 Site ▸ Building ▸ Floor ▸ Space ▸ Zone
                                   └─▸ { Sensor, Person, Object,
                                         Observation, Track, Event }
 ```
 - `Site`, `Building`, `Floor`, `Space` are new containment `WorldNode`
  variants above the existing `Room` (mapped to `Space`, keeping its `area_id`
  and `bounds_enu`) and `Zone`. `Wall`/`Doorway` remain as topological
  elements. Containment reuses the existing `LocatedIn`/`AdjacentTo` edge
  vocabulary; a new `PartOf` edge expresses the pure hierarchy
  (Zone `PartOf` Space `PartOf` Floor …).
 - `Sensor` is the entity **ADR-302** authenticates (`DeviceId` as its stable
  identity) and **ADR-317** (HAL, phase 2) describes the hardware of. `Person`,
  `Object`, `Observation`, `Track`, and `Event` are first-class nodes.
  `Observes`/`LocatedIn` edges already carry quality and dwell timestamps.
 - `Track` and `Person` are defined **here** as the ontology contract that
  **ADR-304** (persistent tracking) produces and updates. `Observation` is what
  an authenticated frame (ADR-302) becomes after calibration (ADR-298), and
  `Event` is the governed output that ADR-315 certifies and ADR-316 witnesses.
 ### 2. Canonical serialization
 - A single, versioned serialization (serde-based, stable field names) is the
  one wire/at-rest representation. Every surface — MQTT/Home-Assistant, REST,
  WebSocket, RuField observations, Matter/HomeKit, agent queries — is a
  **projection** of this model, not an independent schema. `NodeInference` and
  `RoomInference` (ADR-294) become projections of `Sensor→Observes` and the
  `Space`-level fused inference respectively, so ADR-294's node/room separation
  is preserved by construction rather than re-encoded per surface.
 - Every node and edge carries `SemanticProvenance` and exactly one
  `EvidenceLevel` (L0–L5, ADR-282 policy): the evidence ladder travels *with*
  the fact across every projection, so no surface can silently upgrade or drop
  it.
 ### 3. Migration path
 - Each existing per-surface schema gets a documented, tested bidirectional
  mapping to/from the canonical model, plus a migration accessor for consumers
  reading the old shape (mirroring ADR-294's migration accessor). Surfaces are
  cut over one at a time; a surface is "canonical" once its projection is the
  only encoder it uses. Until cutover, the mapping layer is authoritative and
  round-trip-tested so no fact is lost in translation.
 - The `worldgraph` HomeCore `area_id` linkage (ADR-127) remains the join key
  between the ontology's `Space` and external area registries.
 ## Consequences
 - The translation matrix collapses from O(surfaces²) to O(surfaces): each
  surface implements one projection. New surfaces (ROS 2, OpenUSD, OPC UA per
  ADR-282's roadmap) plug in as additional projections.
 - Provenance and evidence level are carried uniformly; a fact cannot cross a
  surface boundary and lose its lineage or its L-level.
 - A schema change reaching every surface; managed by the versioned
  serialization and per-surface migration accessors. Single-node deployments
  keep working (one `Sensor`, one `Space`).
 - The ontology is a *representation*, not an inference engine: it says nothing
  about *how* a `Track` or `Event` is produced — that is owned by ADR-304,
  ADR-298, ADR-299, and the model layer. This ADR does not itself make any
  accuracy claim to grade.
 - Extending `worldgraph` grows one crate's surface rather than forking a second
  world model; the geo/worldmodel sub-crates continue to build on the same node
  vocabulary.
 ## Validation
 - Unit tests (`cargo test -p wifi-densepose-worldgraph`): containment-spine
  construction and invariants (a `Zone` is `PartOf` exactly one `Space`, a
  `Space` on exactly one `Floor`, etc.); round-trip serialization of every node
  and edge type; every node/edge carries exactly one `EvidenceLevel`.
 - Migration tests: each per-surface schema maps to the canonical model and back
  with no loss of provenance or evidence level; `NodeInference`/`RoomInference`
  (ADR-294) project and re-project identically.
 - Contract test: a single canonical `Event` renders correctly through the MQTT,
  REST, and WebSocket projections from one source of truth.
 - No accuracy numbers are claimed; this ADR delivers the shared representation
  the rest of the phase-1 spine writes into.
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
 # ADR-304: Persistent identity & tracking — privacy-preserving probabilistic tracks
 - **Status**: Proposed (ADR-297 phase 2)
 - **Date**: 2026-08-11
 - **Deciders**: ruv
 - **Tags**: tracking, identity, privacy, fusion, worldgraph, phase-2
 ## Context
 This ADR is a child of **ADR-297** and owns primitive #7, *persistent identity
 & tracking*. In the ADR-297 DAG it is a phase-2 primitive sitting on the
 phase-1 spine: it **consumes the ADR-303 ontology** (producing and updating the
 `Track` and `Person` node types defined there), it relies on **ADR-302**
 authenticated identity so that the observations it associates have a verified
 origin, and its outputs are governed `Event`s that ADR-315/ADR-316 can certify
 and witness.
 The product need is to reason about *persistent entities* — "person_7 entered
 the kitchen, then the hallway, then the bedroom" — across radios, modalities,
 rooms, and time. The hard constraint is that this must happen **without
 establishing civil identity**. RuView is camera-free (ADR-282), and a
 persistent pseudonymous track must never become, or be joinable to, a real-
 world named individual. This is a privacy property to be enforced *by
 construction*, not a policy footnote.
 Substantial scaffolding already exists in
 `v2/crates/wifi-densepose-mat/src/tracking` and must be **reused/extended, not
 rebuilt**:
 - `SurvivorTracker`, `TrackedSurvivor`, `TrackId`, `TrackerConfig`,
  `TrackLifecycle`, and `TrackState` — a multi-target tracker with lifecycle
  (tentative/active/lost/terminal) and a `TrackId` backed by a UUID
  (`as_uuid`).
 - `KalmanState` with `predict`/`update`, `position`, `velocity`,
  `position_uncertainty`, and `mahalanobis_distance_sq` — the motion model and
  gating distance.
 - `CsiFingerprint`, `DetectionObservation`, `AssociationResult`, and the
  `can_reidentify`/`matches`/`mark_rescued`/`rescue` re-identification surface —
  the appearance/fingerprint channel for track continuity.
 What is missing is (a) continuity **across radios, modalities, and rooms** (the
 tracker today reasons within a node/room context), (b) a **persistent** entity
 that survives track loss and hand-off between spaces, and (c) an explicit
 **privacy boundary** that guarantees no civil-identity binding.
 ## Options considered
 1. **Per-room independent trackers, no cross-room identity.** Rejected: cannot
   express "person_7 moved kitchen → hallway → bedroom"; loses the entity at
   every room boundary.
 2. **Global identity keyed on a strong biometric fingerprint.** Rejected: a
   fingerprint strong enough to re-identify across long gaps trends toward a
   civil-identity-grade biometric — exactly what the privacy constraint
   forbids.
 3. **Probabilistic persistent tracks with bounded, decaying pseudonymous
   association, built on the existing MAT tracker.** Chosen.
 ## Decision
 Extend `wifi-densepose-mat/tracking` into a **cross-domain persistent track
 layer** that produces ADR-303 `Track`/`Person` nodes.
 ### 1. Persistent probabilistic entity
 - A persistent entity is a pseudonymous `Person` node (ADR-303) with a stable
  synthetic id (e.g. `person_7`) backed by the existing `TrackId`/UUID. It
  aggregates one or more `SurvivorTracker` tracks over time and space and holds
  a **probabilistic** continuity belief — association is never asserted as
  certain, and every hand-off carries a confidence.
 - Continuity across a track-loss gap reuses the existing re-identification
  surface (`can_reidentify`, `CsiFingerprint`, `AssociationResult`), extended
  with a **time- and distance-decayed** association prior so that confidence in
  "same entity" falls with the size of the gap. Beyond a bounded horizon the
  association is dropped and a new pseudonym is minted rather than forcing a
  join — under-linking is the privacy-safe failure mode.
 ### 2. Cross-radio / cross-modality / cross-room continuity
 - Association operates over the ADR-303 ontology graph: `Observes` edges from
  multiple `Sensor`s and `AdjacentTo`/`Doorway` topology constrain plausible
  hand-offs (a person can only move between adjacent spaces). The existing
  `mahalanobis_distance_sq` gating extends to a fused observation across
  modalities rather than a single node's detections.
 - Fusion here is track-level association; the underlying multi-modality fusion
  (radar/mmWave per ADR-063, multistatic per ADR-029, and real sensor fusion
  per ADR-308) supplies the observations. This ADR depends on those for the raw
  cross-modality evidence and does not re-implement sensor fusion.
 ### 3. Privacy boundary (by construction)
 - **No civil-identity binding.** The persistent id is a synthetic pseudonym
  with no field, edge, or join key to any name, account, phone, MAC, or other
  civil identifier. The type carries no such field, so binding is impossible in
  the schema, not merely discouraged.
 - The `CsiFingerprint` used for re-identification is **bounded and decaying**:
  it is scoped to short-horizon continuity, is not persisted as a long-term
  biometric template, and expires. This keeps re-identification useful for
  "same person across the hallway" while structurally unable to serve "this is
  the same person who visited last month."
 - Every `Track`/`Person`/`Event` produced carries `SemanticProvenance` and an
  `EvidenceLevel` (ADR-282), and honors the ADR-277/ADR-280 edge governance and
  ADR-141 attestation — a pseudonymous track is still governed P-class data.
  Tracking accuracy is a per-domain claim to be tagged MEASURED/CLAIMED/
  SYNTHETIC with a reproducer; **this ADR claims no accuracy number.**
 ## Consequences
 - RuView can express persistent, cross-room trajectories for automation and
  analytics while remaining camera-free and civil-identity-free.
 - The privacy-safe failure mode is **under-linking** (mint a fresh pseudonym
  when unsure), which will fragment a trajectory across long gaps or sparse
  coverage. This is a deliberate trade: a fragmented pseudonym is safe, a
  wrong civil-identity join is not.
 - Extends an existing tracker rather than forking one; single-room single-radio
  deployments keep the current behavior (one entity = one track).
 - Cross-modality quality depends on ADR-308/ADR-063/ADR-029 landing; until then
  continuity is WiFi-primary and its limits are stated, not hidden.
 - Being phase 2, this ADR is design intent; it will be revised as the ADR-303
  ontology and ADR-302 identity spine finalize.
 ## Validation
 - Unit tests (`cargo test -p wifi-densepose-mat`): decayed association prior
  (confidence falls with gap; drops beyond horizon → new pseudonym);
  topology-constrained hand-off (no association across non-adjacent spaces);
  schema check that a `Person`/`Track` carries no civil-identifier field.
 - Integration test against a synthetic multi-room, multi-radio scenario:
  a scripted walk kitchen → hallway → bedroom yields one persistent pseudonym
  with per-hand-off confidence, and a deliberately ambiguous crossing produces
  two pseudonyms rather than a false join.
 - Evidence discipline: any tracking-continuity accuracy is reported only with
  the ADR-288 leakage-free protocol and an evidence tag; no number is asserted
  here.
 - Privacy review: confirm no persisted long-term biometric template and no
  civil-identity join path, as an explicit checklist item before any pilot.
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
 # ADR-305: Sensor placement optimizer — floorplan + inventory → recommended positions
 - **Status**: Proposed (ADR-297 phase 3)
 - **Date**: 2026-08-11
 - **Deciders**: ruv
 - **Tags**: placement, planning, rf-twin, coverage, worldgraph, phase-3
 ## Context
 This ADR is a child of **ADR-297** and owns primitive #8, *sensor placement
 optimizer*. In the ADR-297 DAG it is a phase-3, research-forward primitive that
 sits on top of the fused world state and is tightly coupled to **ADR-312**
 (digital RF twin): the twin provides the propagation simulation this optimizer
 plans against. It reads the **ADR-303** canonical ontology for the physical
 scene and, after install, compares its predictions against ADR-299 observability
 and the ADR-315 capability certificate.
 The problem it solves is the single most common cause of a bad RuView
 deployment: sensors placed by guesswork. Whether a room can be reliably sensed
 depends on AP/sensor geometry relative to walls, Fresnel-zone clearance,
 multipath structure, and where people actually move. Today an installer has no
 principled way to answer "where do I put the two nodes I have so the kitchen is
 observable?" — and no way, after install, to know whether reality matched the
 plan. This is a genuine **differentiator**: it turns RuView from "sense
 whatever the given placement happens to allow" into "recommend the placement
 that makes the requested sensing feasible."
 Relevant existing assets to build on rather than duplicate:
 - The `worldgraph` crate models the physical scene the optimizer plans over:
  `Room`/`Space` with `bounds_enu`, `Wall { rf_attenuation_db }` (drywall ≈ 3
  dB, brick ≈ 12 dB), `Doorway`, and `Zone` — enough geometry and coarse RF
  attenuation to seed a coverage model, plus `Sensor` nodes (ADR-303) for
  candidate positions.
 - **ADR-312** (RF twin, phase 3) is the propagation/multipath simulator; this
  optimizer is a *consumer* of the twin, not a second simulator.
 - **ADR-299** (OOD/observability) and **ADR-315** (capability certificate)
  define what "reliably sense the requested phenomenon" means, so the optimizer
  can optimize against the same observability metric the runtime later gates on.
 - **ADR-029** (multistatic) and **ADR-063** (mmWave fusion) inform which link
  geometries are useful for which phenomena.
 ## Options considered
 1. **Static placement guidelines in docs (e.g. "one node per room, opposite
   the door").** Rejected: ignores the specific floorplan, wall materials, and
   the actual hardware inventory; gives no uncertainty and no post-install
   feedback.
 2. **Full electromagnetic solver per site.** Rejected for the default path:
   too heavy for an installer workflow and overkill relative to the coarse
   `rf_attenuation_db` scene RuView actually has; reserved as an optional
   high-fidelity backend inside ADR-312.
