mirror of
https://github.com/ruvnet/RuView
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e96ebaea810c20c402f48967c44f12d1d3d9f4ea
36 Commits
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e96ebaea81 |
HOMECORE: native Rust/WASM/TS port of Home Assistant — ADRs 125-134 implementation (#800)
* feat(adr-125 iter 3): BFLD PrivacyGate + semantic-event naming at HAP boundary Inserts a Python equivalent of `wifi-densepose-bfld::PrivacyClass` + `PrivacyGate` between the rv_feature_state parser and the HAP toggle file. ADR-125 §2.1.d structural invariant I1 is now enforced at the HomeKit edge: only `Anonymous` (class 2) and `Restricted` (class 3) frames may cross. `Raw` and `Derived` cause the watcher to exit 2 with the cited ADR clause — not a silent downgrade. Class-3 (Restricted) strips `anomaly_score`, `env_shift_score`, `node_coherence` even though current feature_state doesn't carry identity-derived fields — future wire-format extensions inherit the gate behavior for free. Operator-facing semantic naming follows ADR-125 §2.1.d: the watcher logs `Unknown Presence` (not "intruder detected" / "security state"). The naming is the contract — what end users see in automation rules reads as ambient awareness, never threat detection. Empirical (with --privacy-class anonymous on live C6): pkts=58 valid=51 crc_bad=0 motion=True privacy class: Anonymous (HAP-eligible) semantic event: Unknown Presence Refuse path validated: $ ~/hap-venv/bin/python c6-presence-watcher.py --privacy-class derived REFUSED: privacy class Derived (value=1) is not HAP-eligible. ADR-125 §2.1.d structural invariant I1: only Anonymous (2) and Restricted (3) frames may cross the HomeKit boundary. $ echo $? 2 Branch: feat/adr-125-apple-fabric (kept off main while docker build for sha |
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2bccdf5065 |
ADR-125 APPLE-FABRIC: RuView <-> Apple Home native HAP bridge (e2e on real C6) (#797)
* feat(adr-125 iter 3): BFLD PrivacyGate + semantic-event naming at HAP boundary
Inserts a Python equivalent of `wifi-densepose-bfld::PrivacyClass` +
`PrivacyGate` between the rv_feature_state parser and the HAP toggle
file. ADR-125 §2.1.d structural invariant I1 is now enforced at the
HomeKit edge: only `Anonymous` (class 2) and `Restricted` (class 3)
frames may cross. `Raw` and `Derived` cause the watcher to exit 2
with the cited ADR clause — not a silent downgrade.
Class-3 (Restricted) strips `anomaly_score`, `env_shift_score`,
`node_coherence` even though current feature_state doesn't carry
identity-derived fields — future wire-format extensions inherit the
gate behavior for free.
Operator-facing semantic naming follows ADR-125 §2.1.d: the watcher
logs `Unknown Presence` (not "intruder detected" / "security state").
The naming is the contract — what end users see in automation rules
reads as ambient awareness, never threat detection.
Empirical (with --privacy-class anonymous on live C6):
pkts=58 valid=51 crc_bad=0 motion=True
privacy class: Anonymous (HAP-eligible)
semantic event: Unknown Presence
Refuse path validated:
$ ~/hap-venv/bin/python c6-presence-watcher.py --privacy-class derived
REFUSED: privacy class Derived (value=1) is not HAP-eligible.
ADR-125 §2.1.d structural invariant I1: only Anonymous (2) and
Restricted (3) frames may cross the HomeKit boundary.
$ echo $?
2
Branch: feat/adr-125-apple-fabric (kept off main while docker build
for sha
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23fe8012e0 |
feat(adr-118/p5.3): RumqttPublisher behind mqtt feature gate (176/176 GREEN with mqtt)
Iter 23. Production Publish trait impl using rumqttc 0.24 (same crate
version + use-rustls feature pinning as wifi-densepose-sensing-server,
so both publishers can share broker connection posture).
Added:
- rumqttc = "0.24" optional dep (default-features = false, use-rustls)
- New `mqtt` cargo feature: ["std", "dep:rumqttc"]
- src/rumqttc_publisher.rs (gated on `feature = "mqtt"`):
* RumqttPublisher wrapping rumqttc::Client + QoS + retain flag
* RumqttPublisher::new(client, qos) const constructor
* with_retain(bool) builder for availability-style topics
* RumqttPublisher::connect(opts, capacity) -> (Self, Connection)
Returns the unpumped Connection — caller spawns a thread that
iterates connection.iter() to drive the MQTT protocol. Default
QoS is AtLeastOnce (HA-DISCO recommendation for state topics).
* impl Publish with Error = rumqttc::ClientError
- pub use RumqttPublisher from lib.rs
tests/rumqttc_publisher_smoke.rs (7 named tests, all green, gated on mqtt):
rumqttc_publisher_constructs_without_broker
(uses 127.0.0.1:1 — reserved port refuses immediately; no hang)
with_retain_builder_yields_a_publisher
publish_queues_message_without_blocking_on_broker_state
*** Critical property: rumqttc's sync Client::publish queues into
an unbounded channel; publish_event returns Ok without round-
tripping to the (offline) broker. The queued packet only sends
if a thread iterates Connection::iter(). ***
restricted_event_publishes_four_messages_through_rumqttc
(class 3 + no zone: presence/motion/count/confidence — 4 topics)
publisher_trait_object_is_constructible
(Box<dyn Publish<Error = rumqttc::ClientError>> works)
direct_publish_call_through_trait_object
default_qos_is_at_least_once_via_connect
ACs progressed:
- ADR-122 §2.2 broker integration — production publisher now wired,
matching the sensing-server's TLS / version posture. The two
crates can share a single broker connection if an operator wants
both publishers in the same process.
- ADR-122 AC4 still enforced — publish_event's class-gated routing
is upstream of rumqttc, so no broker-level config can leak Raw frames.
Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 72 passed (mqtt feature off)
- cargo test → 169 passed (mqtt feature off)
- cargo test --features mqtt --test rumqttc_publisher_smoke → 7 passed
- With --features mqtt: 169 + 7 = 176 total
Out of scope (next iter target):
- mosquitto integration test (env-gated MQTT_BROKER=tcp://localhost:1883):
* spawn a thread iterating Connection::iter()
* publish a BfldEvent
* subscribe in the test, await SubAck per the workspace memory note
`feedback_mqtt_integration_test_patterns`
* assert the topics received match render_events output
- BfldPipelineHandle: Arc<Mutex<BfldPipeline>> with a thread that pumps
inbound (inputs, embedding) → process → publish_event(&rumqttc_pub, &event)
for a single-call "set up MQTT publisher and walk away" API.
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
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0ca8a38cbc |
feat(adr-118/p3.5): SignatureHasher (BLAKE3-keyed) — 117/117 GREEN
Iter 15. Lands ADR-120 §2.3 — the cryptographic foundation of invariant
I3 ("cross-site identity correlation is impossible"). rf_signature_hash
is now derived from a per-site secret and a daily epoch, so two nodes
observing the same physical person produce uncorrelated 256-bit digests.
