feat(ADR-262 P3): live /api/field + /ws/field — RuView sensing speaks RuField (fail-closed egress) (#1071)

* feat(ADR-262 P3): live RuField surface — RuView sensing speaks RuField on /api/field + /ws/field

Wire the P1 `wifi-densepose-rufield` bridge into the live
`wifi-densepose-sensing-server` so the governed sensing cycle emits real
signed RuField `FieldEvent`s on two additive endpoints.

- Cargo: add the `wifi-densepose-rufield` path dep (the single coupling
  point, ADR-262 §5.4 — no new RuView-internal coupling).
- New `src/rufield_surface.rs` (kept out of the 8k-line main.rs):
  `FieldSurface` holds a dedicated ed25519 `Signer` + a bounded ring of
  recent events + the `/ws/field` broadcast topic; `GET /api/field` and
  `GET /ws/field` handlers; a standalone `router()` for isolated testing.
- Signer (defers the P2 key decision, ADR-262 §8 Q1): a STANDALONE
  dev/sensing key from `WDP_RUFIELD_SIGNING_SEED`, else a deterministic
  dev default with a logged WARN. Reusing the `cog-ha-matter` Ed25519
  key is the deferred P2 call — P3 does not pre-empt it.
- Tap: at the ESP32 governed-trust cycle (`main.rs` ~5886 observe_cycle
  / ~5938 SensingUpdate build), `emit_rufield_event` joins the cycle's
  features/classification/signal_field with the engine's
  effective_class/demoted trust state into a `SensingSnapshot` and
  surfaces it via the bridge. Existing endpoints (`/ws/sensing` etc.)
  are unchanged — purely additive.
- Privacy egress: `network_egress_allowed` is fail-closed for an
  unattended live surface — only P1/P2 leave the box; P0 raw and
  P3/P4/P5 (identity/biometric/aggregate) are held edge-local. A
  `Derived` cycle maps to P4/P5 and never surfaces.
- No-phantom: `emit` drops no-presence cycles (no fabricated events).

Gates (tests/rufield_surface_test.rs, tower::oneshot, 4/0): well-formed
signed event (WifiCsi, P2 not P1, is_fusable, real timestamp); empty
cycle → no phantom; Derived trust never surfaces; mixed stream surfaces
only egress-safe events.

Honesty (ADR-262 §0/§6): real plumbing on a live endpoint, NOT accuracy.
Single-link CSI with its existing caveats (no validated room-coordinate
accuracy); dedicated dev signing key pending the P2 ownership decision;
no accuracy claim.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* docs(ADR-262 P3): mark P1+P3 implemented; document /api/field + /ws/field; CHANGELOG

- ADR-262 Status → "P1 + P3 implemented"; add a P3 implementation-status
  block (tap site, endpoints, dedicated dev signer deferring the §8 Q1
  key decision, fail-closed egress, gates). Keep the honesty framing:
  real plumbing on a live endpoint, not accuracy.
- CHANGELOG [Unreleased]: add the ADR-262 P3 entry.
- user-guide: add `/api/field` to the REST table + a "RuField surface
  (ADR-262 P3)" section covering `/api/field` + `/ws/field`, the
  fail-closed P1/P2-only egress, the WDP_RUFIELD_SIGNING_SEED dev key,
  and the no-accuracy honesty note.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* ci: checkout submodules everywhere + Dockerfile copies vendor/rufield

Making wifi-densepose-rufield (ADR-262 bridge) a v2 workspace member means
EVERY cargo-on-workspace context must have the vendor/rufield submodule
present (cargo loads all member manifests). P1 only fixed the rust-tests
job; this adds `submodules: recursive` to all workflow checkouts that run
cargo (mqtt-integration was failing on the missing submodule manifest), and
makes Dockerfile.rust COPY vendor/rufield/ to /vendor/rufield (matches the
bridge's ../../../vendor/rufield path-dep under the collapsed Docker layout).
update-submodules.yml left alone (it manages submodules itself).