 3. **A coverage optimizer that consumes the ADR-312 RF twin over the ADR-303
   scene, then validates predicted vs. measured observability after install.**
   Chosen.
 ## Decision
 Define a **placement optimizer** that takes a floor plan (ADR-303 scene) and a
 hardware inventory and recommends sensor positions, then closes the loop after
 install.
 ### 1. Inputs
 - The ADR-303 canonical scene: `Space`/`Zone` bounds, `Wall` segments with
  `rf_attenuation_db`, `Doorway` topology, and any already-placed `Sensor`
  nodes.
 - A hardware inventory: the count and type of available radios (ESP32-S3/C6
  nodes, mmWave, adapters) with their capability envelopes (what each can
  sense, per ADR-315 / ADR-317 HAL descriptors).
 - A sensing objective: which phenomenon must be observable in which
  `Space`/`Zone` (presence, vitals, pose), expressed against the ADR-299
  observability metric.
 ### 2. Prediction
 - For a candidate placement, query the **ADR-312 RF twin** for simulated RF
  coverage: path loss through `Wall` attenuation, **Fresnel-zone clearance**
  between link endpoints, and coarse **multipath** structure. From that derive
  an **expected observability** and an **uncertainty** for each objective in
  each space — reusing the same observability definition ADR-299 gates on so the
  plan and the runtime speak one language.
 - Search over candidate positions (the inventory bounds the count; the scene
  bounds the geometry) to recommend the placement that maximizes objective
  observability, reporting expected observability **and its uncertainty** per
  space — never a single confident number for a simulated result.
 ### 3. Post-install loop
 - After install, compare **predicted vs. measured** observability using the
  ADR-299 runtime observability signal from the freshly enrolled (ADR-302),
  calibrated (ADR-298) sensors. Where measurement disagrees with prediction,
  recommend adjustments (move, re-aim, add a node) and feed the residual back
  to improve the ADR-312 twin's scene parameters (e.g. a wall's effective
  attenuation).
 ### Evidence discipline
 - Predicted coverage is a **simulation** (evidence level L0 per ADR-282) and is
  labelled `SYNTHETIC`; it is a *recommendation*, never a sensing claim.
 - The predicted-vs-measured comparison is the only place a `MEASURED` statement
  appears, and only with a reproducer and real-silicon observability data
  (CLAUDE.md hardware rule). The optimizer never presents a simulated coverage
  map as evidence that a room *is* being sensed.
 ## Consequences
 - Installers get a principled, floorplan-specific placement plan and, crucially,
  a post-install check that says whether reality matched the plan — a
  differentiating capability over guess-and-check deployment.
 - Quality is bounded by the fidelity of the ADR-312 RF twin and the coarseness
  of the `worldgraph` scene (2D walls, coarse attenuation). The optimizer
  reports uncertainty rather than overstating a coarse model; higher fidelity
  is an ADR-312 concern.
 - Hard dependency on ADR-312 (twin), ADR-299 (observability metric), and
  ADR-303 (scene); this ADR does not build a simulator or an observability
  metric of its own.
 - Being phase 3, this is design intent sitting on the fused world state; it is
  expected to be revised as ADR-312 and the phase-1 spine land.
 - No claim that recommended placement *guarantees* sensing — it maximizes
  modelled observability subject to inventory and geometry, with explicit
  uncertainty.
 ## Validation
 - Unit tests: coverage/observability prediction is a deterministic function of
  scene + placement + twin parameters; Fresnel-zone and wall-attenuation math
  against known analytic cases; search returns the modelled-optimal placement on
  small synthetic scenes.
 - Integration test: on a synthetic floorplan with a known-good and a
  known-bad placement, the optimizer ranks them correctly and reports higher
  uncertainty for the marginal case.
 - Post-install loop test: injected predicted-vs-measured disagreement produces a
  sensible adjustment recommendation and a twin-parameter residual.
 - Field validation (deferred, real-silicon): predicted vs. measured
  observability on an instrumented real site, reported as `MEASURED` with a
  reproducer. Until then all coverage output is `SYNTHETIC`/L0. No coverage or
  accuracy number is asserted by this ADR.
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
 # ADR-306: Active sensing — closed-loop RF experiment control
 - **Status**: Proposed (ADR-297 phase 3)
 - **Date**: 2026-08-11
 - **Deciders**: ruv
 - **Tags**: active-sensing, control-plane, closed-loop, information-gain, actuation, phase-3
 ## Context
 This ADR is a child of **ADR-297** and owns primitive #9, *active sensing*. In
 the ADR-297 phasing it is a phase-3 primitive that sits on top of the fused
 world state produced by **ADR-308** (real sensor fusion) and is driven by the
 information budget of **ADR-311** (information-gain scheduler). It is authored
 as **Proposed**: design intent and validation plan, not a phase-1 build.
 The default posture of every current RuView path is **passive**: RF traffic
 happens for its own reasons (a device transmits, a beacon fires), RuView
 observes whatever CSI/CIR arrives, and the pipeline extracts what it can from
 that incidental signal. The strategic assessment behind ADR-297 named the next
 step: move from *RF-happens → observe* to **RuView-controls-RF → observe the
 response → optimize the next measurement**. That turns sensing into a
 closed-loop experiment — the system chooses what to measure to resolve the
 uncertainty it currently has, rather than accepting the measurements the
 environment happens to offer.
 Substantial control-plane scaffolding already exists and must be
 **reused/extended, not rebuilt**:
 - **ADR-280** (active sensing / programmable perception, *implemented* in
  `ruview-unified/src/control.rs`) already defines the governed control surface
  this ADR closes the loop over: `SensingTask` (evidence-aware, fail-closed
  admission), `SensingAction` + `InformationGoal` (a deliberate act of
  evidence-gathering against a stated hypothesis, bounded by a `PrivacyClass`
  P0–P5 ceiling), `ActiveSensingPlanner` (age-of-information scheduler),
  `CoherentSensorGroup` (coherent fusion fails closed), and `request_actuation`
  → `ActuationReceipt` for governed RIS/movable/fluid-antenna actuation.
 - ADR-280 explicitly recorded that **information-gain *estimation* is not
  implemented** — "the planner uses staleness heuristics, not mutual
  information; RIS drivers, actual multi-AP coherence measurement, and OTFS
  waveform control are hardware-dependent roadmap items." ADR-306 is the ADR
  that closes exactly those gaps, in coordination with ADR-311.
 The missing piece is not the actuation surface — ADR-280 built that and made it
 fail closed — but the **loop**: a controller that reads the current fused-state
 uncertainty, selects a *controllable measurement configuration* expected to
 reduce it most, requests it through the ADR-280 governed surface, observes the
 response, and updates its belief before choosing the next measurement.
 ## Options considered
 1. **Stay passive; only schedule which incidental observations to keep.** This
   is roughly today's `ActiveSensingPlanner` (staleness-priority over regions).
   Rejected as the endpoint: it optimizes *attention* over uncontrolled RF, not
   the *measurement* itself. It remains the fallback when nothing is
   controllable.
 2. **Open-loop measurement scripting** (a fixed sweep of channels/bandwidths).
   Rejected: a fixed sweep spends the RF/energy/privacy budget the same way
   regardless of what is already known; it cannot concentrate measurement where
   uncertainty actually is.
 3. **Closed-loop experiment control** — read uncertainty, pick the controllable
   configuration with highest expected information gain per unit cost/privacy,
   actuate through the ADR-280 governed surface, observe, update, repeat.
   Chosen.
 ## Decision
 Adopt **closed-loop RF experiment control** as a phase-3 controller layered on
 the ADR-280 surface. RuView selects and drives the controllable degrees of
 freedom of the RF measurement, then optimizes the next measurement from the
 observed response.
 ### 1. Controllable degrees of freedom
 Define an `ExperimentControl` vocabulary over the configuration axes RuView can
 influence on hardware that exposes them (each axis is optional and
 capability-gated by ADR-317's HAL, so an ESP32-only deployment simply has an
 empty controllable set and degrades to the passive planner):
 - **Channel / band** and **bandwidth** (which spectrum to probe; reuses the
  ADR-289 wideband subcarrier-agnostic metadata).
 - **Packet timing / cadence** (when to solicit a sounding, and at what rate).
 - **Antenna / chain selection** (which subset of a distributed aperture to
  activate — bounded by the ADR-280 `CoherentSensorGroup` compatibility proof).
 - **Beam / RIS configuration** (which rooms and people become observable —
  governed exactly as ADR-280 §6 requires, via `request_actuation` and an
  `ActuationReceipt`).
 - **802.11bf measurement parameters** (TB/non-TB, reporting config) once
  ADR-307 exposes standardized sensing as a native measurement type.
 ### 2. The loop
 ```
 fused-state uncertainty (ADR-308)
        │
        ▼
 info-gain ranking of ExperimentControl options (ADR-311)
        │  select argmax  E[ΔI] / (cost, energy, privacy ceiling)
        ▼
 governed request  (ADR-280 admit_task / request_actuation, fail-closed)
        │
        ▼
 observe response → update belief (ADR-308) → repeat
 ```
 The controller never bypasses the ADR-280 admission and actuation gates: every
 solicited measurement is a `SensingTask`/`SensingAction`, every environment
 change is an `ActuationReceipt`, and every step composes with the ADR-277
 policy engine. Information gain is what **ADR-311** supplies (the mutual-
 information estimate ADR-280 deferred); ADR-306 owns the *control loop* that
 consumes that estimate and drives the hardware.
 ### 3. Governance and honesty boundary
 - Actuation and solicitation stay fail-closed and privacy-ceilinged: a
  closed-loop experiment cannot widen the P0–P5 ceiling of the task it serves,
  and cannot steer a beam into a zone that does not grant the purpose (ADR-280
  `actuation_requires_policy_authorization`).
 - Any accuracy or "traffic-reduction" claim from the closed loop is tagged
  **MEASURED** only with a named reproducer over a stated scenario, **SYNTHETIC**
  for simulated apertures, and **CLAIMED** otherwise. Real multi-AP coherent
  measurement and RIS actuation remain **hardware-dependent** and require
  real-silicon evidence (a captured runtime log) before any hardware claim, per
  CLAUDE.md. No number is invented here.
 ## Consequences
 - Sensing becomes an experiment: RuView spends its RF/energy/privacy budget on
  the measurements that most reduce current uncertainty, instead of processing
  whatever incidental traffic arrives.
 - The loop is only as strong as its two dependencies: ADR-308 must expose a
  usable uncertainty surface and ADR-311 must produce trustworthy information-
  gain estimates. Where either is absent, the controller degrades to the
  ADR-280 staleness planner rather than acting on a fabricated gain estimate.
 - Controllability is hardware-bounded. On commodity ESP32 sensors the
  controllable set may be limited to cadence; the full loop (bandwidth, antenna,
  beam) needs NICs/RIS that expose those axes, surfaced through ADR-317.
 - This ADR adds a controller; it does not re-open ADR-280's raw-export or
  actuation-governance decisions, which remain authoritative and fail-closed.
 ## Validation
 - Design-level acceptance (phase 3): a simulated closed loop over a synthetic
  scene reduces terminal fused-state uncertainty faster than (a) the passive
  ADR-280 staleness planner and (b) an open-loop fixed sweep, at equal
  measurement budget — reported **SYNTHETIC**, with the scenario and seed named.
 - Governance tests: every solicited measurement and actuation in the loop is
  admitted through the ADR-280 fail-closed path; a loop step that would exceed
  the task's privacy ceiling or steer into an ungranted zone is denied.
 - Degradation test: with an empty controllable set (ESP32-only), the controller
  falls back to the staleness planner with no error and no fabricated gain.
 - Hardware validation of bandwidth/antenna/beam actuation is explicitly out of
  scope until real silicon exposes those axes and produces a captured log.
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
 # ADR-307: 802.11bf-native architecture — standardized WLAN sensing as native measurement types
 - **Status**: Proposed (ADR-297 phase 2)
 - **Date**: 2026-08-11
 - **Deciders**: ruv
 - **Tags**: 80211bf, wlan-sensing, standards, measurement-types, hal, phase-2
 ## Context
 This ADR is a child of **ADR-297** and owns primitive #10, *802.11bf-native
 architecture*. In the ADR-297 phasing it is a phase-2 integration primitive: it
 sits on the phase-1 spine (authenticated identity ADR-302, spatial ontology
 ADR-303, evidence engine ADR-301) and **feeds ADR-317** (the RuView sensor HAL),
 which is the clause of the acceptance test that "identifies the hardware." It is
 authored as **Proposed**.
 **IEEE 802.11bf-2025 ("WLAN Sensing") was published 2025-09-26** — verified
 against the IEEE SA record in `wifi-densepose-hardware` (`ieee80211bf/mod.rs`
 header, "evidence grade MEASURED", ADR-152 §1.1). Standardization is complete
 for sub-7 GHz and >45 GHz (DMG) bands: formal sensing measurement setup,
 measurement instances, feedback/reporting, and sensing-by-proxy (SBP). This
 changes RuView's strategic frame: rather than treating every WiFi measurement as
 an *opportunistic* extraction from incidental traffic, RuView can be the **open
 reference sensing stack around the standard** — the day commodity silicon
 exposes it.
 Substantial scaffolding already exists and must be **reused/extended, not
 rebuilt**. `v2/crates/wifi-densepose-hardware/src/ieee80211bf/` already models
 the standardized procedure surface as forward-compatible types (ADR-152/153):
 - `types` — `SpecProfile` version gates, `SensingRole`/`TransceiverRole`,
  `MeasurementSetupParams`, `SensingCapabilities` negotiation, and required
  `ConsentMode` governance metadata on every setup.
 - `messages` — `SensingMeasurementSetupRequest/Response`,
  `SensingMeasurementInstance`, `SensingMeasurementReport`, `CsiReportPayload`,
  `SbpRequest/Response`, `SensingSessionTermination`.
 - `session` — a deterministic FSM (`Idle → SetupNegotiating → Active →
  Terminating → Idle`) with rejection paths, single-role enforcement, and SBP
  proxy mode; `table` (responder-side setup registry); `transport` (the
  `SensingTransport` seam, a `SimTransport` test double, and an
  `OpportunisticCsiBridge` that maps today's opportunistic CSI onto the
  standardized report path).
