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# ADR-272: WebSocket authentication tickets
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- **Status**: accepted
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- **Date**: 2026-07-22
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- **Deciders**: RuView maintainers
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- **Tags**: auth, websocket, security, sensing-server
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- **Related**: ADR-271 (Cognitum OAuth resource server), ADR-055 (integrated sensing server), PR #1313 (the exemption this supersedes), cognitum-one/dashboard ADR-060
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## Context
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`bearer_auth` gates `/api/v1/*`. WebSocket upgrade endpoints were exempt, for a
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real reason: a browser's `WebSocket` constructor cannot attach an
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`Authorization` header to the handshake, so a gated socket is simply
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unreachable from page JavaScript. `/ws/sensing` and `/ws/introspection` sat
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outside `PROTECTED_PREFIX` entirely; `/api/v1/stream/pose` was added to an
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explicit `EXEMPT_PATHS` list by PR #1313.
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The reasoning was sound. The consequence was not, and it was measured rather
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than argued. On a server with `RUVIEW_API_TOKEN` set — an operator who believes
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authentication is ON — a real WebSocket handshake carrying **no credential at
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all**:
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```
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/ws/sensing -> 101 Switching Protocols
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/ws/introspection -> 101 Switching Protocols
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/api/v1/stream/pose -> 101 Switching Protocols
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/api/v1/models -> 401 Unauthorized (control)
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```
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**The control plane was locked and the data plane was open.** `/ws/sensing`
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carries the live sensing output — presence, pose, breathing and heart rate.
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`/ws/introspection` exposes internal pipeline state. For the ADR-055 desktop
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topology (server bundled in the app, loopback only) that is bounded. For the
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LAN/hub deployment RuView also supports, anyone who can reach the port can
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watch the sensor.
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ADR-271 sharpened the contrast rather than causing it: the REST surface is now
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genuinely strong — offline-verified Cognitum tokens, scope-separated
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destructive routes — which makes an ungated data plane the obvious way in.
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*Precision about the evidence:* the handshake completing was verified. A
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payload frame was not captured in that window, so the finding is "the
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connection is established without a credential", not "data was read".
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## Decision
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Gate every WebSocket upgrade. Accept **either** of two credentials, chosen to
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match what each kind of client can actually do.
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### 1. Native clients send a bearer on the upgrade
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The Python client, the Rust CLI and the TypeScript MCP client are not browsers
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and have never been subject to the header limitation. They **can** send a normal
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`Authorization: Bearer` on the handshake, so the server accepts one there;
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routing them through a ticket would add a round-trip and a second credential
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path for no benefit.
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> **Correction, 2026-07-23.** This section previously stated that those clients
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> **do** send a bearer. The published Python client does not:
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> `python/wifi_densepose/client/ws.py` calls `websockets.connect(url,
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> ping_interval, ping_timeout, max_size)` and passes no headers at all — the
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> file contains zero occurrences of `extra_headers` or `Authorization`. So every
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> `wifi-densepose[client]` consumer **401s the moment an operator enables
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> auth**, and this ADR told them they would be fine.
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>
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> The server side of the decision stands — a bearer on the upgrade is accepted,
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> and that is the right contract for a non-browser client. What is missing is
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> the client implementing it, tracked as ruvnet/RuView#1395. Until then the only
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> remedy available to those users is
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> `RUVIEW_WS_LEGACY_UNAUTHENTICATED=1`, which reopens the exposure this ADR
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> exists to close — so it is a migration aid with a deadline, not an answer.
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### 2. Browsers exchange their credential for a single-use ticket
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`POST /api/v1/ws-ticket` is an ordinary authenticated request — where headers
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*do* work — and returns an opaque ticket the page appends as
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`?ticket=<value>` on the socket URL.
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**A credential in a URL is normally a mistake.** URLs reach access logs,
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`Referer` headers and browser history. Three properties bound this one, and all
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three are load-bearing:
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| Property | Why it matters |
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|---|---|
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| **Single use** — consumed on the first upgrade attempt, valid or not | A ticket found in a log is already spent |
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| **~30 second TTL** | Long enough to open a socket; not long enough to harvest |
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| **Not the credential** — authorizes one WebSocket | Cannot be replayed against `/api/v1/*`, cannot be refreshed, carries no reusable identity |
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The long-lived bearer token is still never placed in a URL.
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A ticket **inherits the issuing principal's scopes**, so a `sensing:read`
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session cannot mint one that outranks itself, and a ticket from a token without
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`sensing:read` is refused at the upgrade.