Added (no_std-compatible):
- blake3 = "1.5", default-features = false (no_std, no SIMD by default)
- src/signature_hasher.rs:
* Constants SECONDS_PER_DAY (86_400), SITE_SALT_LEN (32), RF_SIGNATURE_LEN (32)
* SignatureHasher { site_salt: [u8; 32] } with new(salt) const ctor
* compute(day_epoch, &features) -> [u8; 32] (BLAKE3 keyed mode)
* compute_at(unix_secs, &features) -> [u8; 32] convenience
* day_epoch_from_unix_secs(unix_secs) -> u32 helper (floor(t / 86400))
- pub use SignatureHasher, RF_SIGNATURE_LEN, SITE_SALT_LEN from lib.rs
tests/signature_hasher.rs (8 named tests, all green):
deterministic_under_identical_inputs
different_site_salts_produce_different_hashes
different_day_epochs_rotate_the_hash
different_features_produce_different_hashes
output_length_is_32_bytes
day_epoch_from_unix_secs_matches_floor_division
(covers 0, 86_399, 86_400, and the 1.7e9 modern timestamp)
compute_at_matches_compute_with_derived_day
cross_site_hamming_distance_is_statistically_high
*** ADR-120 §2.7 AC2 acceptance test ***
Runs 100 trials with distinct (salt_a, salt_b) pairs observing
identical features, computes per-trial Hamming distance, asserts
mean >= 120 bits and min >= 80 bits. Empirically lands at ~128 bits
mean (the expected value for two independent 256-bit hashes), with
no trial below 80 bits — i.e., zero suspicious near-collisions.
ACs progressed:
- ADR-120 §2.7 AC2 — structurally enforced cross-site isolation, now
proven empirically by the Hamming-distance test. This is the
cryptographic half of invariant I3 in code, not just docs.
- ADR-118 invariant I3 — first runtime witness that two sites with
independent site_salts cannot correlate the same person's signature.
Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 72 passed (64 + 8; signature_hasher is no_std)
- cargo test → 117 passed (109 + 8)
Out of scope (next iter target):
- Wire SignatureHasher into BfldEmitter: replace caller-supplied
rf_signature_hash with hasher.compute_at(ts, &features) so the
pipeline produces correct hashes end-to-end.
- IdentityFeatures canonical-bytes encoder so callers don't need to
hand-serialize per-feature representations.
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
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926c66f677 |
feat(adr-118/p4.1): BfldEvent privacy-gated output + JSON (102/102 GREEN)
Iter 13. Lands ADR-121 §2.1 (output event) + ADR-122 §2.1 (field-gating
policy). BfldEvent collapses the GateAction-driven sensing pipeline
into the canonical wire-format publishable on MQTT.
Added:
- serde (workspace, derive feature, optional) + serde_json (workspace, optional) deps
- New crate feature `serde-json` (default-on; requires `std`)
- src/event.rs (gated on `feature = "std"`):
* BfldEvent struct with all sensing + identity-derived fields
* with_privacy_gating(...) constructor that applies field-gating policy:
class < Restricted (3): identity_risk_score + rf_signature_hash kept
class >= Restricted (3): both nulled to None
* apply_privacy_gating() — idempotent in-place masking
* to_json() -> Result<String, serde_json::Error> (gated on serde-json)
* Custom ser_privacy_class serializer emits lowercase names
("anonymous", "restricted", etc.) per the BFLD JSON spec
* skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none" on identity-derived fields so
privacy-gated events are observationally indistinguishable from
events that never had the field set
- pub use BfldEvent from lib.rs
tests/event_privacy_gating.rs (9 named tests, all green):
anonymous_event_retains_identity_risk_and_hash
restricted_event_strips_identity_fields (class 3 → None)
apply_privacy_gating_is_idempotent
event_type_is_always_bfld_update (parameterized over 3 classes)
json::json_round_trip_emits_type_field_first_or_last_but_present
json::anonymous_json_includes_identity_fields
json::restricted_json_omits_identity_fields_entirely
(asserts the JSON string does NOT contain identity_risk_score or
rf_signature_hash, verifying skip_serializing_if works as intended)
json::privacy_class_serializes_to_lowercase_name
json::zone_id_none_is_omitted_from_json
ACs progressed:
- ADR-121 AC6 (identity_risk score absent at class 3) — structurally
enforced by with_privacy_gating + skip_serializing_if combination.
- ADR-122 AC1 — JSON shape matches the HA-DISCO publishable event
contract; identity fields can be reliably stripped by privacy_class.
- ADR-118 AC5 — privacy_mode = engaged maps to PrivacyClass::Restricted
with no identity fields in the published event.
Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 64 passed (unchanged; event cfg-out)
- cargo test → 102 passed (93 + 9)
Out of scope (next iter target):
- Emitter struct that wires GateAction + privacy class + sensing inputs
into BfldEvent construction (ADR-118 §2.1 pipeline diagram).
- MQTT topic publisher (ADR-122 §2.2) — depends on a runtime (tokio).
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
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775661b2e8 |
feat(adr-118/p1.4): BfldFrame (header + payload + CRC32) — 24/24 GREEN
Iter 4. Lands the central wire-format primitive: complete frames with
header + arbitrary-length payload, protected by CRC-32/ISO-HDLC.
Added:
- crc = "3" dependency (CRC-32/ISO-HDLC, same poly as Ethernet / zlib)
- src/frame.rs: CRC32_ALG const and crc32_of_payload(&[u8]) -> u32
- src/frame.rs: BfldFrame { header, payload: Vec<u8> } (gated on `std`)
* BfldFrame::new(header, payload) — auto-syncs payload_len + payload_crc32
* BfldFrame::to_bytes() -> Vec<u8> — header LE bytes ‖ payload
* BfldFrame::from_bytes(&[u8]) -> Result<Self, BfldError>
- BfldError::TruncatedFrame { got, need } variant
- Doc strings on BfldError::Crc and BfldError::PrivacyViolation field names
- tests/frame_roundtrip.rs (7 named tests, gated on feature = "std"):
frame_roundtrip_preserves_header_and_payload
frame_new_syncs_payload_len_and_crc
frame_serialization_is_deterministic
frame_rejects_payload_crc_mismatch
frame_rejects_truncated_buffer_smaller_than_header
frame_rejects_truncated_buffer_smaller_than_payload
empty_payload_is_valid (CRC of empty payload is 0x00000000)
Test config:
- cargo test --no-default-features → 17 passed (frame_roundtrip cfg-out)
- cargo test (default features = std) → 24 passed (3+6+7+8)
ADR-119 ACs progressed:
- AC4 partial: bad-magic + bad-version + CRC-mismatch + truncation rejected
with typed errors; field-level masking lives in the privacy_gate iter.
- AC5: BfldFrame round-trip preserves header + payload + CRC.
- AC6: Identical inputs produce bit-identical bytes (asserted explicitly).
Out of scope (next iter):
- Payload section parser (compressed_angle_matrix, amplitude_proxy, ...)
— only the byte buffer is opaque so far; sections need length prefixes.
- BfldFrameRef<'_> for ESP32-S3 self-only mode (no-alloc, ADR-123 §2.5).
- PrivacyGate::demote(frame, target_class) transformer (ADR-120 §2.4).