 The module's own honesty note is authoritative and carried forward here: it is
 **not a certified 802.11bf implementation**, and **no commodity silicon — ESP32
 included — implements the standard yet**; the OTA frame binding lands when a
 chipset exposes it. Wideband ingest plumbing is already in place too: **ADR-289**
 (FeitCSI/AX210) carries native subcarrier dimensionality end-to-end and records
 the native→pipeline mapping, and noted that "truncated CIR is a natural
 extension of the same plumbing."
 What is missing is architectural, not protocol scaffolding: normalized CSI is
 still treated as *the* WiFi input. The standardized sensing measurements
 (TB/non-TB soundings, truncated CIR / PDP reports) are modeled as protocol
 messages but are **not yet first-class native measurement types** that flow
 through calibration (ADR-298), fusion (ADR-308), and the ontology (ADR-303) on
 equal footing with normalized CSI.
 ## Options considered
 1. **Keep 802.11bf as a protocol model only; always down-convert its reports to
   normalized CSI at ingest.** Rejected: truncated CIR/PDP carry range-resolved
   multipath structure that flattening to a CSI matrix discards; it also wastes
   the standard's native report semantics.
 2. **Fork a parallel "bf pipeline" alongside the CSI pipeline.** Rejected:
   duplicates calibration, fusion, ontology, and evidence plumbing, and re-opens
   the O(surfaces²) translation problem ADR-303 exists to close.
 3. **Promote standardized sensing measurements to native measurement types
   inside the existing pipeline**, with normalized CSI as one measurement type
   among several. Chosen.
 ## Decision
 Adopt an **802.11bf-native architecture**: standardized WLAN sensing
 measurements become **additional native measurement types**, alongside — not
 replacing — normalized CSI.
 ### 1. Native measurement types
 - Define the standardized reports the `ieee80211bf` module already models
  (TB and non-TB soundings; truncated CIR; PDP) as first-class
  `MeasurementType` variants that the pipeline carries end-to-end, each tagged
  with its `SpecProfile` and band. Normalized CSI remains one such type; the
  `OpportunisticCsiBridge` remains the path for silicon that only offers
  incidental CSI.
 - Truncated CIR/PDP reuse the **ADR-289** subcarrier-agnostic / native-
  dimensionality plumbing (truncated CIR is the stated natural extension); the
  native→pipeline mapping is recorded in frame metadata so downstream stages
  know the true range/spectral resolution of a bf report vs. an interpolated CSI
  frame.
 ### 2. Ontology and governance binding
 - Each standardized measurement becomes an ADR-303 `Observation` node from an
  ADR-302-authenticated `Sensor`, carrying `SemanticProvenance` and exactly one
  `EvidenceLevel` (L0–L5, ADR-282). The `ieee80211bf` `ConsentMode` metadata —
  required on every setup — composes with the ADR-277 policy engine, so a
  standardized session is admitted under the same governance as any other
  sensing task (ADR-280).
 - SBP (sensing-by-proxy) sessions attribute the report to the proxying and the
  sensing entities distinctly, so provenance is not laundered through the proxy.
 ### 3. HAL feed (ADR-317)
 - The capability set a device advertises — which `MeasurementType`s, bands,
  bandwidths, roles, and `SpecProfile` it supports — is exactly the descriptor
  **ADR-317** (HAL) needs to "identify the hardware." ADR-307 defines that
  capability descriptor as the projection of `SensingCapabilities`; ADR-317
  consumes it. A device that implements no bf profile advertises only the
  opportunistic-CSI capability.
 ## Consequences
 - RuView is positioned as the open reference stack *around* the standard: when a
  chipset exposes 802.11bf, its native reports flow through calibration, fusion,
  ontology, and evidence with no bespoke pipeline — the plumbing is already
  tested against `SimTransport` and synthetic fixtures.
 - Normalized CSI is demoted from "the WiFi input" to "one measurement type,"
  which is the correct framing for a multi-measurement future and prevents the
  bf path from being a second-class citizen.
 - **No hardware claim is made or implied.** No commodity silicon implements
  802.11bf yet; this ADR wires the *types and flow*, tested in simulation. Any
  OTA/native-report accuracy claim requires real silicon evidence (a captured
  log) per CLAUDE.md, and any wideband number must be tagged with the capture
  hardware (ADR-289). No benchmark number is invented here.
 - This ADR does not re-open ADR-152/153's decision to avoid OTA frame binding
  until silicon exists; it consumes that surface and adds the pipeline
  integration.
 ## Validation
 - `cargo test -p wifi-densepose-hardware` — existing `ieee80211bf` FSM,
  table, and transport tests continue to pass; new tests assert that a
  `SensingMeasurementReport` (TB and non-TB) and a truncated-CIR/PDP report
  round-trip through the pipeline as native `MeasurementType`s.
 - `cargo test -p wifi-densepose-mat` — truncated CIR ingest reuses the ADR-289
  subcarrier-agnostic path and records the native→pipeline mapping; dimension/
  version validation on standardized reports mirrors the FeitCSI parser gates.
 - Ontology/governance tests: each standardized measurement becomes an ADR-303
  `Observation` from an ADR-302-authenticated `Sensor` with one `EvidenceLevel`;
  `ConsentMode` composes with ADR-277 admission; SBP attributes proxy vs. sensor
  provenance distinctly.
 - HAL contract test: the ADR-317 capability descriptor is derivable from
  `SensingCapabilities`; a bf-less device advertises only opportunistic CSI.
 - All measurement-type flows are simulation-tested (`SimTransport`, synthetic
  fixtures); OTA binding and any hardware accuracy claim remain out of scope
  until real silicon exposes the standard.
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
 # ADR-308: Real sensor fusion — uncertainty-aware, multiple observations → one world state
 - **Status**: Proposed (ADR-297 phase 2)
 - **Date**: 2026-08-11
 - **Deciders**: ruv
 - **Tags**: fusion, uncertainty, multimodal, world-state, ontology, phase-2
 ## Context
 This ADR is a child of **ADR-297** and owns primitive #11, *real sensor fusion*.
 In the ADR-297 DAG it is a phase-2 integration primitive: it **consumes ADR-303**
 (canonical spatial ontology) and **produces the single fused world state** that
 the phase-3 primitives build on — **ADR-309** (long-term spatial memory),
 **ADR-310** (counterfactual inference), and **ADR-312** (digital RF twin). It is
 authored as **Proposed**.
 The defining invariant is not "support more modalities" but the *shape of the
 output*: **multiple observations must resolve to one probabilistic world state,
 not many feeds into a visualization.** A dashboard that shows a WiFi layer, a
 mmWave layer, and a BLE layer side by side is not fusion; it pushes the
 reconciliation onto the human. Real fusion produces one uncertainty-aware state
 that every downstream consumer reads, with each contributing observation's
 provenance and confidence still recoverable.
 Substantial scaffolding already exists and must be **reused/extended, not
 rebuilt**:
 - **ADR-063** (60 GHz mmWave ↔ WiFi CSI fusion, *Proposed*) established the
  first cross-modal fusion case: pairing noisy CSI-derived vitals with clinical-
  grade mmWave FMCW radar (Seeed MR60BHA2 over UART, with a **live hardware
  capture** logged on 2026-03-15). ADR-308 generalizes that pairwise case into
  an N-modality, uncertainty-aware fusion.
 - **ADR-137** (fusion-engine quality scoring, *Accepted — partial*) already
  built the auditable-quality building block: it identified that the multistatic
  fusers (`wifi-densepose-signal/src/ruvsense/multistatic.rs`,
  `wifi-densepose-ruvector/src/viewpoint/fusion.rs`) discarded the evidence they
  used, and specified a single auditable record — "this fused output is
  trustworthy because X, Y, Z, but be aware of contradiction C" — with evidence
  references and contradiction flags. ADR-308 reuses that record as the
  provenance/quality carrier of the fused state.
 - **ADR-280** `CoherentSensorGroup` (fail-closed coherent fusion) and
  **ADR-303** `Observation`/`Track`/`Event` node types are the input and output
  vocabulary respectively.
 What is missing is the **uncertainty-aware combiner across heterogeneous
 modalities**: a fusion stage that takes authenticated observations from WiFi,
 BLE, UWB, mmWave, acoustic, IMU, lidar, and cameras (only where policy permits),
 each with its own uncertainty, and emits one probabilistic `WorldState` — with
 per-observation contradiction flags, not a stack of independent feeds.
 ## Options considered
 1. **Per-modality feeds rendered together** (today's implicit model on some
   surfaces). Rejected: it is visualization, not fusion; contradictions are
   never reconciled and there is no single state to reason over.
 2. **Hard-switch "best modality wins"** (e.g., always prefer mmWave vitals over
   CSI vitals). Rejected: throws away corroborating evidence and cannot express
   *disagreement* — the very thing ADR-137's contradiction flags exist to
   surface — and degrades badly when the preferred modality is absent or OOD.
 3. **Uncertainty-weighted probabilistic fusion into one world state**, reusing
   ADR-137's auditable quality record and ADR-280's fail-closed coherence gate.
   Chosen.
 ## Decision
 Adopt **uncertainty-aware multimodal fusion** whose invariant output is one
 probabilistic world state.
 ### 1. Inputs: authenticated, ontology-typed observations
 - Inputs are ADR-303 `Observation` nodes from **ADR-302-authenticated** sensors.
  Supported modalities: WiFi (CSI / 802.11bf native reports via ADR-307), BLE,
  UWB, mmWave (ADR-063), acoustic, IMU, lidar, and cameras. Cameras and any
  higher privacy-class modality enter fusion **only where the ADR-277 policy
  engine permits** — camera-free coverage is a RuView invariant (ADR-282), so
  cameras are an opt-in, policy-gated input, never assumed present.
 - Each observation carries its own uncertainty and exactly one `EvidenceLevel`
  (ADR-282). An observation flagged out-of-distribution by **ADR-299** is
  down-weighted or excluded per its OOD verdict rather than silently averaged in.
 ### 2. Combiner: uncertainty-weighted, contradiction-aware
 - Observations are combined by their uncertainty into one probabilistic
  `WorldState` over the ADR-303 entities (`Person`, `Object`, `Track`, and the
  per-`Space` inference). The combiner does **not** collapse disagreement: when
  modalities conflict beyond their stated uncertainty, the fused output carries
  ADR-137 **contradiction flags** and the evidence references that produced
  them, so a consumer can see *that* WiFi and mmWave disagree and *why*.
 - Coherent multi-node fusion inherits ADR-280's fail-closed
  `CoherentSensorGroup` gate: no coherent combination unless sync, phase, and
  geometry compatibility are proven; otherwise the group degrades to incoherent
  combination rather than producing confident nonsense.
 ### 3. Output: one world state, provenance preserved
 - The output is a single `WorldState` written into the ADR-303 ontology, with
  every fused value retaining recoverable per-observation provenance and the
  ADR-137 quality record. This is the state ADR-309/310/312 consume; they read
  one probabilistic world, not a modality stack.
 - The fused state carries an aggregate uncertainty and an evidence level derived
  from its inputs (never upgraded above the weakest contributing L-level for a
  given claim).
 ## Consequences
 - Downstream primitives (spatial memory, counterfactual, RF twin) build on one
  probabilistic world state with uniform uncertainty and provenance, instead of
  re-implementing reconciliation per consumer.
 - Contradictions become first-class signal, not noise: ADR-137's record means a
  disagreement between mmWave and CSI is surfaced and auditable, which is also
  what lets ADR-299 and the evidence engine (ADR-301) reason about reliability.
 - Fusion is uncertainty-honest: an OOD or low-evidence observation is
  down-weighted, not averaged in as if trustworthy; a fused claim never presents
  a stronger evidence level than its weakest necessary input.
 - **No accuracy or "camera-grade" claim is made.** ADR-063's mmWave path has a
  real-silicon capture; the multimodal combiner's accuracy is not asserted here.
  Any fused-accuracy number requires a named reproducer tagged MEASURED /
  SYNTHETIC / CLAIMED, and WiFi sensing is never presented as camera-grade
  (CLAUDE.md, ADR-282). No number is invented.
 - Cameras remain a governed, opt-in input; enabling them does not weaken the
  camera-free coverage guarantee for deployments that exclude them.
 ## Validation
 - `cargo test -p wifi-densepose-ruvector` / `-p wifi-densepose-signal` — the
  ADR-137 quality record and contradiction flags travel with the fused output;
  the ADR-280 `CoherentSensorGroup` gate still fails closed under
  clock/phase/geometry violation.
 - Fusion invariant test: N modality observations over one scene resolve to a
  single `WorldState` node in the ADR-303 ontology (not N feeds), with
  per-observation provenance recoverable and one aggregate evidence level.
 - Uncertainty tests: a high-uncertainty or ADR-299-flagged-OOD observation is
  down-weighted/excluded; conflicting modalities produce a contradiction flag
  rather than a silently averaged value; the fused evidence level never exceeds
  the weakest necessary input.
 - Governance test: a camera or higher-privacy modality is admitted into fusion
  only when the ADR-277 policy engine permits; otherwise it is excluded and the
  fused state notes the exclusion.
 - Any accuracy comparison (e.g., fused vitals vs. mmWave-only) is reported with
  its evidence tag and reproducer; none is asserted in this ADR.