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### 3. WebSocket paths are matched by **prefix**, not by an allowlist
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Anything under `/ws/` is treated as an upgrade path, plus the one endpoint that
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lives outside it (`/api/v1/stream/pose`).
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This is the most important detail in the ADR. An allowlist means every
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WebSocket route added later is ungated until someone remembers to extend it —
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the same bug, reintroduced on a delay. It is not hypothetical:
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`/ws/train/progress` (ADR-186, arriving with PR #1387) is already referenced by
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`ui/services/training.service.js` and would have shipped unauthenticated under
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an allowlist. Prefix matching gates it on arrival.
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New WebSocket routes should live under `/ws/` and inherit gating for free.
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### 4. A migration escape hatch, deliberately uncomfortable
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`RUVIEW_WS_LEGACY_UNAUTHENTICATED=1` restores the previous behaviour. Gating
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these paths **breaks a browser UI that has not yet been updated to fetch a
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ticket**, and not every deployment can update server and UI in lockstep.
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It is a migration aid, not a supported configuration:
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- It logs a warning on every boot naming the actual exposure — "the live
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sensing stream — presence, pose and vital signs — is readable by anyone who
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can reach this port" — rather than something an operator can skim past.
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- Its blast radius is exactly the WebSocket paths. A test pins that it does not
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weaken `/api/v1/*`.
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- It is read **once at construction**, so changing the environment cannot
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silently open the paths on a running server.
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The alternative — a clean break with no hatch — was considered and rejected as
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sequencing, not principle: a hard break tempts an operator into turning auth off
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entirely, which is strictly worse than a narrow, loudly-announced exception.
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The hatch should be removed once the shipped UI fetches tickets.
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### 5. Deployments with auth off are unchanged
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No credential configured ⇒ the middleware is the same no-op it has always been.
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Pinned by a test.
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## Consequences
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- The measured hole is closed: all three paths now return `401` to a
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credential-less handshake, while a bearer or a valid ticket returns `101`.
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- Browser UIs need updating. Shipped in the same change for
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`sensing.service.js`, `websocket-client.js` and `observatory/js/main.js` via
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a shared `withWsTicket()` helper; a ticket is minted per connection attempt
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and never cached, because it is single-use and short-lived.
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- A UI running against a server that predates this ADR still works: the helper
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treats `404` from `/api/v1/ws-ticket` as "no ticket needed".
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- One more round-trip before a browser opens a socket. Negligible against a
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stream that then runs for minutes.
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- Tickets live in memory, capped at 512 outstanding and self-healing as they
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expire, so an authenticated but misbehaving caller cannot grow the store
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without bound. In-memory is correct rather than convenient: a ticket
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surviving a restart would outlive the server that vouched for it.
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## Supersedes
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PR #1313's `enabled_exempts_pose_stream_websocket`, which asserted the
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exemption. Its premise about browsers was correct and is preserved here; its
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conclusion is replaced. The test was renamed and inverted rather than deleted,
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with the history in its doc comment, and the half that still matters — the
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WebSocket rule must not leak to other `/api/v1/*` paths — is kept.
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## Deliberately not done
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- **`/health*` stays ungated.** Orchestrator probes hit it anonymously, and
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that is the point of a liveness endpoint. `/health/metrics` is included in
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that exemption; if metrics ever carry occupancy-derived values this should be
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revisited, because that would make them sensing data wearing an ops label.
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- **`/ui/*` stays ungated.** It is static assets; the data behind them is
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gated.
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- **No revocation of an issued ticket.** It expires in seconds and is
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single-use; a revocation path would be more machinery than the exposure
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justifies.
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- **No ticket for native clients.** They can send a header, so they should.
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## Implementation
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`v2/crates/wifi-densepose-sensing-server/src/ws_ticket.rs` (store),
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`src/bearer_auth.rs` (gating), `src/main.rs` (`POST /api/v1/ws-ticket`),
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`ui/services/ws-ticket.js` plus the three call sites.
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Tests: 12 store, 9 gating, 4 path-matching. Store coverage includes single-use
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enforcement, replay refusal, expiry refusal *and* pruning, 256-bit
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unpredictability, cap enforcement and self-healing, and `?myticket=x` not being
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read as `?ticket=x`. Gating coverage includes every known WS path refusing an
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unauthenticated upgrade, bearer acceptance, ticket single-use, a ticket being
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useless against REST, the escape hatch working *and* not weakening REST, and
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auth-off behaviour unchanged.
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