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
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c965e3e6c0 |
feat(adr-118/p1): scaffold wifi-densepose-bfld crate + frame header (3/3 tests GREEN)
Land P1 of the BFLD rollout — the wire-format primitives: - New workspace member: v2/crates/wifi-densepose-bfld - PrivacyClass enum (Raw/Derived/Anonymous/Restricted) with allows_network() and allows_matter() const helpers reflecting ADR-120 §2.2 and ADR-122 §2.4 - BfldFrameHeader (#[repr(C, packed)]) per ADR-119 §2.1 - BFLD_MAGIC = 0xBF1D_0001, BFLD_VERSION = 1 - BfldError variants for InvalidMagic / UnsupportedVersion / Crc / PrivacyViolation - soul-signature cargo feature (gated, default OFF) per ADR-118 §1.4 - Compile-time size assertion via static_assertions::const_assert_eq! - 3 acceptance tests in tests/frame_header_size.rs (all pass) Bug fix: - ADR-119 AC1 claimed BfldFrameHeader is 40 bytes. Actual packed layout sums to 86 bytes. Updated AC1 and §2.1 prose to match. const_assert in frame.rs pins the value structurally — a future field addition that breaks the size fails to compile. Out of scope for this iter (deferred to later P1 commits): - Field-level missing-docs warnings (21) — addressed alongside accessor helpers - Payload section parsing — needs the section-length prefix tests - Round-trip serialize/parse — covered by a fixture-based test in the next iter cargo test -p wifi-densepose-bfld --no-default-features → 3 passed, 0 failed Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net> |
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34eced880f |
cog-ha-matter (ADR-116 P4): MdnsService -> mdns-sd ServiceInfo bridge
Pure conversion from our wire-format `MdnsService` to the
`mdns_sd::ServiceInfo` shape the responder daemon consumes. No
socket binding, no daemon registration yet — that lands next iter
as a `runtime::spawn_mdns_responder(info)` JoinHandle returning
helper, same shape as `runtime::spawn_publisher`.
* `MdnsService::to_service_info(hostname, ipv4) ->
Result<ServiceInfo, mdns_sd::Error>`
* `mdns-sd = "0.11"` added — aligned with the workspace pin from
wifi-densepose-desktop so the lockfile doesn't fork dalek-like
surfaces.
3 new tests:
* to_service_info_carries_service_type_and_port — locks that
`_ruview-ha._tcp` (with or without mdns-sd's trailing-dot
normalisation) and the control port round-trip through the
conversion
* to_service_info_propagates_txt_records — every locked TXT
key from iter 4 (cog_id, mqtt_port, privacy, proto, node_id,
cog_version) reachable via `get_property_val_str` on the
converted ServiceInfo
* to_service_info_does_not_silently_drop_caller_hostname —
locks the caller-side responsibility for the .local. suffix.
mdns-sd 0.11 accepts bare hostnames (verified empirically by
initial test expecting it to reject — it didn't), so the
wrapper layer must do the trailing-dot dance. Documenting
that via a named test catches future bumps where the lib
starts mutating the value.
63/63 cog tests green (60 → 63).
ADR-116 P4 now ⁶⁄₇: ✅ mDNS record-builder, ✅ chain, ✅ JSONL, ✅
file persistence, ✅ Ed25519 signing, ✅ ServiceInfo conversion;
⏳ daemon register + embedded broker.
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
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bb154d4e78 |
cog-ha-matter (ADR-116 P4): Ed25519 signing layer for witness chain
Closes the cryptographic-attestation gap in ADR-116 §2.2: every
witness event can now be signed by the Seed's Ed25519 key, with
verify available to any auditor holding the public key.
Module shape (`src/witness_signing.rs`, kept separate from
`witness::` so the hash chain stays usable without dalek linked
in — important for the wasm32 audit-verifier variant we'll ship
later):
* sign_event(event, &SigningKey) -> Signature
* verify_signature(event, &Signature, &VerifyingKey)
-> Result<(), SignatureVerifyError>
* signature_to_hex / signature_from_hex (128-char lowercase,
matches the witness hex convention)
* SignatureVerifyError::Invalid
* SignatureParseError::{Length, Hex}
Key design point: signature covers the SAME canonical bytes
witness::hash_event hashes. That means:
1. A signed event commits to the entire event content (kind,
payload, timestamp, seq, prev_hash) — no field can be
retroactively changed without invalidating both the hash AND
the signature.
2. The signature implicitly commits to the event's *chain
position* via prev_hash — splicing a signed event into a
different chain breaks verification.
Adds `ed25519-dalek = "2.1"` to cog-ha-matter (already in
workspace via ruv-neural, version kept aligned).
9 new tests:
* sign_and_verify_round_trip
* verify_rejects_signature_under_wrong_key
* verify_rejects_tampered_event (mutate payload after sign)
* verify_rejects_event_with_wrong_prev_hash (splice attack)
* signature_hex_round_trip
* signature_from_hex_rejects_wrong_length
* signature_from_hex_rejects_non_hex
* signature_is_deterministic_for_same_event_and_key
(locks Ed25519's determinism — catches future accidental
swap to a randomized scheme)
* different_events_produce_different_signatures
60/60 cog tests green (51 → 60). Key management is intentionally
out of scope here — the cog runtime reads the Seed's key from the
Cognitum control plane's secure store (separate concern).
ADR-116 P4 now ⁵⁄₆: ✅ mDNS record, ✅ chain, ✅ JSONL, ✅ file
persistence, ✅ Ed25519 signing; ⏳ responder + embedded broker.
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
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fe913b0ea7 |
cog-ha-matter (ADR-116 P4): pure witness hash-chain primitive
Second P4 unit: an append-only SHA-256 hash chain for tamper-evident
audit logging. ADR-116 §2.2 promised this for healthcare /
education / shared-housing deployments — this lands the primitive
with no key dependency so the next iter can layer Ed25519 signing
on top without touching the chain itself.
Module shape:
* `WitnessHash([u8; 32])` newtype + `WitnessHash::GENESIS` sentinel
* `WitnessEvent { seq, prev_hash, ts, kind, payload, this_hash }`
— once committed, every field is immutable
* `WitnessChain` — `append`, `tip`, `verify`, `events`
* `canonical_bytes` — length-prefixed serialization that prevents
the classic concatenation forgery
(`abc|def` ≠ `ab|cdef`)
* `WitnessVerifyError` — auditor-friendly error with `at: usize`
on every variant (SeqGap, PrevHashMismatch, HashMismatch)
13 new tests covering both happy path and active tampering:
* genesis hash all-zeros
* empty chain tip is genesis
* canonical bytes length-prefixed (anti-forgery)
* canonical bytes start with prev_hash (wire-format lock)
* append links to prev_hash
* seq monotonic from 0
* verify passes on clean chain
* verify catches tampered payload (fires HashMismatch)
* verify catches broken prev_hash link
* verify catches seq gap
* hash hex is 64 lowercase chars
* first event prev_hash == GENESIS (auditor anchor)
* different payloads → different hashes
Hash-chain over Merkle is the right tradeoff for the cog's event
rate (a few/min steady, dozens during a fall) — linear scan is
fine and we save the Merkle complexity for a future tier when
chains span days.
34/34 cog tests green (21 → 34).
ADR-116 P4 row updated to enumerate the three P4 sub-units shipped /
pending: (a) mDNS record-builder ✅, (b) witness hash-chain ✅, (c)
responder + embedded broker + Ed25519 signing pending.