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
 # ADR-309: Long-term spatial memory — learn the normal physics of a location
 - **Status**: Proposed (ADR-297 phase 3)
 - **Date**: 2026-08-11
 - **Deciders**: ruv
 - **Tags**: spatial-memory, ruvector, anomaly-detection, temporal, world-state, phase-3
 ## Context
 This ADR is a child of **ADR-297** and owns primitive #12, *long-term spatial
 memory*. In the ADR-297 phasing it is a phase-3 primitive that sits on the fused
 world state produced by **ADR-308** (real sensor fusion) and **ties to ADR-312**
 (digital RF twin): spatial memory is the *learned normal* that a twin can
 simulate against and that anomaly detection compares against. It is authored as
 **Proposed**.
 The capability is to **learn the normal physics of a location** so anomalies
 surface *without training a detector for every anomaly*. Concretely, the system
 should learn statements like: "a chair is normally here"; "this bedroom is
 usually occupied between these hours"; "the RF propagation of this space
 changed"; "this machine's vibration signature changed"; "a new reflector
 appeared." None of these is a labeled anomaly class — they are *deviations from
 a learned baseline of normality*. This is the difference between supervised
 anomaly detection (which needs examples of every failure) and **baseline-relative
 anomaly detection** (which needs only a well-characterized normal).
 Substantial substrate already exists and must be **reused/extended, not
 rebuilt**:
 - **RuVector** (`v2/crates/wifi-densepose-ruvector`) is the designated substrate
  in the ADR-282 layer stack ("persistent objects, Gaussian fields, scene
  graphs, temporal memory"). It already provides the vector/temporal machinery
  this ADR needs — HNSW indexing (`hnsw.rs`, `hnsw_quantized.rs`), an event log
  (`event_log.rs`), coverage and estimator surfaces, and the `crv`/`mat`
  temporal sub-modules — so long-term spatial memory is a *consumer and
  organizer* of RuVector primitives, not a new store.
 - **ADR-303** supplies the entity vocabulary the memory is indexed by (`Space`,
  `Object`, `Sensor`, `Track`, `Event`); **ADR-308** supplies the fused,
  uncertainty-carrying `WorldState` snapshots that memory accumulates over time.
 - **ADR-135** (empty-room baseline calibration) and **ADR-298** (automatic
  domain calibration) already establish a *calibration-time* baseline of a
  space; ADR-309 extends that from a one-shot baseline to a **continuously
  learned, time-of-day-aware** model of normal.
 What is missing is the **temporal normality model**: a per-`Space` learned
 distribution of fused world states over time (including periodicity — hour of
 day, day of week), plus RF-propagation and modality-signature baselines, against
 which a live fused state is scored for deviation.
 ## Options considered
 1. **Supervised anomaly classifiers per anomaly type.** Rejected: it needs
   labeled examples of every anomaly (fall, intrusion, machine fault, moved
   furniture), which do not exist for most spaces and do not transfer between
   rooms; it also cannot catch a *novel* anomaly it was never trained on.
 2. **Single static baseline** (the ADR-135 empty-room snapshot, used forever).
   Rejected as the endpoint: it cannot express *when* a space is normally
   occupied, cannot track slow legitimate drift (furniture rearranged on
   purpose), and flags every diurnal change as anomalous.
 3. **Continuously learned, time-aware normality model on the RuVector
   substrate**, scoring live fused state against learned normal. Chosen.
 ## Decision
 Adopt a **long-term spatial memory** that learns each location's normal physics
 on the RuVector substrate and scores live fused state against it.
 ### 1. What "normal" is learned over
 Per ADR-303 `Space` (and the entities within it), accumulate the ADR-308 fused
 `WorldState` over time into a learned normality model covering:
 - **Occupancy / activity periodicity** — the distribution of presence and
  activity by hour-of-day and day-of-week (the "bedroom usually occupied certain
  hours" case).
 - **Static scene layout** — persistent `Object` positions and the expected
  reflector set (the "chair normally here" / "new reflector appeared" cases),
  building on the ADR-135/298 baseline.
 - **RF-propagation baseline** — the space's normal multipath/propagation
  signature (the "RF propagation changed" case).
 - **Per-modality signatures** — e.g., a machine's normal vibration/acoustic/IMU
  signature (the "vibration signature changed" case).
 Each learned baseline carries its own uncertainty and an `EvidenceLevel`
 (ADR-282); a baseline learned from replay is L1, from a field pilot L4, and is
 never presented above the evidence of the observations it was learned from.
 ### 2. Substrate: RuVector, temporally compressed
 - The memory is stored and indexed on RuVector (HNSW for nearest-normal recall,
  the event log for the temporal stream, the temporal sub-modules for
  compression). Long-horizon history is temporally compressed — recent detail
  retained, older history summarized — so memory cost is bounded rather than
  growing linearly forever.
 - The memory is *keyed by* the ADR-303 ontology, so "normal for this `Space` at
  this hour" is a first-class query, and slow legitimate drift updates the
  baseline (with provenance) instead of accumulating as permanent anomaly.
 ### 3. Anomaly = deviation from learned normal
 - A live fused `WorldState` is scored against the applicable learned baseline
  (matched by space and time context). A deviation beyond the baseline's
  uncertainty is surfaced as an ADR-303 `Event` — *without* a per-anomaly
  detector — carrying the baseline it deviated from, the deviation magnitude,
  and its evidence level. Whether that event is actionable is a policy/consumer
  decision (ADR-277), not this layer's.
 - The learned normal is exactly what **ADR-312** (RF twin) can simulate against:
  the twin proposes an expected state, spatial memory supplies the learned
  actual-normal, and their divergence is a physically grounded anomaly signal.
 ## Consequences
 - Anomaly detection generalizes: a space gets deviation detection from its own
  learned normal, so a novel anomaly (never labeled anywhere) still registers as
  a deviation, and the model transfers to a new room by *learning that room's*
  normal rather than importing a foreign detector.
 - Bounded memory: temporal compression keeps long-horizon memory finite; the
  trade-off is that fine detail of old history is summarized, which is acceptable
  for a normality baseline.
 - Legitimate change is not a permanent false positive: slow drift updates the
  baseline with provenance, distinguishing "furniture deliberately rearranged"
  (baseline shifts) from "reflector appeared unexpectedly" (deviation event).
 - **No accuracy claim is made.** Deviation-detection quality is not asserted
  here; any detection-rate or false-positive number requires a named reproducer
  tagged MEASURED / SYNTHETIC / CLAIMED, and a health/safety framing stays within
  the ADR-282 bounded-claims discipline (decision support, not diagnosis). No
  number is invented.
 - The memory is governed: learned baselines are observations of a space, subject
  to the same ADR-277 retention/privacy policy as the fused state they summarize;
  no raw P0 RF is retained to build a baseline.
 ## Validation
 - `cargo test -p wifi-densepose-ruvector` — the normality model builds on the
  existing HNSW/event-log/temporal primitives; nearest-normal recall and
  temporal-compression bounds are exercised on synthetic streams.
 - Baseline/deviation tests: a synthetic scene with a known injected change (moved
  `Object`, altered propagation, altered modality signature) produces a deviation
  `Event` against the learned normal *without* a per-anomaly detector; an
  unchanged diurnal cycle produces none (no false positive on normal periodicity).
 - Drift test: a slow legitimate change updates the baseline (with provenance)
  rather than emitting a persistent anomaly; an abrupt change does emit one.
 - Evidence test: a learned baseline carries the evidence level of its source
  observations and is never presented above it; retention honors ADR-277.
 - Twin-linkage design check (with ADR-312): divergence between a twin-simulated
  expected state and the learned normal is expressible as a deviation signal.
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
 # ADR-310: Counterfactual inference — generative spatial reasoning
 - **Status**: Proposed (ADR-297 phase 3)
 - **Date**: 2026-08-11
 - **Deciders**: ruv
 - **Tags**: inference, generative, counterfactual, rf-twin, fusion, uncertainty, phase-3
 ## Context
 This ADR is a child of **ADR-297** (perception substrate program) and owns
 primitive #13, *counterfactual inference*. In the ADR-297 DAG it is a phase-3,
 research-forward primitive that sits on top of the fused world state: it
 **consumes ADR-308** (real sensor fusion) for the current fused estimate and
 **ADR-312** (digital RF twin) for the twin's expected measurement
 distributions. It is design intent, authored as Proposed, and is expected to be
 revised as the phase-1 spine and the phase-2 fusion layer land.
 RuView today reasons discriminatively: a task head maps measurements to a label
 or a pose. That answers "what does the classifier say?" but not the questions an
 operator actually asks — *would these RF measurements still make sense if nobody
 were present? Does one person explain the observation better than two?* Those
 are counterfactual questions, and a classifier cannot answer them because it has
 no model of what a measurement *should* look like under a hypothesized world
 state. A discriminative head asked about an empty room simply emits its
 best-effort label; it cannot say "the observation is better explained by
 absence."
 The step this ADR proposes is toward a **generative spatial model**: given a
 hypothesized scene state (occupancy, count, coarse positions) and the ADR-312
 twin's propagation model for the deployment, predict the *expected* measurement
 distribution, then score how well each hypothesis explains the observed
 measurement. The best-explaining hypothesis — including the *nobody-present*
 null hypothesis — is the answer, and the margin between hypotheses is a
 first-class uncertainty signal.
 Relevant existing assets to build on rather than duplicate:
 - **ADR-308** (fusion) already produces the fused world estimate and its
  covariance; the counterfactual layer scores hypotheses *relative to* that
  estimate rather than re-fusing raw measurements.
 - **ADR-312** (RF twin) is the generative forward model — per-deployment
  geometry, radio locations, and expected measurement distributions. This ADR
  is a *consumer* of the twin's forward simulator, not a second simulator.
 - **ADR-299** (OOD/observability) already owns the `UNKNOWN` verdict; the
  null-hypothesis ("nobody present better explains this than any occupancy
  hypothesis") and the "no hypothesis explains this" case route through ADR-299,
  not a parallel gate.
 - `frame::EvidenceLevel` L0–L5 (ADR-282) and the ADR-301 evidence engine
  account for the resulting confidence.
 ## Options considered
 1. **Keep only discriminative heads.** Rejected: cannot express absence,
   cannot compare "one person vs. two" as competing explanations, and gives a
   confident label even when no world state explains the data.
 2. **A second, independently trained generative network with its own forward
   model.** Rejected for the default path: duplicates the ADR-312 twin's
   propagation model, invites the two models to disagree, and multiplies the
   surface that must be validated. Reserved only if the twin's analytic forward
   model proves insufficient for a phenomenon.
 3. **A hypothesis-scoring layer that uses the ADR-312 twin as the forward model
   and the ADR-308 fused state as the hypothesis prior, routing low-margin and
   null-dominant cases to the ADR-299 UNKNOWN verdict.** Chosen.
 ## Decision
 Define a **counterfactual inference layer** that scores a small set of scene
 hypotheses against observed measurements using the digital RF twin as the
 generative forward model.
 ### 1. Hypothesis set
 - Hypotheses are drawn from the ADR-308 fused state and its neighbourhood: the
  current estimate, the **null hypothesis** (nobody present), and a bounded set
  of nearby alternatives (±1 occupant, shifted position). The fused estimate
  supplies the prior so the search stays small and grounded rather than
  enumerating an open world.
 - The hypothesis space is expressed over the **ADR-303** canonical ontology
  (`Space`/`Zone`, occupant count, coarse position), so a counterfactual result
  is a governed spatial statement, not an opaque score.
 ### 2. Forward model and scoring
 - For each hypothesis, query the **ADR-312 twin** for the expected measurement
  distribution given that scene state and the deployment's propagation model.
  Score the observed measurement's likelihood under each hypothesis's expected
  distribution.
 - The answer is the maximum-likelihood hypothesis; the **margin** between the
  top hypotheses (and between the top hypothesis and the null) is the
  confidence signal, carried into the ADR-301 evidence engine.
 ### 3. Routing to UNKNOWN
 - When the null hypothesis dominates, the layer reports *absence*, not a
  low-confidence occupancy label.
 - When **no** hypothesis explains the observation well (all likelihoods low, or
  the winning margin below threshold), the result routes to the **ADR-299**
  `UNKNOWN` verdict — the observation is outside what the twin can explain, and
  the honest output is "I cannot account for this," never a forced label.
 ### Evidence discipline
 - Twin-predicted distributions are a **simulation** (evidence level L0 per
  ADR-282) labelled `SYNTHETIC`; a counterfactual verdict inherits the evidence
  level of its weakest input and is never presented as camera-grade ground
  truth (CLAUDE.md honesty rule).
 - Any accuracy statement about counterfactual discrimination (e.g. "distinguishes
  one occupant from two") requires the mean-pose-style baseline discipline of
  CLAUDE.md, a leakage-free held-out split, and a reproducer before it may be
  tagged `MEASURED`. This ADR asserts **no** such number.
 ## Consequences
 - RuView gains the ability to answer absence and "which explanation is better"
  questions that discriminative heads structurally cannot — a step toward
  generative spatial reasoning and a differentiator for security and
  facility-monitoring applications where *absence* is the valuable signal.
 - Quality is bounded by the fidelity of the ADR-312 twin's forward model and the
  ADR-308 fused prior; the layer reports margins and defers to ADR-299 UNKNOWN
  rather than overstating a coarse model.
 - Hard dependency on ADR-308 (fused state and covariance) and ADR-312 (forward
  model); this ADR builds neither a fusion engine nor a propagation simulator of
  its own.
 - Being phase 3, this is design intent sitting on the fused world state; it is
  expected to be revised as ADR-308 and ADR-312 land, and it is not implemented
  by the phase-1 swarm.
 ## Validation
 - Unit tests: hypothesis likelihood scoring is a deterministic function of
  observed measurement + hypothesis + twin parameters; the null hypothesis wins
  on a synthesized empty-room measurement; a two-occupant measurement scores the
  two-occupant hypothesis above the one-occupant hypothesis on a controlled
  synthetic case.
 - Integration test: measurements the twin cannot explain (out-of-model
  scattering) drive the layer to the ADR-299 UNKNOWN verdict rather than a
  forced occupancy label; margins propagate into the ADR-301 evidence engine.
 - Held-out discrimination (deferred, real-silicon): one-vs-two and
  presence-vs-absence discrimination on a leakage-free held-out split with a
  mean-pose baseline, reported as `MEASURED` with a reproducer. Until then all
  counterfactual output is `SYNTHETIC`/L0. No discrimination accuracy number is
  asserted by this ADR.