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

---------

Co-authored-by: ruv <ruvnet@gmail.com>

docs/adr/ADR-262-rufield-ruview-integration.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 | Field | Value |
 |-------|-------|
-| **Status** | Proposed — P1 implemented |
+| **Status** | Proposed — **P1 + P3 implemented** (live `/api/field` + `/ws/field`; P3 signs with a **dedicated dev/sensing key**, deferring the §8 Q1 `cog-ha-matter` key-ownership decision to P2) |
 | **Date** | 2026-06-14 |
 | **Deciders** | ruv |
 | **Codebase target** | New thin bridge crate `wifi-densepose-rufield` (v2 workspace member); taps `wifi-densepose-sensing-server` emit path + `wifi-densepose-engine` `TrustedOutput`; depends on `vendor/rufield/crates/rufield-*` via path (the `vendor/rvcsi` pattern) |
@@ -30,7 +30,15 @@ This project has been publicly accused of "AI slop." This ADR answers with **evi
 - **Privacy (§3.3 crux)** — `map_privacy()` maps by information content, **fail-closed**: `Raw → P0`, `Derived → P4` (or `P5` if identity-bound — **never P1**), `Anonymous → P2`, `Restricted → P2`; a `demoted` cycle floors egress to ≥ P2.
 - **Gates that pass** (`tests/p1_gates.rs`, 15 tests / 0 failed = 5 unit + 9 integration + 1 doc): round-trip (snapshot → `FieldEvent` → serde → equal); `is_fusable` (verified ed25519 receipt); `RuFieldFusion::ingest` accept + `infer()` runs; **privacy-safety** (`gate_privacy_safety_derived_never_maps_to_low_privacy` — `Derived → P4/P5`, never P1; full §3.3 table; fail-closed demotion); determinism (same snapshot + same signer seed → byte-identical event).
 
-**Deferred:** the §3.3 *provenance carrier* recommendation (reuse the `cog-ha-matter` SHA-256+Ed25519 chain + embed the BLAKE3 engine witness) is **not** in P1 — P1 takes a dedicated `Signer` param (the §8 open question 1 key-ownership decision is unresolved). P2's BLAKE3-embed, P3 (live `/ws/field` surfacing — the bridge is **not** wired into the running server yet), and P4 (multi-modality) remain future work. **No accuracy is claimed** (§0 / §6) — P1 is tested plumbing + a safe privacy mapping.
+**P3 (§4) is implemented** as the live RuField surface in `wifi-densepose-sensing-server` (the bridge is now wired into the running server):
+
+- **Tap** — at the ESP32 governed-trust cycle (`main.rs` `observe_cycle` ~`:5886` / `SensingUpdate` build ~`:5938`), a new `emit_rufield_event` joins the cycle's `SensingUpdate` (features / classification / signal_field) with the engine's recorded `effective_class` / `demoted` trust state into a `wifi_densepose_rufield::SensingSnapshot`, then `snapshot_to_field_event(&snap, &signer)`. Existing endpoints (`/ws/sensing` etc.) are **unchanged** — purely additive.
+- **Surface** — `GET /api/field` (latest signed `FieldEvent`s + signer pubkey + a `dev_signing_key` flag) and `GET /ws/field` (broadcast stream, mirroring `/ws/sensing`), both mounted on the HTTP port and `/ws/field` also on the WS port. A small bounded ring buffer (`FIELD_RING_CAPACITY = 64`) holds recent **network-surfaced** events. New handler code lives in `src/rufield_surface.rs`, not in the 8k-line `main.rs`.
+- **Signer (defers the P2 key decision)** — a **dedicated standalone `Signer`** held in server state, seeded from `WDP_RUFIELD_SIGNING_SEED` (64-hex or ≥32-byte value), else a deterministic dev default with a logged `WARN`. Reusing the `cog-ha-matter` Ed25519 key (§8 Q1) is the **deferred P2** decision — P3 uses a standalone sensing key so it does not pre-empt that call.
+- **Egress privacy (fail-closed)** — `network_egress_allowed` is *stricter* than `DefaultPrivacyGuard` for an unattended live surface: only **P1/P2** leave the box; P0 (raw) and P3/P4/P5 (identity/biometric/aggregate above the default P2 ceiling) are held edge-local. A `Derived` cycle maps to P4/P5 and is therefore **never** surfaced. No-presence cycles emit nothing (no phantom events).
+- **Gates that pass** (`tests/rufield_surface_test.rs`, 4 integration via `tower::oneshot` + 4 module unit, 0 failed): a well-formed **signed** event (`Modality::WifiCsi`, P2 not P1, `is_fusable` ed25519-verified, real timestamp); **empty cycle → no phantom**; **privacy-safety** — an injected `Derived` trust never surfaces on `/api/field`; a mixed stream surfaces only egress-safe events.
+
+**Deferred:** the §3.3 *provenance carrier* recommendation (reuse the `cog-ha-matter` SHA-256+Ed25519 chain + embed the BLAKE3 engine witness) is **not** in P1/P3 — both take a dedicated `Signer` (the §8 open question 1 key-ownership decision is unresolved; P3 uses a standalone dev/sensing key precisely so it does not pre-empt P2). P2's `cog-ha-matter` key reuse + BLAKE3-embed, and P4 (multi-modality), remain future work. **No accuracy is claimed** (§0 / §6) — P1/P3 are tested plumbing on a live endpoint + a safe privacy mapping; the live surface is single-link CSI with its existing caveats (no validated room-coordinate accuracy — `field_localize`).
 