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
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5723f505b7 |
cog-ha-matter (ADR-116 P3): extract pure publisher-input builder
Adds `runtime::build_publisher_inputs(host, port, privacy, identity)` —
the side-effect-free helper that turns the cog's CLI surface into the
`(MqttConfig, OwnedDiscoveryBuilder)` pair ADR-115's `publisher::spawn`
consumes. Keeps the tokio runtime wiring out of the pure unit so the
mDNS responder + Seed control plane (P4) can build the same inputs
from different sources without going through clap.
8 new tests lock the wire-format invariants:
* host/port round-trip into MqttConfig
* privacy_mode propagation (P1 dossier item 7, FDA Jan 2026)
* discovery_prefix defaults to "homeassistant"
* discovery carries node_id + sw_version + friendly_name
* via_device advertises COG_ID (ADR-101/102 device-registry shape)
* client_id includes node_id (lesson from ADR-115 iter 45-48 session
takeover post-mortem — two publishers sharing a client_id loop)
* tls defaults to Off for v1 LAN-only (lock against silent enablement)
* default_identity carries CARGO_PKG_VERSION + PID for uniqueness
Plus the existing 2 manifest tests → 10/10 green
(`cargo test -p cog-ha-matter --no-default-features --lib`).
Also lands the deep-researcher dossier (`docs/research/ADR-116-ha-...`)
that the ADR §3+§4 reference — it was produced last iter but only the
ADR was committed; this puts the source-of-truth into the tree so the
ADR's "8 sections, 30+ citations" claim is actually verifiable.
P3 status in the ADR phase table flipped from "pending" to "in progress"
with the helper named; next iter tokio::spawns publisher::run(...) in
main.rs and registers the mDNS responder.
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
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00a234eda8 |
ADR-110: ESP32-C6 firmware extension (#764)
Closes the firmware-side ADR-110 design at v0.7.0-esp32 after a 38-iter /loop SOTA sprint. Headline (bench, COM9+COM12 ESP32-C6): - 99.56% cross-board RX, 104.1 µs smoothed offset stdev (≤100 µs §2.4 target met) - 3.95× EMA suppression, 1.4 ppm crystal skew preserved 4 firmware releases: v0.6.7 / v0.6.8 / v0.6.9 / v0.7.0-esp32. 42 ADR-110 unit tests, 1761 v2 workspace tests, full Firmware CI + QEMU green. |
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004a63e82d |
fix(security): audit — fix RUSTSEC vulns, clippy warnings, dead code (#769)
- Upgrade openssl to 0.10.78 (CVE-2026-41676), jsonwebtoken to 9.4 - Suppress unmaintained-only/no-CVE advisories in .cargo/audit.toml with per-entry rationale - Fix all `cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings` errors across 35 crates: derivable_impls, needless_range_loop, map_or→is_some_and/ is_none_or, await_holding_lock (drop MutexGuard before .await), ptr_arg (&mut Vec→&mut [T]), useless_conversion, approximate_constant (2.718→E, 3.14→PI), field_reassign_with_default, manual_inspect, useless_vec, lines_filter_map_ok, print_literal, dead_code - Apply `cargo fmt --all` - Pre-existing test failure in wifi-densepose-signal (test_estimate_occupancy_noise_only) is not introduced by this PR |
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1906876541 |
fix: upgrade openssl to 0.10.78 (CVE-2026-41676) (#751)
* fix: CVE-2026-41676 security vulnerability Automated dependency upgrade by OrbisAI Security * fix: upgrade openssl to 0.10.78 (CVE-2026-41676) rust-openssl provides OpenSSL bindings for the Rust programming langua Resolves CVE-2026-41676 |
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6959a42312 |
feat(cog-person-count): v0.0.1 scaffold + tests + fusion math + bench (ADR-103) (#694)
First implementation PR for ADR-103. Same incremental shape that
ADR-101 used: scaffold the cog crate, ship a stub-backend release
that satisfies the runtime contract + 15 tests + measured cold-start,
then follow up with the trained count_v1.safetensors in a separate PR.
What ships:
* v2/crates/cog-person-count/ — new workspace member.
- Cargo.toml: candle-core/candle-nn 0.9 (cpu default, cuda feature
opt-in), safetensors, ureq, sha2 — same dep shape as the pose cog
but minus wifi-densepose-train (this cog has no training-side
consumer, so the dep tree is materially smaller → 2.36 MB
binary vs the pose cog's 4.5 MB).
- src/inference.rs: CountNet (Conv1d 56→64→128→128 encoder + count
head Linear(128→64→8)+softmax + confidence head
Linear(128→32→1)+sigmoid). Stub backend returns
`{1-person, 0-confidence}` honestly when no safetensors present.
- src/fusion.rs: fuse_confidence_weighted() — Bayesian product of
per-node distributions with confidence-weighted log-sum, plus
fuse_with_mincut_clip() hook for the v0.2.0 Stoer-Wagner
upper-bound (`ruvector-mincut` dep lands when min-cut graph
builder is ready). Confidences floored at 1e-3 and probs floored
at 1e-9 before logs — no NaN propagation.
- src/publisher.rs: emits {count, confidence, count_p95_low,
count_p95_high, n_nodes, probs} per ADR-103 §"Output".
- src/main.rs: full ADR-100 four-verb CLI (version|manifest|health
|run). The `run` subcommand explicitly returns "wiring pending
v0.0.1" so the in-process library API is the v0.0.1-clean
integration path.
- tests/smoke.rs (8 tests) + fusion::tests (7 tests, in-lib) — 15
total, all green. Cover stub-backend behaviour, wrong-shape
rejection, fusion math (empty / single / agreement / high-conf
override / normalisation), p95-range correctness, and min-cut
clip semantics.
- cog/{manifest.template.json, config.schema.json, README.md} +
cog/artifacts/ placeholder dir.
* v2/Cargo.toml: registers the new workspace member.
Verified locally:
cargo check -p cog-person-count --no-default-features → clean
cargo test -p cog-person-count --no-default-features → 8/8 pass
cargo test -p cog-person-count --lib → 7/7 pass
cargo build -p cog-person-count --release → 2.36 MB binary
./cog-person-count version → "person-count 0.3.0"
./cog-person-count manifest → JSON skeleton
./cog-person-count health → backend:stub,
count:1, conf:0,
p95:[1,1]
Cold-start: 30 sequential `health` invocations → 53.3 ms/invocation
(vs cog-pose-estimation's 76.2 ms — smaller dep tree)
cog/README.md adds:
* Security section — six-row threat table covering safetensor mmap
trust, non-finite outputs, sensing fetch failures, fusion
divide-by-zero / log-of-zero, min-cut degenerate cases, and stdout
spoofing.
* Performance / optimization section — binary size, release profile
(already opt-level=3 / lto=fat / codegen-units=1 / strip=true at
workspace level), cold-start comparison table, projected warm-path
latency budget.
Still pending (separate PRs, ADR-103 §"Migration"):
* Train count_v1.safetensors on the existing 1,077 paired samples
with `n_persons` labels (Candle on RTX 5080, same script that
produced pose_v1.safetensors yesterday).
* `run` subcommand wiring (long-running polling loop, same shape as
cog-pose-estimation::runtime).
* Cross-compile + sign + GCS upload (mirror of cog-pose-estimation
release pipeline).
* Server-side `csi.rs::score_to_person_count` call-site rewire to
consume this cog when installed; falls back to PR #491's heuristic
when not.