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
 # ADR-311: Information-gain scheduler — sample the most informative radios
 - **Status**: Proposed (ADR-297 phase 3)
 - **Date**: 2026-08-11
 - **Deciders**: ruv
 - **Tags**: scheduling, active-sensing, information-gain, edge, energy, fusion, phase-3
 ## Context
 This ADR is a child of **ADR-297** (perception substrate program) and owns
 primitive #14, *information-gain scheduler*. In the ADR-297 DAG it is a phase-3,
 research-forward primitive that sits on top of the fused world state and
 **pairs with ADR-306** (active sensing): ADR-306 decides *what to probe*
 (waveform, sensing task); this ADR decides *which radios/modalities to spend
 budget on next*. It is authored as Proposed and is not implemented by the
 phase-1 swarm.
 With multiple sensors, processing every stream at full rate is wasteful: many
 radios are, at any moment, contributing little to the current estimate while
 consuming compute, energy, and bandwidth — the three scarce resources on the
 edge nodes RuView targets (ESP32-S3/C6 and small gateways). Treating all sensors
 equally is precisely the design that does not survive a real deployment of
 "hundreds of sensors."
 The scheduler assigns each candidate sensor/modality a value
 ```
 Value(sensor) ≈ expected uncertainty reduction / (compute + energy + bandwidth)
 ```
 and spends the next sampling/processing budget on the highest-value sensors.
 Expected uncertainty reduction is estimated *before* paying for the measurement,
 which is why the scheduler needs a model of what each sensor is likely to tell
 it — supplied by the fused state's covariance and the RF twin's forward model,
 not by actually sampling.
 Relevant existing assets to build on rather than duplicate:
 - **ADR-308** (fusion) maintains the fused state and its covariance — the
  current uncertainty the scheduler is trying to reduce. Expected uncertainty
  reduction is computed against that covariance, not a private one.
 - **ADR-312** (RF twin) provides the per-sensor forward model used to predict a
  candidate measurement's expected informativeness before sampling.
 - **ADR-317** (RuView sensor HAL, phase 2) exposes each radio's real
  compute/energy/bandwidth cost descriptors; the denominator is read from the
  HAL, not guessed per platform.
 - **ADR-306** (active sensing) is the paired actuator: the scheduler ranks
  sensors, ADR-306 chooses the probe on the chosen sensor.
 - **ADR-299** (observability) defines the phenomenon the estimate is *for*, so
  the scheduler prioritizes uncertainty reduction on the objective that matters,
  not on nuisance dimensions.
 ## Options considered
 1. **Round-robin / process-everything scheduling.** Rejected: burns edge
   compute and energy on redundant streams and does not scale to large fleets;
   the strategic and external reviews named exactly this as an edge-deployment
   blocker.
 2. **Static priority per sensor type (e.g. always prefer mmWave).** Rejected:
   ignores that a sensor's *current* informativeness depends on the scene and
   the present uncertainty — a well-placed WiFi link can dominate an occluded
   mmWave node in a given moment.
 3. **A value-of-information scheduler that ranks sensors by expected uncertainty
   reduction per unit cost, using the ADR-308 covariance and ADR-312 forward
   model, with costs from the ADR-317 HAL.** Chosen.
 ## Decision
 Define an **information-gain scheduler** that allocates the next
 sampling/processing budget across available radios by value of information.
 ### 1. Value function
 - For each candidate sensor/modality, estimate **expected uncertainty
  reduction** on the ADR-299 objective by evaluating how much a predicted
  measurement (via the **ADR-312** forward model) would shrink the **ADR-308**
  fused-state covariance — a value-of-information estimate made *before* paying
  for the measurement.
 - Divide by the sensor's **cost** — compute + energy + bandwidth — read from the
  **ADR-317** HAL descriptors. The exact weighting of the three cost terms is a
  deployment policy (a battery node weights energy heavily; a wired gateway
  weights bandwidth), configured, not hardcoded.
 ### 2. Allocation
 - Rank candidates by value and spend the budget on the top set, subject to a
  configurable floor that guarantees each sensor is sampled at least
  occasionally (so a sensor whose value is currently low is not starved into
  permanent blindness and can be re-evaluated as the scene changes).
 - The scheduler emits an allocation, not a measurement; **ADR-306** active
  sensing chooses the probe/waveform on each selected sensor, and the fusion
  layer (ADR-308) incorporates the result.
 ### 3. Governance and honesty
 - Skipping a sensor for a cycle is a *deliberate* reduction in coverage; the
  scheduler records which sensors were sampled so downstream evidence (ADR-301)
  reflects the actual sensing that occurred, and observability (ADR-299) can
  raise `UNKNOWN` for a zone that went under-sampled rather than reporting a
  stale estimate as current.
 ### Evidence discipline
 - Expected-uncertainty-reduction estimates are model predictions from the
  ADR-312 twin (simulation, L0 per ADR-282, `SYNTHETIC`); a scheduling decision
  is a resource choice, never a sensing claim.
 - Any energy/latency/throughput improvement figure requires real-silicon
  measurement with a reproducer before it is tagged `MEASURED` (CLAUDE.md
  hardware rule). This ADR asserts **no** efficiency number.
 ## Consequences
 - Edge deployments spend scarce compute, energy, and bandwidth where they buy
  the most certainty, making "hundreds of sensors" operationally tractable — a
  capability the reviews flagged as critical for edge deployment.
 - Quality is bounded by the accuracy of the ADR-312 forward model (informativeness
  prediction) and ADR-317 cost descriptors; a poor forward model degrades to
  near-round-robin, which is safe but not optimal. The sampling floor bounds the
  worst case.
 - Hard dependency on ADR-308 (covariance), ADR-312 (forward model), and ADR-317
  (cost descriptors), and paired with ADR-306; this ADR builds none of those.
 - Being phase 3, this is design intent sitting on the fused world state and is
  expected to be revised as ADR-306, ADR-308, ADR-312, and the ADR-317 HAL land.
 ## Validation
 - Unit tests: the value function is a deterministic function of covariance +
  forward model + cost descriptors; a sensor predicted to reduce objective
  uncertainty more per unit cost ranks above one that reduces it less; the
  sampling floor guarantees eventual re-evaluation of a low-value sensor.
 - Integration test: on a synthetic multi-sensor scene, the scheduler reduces
  objective uncertainty faster per unit modelled cost than round-robin, and
  raises ADR-299 UNKNOWN for a deliberately starved zone rather than reporting a
  stale estimate.
 - Field validation (deferred, real-silicon): energy/latency/throughput on an
  instrumented multi-node deployment, reported as `MEASURED` with a reproducer.
  Until then all informativeness and cost figures are `SYNTHETIC`/L0. No
  efficiency number is asserted by this ADR.
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
 # ADR-312: Digital RF twin — persistent per-deployment RF model
 - **Status**: Proposed (ADR-297 phase 3)
 - **Date**: 2026-08-11
 - **Deciders**: ruv
 - **Tags**: rf-twin, digital-twin, propagation, calibration, spatial-memory, worldgraph, phase-3
 ## Context
 This ADR is a child of **ADR-297** (perception substrate program) and owns
 primitive #15, *digital RF twin*. In the ADR-297 DAG it is a phase-3,
 research-forward primitive that underpins several other phase-3 primitives:
 **ADR-305** (placement optimizer) plans against the twin's propagation model,
 **ADR-310** (counterfactual inference) uses it as the generative forward model,
 and **ADR-311** (information-gain scheduler) uses it to predict per-sensor
 informativeness. It ties directly to **ADR-298** (calibration), **ADR-305**
 (placement), and **ADR-309** (long-term spatial memory). It is authored as
 Proposed and is not implemented by the phase-1 swarm.
 RuView today has no persistent, per-deployment model of the RF environment.
 Calibration state, observed multipath, and radio geometry exist transiently
 inside a running session; when the process restarts or a change happens
 overnight, there is nothing that says "this is what this room's RF looked like
 yesterday." Without a persistent baseline, a physical change — furniture moved,
 a wall opened, a machine relocated, an intruder present — has nothing to be a
 *delta against*. It is just a different measurement, indistinguishable from
 noise or drift.
 The **digital RF twin** is that persistent baseline: a per-deployment model
 holding
 - **geometry and radio locations** (from the ADR-303 scene / worldgraph),
 - **propagation history** and **observed multipath** structure,
 - **calibration state** (from ADR-298),
 - **expected measurement distributions** for each link and phenomenon.
 Once the twin exists, a physical change becomes a **measurable delta against the
 twin** rather than an unexplained measurement. This is what connects RuView to
 facility management (what changed in this space?), security (is there an
 unexplained presence?), robotics (has the map drifted?), and industrial
 monitoring (did the plant layout change?) — the applications the strategic
 assessment named as the value beyond a single detector.
 Relevant existing assets to build on rather than duplicate:
 - The `worldgraph` crate already models the physical scene — `Room`/`Space`
  with `bounds_enu`, `Wall { rf_attenuation_db }`, `Doorway`, `Zone`, and
  `Sensor` nodes (ADR-303). The twin *annotates and persists* this scene with RF
  state; it does not invent a second geometry.
 - `wifi-densepose-calibration` (enrollment, bank, anchor, runtime, specialist)
  holds the calibration state the twin persists; the twin references and
  versions calibration records, it does not reimplement calibration.
 - **ADR-309** (long-term spatial memory, phase 3) is the persistence and
  temporal-history substrate; the twin is a *structured occupant* of that
  memory, not a separate database.
 - **ADR-302** (authenticated identity) and **ADR-292** (provenance) mean the
  measurements that update the twin carry verified lineage, so a delta is
  attributable rather than anonymous.
 ## Options considered
 1. **No persistent RF model (status quo).** Rejected: every change looks like
   noise; nothing supports "what changed since yesterday?", which is the
   question the facility/security/industrial applications actually ask.
 2. **A full electromagnetic digital twin (per-site ray-tracing / FDTD kept in
   sync in real time).** Rejected for the default path: far heavier than the
   coarse `rf_attenuation_db` scene RuView actually has and impractical on edge
   hardware. A high-fidelity solver is retained as an *optional backend* the
   twin can call, not the baseline.
 3. **A persistent, per-deployment RF model layered over the ADR-303 scene and
   ADR-309 memory: geometry + radio locations + calibration state + observed
   multipath + expected measurement distributions, updated by verified
   measurements, exposing changes as deltas.** Chosen.
 ## Decision
 Define the **digital RF twin** as a persistent, versioned, per-deployment model
 of the RF environment, layered over existing scene, calibration, and memory
 assets.
 ### 1. State the twin holds
 - **Geometry and radio locations** referenced from the ADR-303 / worldgraph
  scene (not copied).
 - **Calibration state** referenced and versioned from
  `wifi-densepose-calibration` (ADR-298), so the twin knows *which* calibration
  a stored distribution was captured under.
 - **Observed multipath and propagation history** — a bounded temporal summary
  of per-link channel structure, stored in ADR-309 spatial memory.
 - **Expected measurement distributions** per link and phenomenon — the forward
  model ADR-305, ADR-310, and ADR-311 consume.
 ### 2. Update and delta
 - Verified measurements (ADR-302 identity, ADR-292 provenance) update the twin's
  distributions online, bounded by ADR-298 calibration validity. A new
  observation is compared to the twin's expected distribution; the **delta** —
  and its statistical significance against the twin's own variance — is the
  primary output. A change large relative to the twin's modelled variance is a
  *detected physical change*, not noise.
 - The twin is **versioned**: a calibration event, a deliberate geometry edit, or
  an accepted physical change advances the twin version, so history is
  auditable and a delta is always relative to a named baseline.
 ### 3. Consumers
 - **ADR-305** queries the twin's propagation model to plan placements.
 - **ADR-310** uses the twin's expected distributions as the generative forward
  model for hypothesis scoring.
 - **ADR-311** uses per-sensor expected informativeness from the twin.
 - Facility/security/robotics/industrial integrations read the twin's change
  deltas as governed ADR-303 spatial events.
 ### Evidence discipline
 - The twin's expected distributions and any propagation simulation are
  **simulation** (evidence level L0 per ADR-282), labelled `SYNTHETIC`. A delta
  computed against them is a model-relative statement.
 - A change/anomaly detection *claim* (e.g. "detects furniture-scale changes")
  requires real-silicon measurement against a leakage-free protocol with a
  reproducer before it is tagged `MEASURED` (CLAUDE.md hardware rule). The twin
  never presents a modelled expected distribution as evidence that a physical
  state *is* the case; it presents a *delta and its significance*. This ADR
  asserts **no** detection-accuracy number.
 ## Consequences
 - RuView gains a persistent per-deployment baseline, turning "a different
  measurement" into "a measurable, attributable, versioned change" — the bridge
  from a sensing runtime to facility management, security, robotics, and
  industrial monitoring.
 - The twin is the shared forward model for ADR-305/310/311, so those primitives
  speak one propagation model rather than three inconsistent ones — a
  deliberate reason to build the twin before its consumers mature.
 - Quality is bounded by the coarseness of the worldgraph scene and the fidelity
  of the forward model; the twin reports deltas *with significance against its
  own variance* rather than asserting confident change detection on a coarse
  model. The optional high-fidelity backend is where higher accuracy lives.
 - Hard dependency on ADR-303 (scene), ADR-298 (calibration state), and ADR-309
  (persistence); it reuses `worldgraph` and `wifi-densepose-calibration` rather
  than rebuilding geometry or calibration.
 - Being phase 3, this is design intent; it is expected to be revised as the
  phase-1 spine, ADR-308 fusion, and ADR-309 memory land.
 ## Validation
 - Unit tests: the twin's expected distribution is a deterministic function of
  scene + calibration + propagation history; delta computation and its
  significance against stored variance are correct on synthetic distributions;
  versioning advances on calibration/geometry/accepted-change events and history
  is retained.
 - Integration test: on a synthetic deployment, an injected physical change (a
  wall attenuation shift) produces a significant delta against the twin while
  ordinary noise does not; the delta surfaces as a governed ADR-303 event with
  provenance (ADR-302/292).