 ---
 

docs/user-guide.md

@@ -522,6 +522,25 @@ Base URL: `http://localhost:3000` (Docker) or `http://localhost:8080` (binary de
 | `GET` | `/api/v1/mesh` | ADR-110 fleet-wide mesh sync map ([iter 29](adr/ADR-110-esp32-c6-firmware-extension.md)) | `{"nodes":{"9":{...},"12":{...}},"total":2}` |
 | `GET` | `/api/v1/nodes/:id/sync` | Single-node mesh sync snapshot (or 404) | `{"offset_us":1163565,"is_leader":false,...}` |
 | `GET` | `/api/v1/mesh/metrics` | ADR-110 mesh state in Prometheus exposition format ([iter 36](adr/ADR-110-esp32-c6-firmware-extension.md)) | `wifi_densepose_mesh_offset_us{node="9"} 1163565\n…` |
+| `GET` | `/api/field` | ADR-262 P3 — latest **signed RuField `FieldEvent`s** from the live sensing cycle, plus the signer pubkey + a `dev_signing_key` flag. Only egress-safe (P1/P2) events are surfaced; identity/biometric (P4/P5) and raw (P0) are held edge-local | `{"spec":"rufield","signer_pubkey_hex":"…","dev_signing_key":true,"events":[…]}` |
+
+### RuField surface (ADR-262 P3)
+
+RuView's live WiFi-CSI sensing now also speaks the standalone **RuField MFS** wire format. Each governed sensing cycle is converted (via the `wifi-densepose-rufield` anti-corruption bridge) into a **signed** `FieldEvent` (`Modality::WifiCsi`, ed25519 `ProvenanceRef`) and surfaced on two additive endpoints:
+
+- `GET /api/field` — the most recent signed events (JSON).
+- `GET /ws/field` — a WebSocket that streams each cycle's signed event (mirrors `/ws/sensing`).
+
+```bash
+curl -s http://localhost:3000/api/field | python -m json.tool          # latest signed FieldEvents
+python -c "import asyncio,websockets; asyncio.run((lambda: websockets.connect('ws://localhost:8765/ws/field'))())"  # stream
+```
+
+Privacy is fail-closed: only egress-safe **P1/P2** events leave the box — raw (P0) and identity/biometric/aggregate (P3–P5) cycles are held **edge-local** and never appear on these endpoints; a no-presence cycle emits **no event**.
+
+**Signing key:** the surface signs with a **dedicated dev/sensing key**, seeded from `WDP_RUFIELD_SIGNING_SEED` (a 64-char hex string or a ≥32-byte value); when unset it falls back to a deterministic dev default and logs a `WARN` (the `dev_signing_key` flag in `/api/field` reflects this). This is a standalone key pending the ADR-262 §8 Q1 key-ownership decision — set `WDP_RUFIELD_SIGNING_SEED` for any real deployment.
+
+> **Honesty (ADR-262 §0/§6):** this is real plumbing on a live endpoint, **not an accuracy claim.** It is the single-link CSI sensing with its existing caveats (no validated room-coordinate accuracy — positions are the "strongest field peak", not calibrated triangulation).
 
 ### Example: Get fleet mesh state (ADR-110)