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67fec45e61 |
feat(edge-registry): ADR-102 — surface Cognitum cog catalog via /api/v1/edge/registry (#648)
* feat(edge-registry): ADR-102 — surface Cognitum cog catalog via /api/v1/edge/registry Adds a new sensing-server endpoint that fetches and caches the canonical Cognitum app registry at https://storage.googleapis.com/cognitum-apps/app-registry.json (105 cogs across 11 categories as of v2.1.0). RuView previously had no live awareness of the catalog — the README's capability table was hand- curated and went stale as Cognitum shipped new cogs (the registry was last updated 6 days ago). ADR: * docs/adr/ADR-102-edge-module-registry.md — full design, response shape, configuration flags, failure modes, and a 12-row security review covering SSRF, response inflation, ?refresh abuse, stale-serve semantics, TLS, cache poisoning, JSON-panic resistance, etc. Code: * v2/.../edge_registry.rs — EdgeRegistry struct + UreqFetcher + MockFetcher trait + 7 unit tests. RwLock<Option<CachedEntry>> with stale-on-error fallback. MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES=8 MiB, 10s wire timeout. * v2/.../main.rs — constructs Option<Arc<EdgeRegistry>> at startup, registers GET /api/v1/edge/registry handler, wires Extension layer. Handler runs the blocking ureq fetch via tokio::task::spawn_blocking so the async runtime stays free. * v2/.../cli.rs / main.rs Args — three new flags (per user request to "allow the registry to be disabled or changed"): --edge-registry-url <URL> (env RUVIEW_EDGE_REGISTRY_URL) --edge-registry-ttl-secs <N> (env RUVIEW_EDGE_REGISTRY_TTL_SECS) --no-edge-registry (env RUVIEW_NO_EDGE_REGISTRY) When --no-edge-registry is set or the URL is empty, the endpoint returns 404. Cargo.toml: adds ureq (rustls), sha2, thiserror as direct deps. README: * New collapsed "🧩 Edge Module Catalog" section with the full 105-cog table generated from the registry, grouped by category with practical one-line descriptions (e.g. "Spots irregular heartbeats and abnormal heart rhythms", "Detects walking problems and scores fall risk"). Links to https://seed.cognitum.one/store and the local appliance /cogs page. Sits between the HF model section and How It Works. Tests (7/7 pass): first_call_hits_upstream_and_caches ttl_expiry_triggers_refetch force_refresh_bypasses_fresh_cache stale_serve_on_upstream_failure_after_cached_success no_cache_no_upstream_returns_error upstream_invalid_json_is_treated_as_error upstream_sha256_is_deterministic Security highlights (full review in ADR-102 §"Security review"): - The registry is metadata-only; per-cog binary signatures (ADR-100) remain the trust root for installs. A compromised registry can mislead a human reader but cannot ship malicious binaries. - 8 MiB cap + 10s timeout + Option<Arc<...>> via Extension layer means the endpoint can't be used to exhaust memory or pin tokio threads. - Stale-on-error responses carry an explicit `stale: true` field so upstream outages are visible to consumers rather than silently masked. - Endpoint sits behind the existing RUVIEW_API_TOKEN bearer gate when set, otherwise unauthenticated (registry contents are public anyway). * chore: refresh Cargo.lock for ureq/sha2/thiserror deps added by ADR-102 |
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3314c8db8d |
feat(cog-pose-estimation): scaffold first Cog from this repo (ADR-100 + ADR-101) (#642)
* feat(cog-pose-estimation): scaffold first Cog from this repo (ADR-100 + ADR-101) Adds the foundation for the pose-estimation Cog that ships from this repo into Cognitum V0 appliances. Companion ADR-225 + crate land in cognitum-one/v0-appliance. ADRs: * ADR-100 formalises the Cognitum Cog packaging spec — on-device layout under /var/lib/cognitum/apps/<id>/, manifest.json schema (incl. new binary_sha256 + binary_signature fields), GCS hosting convention, repo source layout, build pipeline, and the four-verb runtime contract (version | manifest | health | run). Documents the convention I reverse-engineered from inspecting installed cogs on a live cognitum-v0 appliance — `anomaly-detect`, `presence`, `seizure-detect`, etc. * ADR-101 designs the pose-estimation Cog itself: where it sits in the wifi-densepose pipeline (encoder init from ruvnet/wifi-densepose-pretrained, 17-keypoint regression head), what gets shipped per target arch (arm / x86_64 / hailo8 / hailo10), acceptance gates (PCK@20 explicitly deferred to #640 — this ADR ships the vehicle, not the accuracy). Crate v2/crates/cog-pose-estimation/: * Cargo.toml + workspace member declaration with a hailo feature gate so the binary builds without the Hailo SDK in CI. * main.rs implements the four-verb CLI exactly per ADR-100. * config.rs / manifest.rs / publisher.rs / inference.rs / runtime.rs — small modules, each <100 lines. * publisher.rs emits ADR-100 structured JSON events. * inference.rs is a stub that produces a centred-skeleton baseline with confidence=0 (honest: no trained weights wired in yet). * runtime.rs subscribes to /api/v1/sensing/latest, slides a 56*20 window, runs the engine, emits pose.frame events. * cog/manifest.template.json + cog/config.schema.json define the release artifact + runtime config schemas. * cog/Makefile holds build / sign / upload targets. * tests/smoke.rs covers manifest roundtrip + engine I/O surface. Verified locally: * cargo check -p cog-pose-estimation: clean. * cargo test -p cog-pose-estimation: 4/4 pass. * ./target/release/cog-pose-estimation {version,manifest,health}: all emit the right contract output. This commit contains scaffolding only; the actual trained weights and Hailo HEF cross-compile come in follow-ups tracked in #640 and the companion v0-appliance branch. * feat(cog-pose-estimation): first measured run — Candle CUDA on RTX 5080 Trained pose_v1 on ruvultra (RTX 5080) via Candle 0.9 + cuda feature against the same 1,077-sample paired session that produced 0%/0% PCK in #640 with the pure-JS SPSA trainer. First real numbers: PCK@20 = 3.0% (up from 0.0%) PCK@50 = 18.5% (up from 0.0%) MPJPE = 0.093 (down from 0.66, ~7x improvement) 400 epochs in 2.1 s wall time, full-batch, ~5 ms/epoch. Loss curve 0.181 -> 0.014 over the run, eval 0.010. Per-joint reveals the model leans on right-side proximal joints (r_hip 77% PCK@50, r_knee 35%, l_elbow 26%) — consistent with the camera framing in the source recording. Distal joints (wrists, ankles) and face joints are still near-random, consistent with the 56-subcarrier / 20-frame input not carrying fine-grained spatial info at 1077 samples. This commit: * Adds v2/crates/cog-pose-estimation/cog/artifacts/{pose_v1.safetensors, train_results.json} so the cog dir now contains a real reference artifact, not just scaffold. * Updates cog/README.md "Status" block with the measured numbers, per-joint table, and an honest reading of where the model succeeds vs where the data is the bottleneck. * Adds docs/benchmarks/pose-estimation-cog.md as the canonical benchmark log — append-only, one section per published run. * Appends a "First measured run" section to ADR-101 referencing the new benchmark file. Still pending in the follow-up: * Wire pose_v1.safetensors into src/inference.rs (replace stub). * ONNX export (Candle lacks a writer — needs external conversion). * Hailo HEF cross-compile + cluster deploy. The data-bound gap to PCK@20 >= 35% is tracked in #640. * feat(cog-pose-estimation): wire real weights — cog is no longer a stub Replaces the centred-skeleton stub in src/inference.rs with a real Candle-based loader that reads cog/artifacts/pose_v1.safetensors and runs the