 - Field validation (deferred, real-silicon): change detection on an instrumented
  real deployment with a controlled physical-change protocol, reported as
  `MEASURED` with a reproducer. Until then all twin distributions and deltas are
  `SYNTHETIC`/L0. No detection-accuracy number is asserted by this ADR.
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
 # ADR-313: Fleet control plane — provisioning to audit trails
 - **Status**: Proposed (ADR-297 phase 2)
 - **Date**: 2026-08-11
 - **Deciders**: ruv
 - **Tags**: fleet, operations, provisioning, firmware, updates, audit, identity, phase-2
 ## Context
 This ADR is a child of **ADR-297** (perception substrate program) and owns
 primitive #16, *fleet control plane*. In the ADR-297 DAG it is a phase-2
 integration-and-operations primitive that sits on the phase-1 spine: it
 **consumes ADR-302** (authenticated sensor identity) for per-device identity and
 enrollment, and **ADR-315** (capability certificate) for the signed models,
 calibration validity, and capability envelopes a device is allowed to run. It is
 authored as Proposed and is not implemented by the phase-1 swarm.
 The external and internal reviews both named the same operational gap: RuView
 has strong per-device primitives but no **release identity** and no **bill of
 materials** binding a fielded sensor to the exact firmware, model, and
 calibration it is running — and no plane to manage that across many devices.
 Without this, a handful of nodes is fine but *hundreds* of sensors become an
 operational nightmare: no coherent way to provision, roll certificates, verify
 firmware compatibility, distribute signed models, track calibration lifecycle,
 watch health, stage updates, roll back, diagnose remotely, enforce data
 retention, or produce an audit trail. This ADR addresses that release-identity /
 BOM gap directly.
 The scope is deliberately the **control plane**, not the data plane. The
 authenticated measurement path is **ADR-293** (bind + allowlist) plus **ADR-302**
 (signed envelope); this ADR governs the *devices and artifacts*, not the
 per-frame stream.
 Relevant existing assets to build on rather than duplicate:
 - **ADR-302** already defines per-device keypairs, the `DeviceId → public key →
  capabilities` enrollment record, key rotation and revocation *semantics* — and
  explicitly deferred their **fleet distribution** to this ADR. The control
  plane is the distribution and lifecycle layer over ADR-302 identity, not a new
  identity scheme.
 - **ADR-315** (capability certificate) defines the signed, expiring artifact a
  device is authorized to run; the fleet plane is what *distributes, stages, and
  revokes* those certificates and the signed models they point at.
 - **ADR-298** (calibration) owns calibration validity/expiry; the fleet plane
  tracks calibration *lifecycle* across the fleet (which nodes are due, which are
  stale) rather than redefining calibration.
 - **ADR-316** (witness chain) provides the append-only, re-verifiable record;
  fleet audit trails are witness-chain entries, not a parallel log format.
 - **ADR-317** (RuView sensor HAL, phase 2) provides hardware/firmware capability
  descriptors used for firmware-compatibility checks before staging an update.
 - `wifi-densepose-bfld` `CapabilityAttestation` (ADR-141) is the device-side
  attestation the plane checks against declared cohort capabilities.
 ## Options considered
 1. **Manual per-device operations (SSH/flash by hand).** Rejected: does not
   scale past a handful of nodes, produces no release identity, no audit trail,
   and no safe rollback — exactly the operational nightmare the reviews named.
 2. **Adopt a generic third-party IoT device-management platform wholesale.**
   Rejected as the core: generic platforms do not understand RuView's signed
   capability certificate, calibration validity, or witness chain, and would
   fork trust away from the phase-1 spine. A generic transport/agent *may* be a
   backend, but identity, certificates, and audit remain RuView's.
 3. **A RuView-native control plane layered on ADR-302 identity, ADR-315
   certificates, ADR-298 calibration lifecycle, and ADR-316 audit — covering
   provisioning through rollback and retention.** Chosen.
 ## Decision
 Define a **fleet control plane** that manages RuView sensors and their signed
 artifacts across their lifecycle, built on the phase-1 identity/certificate
 spine.
 ### 1. Release identity and bill of materials
 - Each fielded device has a **BOM record** binding `DeviceId` (ADR-302) → exact
  firmware version → signed model set → active capability certificate (ADR-315)
  → current calibration record (ADR-298) → HAL/hardware descriptor (ADR-317).
  This *is* the release identity the reviews found missing: given a device you
  can state precisely what it is running and prove it is signed.
 ### 2. Provisioning, certificates, firmware compatibility
 - **Provisioning** is the authorized ADR-302 enrollment step at fleet scale:
  minting a keypair, registering the public key and capabilities, and issuing
  the initial ADR-315 certificate. A device is untrusted until provisioned.
 - **Certificate lifecycle**: issue, rotate, expire, and **revoke** ADR-315
  certificates and the ADR-302 keys behind them; revocation lists are
  distributed here (the distribution ADR-302 deferred).
 - **Firmware compatibility**: before staging a firmware or model, check the
  target's ADR-317 HAL descriptor and ADR-141 capability attestation so an
  incompatible or under-capable device is never sent an artifact it cannot
  honestly run.
 ### 3. Cohorts, staged updates, rollback
 - Devices group into **cohorts** (by site, hardware, capability). Updates —
  signed models and firmware — roll out **staged** (canary → cohort → fleet)
  with health gates between stages, and **roll back** to the previously recorded
  BOM on a failed health check. Only signed artifacts are ever staged.
 ### 4. Health telemetry, remote diagnostics, retention, audit
 - **Health telemetry** and **remote diagnostics** report device liveness,
  calibration staleness (ADR-298), certificate expiry (ADR-315), and error
  state — read-only diagnostics by default, mutations authorized explicitly.
 - **Data retention** policy is enforced per cohort, and P0/CSI/person data never
  leaves the edge except under the ADR-277/280 governance already in force
  (CLAUDE.md: never commit or exfiltrate CSI/person data).
 - Every lifecycle action — provision, rotate, revoke, stage, roll back — is
  written as an **ADR-316 witness-chain** entry, giving a re-verifiable **audit
  trail** rather than a mutable log.
 ### Authority and least privilege
 - The control plane is default-deny (CLAUDE.md: default to least authority).
  Provisioning, key rotation, revocation, staging, and rollback are each
  separately authorized operations; no fleet action is implied by another.
  Credentials and private keys are never logged or committed.
 ## Consequences
 - Hundreds of sensors become operable: coherent release identity, signed-artifact
  distribution, staged updates with rollback, and a re-verifiable audit trail —
  closing the release-identity / BOM gap the reviews raised.
 - The plane concentrates operational authority; that is mitigated by
  default-deny, per-action authorization, signed-only artifacts, and
  witness-chained audit. A compromised plane must still forge signatures the
  phase-1 spine verifies.
 - Hard dependency on ADR-302 (identity), ADR-315 (certificate), ADR-298
  (calibration lifecycle), ADR-316 (audit), and ADR-317 (firmware/HAL
  compatibility). This ADR distributes and sequences those artifacts; it does
  not redefine identity, certificates, calibration, or the witness format.
 - Being phase 2, this is design intent depending on the spine; it is expected to
  be revised as ADR-315, ADR-316, and ADR-317 land.
 - **No fielded fleet-operation claim is MEASURED without real-silicon evidence**
  (CLAUDE.md hardware rule): staged update and rollback on real nodes require a
  captured runtime log. A passing simulation is not fleet evidence.
 ## Validation
 - Unit tests: BOM records bind identity/firmware/model/certificate/calibration
  consistently and reject inconsistent bindings; certificate issue/rotate/revoke
  transitions are correct; a firmware-incompatible target is refused staging;
  every lifecycle action emits a well-formed ADR-316 witness entry.
 - Integration test: a synthetic cohort undergoes a canary→cohort→fleet staged
  update; an injected health failure triggers rollback to the prior BOM; the
  full sequence is re-verifiable from the witness chain offline; a revoked
  certificate is rejected fleet-wide.
 - Security test (`npm run test:security` analogue for the plane): default-deny
  is enforced; unauthorized provision/rotate/revoke/stage is rejected and
  counted; no credential or P0 data appears in telemetry or audit output.
 - Field validation (deferred, real-silicon): a real multi-node staged update and
  rollback with a captured boot/runtime log, reported as `MEASURED` with a
  reproducer. Until then all fleet-operation results are simulator-level. No
  fielded reliability number is asserted by this ADR.
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
 # ADR-314: Multi-domain benchmark scorecard — regressions cannot hide behind pooled accuracy
 - **Status**: Accepted — initial implementation planned (ADR-297 phase 1)
 - **Date**: 2026-08-11
 - **Deciders**: ruv
 - **Tags**: benchmark, aetherarena, ci-gate, evidence, honesty, domain-generalization, substrate
 ## Context
 This ADR is primitive 17 of the perception-substrate program (ADR-297) and the
 per-PR enforcement edge of the phase-1 certificate spine. In the ADR-297
 dependency DAG it reads accuracy from the evidence engine (ADR-301), consumes
 the domain state produced by out-of-distribution detection (ADR-299), scores
 against calibration certificates (ADR-298), and is anchored in the witness chain
 (ADR-316). It is the surface that makes the rest of the spine testable on every
 change to sensing code.
 A single pooled accuracy number is the classic way a domain-generalization
 regression hides. A model can raise mean PCK or mean presence accuracy while
 quietly collapsing on unseen rooms, unseen devices, or stationary subjects —
 exactly the conditions WiFi sensing fails in and exactly the conditions a
 pooled average washes out. The strategic assessment (ADR-297) named this: what
 distinguishes infrastructure from a demo is that a regression on *any* operating
 domain is caught before merge, not discovered in the field.
 RuView does not need a new benchmark to do this. AetherArena is already
 **v0-complete infrastructure** (ADR-149): a deterministic scoring engine
 reusing `wifi-densepose-train` (`src/ruview_metrics.rs`, `src/ablation.rs`,
 `src/eval.rs`, `src/proof.rs`), a `PROOF_SEED=42` determinism substrate that
 SHA-256-hashes outputs against an expected hash, an append-only witness ledger,
 and a live Hugging Face Space. ADR-145's ablation harness already computes
 presence accuracy, localization error, FP/FN, latency percentiles, a
 privacy-leakage score, and **cross-room degradation**. The board is
 intentionally empty (benchmark-first). What is missing is not a scorer but a
 **scorecard format** that reports per-domain rather than pooled, and a
 **sensing-crate CI gate** that runs it on every PR.
 ## Options considered
 1. **Keep the single pooled score / `RuViewTier`.** Rejected: it is exactly the
   surface a per-domain regression hides behind; a Gold tier can coexist with a
   broken unseen-room slice.
 2. **Add a new benchmark repo/harness for domains.** Rejected: AetherArena's
   scorer, determinism binding, and witness ledger already exist and are the
   right engine; a parallel harness would fork the scoring substrate and its
   anti-gaming/leakage discipline.
 3. **Extend the AetherArena scorer with a per-domain scorecard and wire it as a
   per-PR sensing-crate gate.** Chosen.
 ## Decision
 Reuse the AetherArena scorer and witness ledger (ADR-149) and add two things: a
 **multi-domain scorecard** format and a **sensing-crate PR gate** that produces
 it.
 ### 1. The multi-domain scorecard
 The scorecard reports each capability broken out by operating domain, never
 pooled into one figure. The v0 domain axes:
 - **Presence**: `room-known`, `room-unseen`, `device-unseen`, `stationary-10m`
  (a stationary subject at range — the canonical WiFi failure case).
 - **Pose**: `matched`, `subject-unseen`, `room-unseen`.
 - **OOD rejection**: the rate at which genuinely out-of-distribution input is
  correctly returned as UNKNOWN by ADR-299 (a capability, not a failure) and
  the false-UNKNOWN rate on in-distribution input.
 - **Calibration drift**: fingerprint-distance trajectory against the ADR-298
  certificate over the scored window, and the fraction of inferences in each
  ADR-299 `DomainState` (KNOWN / DEGRADED / UNKNOWN).
 Each cell carries exactly one `EvidenceLevel` (L0–L5, ADR-282). A slice scored
 on synthetic input is L0/`Synthetic` by construction; a slice on a leakage-free
 held-out real split is graded higher and only then may a per-domain number be
 labelled MEASURED. Pose PCK cells additionally require the mean-pose baseline
 and a leakage-free held-out split (CLAUDE.md) or they are not reported as pose
 accuracy at all.
 ### 2. Per-domain regression gate
 - The gate compares each scorecard cell against the merged-baseline scorecard
  stored in the AetherArena witness ledger. A regression **in any single
  domain** beyond its configured threshold fails the PR, even if the pooled
  average improved. Improvement on `room-known` cannot buy a regression on
  `room-unseen`.
 - Thresholds are per-domain and per-capability; the unseen/stationary/OOD
  domains carry the strictest budgets because they are the ones a pooled score
  hides. The baseline is append-only and witness-anchored — a new baseline is a
  new signed ledger entry, never an in-place overwrite (ADR-149 ledger pattern,
  ADR-316 anchoring).
 ### 3. Sensing-crate CI wiring
 - Every PR that touches a sensing crate runs the scorecard across all domains
  under the ADR-011/ADR-149 determinism binding (`PROOF_SEED=42`), so the run
  is reproducible and tamper-evident. The gate is added to
  `.github/workflows/` as an authoritative check.
 - The held-out real split remains private and is never accessible to synthetic
  generation, augmentation, or calibration (ADR-149 leakage constraint, ADR-282
  rule d). Submitters/PRs provide a model, not predictions on data they hold.
 ### Provenance and honesty discipline
 - No benchmark numbers are invented by this ADR. It delivers the scorecard
  format, the per-domain gate, and the CI wiring; the numbers come from the
  ADR-301 evidence ledger and the AetherArena scorer on real data, labelled at
  the honest evidence level. Empty domains report "no evidence," which the gate
  treats as no coverage — never as a pass.
 ## Consequences
 - A domain-generalization regression can no longer merge behind a flattering
  pooled average; the failure mode that most distinguishes fielded sensing from
  a demo is caught at PR time.