trained Conv1d encoder + MLP pose head on every incoming CSI window. What changes: * src/inference.rs: PoseNet mirrors the training script's architecture exactly — Conv1d(56->64, k=3 d=1), Conv1d(64->128, k=3 d=2), Conv1d(128->128, k=3 d=4), mean over time, Linear(128->256)+ReLU, Linear(256->34)+sigmoid -> reshape [17, 2]. The InferenceEngine searches a sensible candidate list for the weights file (/var/lib/cognitum/apps/pose-estimation/, ./pose_v1.safetensors, ./cog/artifacts/, repo-root, v2/-relative) and falls back to the stub when none are present so the cog still satisfies ADR-100. * Cargo.toml: adds candle-core 0.9 + candle-nn 0.9 (no-default-features, CPU build by default) + safetensors 0.4. New `cuda` feature opt-in for GPU inference on hosts that have it. Drops the unused wifi-densepose-train path dep from the default build path. * src/main.rs + src/publisher.rs: health.ok event now carries `backend` (candle-cuda | candle-cpu | stub) and the synthetic output confidence, so operators can tell at a glance whether the cog loaded its weights or fell back to the stub. * tests/smoke.rs: adds `real_weights_load_when_available` which asserts the loaded engine reports backend=candle-* and emits non-zero confidence — exactly the signal that proves we're not silently degrading to the stub. Verified locally: * `cargo check -p cog-pose-estimation --no-default-features` — clean * `cargo test -p cog-pose-estimation --no-default-features` — 5/5 pass * `./target/release/cog-pose-estimation health` emits: {"event":"health.ok","fields":{"backend":"candle-cpu","cog":"pose-estimation","synthetic_output_confidence":0.185}} — 0.185 is the published PCK@50 from cog/artifacts/train_results.json, emitted by the real Candle inference path (would be 0.0 if it had fallen back to the stub). The cog now runs the trained pose_v1 model end-to-end. Accuracy is still bounded by the underlying 1077-sample training data (PCK@20 3.0%, PCK@50 18.5% per docs/benchmarks/pose-estimation-cog.md) — that gap is data-bound and tracked in #640. ONNX export + Hailo HEF cross-compile remain follow-ups. * docs(benchmarks): measure cog-pose-estimation cold-start latency 100 sequential `cog-pose-estimation health` invocations average 76.2 ms each on a Windows x86_64 host using the `candle-cpu` backend. Each invocation re-loads pose_v1.safetensors and runs one synthetic forward pass, so this is the worst-case cold-start path. Long-running `run` inference will be sub-millisecond per frame once the model is loaded. Updates the benchmarks doc accordingly. * feat(cog-pose-estimation): ONNX export — pose_v1.onnx + scripts/export-onnx.py Adds the canonical ONNX artifact that unblocks downstream Hailo HEF cross-compile + ONNX Runtime benchmarks. Generated on ruvultra (torch 2.12.0 + CUDA), 12,059 bytes, opset 18, dynamic batch axis. * scripts/export-onnx.py: mirrors the Candle inference architecture in PyTorch (Conv1d 56->64, 64->128, 128->128 + Linear 128->256->34), pure- python safetensors loader (no extra pip dep), exports via torch.onnx.export, then verifies via onnx.checker.check_model and numerical parity against the torch reference. * Verified parity vs torch: max |torch - onnx| = 8.94e-8 (1e-5 threshold). Effectively bit-perfect. * v2/crates/cog-pose-estimation/cog/artifacts/pose_v1.onnx — the artifact itself, 12 KB. * docs/benchmarks/pose-estimation-cog.md — adds an ONNX export section with the verification numbers. Next: Hailo HEF cross-compile (still gated on Hailo SDK on a self-hosted runner) and ONNX Runtime latency benchmarks on each target arch. * feat(cog-pose-estimation): release v0.0.1 — signed aarch64 binary on GCS End-to-end deploy: cross-compiled to aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu on ruvultra, ran via qemu-aarch64-static, then smoke-tested on a real cognitum-v0 Pi 5. Signed with COGNITUM_OWNER_SIGNING_KEY (Ed25519) and uploaded to gs://cognitum-apps/cogs/arm/. Real-hardware results on cognitum-v0 (Pi 5): health: backend=candle-cpu, confidence=0.185, real weights loaded 30x sequential `health`: 0.251 s total -> 8.4 ms / invocation (cold) GCS release artifacts (publicly downloadable): binary: 3,741,976 bytes sha256 1e1a7d3dd01ca05d5bfc5dbb142a5941b7866ed9f3224a21edc04d3f09a99bf5 weights: 507,032 bytes sha256 eb249b9a6b2e10130437a10976ed0230b0d085f86a0553d7226e1ae6eae4b9e5 signature (Ed25519, b64): LUN7xqLPYD3MFzm5dKB5MnYU0LvoRtek5ci5KiKPHBg+Xo6xuazwokn2Dw2JPMaLYJzmWn/SpT4djuR7hYvVDw== Adds: * v2/crates/cog-pose-estimation/cog/artifacts/manifest.json — the release-pipeline-produced manifest with all fields filled in per ADR-100, including arch, target_triple, signature, and a build_metadata block carrying the validation PCK numbers. * docs/benchmarks/pose-estimation-cog.md — new sections covering the real Pi 5 smoke (8.4 ms cold-start) and the signed GCS release artifacts. Verified by downloading the binary anonymously from GCS and re-computing the sha256 — matches the locally-computed sha exactly. Signature decoded to the expected 64-byte Ed25519 length. Closes the GCS-upload acceptance criterion from ADR-100; the only pending work is Hailo HEF cross-compile (still SDK-gated) and an x86_64 release alongside this arm release. * docs(benchmarks): record live cognitum-v0 install + 5-sec smoke run Adds the "Live appliance install" section documenting what happened when the signed v0.0.1 binary + weights were installed under /var/lib/cognitum/apps/pose-estimation/ on cognitum-v0 (the V0 cluster leader). * Layout matches the existing anomaly-detect / presence / seizure- detect cogs exactly — the Cogs dashboard at http://cognitum-v0:9000/cogs auto-discovers entries. * `cog-pose-estimation run` ran for 5 seconds in the background and cleanly emitted run.started + structured WARN events for the missing local sensing-server on :3000 (cognitum-v0's actual CSI source is ruview-vitals-worker on :50054, not :3000). No crashes, no NaN, no leaks. * Wiring `sensing_url` to the appliance-native source is a separate Day-2 integration task. |
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1b155ad027 |
chore: remove empty stub crates wifi-densepose-{api,db,config} (closes #578) (#608)
Each of these crates was a single-line doc-comment placeholder: v2/crates/wifi-densepose-api/src/lib.rs: //! WiFi-DensePose REST API (stub) v2/crates/wifi-densepose-db/src/lib.rs: //! WiFi-DensePose database layer (stub) v2/crates/wifi-densepose-config/src/lib.rs: //! WiFi-DensePose configuration (stub) with empty [dependencies] in their Cargo.toml and zero references from any source file or Cargo.toml in the workspace (verified by `grep -rln wifi-densepose-api/-db/-config` across `v2/`). They were reserved early for an envisioned REST/database/config split that never materialised. The functionality these would have provided is covered today by: - REST/WS: wifi-densepose-sensing-server (Axum) - Config: per-crate config + CLI args in sensing-server and desktop - DB: no persistent state; system is real-time Removal prevents `cargo` from listing dead crates, shipping empty published artifacts to crates.io, or wasting reviewer attention. If any of these names is needed in the future, reintroduce them with a real implementation. Per the issue reporter (@bannned-bit / Matad0r) #578 explicitly listed "OR be removed from workspace members until implementation starts" as an acceptable resolution. Updated: - `v2/Cargo.toml`: drop the three members (with inline comment explaining why) - `v2/Cargo.lock`: regenerated by cargo check - `CLAUDE.md`: drop the three rows from the crate table and the publishing order list - `CHANGELOG.md`: add an `[Unreleased] / Removed` entry Verified: - `cd v2 && cargo check --workspace --no-default-features` -> finished in 48s, no errors (warnings unchanged) |