 - Every PR touching sensing pays a per-domain scoring cost. Bounded by reusing
  the existing deterministic scorer and by tiered compute (CPU smoke vs full
  score, ADR-149), but it is a deliberate cost for per-domain safety.
 - The empty AetherArena board fills with honest, per-domain, evidence-labelled
  results rather than a single headline tier — consistent with the
  benchmark-first posture and with ADR-282's ecosystem positioning.
 - Some domains will show weak or absent coverage. Surfacing that per-domain is
  the point; the scorecard must never paper over a thin domain with a pooled
  number.
 - The program-level acceptance test (ADR-297) is encoded here as an AetherArena
  scenario, closing the loop once the phase-1 spine lands.
 ## Validation
 - `cargo test` on the AetherArena scorer extension — per-domain slicing math
  against fixtures; per-domain regression gate fails on a single-domain
  regression while pooled improves, and passes when all domains hold; empty
  domains report "no evidence," not a pass; every cell carries exactly one
  `EvidenceLevel`; synthetic slices are L0 by construction.
 - Determinism: a scored run reproduces its SHA-256 hash under `PROOF_SEED=42`
  (ADR-011/ADR-149 binding); the baseline scorecard is append-only and
  witness-anchored (ADR-316), never mutated in place.
 - CI: the sensing-crate gate runs on a PR touching a sensing crate and blocks a
  planted single-domain regression.
 - Real-data scorecards (a leakage-free held-out split with ADR-300 references)
  are the maturity milestone; a synthetic scorecard is L0 and no per-domain
  number is MEASURED without a reproducer per CLAUDE.md.
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
 # ADR-315: Capability certificates — validated-for-this-environment claims
 - **Status**: Accepted — initial implementation planned (ADR-297 phase 1)
 - **Date**: 2026-08-11
 - **Deciders**: ruv
 - **Tags**: capability, certificate, evidence, provenance, signature, honesty, substrate
 ## Context
 This ADR is primitive 18 of the perception-substrate program (ADR-297) and,
 per the strategic assessment, among the strongest ideas in the program: it is
 where the whole certificate spine becomes a consumable contract. In the ADR-297
 dependency DAG it **consumes the evidence engine (ADR-301)** — a capability
 certificate is a signed attestation minted over a slice of that ledger — the
 **calibration certificate (ADR-298)** for the environment it is validated
 against, and the **RuField signature types (ADR-302 / ADR-260/262/277/279)** to
 sign it. It reports domain state via ADR-299 and is anchored in the witness
 chain (ADR-316).
 RuView must stop making unconditional capability claims. "Supports presence" is
 not a true statement — presence detection works in some rooms, on some hardware,
 for some subject dynamics, and fails on a stationary subject at range in an
 uncalibrated room. A capability is only ever *validated for a specific
 environment*, and the honest unit of that claim is a signed, expiring
 certificate, not a feature flag in a README.
 The ingredients now exist across the phase-1 spine: ADR-301 accumulates
 per-`(room, device, subject)` accuracy, false-positive rate, drift, and domain
 state; ADR-298 produces the signed room fingerprint the environment is keyed to;
 ADR-302 provides the authenticated device identity and `CapabilityAttestation`
 (BFLD, ADR-141) that bounds *what a device is even attested to sense*; ADR-282
 provides the mandatory `EvidenceLevel`. What is missing is the artifact that
 binds them into a single, verifiable "validated here, until then" claim and the
 consumer-side rule that refuses capabilities lacking one.
 ## Options considered
 1. **Static capability flags / a `supports_presence` boolean.** Rejected: it is
   the exact dishonest claim — environment-independent, unsigned, non-expiring,
   and false the moment the room, device, or subject dynamics differ.
 2. **Report raw ledger accuracy to consumers directly.** Rejected: the ledger
   (ADR-301) is the source of truth but not a portable, signed, bounded contract;
   handing consumers raw records pushes evidence-weighting and expiry logic into
   every consumer and drops the single verifiable object.
 3. **Mint a signed, expiring `CapabilityCertificate` over an ADR-301 ledger
   slice, and make consumers refuse capabilities without a valid one.** Chosen.
 ## Decision
 Introduce a signed **`CapabilityCertificate`**: a bounded attestation that a
 specific capability has been validated for a specific environment, for a bounded
 time.
 ### 1. The certificate
 A serializable `CapabilityCertificate` binding:
 - `capability` — the phenomenon (e.g. `presence`, `pose`), which must be within
  the device's ADR-302/ADR-141 `CapabilityAttestation` (a device cannot be
  certified for something it is not even attested to sense).
 - `room` — the ADR-303 space identifier, tied to the ADR-298 calibration
  certificate version the validation was performed against.
 - `hardware` — the ADR-302 authenticated `DeviceId` (and, in phase 2, the
  ADR-317 HAL descriptor of the sensor).
 - `model` — the model version scored.
 - `calibrated_date` — the calibration certificate age at validation time.
 - `moving_recall`, `stationary_recall`, `false_presence_per_24h` — the measured
  operating metrics, sliced from the ADR-301 ledger for this exact context (not
  a global average), each honestly labelled. These are per-capability; a pose
  certificate carries pose metrics with the mean-pose baseline and a
  leakage-free split (CLAUDE.md) or it is not issued.
 - `valid_until` — an explicit expiry; a certificate is never open-ended.
 - `evidence_level` — exactly one L0–L5 (ADR-282). A certificate minted from a
  synthetic ledger slice is L0/`Synthetic`; a MEASURED metric requires an
  ADR-300 reference and a reproducer. The certificate cannot upgrade the level
  of the ledger it is minted from (ADR-301 honesty rule).
 - `signature` — a RuField `SignatureBlock` (ADR-302 / ADR-260/262/277/279) over
  the canonical serialization; an unsigned certificate is not a valid
  certificate. The certificate is anchored in the witness chain (ADR-316).
 ### 2. Minting
 - A certificate is minted from a slice of the ADR-301 evidence ledger for one
  `(room, device, subject-class, model)` context. If the ledger reports "no
  evidence" for that context, **no certificate is issued** — absence of evidence
  is never a capability. Minting is a pure function over the append-only ledger
  at mint time; the metrics are frozen into the signed object.
 - Expiry (`valid_until`) is derived from calibration validity (ADR-298) and an
  evidence-freshness policy: a certificate cannot outlive the calibration it was
  validated against, and drift beyond the ADR-298 envelope invalidates both.
 ### 3. Consumer refusal rule
 - Applications and surfaces **refuse to consume a capability that lacks a valid
  certificate for the current environment**. "Valid" means: signature verifies,
  `room`/`hardware`/`model` match the running context, `valid_until` is in the
  future, and the referenced calibration certificate is itself still valid
  (ADR-298 not invalidated). A failed check yields UNKNOWN via ADR-299, not a
  best-effort guess.
 - This makes the ADR-297 acceptance clause "quantify whether it can reliably
  sense the requested phenomenon → generate a signed capability certificate"
  a hard gate rather than a hope.
 ## Consequences
 - RuView can no longer claim a capability it has not validated for the caller's
  environment; the honest failure — "not certified here" → UNKNOWN — is
  surfaced by construction rather than by discipline.
 - OEM/integrator diligence gets a single verifiable artifact ("presence,
  validated in *this* room, on *this* device, with *these* recall/false-alarm
  numbers, until *this* date, at *this* evidence level, signed") — the strongest
  commercial output of the spine.
 - Certificates expire and get refused; some environments will have no
  certificate and therefore no capability until validated. That refusal is the
  intended honest behavior, not a regression.
 - Key management and expiry policy are operational responsibilities, reusing the
  ADR-302 enrollment/rotation and ADR-298 validity machinery rather than new
  infrastructure; fleet distribution of certificates is owned by ADR-313.
 - No capability number is invented here; every metric on a certificate is sliced
  from the ADR-301 ledger at its honest evidence level.
 ## Validation
 - `cargo test` on the certificate crate — mint from a ledger slice produces the
  frozen metrics; "no evidence" context yields no certificate; signature
  round-trip and tamper rejection; `valid_until` and calibration-linked expiry
  enforced; consumer refusal on room/hardware/model mismatch, expiry, or
  invalidated calibration resolves to UNKNOWN (ADR-299), not a guess; evidence
  level is inherited from the ledger and cannot be upgraded; a certificate
  cannot be issued for a capability outside the device's ADR-302/ADR-141
  attestation.
 - Cross-ADR: an ADR-301 ledger fixture mints a certificate; an ADR-299 test
  asserts an expired/mismatched certificate gates to UNKNOWN; the ADR-297
  acceptance test consumes a minted certificate end-to-end.
 - Real-deployment certificates (minted from a populated ledger with ADR-300
  references on live ESP32 captures) are the maturity milestone and require
  hardware evidence per CLAUDE.md; a certificate minted from a synthetic ledger
  is L0 by construction.
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
 # ADR-316: Witness chain — epistemic infrastructure for physical AI
 - **Status**: Accepted — initial implementation planned (ADR-297 phase 1)
 - **Date**: 2026-08-11
 - **Deciders**: ruv
 - **Tags**: provenance, witness, evidence, signature, epistemics, ontology, substrate
 ## Context
 This ADR is primitive 19 of the perception-substrate program (ADR-297) and a
 spine root of its phase-1 certificate stack. In the ADR-297 dependency DAG it
 **extends the source-provenance state machine (ADR-292)** and the RuField
 provenance types, **ties to the signature machinery (ADR-302 /
 ADR-260/262/277/279)**, and anchors the artifacts produced by ADR-298
 (calibration certificates), ADR-301 (evidence records), ADR-314 (benchmark
 scorecards), and ADR-315 (capability certificates). In phase 2 it carries the
 independent-corroboration link from ADR-300.
 The strategic assessment (ADR-297) framed RuView's real product as **epistemic
 infrastructure for physical AI**: the value is not the claim "a person is
 present" but the *auditable reasoning* behind it. A bare boolean output discards
 everything a downstream system needs to trust or contest it — which radio
 observed it, what DSP evidence supported it, which model inferred it, whether an
 independent sensor agreed, what spatial state it updated, and what policy acted
 on it. Once the answer is a boolean, "why do you believe that?" has no answer.
 RuView already has the pieces of a chain but not the chain itself. ADR-292
 defines a canonical `SourceState` (`Synthetic` / `LiveVerified` /
 `LiveUnverified` / `Stale` / `Disconnected`) with `Unknown` structurally
 forbidden from collapsing to live. ADR-302 defines the signed
 `device → measurement → sequence → timestamp → … → signed event` chain of
 custody. RuField carries `FrameProvenance`, `SemanticProvenance`, and signature
 types; the AetherArena witness ledger (ADR-149) demonstrates an append-only,
 witness-anchored ledger. What is missing is a single **staged, signed envelope**
 that travels the whole pipeline and records, at each stage, the confidence and
 provenance of that stage.
 ## Options considered
 1. **Keep provenance as scattered per-stage fields (status quo).** Rejected:
   `FrameProvenance`, `SourceState`, calibration state, and model uncertainty
   live in different structures and are re-encoded per surface; there is no
   single object a consumer can re-verify offline to answer "why."
 2. **Log a free-form audit trail alongside the output.** Rejected: mutable,
   unsigned, and not structurally tied to the output — the classic
   dashboard-that-overwrites-yesterday failure the evidence engine (ADR-301)
   already rejects.
 3. **A staged, signed witness envelope carried through the pipeline, each stage
   appended and signed, anchored in an append-only ledger.** Chosen.
 ## Decision
 Define the **witness chain**: a staged, append-only, signed envelope that
 accompanies an observation from radio to policy decision. Instead of emitting
 "person present," RuView emits a chain whose stages are:
 ```
 RF observation ▸ DSP evidence ▸ model inference ▸ independent corroboration
              ▸ spatial state ▸ policy decision
 ```
 ### 1. The staged envelope
 - Each stage is a signed record carrying its **confidence** and its
  **provenance**:
  - **RF observation** — the ADR-302 authenticated frame envelope
    (`DeviceId`, sequence, timestamp, measurement hash) and its ADR-292
    `SourceState`. This is the root link; a `Synthetic` root can never present
    as a `LiveVerified` one (ADR-292 invariant).
  - **DSP evidence** — the deterministic signal features and the ADR-137
    quality signals that support (or fail to support) an inference.
  - **model inference** — the model version, its raw output, and its predictive
    uncertainty; the ADR-299 `DomainState` (KNOWN / DEGRADED / UNKNOWN) gate
    result, so a low-confidence or out-of-distribution inference is recorded as
    such, not silently promoted.
  - **independent corroboration** — the phase-2 ADR-300 agreement link
    (a reference/second modality that agreed or disagreed); absent in phase 1,
    the stage records "no corroboration," never a fabricated one.
  - **spatial state** — the ADR-303 ontology `Observation`/`Track`/`Event` the
    inference updated, carrying `SemanticProvenance` and its `EvidenceLevel`.
  - **policy decision** — the governed action taken (or withheld), with the
    certificate (ADR-315) it relied on.
 - Each stage carries exactly one `EvidenceLevel` (L0–L5, ADR-282); the envelope's
  effective level is the **minimum** across its stages — a synthetic root or an
  unreferenced inference caps the whole chain, so the chain cannot claim more
  than its weakest link.
 ### 2. Signing and anchoring
 - Each stage is signed with RuField signature types (ADR-302 /
  ADR-260/262/277/279) over the canonical serialization of that stage plus the
  hash of the prior stage, so the chain is tamper-evident end to end and any
  broken link is detectable. The completed chain is anchored in an append-only,
  witness-anchored ledger following the AetherArena pattern (ADR-149); it is the
  same anchoring ADR-298/ADR-301/ADR-314/ADR-315 write into.
 - The chain is **append-only**: a correction is a new chain referencing the
  prior one, never an in-place edit (mirroring ADR-301 and CLAUDE.md's "source
  over summaries").
 ### 3. Offline re-verification
 - A consumer with the enrolled public keys (ADR-302) can re-verify a chain
  offline: check each stage signature, check each prior-stage hash, and read the
  per-stage confidence and evidence level — answering "why do you believe this?"
  without trusting the emitting host. This is the property store-and-forward
  channel authentication (rejected in ADR-302) cannot provide.