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a80617ee84 |
chore(deps): bump console from 0.15.11 to 0.16.3 in /v2 (#471)
Bumps [console](https://github.com/console-rs/console) from 0.15.11 to 0.16.3. - [Release notes](https://github.com/console-rs/console/releases) - [Changelog](https://github.com/console-rs/console/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md) - [Commits](https://github.com/console-rs/console/compare/0.15.11...0.16.3) --- updated-dependencies: - dependency-name: console dependency-version: 0.16.3 dependency-type: direct:production update-type: version-update:semver-minor ... Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com> Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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afc86c6fc4 |
chore(deps): bump thiserror from 1.0.69 to 2.0.18 in /v2 (#469)
Bumps [thiserror](https://github.com/dtolnay/thiserror) from 1.0.69 to 2.0.18. - [Release notes](https://github.com/dtolnay/thiserror/releases) - [Commits](https://github.com/dtolnay/thiserror/compare/1.0.69...2.0.18) --- updated-dependencies: - dependency-name: thiserror dependency-version: 2.0.18 dependency-type: direct:production update-type: version-update:semver-major ... Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com> Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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e6710e8988 |
chore(deps): bump ndarray-linalg from 0.16.0 to 0.18.1 in /v2 (#477)
Bumps [ndarray-linalg](https://github.com/rust-ndarray/ndarray-linalg) from 0.16.0 to 0.18.1. - [Release notes](https://github.com/rust-ndarray/ndarray-linalg/releases) - [Commits](https://github.com/rust-ndarray/ndarray-linalg/compare/ndarray-linalg-v0.16.0...ndarray-linalg-v0.18.1) --- updated-dependencies: - dependency-name: ndarray-linalg dependency-version: 0.18.1 dependency-type: direct:production update-type: version-update:semver-minor ... Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com> Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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ab9799adc3 |
chore(deps): bump tower-http from 0.5.2 to 0.6.8 in /v2 (#483)
Bumps [tower-http](https://github.com/tower-rs/tower-http) from 0.5.2 to 0.6.8. - [Release notes](https://github.com/tower-rs/tower-http/releases) - [Commits](https://github.com/tower-rs/tower-http/compare/tower-http-0.5.2...tower-http-0.6.8) --- updated-dependencies: - dependency-name: tower-http dependency-version: 0.6.8 dependency-type: direct:production update-type: version-update:semver-minor ... Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com> Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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bdb4484259 |
chore(deps): bump tch from 0.14.0 to 0.24.0 in /v2 (#482)
Bumps [tch](https://github.com/LaurentMazare/tch-rs) from 0.14.0 to 0.24.0. - [Release notes](https://github.com/LaurentMazare/tch-rs/releases) - [Changelog](https://github.com/LaurentMazare/tch-rs/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md) - [Commits](https://github.com/LaurentMazare/tch-rs/commits) --- updated-dependencies: - dependency-name: tch dependency-version: 0.24.0 dependency-type: direct:production update-type: version-update:semver-minor ... Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com> Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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ba370c7b08 |
chore(deps): bump tabled from 0.15.0 to 0.20.0 in /v2 (#481)
Bumps [tabled](https://github.com/zhiburt/tabled) from 0.15.0 to 0.20.0. - [Changelog](https://github.com/zhiburt/tabled/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md) - [Commits](https://github.com/zhiburt/tabled/commits) --- updated-dependencies: - dependency-name: tabled dependency-version: 0.20.0 dependency-type: direct:production update-type: version-update:semver-minor ... Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com> Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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3fdd310f89 |
chore(deps): bump tauri-plugin-dialog from 2.6.0 to 2.7.1 in /v2 (#480)
Bumps [tauri-plugin-dialog](https://github.com/tauri-apps/plugins-workspace) from 2.6.0 to 2.7.1. - [Release notes](https://github.com/tauri-apps/plugins-workspace/releases) - [Commits](https://github.com/tauri-apps/plugins-workspace/compare/log-v2.6.0...log-v2.7.1) --- updated-dependencies: - dependency-name: tauri-plugin-dialog dependency-version: 2.7.0 dependency-type: direct:production update-type: version-update:semver-minor ... Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com> Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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98e7eeda42 |
chore(deps): bump ruvector-core from 2.0.5 to 2.2.0 in /v2 (#479)
Bumps [ruvector-core](https://github.com/ruvnet/ruvector) from 2.0.5 to 2.2.0. - [Release notes](https://github.com/ruvnet/ruvector/releases) - [Changelog](https://github.com/ruvnet/RuVector/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md) - [Commits](https://github.com/ruvnet/ruvector/compare/v2.0.5...v2.2.0) --- updated-dependencies: - dependency-name: ruvector-core dependency-version: 2.2.0 dependency-type: direct:production update-type: version-update:semver-minor ... Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com> Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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5615edb24e |
chore(deps): bump ruvector-temporal-tensor from 2.0.4 to 2.0.6 in /v2 (#476)
Bumps [ruvector-temporal-tensor](https://github.com/ruvnet/ruvector) from 2.0.4 to 2.0.6. - [Release notes](https://github.com/ruvnet/ruvector/releases) - [Changelog](https://github.com/ruvnet/RuVector/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md) - [Commits](https://github.com/ruvnet/ruvector/commits) --- updated-dependencies: - dependency-name: ruvector-temporal-tensor dependency-version: 2.0.6 dependency-type: direct:production update-type: version-update:semver-patch ... Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com> Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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94ef125240 |
feat(sensing-server): introspection module skeleton (ADR-099 D1+D7+D8)
Adds the per-frame introspection state that ADR-099 specifies, plus the two
midstream dependencies. Pure addition — no other code touched.
v2/crates/wifi-densepose-sensing-server/Cargo.toml
+ midstreamer-temporal-compare = "0.2"
+ midstreamer-attractor = "0.2"
v2/crates/wifi-densepose-sensing-server/src/introspection.rs (new, 530 lines)
pub struct IntrospectionState
├─ midstreamer-attractor's AttractorAnalyzer (regime + Lyapunov)
├─ SignatureLibrary (JSON-loaded labelled segments)
├─ VecDeque<f64> sliding amplitude buffer (default 128 points)
└─ update(timestamp_ns, derived_feature) — never window-blocked
+ snapshot() -> IntrospectionSnapshot
{ timestamp_ns, frame_count, regime, lyapunov_exponent,
attractor_dim, attractor_confidence, top_k_similarity }
pub enum Regime { Idle, Periodic, Transient, Chaotic, Unknown }
pub struct Signature { id, label, vectors, dtw, promotion_threshold }
pub struct SimilarityMatch { signature_id, score, above_threshold }
DTW path is currently a host-side stand-in (length-normalised L1 with the
real DTW call deferred to I3/I5 once vec128 embeddings exist — ADR-099 P1).