 ### Provenance and honesty discipline
 - The witness chain never manufactures confidence: a stage that lacks evidence
  records the absence. A `Synthetic` root, a missing corroboration, or an
  UNKNOWN gate is carried faithfully and caps the chain's evidence level. No
  accuracy number is invented here; the chain records the numbers the other
  primitives produce at their honest level.
 ## Consequences
 - Every RuView output becomes contestable and auditable: a downstream physical-AI
  system can inspect the reasoning, weight it by per-stage confidence, and reject
  a chain whose weakest link is too weak — the defining property of epistemic
  infrastructure the strategic assessment asked for.
 - The certificate spine (ADR-298/301/314/315) gains a single anchoring substrate;
  each of those artifacts is a specialization of a witness record rather than a
  bespoke signed blob.
 - Carrying and signing a staged envelope adds per-observation size and CPU cost;
  bounded by reusing RuField signatures and the existing ledger, and by the
  minimum-level rule keeping the object honest rather than exhaustive.
 - The chain will frequently reveal weak links (synthetic root, no corroboration,
  DEGRADED gate). Surfacing that is the point; the envelope must never smooth a
  weak stage into a confident summary.
 ## Validation
 - `cargo test` on the witness-chain crate — stage-by-stage signature round-trip
  and tamper rejection (a mutated stage or a broken prior-stage hash fails
  verification); effective evidence level equals the minimum across stages; a
  `Synthetic` root caps the chain and cannot present as `LiveVerified`
  (ADR-292 invariant); an UNKNOWN gate (ADR-299) and a "no corroboration" stage
  are recorded faithfully; append-only correction produces a new chain
  referencing the prior one.
 - Cross-ADR: an ADR-302 signed frame lineage serializes into a chain that
  re-verifies offline with only the enrolled public keys; ADR-298/301/314/315
  artifacts anchor into the same ledger.
 - Real-deployment chains (from live ESP32 captures with ADR-300 corroboration)
  are the maturity milestone and require hardware evidence per CLAUDE.md; a
  chain rooted in synthetic input is L0 by construction.
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
 # ADR-317: RuView sensor HAL — abstract all sensing hardware to one Observation type
 - **Status**: Proposed (ADR-297 phase 2)
 - **Date**: 2026-08-11
 - **Deciders**: ruv
 - **Tags**: hal, sensor-abstraction, ontology, fusion, adapters, category, phase-2
 ## Context
 This ADR is primitive 20 of the perception-substrate program (ADR-297) and a
 phase-2 integration primitive; it is authored as **Proposed**. In the ADR-297
 DAG it **consumes the canonical spatial ontology (ADR-303)** — its output is an
 ontology `Observation` bound to a `Sensor` entity — and **feeds real sensor
 fusion (ADR-308)**, which resolves many observations into one world state. It
 closes the "identify the hardware" clause of the ADR-297 acceptance test that
 phase 1 leaves open.
 RuView's strategic ceiling is set by how tightly it is coupled to WiFi CSI.
 Every new modality today lands as a bespoke ingest path with its own frame
 shape, its own provenance handling, and its own place in the pipeline. That is
 the difference between "a WiFi-DensePose project" and "an open
 spatial-intelligence operating layer": the category changes the moment *any*
 sensing hardware — {CSI, 802.11bf, BLE, UWB, mmWave, acoustic, camera, lidar,
 IMU, custom} — enters through one abstraction and becomes one `Observation`
 feeding one world model.
 Crucially this is a *unification*, not a green field. Adapters already exist and
 must be reused, not rebuilt:
 - ADR-279's native RF frame contract (`RfFrameV2`) already unifies ESP32,
  Intel, Atheros, PicoScenes, Realtek radar, and 320 MHz 802.11bk producers as
  `RfFrameV2` producers into a shared latent — "lightweight per-device adapters
  into a shared latent, not a shared tensor." The HAL generalizes that lesson
  beyond RF.
 - Existing CSI adapters (ESP32/Nexmon/FeitCSI paths), the mmWave fusion path
  (ADR-063), and the multistatic WiFi path (ADR-029) are concrete producers to
  bring under one trait.
 - ADR-302 already authenticates a `Sensor`/`DeviceId`; ADR-303 already defines
  `Sensor`, `Observation`, `Track`, and `Event` as first-class node types. The
  HAL is the trait that turns a heterogeneous device into that authenticated
  `Sensor` emitting those `Observation`s.
 The gap is a single **`SensorHal` trait and one `Observation` type** that every
 modality implements, so the world model never sees a modality-specific frame —
 only a provenance-bearing, evidence-labelled `Observation`.
 ## Options considered
 1. **Continue adding per-modality ingest paths.** Rejected: O(modalities) bespoke
   pipelines, each re-encoding provenance and evidence, each a place the ladder
   can be dropped — and it keeps RuView categorically a WiFi project.
 2. **Force every modality into the ADR-274/279 RF tensor/frame.** Rejected: the
   ADR-279 lesson is precisely that premature canonicalization discards
   information (bandwidth, antenna structure, phase). A camera, lidar, or IMU
   has no meaningful `RfFrameV2` projection; forcing one is the same mistake at a
   larger scale.
 3. **Define a `SensorHal` trait producing one `Observation` type, with existing
   adapters as implementations feeding a shared latent and the ADR-303
   ontology.** Chosen.
 ## Decision
 Introduce a **`SensorHal` trait** and a single **`Observation`** type. Every
 sensing modality is an implementation of the trait; the world model consumes
 only `Observation`s.
 ### 1. The `SensorHal` trait
 - A `SensorHal` describes a device's **capabilities** (which phenomena it can
  sense — reusing the ADR-302/ADR-141 `CapabilityAttestation`), its **native
  frame** (kept native, not canonicalized, per the ADR-279 shared-latent
  lesson), and a method that lifts a native frame into an `Observation`.
 - Implementations wrap the existing producers: CSI (ESP32/Nexmon/FeitCSI via the
  ADR-279 `RfFrameV2` path), 802.11bf (ADR-307, phase 2), BLE, UWB, mmWave
  (ADR-063), acoustic, camera, lidar, IMU, and `custom`. RF modalities reuse the
  ADR-279 per-device latent adapters wholesale; the HAL adds the non-RF and
  ranging modalities under the same trait.
 - The trait is the boundary where untrusted hardware input is validated
  (CLAUDE.md: validate at every hardware/FFI boundary; default to least
  authority). A device is authenticated as an ADR-302 `Sensor` before its
  observations are trusted.
 ### 2. The `Observation` type
 - One provenance-bearing `Observation`: a measurement plus its `SensorHal`
  source descriptor, its ADR-302 authenticated `DeviceId`, its ADR-292
  `SourceState`, its native-frame reference (not a lossy projection), and
  exactly one `EvidenceLevel` (L0–L5, ADR-282). A camera-derived `Observation`
  and a CSI-derived `Observation` are the same type with different provenance —
  and a camera observation never lifts WiFi output to camera-grade; each carries
  its own honest evidence level (CLAUDE.md: never present WiFi sensing as
  camera-grade).
 - The `Observation` maps directly onto the ADR-303 ontology `Observation` node
  attached to its `Sensor`, so the ontology is the one representation and the
  HAL is its ingest funnel.
 ### 3. Feeding fusion
 - Observations from any set of modalities flow into ADR-308 fusion, which
  resolves them into one probabilistic world state. The HAL guarantees fusion
  never sees a modality-specific frame — only `Observation`s with uniform
  provenance and evidence — which is what makes ADR-308's "many observations →
  one world state" invariant implementable across heterogeneous hardware.
 ### Category and honesty discipline
 - This ADR changes RuView's category from a WiFi-DensePose pipeline to an open
  spatial-intelligence operating layer, but it makes **no accuracy claim**: the
  HAL delivers a uniform ingest boundary, not a detector. Any capability of a
  newly-connected sensor is still gated by ADR-299 and certified by ADR-315 for
  its specific environment — connecting a camera does not grant a validated
  capability by itself.
 - Hardware support for a given modality is CLAIMED until demonstrated on real
  silicon with captured evidence per CLAUDE.md; a passing trait test proves the
  abstraction, not a fielded device.
 ## Consequences
 - New sensing hardware lands as one `SensorHal` implementation instead of a
  bespoke pipeline; the translation matrix stays O(modalities), mirroring how
  ADR-303 collapsed the surface matrix.
 - The ADR-297 acceptance clause "identify the hardware" becomes implementable:
  a new sensor type is described by its HAL, authenticated as an ADR-302
  `Sensor`, calibrated (ADR-298), gated (ADR-299), and certified (ADR-315)
  through the same phase-1 spine, closing the last open clause.
 - A trait boundary and an `Observation` type are added; existing RF adapters
  are re-expressed as implementations rather than rewritten, preserving the
  ADR-279 native-frame/shared-latent design.
 - Non-RF modalities (camera, lidar, acoustic) enter the governed plane with the
  same provenance and privacy discipline as RF; a camera is not a privacy-free
  shortcut — it inherits the ADR-277 governance and its own evidence level.
 - As a phase-2 Proposed ADR, the trait shape may be revised as ADR-308 fusion
  and ADR-307 802.11bf land; that revision is expected for a phased program.
 ## Validation
 - `cargo test` on the HAL crate (design-time, Proposed) — a fixture `SensorHal`
  for each of at least two modalities (CSI via ADR-279, plus one non-RF)
  produces uniform `Observation`s; every `Observation` carries a `DeviceId`,
  `SourceState`, native-frame reference, and exactly one `EvidenceLevel`; a
  synthetic source yields L0/`Synthetic` and cannot alias to measured
  (ADR-279 invariant 6); an unauthenticated device's observations are rejected
  at the trait boundary (ADR-302).
 - Cross-ADR: an `Observation` maps round-trip to an ADR-303 ontology
  `Observation` node with no provenance loss, and a set of `Observation`s from
  distinct modalities is accepted by an ADR-308 fusion fixture.
 - Real-silicon evidence is required before any modality's hardware support is
  claimed beyond CLAIMED: a captured boot/runtime log from the real device
  emitting `Observation`s. A successful build or simulator run is not hardware
  evidence (CLAUDE.md).
@@ -155,6 +155,26 @@ Statuses: **Proposed** (under discussion), **Accepted** (approved and/or impleme
 | [ADR-295](ADR-295-model-release-sanity-gates.md) | Model release sanity gates — block degenerate and mislabeled model artifacts | Accepted (initial implementation) |
 | [ADR-296](ADR-296-csi-data-incident-repo-controls.md) | Repository CSI data-incident controls — ignore rules and pre-commit/CI policy check | Accepted (controls implemented; tree remediation gated) |
 | [ADR-297](ADR-297-perception-substrate-program.md) | RuView perception substrate — phased 20-primitive program (calibration, evidence, trust, deployment) | Accepted (program; children ADR-298..317) |
 | [ADR-298](ADR-298-automatic-domain-calibration.md) | Automatic domain calibration — signed, versioned, invalidatable room fingerprint | Accepted (phase 1) |
 | [ADR-299](ADR-299-out-of-distribution-detection.md) | Out-of-distribution detection — KNOWN / DEGRADED / UNKNOWN gating | Accepted (phase 1) |
 | [ADR-300](ADR-300-ground-truth-synchronization.md) | Ground-truth synchronization — reference sensors as a formal validation plane | Proposed (phase 2) |
 | [ADR-301](ADR-301-evidence-engine.md) | Evidence engine — per-(room,device,subject) accuracy ledger | Accepted (phase 1) |
 | [ADR-302](ADR-302-authenticated-sensor-identity.md) | Authenticated sensor identity — RF chain of custody | Accepted (phase 1) |
 | [ADR-303](ADR-303-canonical-spatial-ontology.md) | Canonical spatial ontology — one Site→…→Event model for every surface | Accepted (phase 1) |
 | [ADR-304](ADR-304-persistent-identity-tracking.md) | Persistent identity & tracking — privacy-preserving probabilistic tracks | Proposed (phase 2) |
 | [ADR-305](ADR-305-sensor-placement-optimizer.md) | Sensor placement optimizer — floorplan + inventory → recommended positions | Proposed (phase 3) |
 | [ADR-306](ADR-306-active-sensing.md) | Active sensing — closed-loop RF experiment control | Proposed (phase 3) |
 | [ADR-307](ADR-307-80211bf-native-architecture.md) | 802.11bf-native architecture — standardized WLAN sensing as native measurement types | Proposed (phase 2) |
 | [ADR-308](ADR-308-real-sensor-fusion.md) | Real sensor fusion — uncertainty-aware, multiple observations → one world state | Proposed (phase 2) |
 | [ADR-309](ADR-309-long-term-spatial-memory.md) | Long-term spatial memory — learn the normal physics of a location | Proposed (phase 3) |
 | [ADR-310](ADR-310-counterfactual-inference.md) | Counterfactual inference — generative spatial reasoning | Proposed (phase 3) |
 | [ADR-311](ADR-311-information-gain-scheduler.md) | Information-gain scheduler — sample the most informative radios | Proposed (phase 3) |
 | [ADR-312](ADR-312-digital-rf-twin.md) | Digital RF twin — persistent per-deployment RF model | Proposed (phase 3) |
 | [ADR-313](ADR-313-fleet-control-plane.md) | Fleet control plane — provisioning to audit trails | Proposed (phase 2) |
 | [ADR-314](ADR-314-benchmark-multi-domain-scorecard.md) | Multi-domain benchmark scorecard — regressions cannot hide behind pooled accuracy | Accepted (phase 1) |
 | [ADR-315](ADR-315-capability-certificates.md) | Capability certificates — validated-for-this-environment claims | Accepted (phase 1) |
 | [ADR-316](ADR-316-witness-chain.md) | Witness chain — staged, signed epistemic envelope | Accepted (phase 1) |
 | [ADR-317](ADR-317-sensor-hal.md) | RuView sensor HAL — abstract all sensing hardware to one Observation type | Proposed (phase 2) |
 ---