The attractor path is wired to midstream directly. The analyze() step only
runs every N frames (default 8) to stay under the per-frame ms budget.
8 unit tests (snapshot defaults, frame-count + timestamp advance, empty
library, scoring + ordering invariants, threshold gating, empty-signature
fault-tolerance, regime classification after 200 frames). 199 → 207 lib tests,
0 failures. cargo build clean (only pre-existing warnings).
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
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c641fc44ae |
feat(docker+sensing-server): refresh Docker publish + opt-in bearer-token API auth
Closes #520, #514, #443. ## #520 / #514 — stale Docker image, missing UI assets `ruvnet/wifi-densepose:latest` was published before `ui/observatory*` and `ui/pose-fusion*` were added; users see /app/ui missing those files and the v0.6+ packet format doesn't reach the server. Two fixes: 1. `docker/Dockerfile.rust` now `RUN`s a build-time guard after `COPY ui/` that fails the build if `index.html` / `observatory.html` / `pose-fusion.html` / `viz.html` (or the `observatory/` / `pose-fusion/` / `components/` / `services/` directories) are missing, plus an exec-bit check on `/app/sensing-server`. A stale image can never be silently produced again. 2. New `.github/workflows/sensing-server-docker.yml` rebuilds + pushes on every change to the Dockerfile, the server crate, the signal/vitals/ wifiscan crates, the workspace manifests, the `ui/` tree, or itself — plus `v*` tags and manual dispatch. Pushes to both `docker.io/ruvnet/ wifi-densepose` AND `ghcr.io/ruvnet/wifi-densepose` with `latest` + `vX.Y.Z` + `sha-<short>` tags, then post-push smoke-tests the artifact: /health, /api/v1/info, the observatory + pose-fusion HTML, AND the bearer-auth path (no token → 401, wrong → 401, correct → 200). Uses the `DOCKERHUB_USERNAME`/`DOCKERHUB_TOKEN` repo secrets; ghcr.io rides on the workflow's GITHUB_TOKEN. ## #443 — sensing-server REST API auth model QE security audit raised that 40+ /api/v1/* routes have no auth layer with a default `0.0.0.0` bind. New `wifi_densepose_sensing_server::bearer_auth` module + middleware: - Env-var-gated: `RUVIEW_API_TOKEN` unset/empty ⇒ middleware is a no-op (current LAN-mode behaviour preserved — **no default change**); set ⇒ every `/api/v1/*` request must carry `Authorization: Bearer <token>` or the server returns 401. - Constant-time byte compare via local `ct_eq` (no new dep). - `/health*`, `/ws/sensing`, and `/ui/*` are intentionally never gated (orchestrator probes + local browsers). - Startup logs which mode is active and warns when auth is ON with a `0.0.0.0` bind. - 8 unit tests on the middleware via `tower::ServiceExt::oneshot` (sensing-server lib tests 191 → 199, 0 failures). Verified locally: `cargo build --workspace --no-default-features` ✓, `cargo test -p wifi-densepose-sensing-server --no-default-features` ✓. Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net> |
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b116a99481 |
feat(rvcsi): real nexmon_csi UDP/PCAP fidelity — chanspec decode, libpcap reader, NexmonPcapAdapter
Raises the Nexmon path from a normalized record format to parsing what the patched Broadcom firmware actually emits, end to end. napi-c shim (ABI 1.0 -> 1.1, additive): - rvcsi_nx_csi_udp_header / rvcsi_nx_csi_udp_decode — parse the real nexmon_csi UDP payload: the 18-byte header (magic 0x1111, rssi int8, fctl, src_mac[6], seq_cnt, core/spatial-stream, Broadcom chanspec, chip_ver) + nsub complex CSI samples (modern int16 LE I/Q export — what CSIKit/csireader.py read for the BCM43455c0 / 4358 / 4366c0; nsub = (len-18)/4). rvcsi_nx_csi_udp_write to synthesize payloads for tests. rvcsi_nx_decode_chanspec — d11ac chanspec -> channel (chanspec & 0xff) / bandwidth (bits [13:11], cross-checked against the FFT size) / band (bits [15:14], cross-checked against the channel number). Still allocation-free, bounds-checked, structured errors, never panics. - ffi.rs wraps it: decode_chanspec / parse_nexmon_udp_header / decode_nexmon_udp / encode_nexmon_udp + DecodedChanspec / NexmonCsiHeader; every unsafe block documented; the ABI guard now expects 1.1. rvcsi-adapter-nexmon: - pcap.rs — a dependency-free classic-libpcap reader (all four byte-order / timestamp-resolution magics; Ethernet / raw-IPv4 / Linux-SLL link types; tolerates a truncated final record; pcapng is a follow-up) + extract_udp_payload + a synthetic_udp_pcap / synthetic_nexmon_pcap test/example generator. - NexmonPcapAdapter (a CsiSource) — reads the CSI UDP packets out of a `tcpdump -i wlan0 dst port 5500 -w csi.pcap` capture, decodes each via the C shim, stamps the frame timestamp from the pcap packet time; non-CSI packets counted as "skipped" in health. rvcsi-runtime: decode_nexmon_pcap, summarize_nexmon_pcap (+ NexmonPcapSummary: link type, CSI frame count, channels, bandwidths, subcarrier counts, chip versions, RSSI range, time span), CaptureRuntime::open_nexmon_pcap[_bytes]. rvcsi-node (napi-rs): nexmonDecodePcap, inspectNexmonPcap, decodeChanspec, RvcsiRuntime.openNexmonPcap. @ruv/rvcsi SDK + .d.ts updated (NexmonPcapSummary, DecodedChanspec). rvcsi-cli: `record --source nexmon-pcap`, `inspect-nexmon`, `decode-chanspec`. 161 rvcsi tests pass (adapter-nexmon 9->22), 0 failures, clippy-clean. ADR-096 §2.2/§2.3/§5, CHANGELOG, CLAUDE.md updated. https://claude.ai/code/session_01CdYAPvRTjcch6YrYf42n1z |
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7393cc2b73 |
feat(rvcsi): rvcsi-runtime composition + rvcsi-node (napi-rs) + rvcsi-cli + @ruv/rvcsi TS SDK
- rvcsi-runtime — the composition layer (no FFI): CaptureRuntime (CsiSource + validate_frame + SignalPipeline + EventPipeline, with next_validated_frame / next_clean_frame / drain_events / health) plus one-shot helpers (summarize_capture → CaptureSummary, decode_nexmon_records, events_from_capture, export_capture_to_rf_memory, rf_memory_self_check). 10 tests. - rvcsi-node — the napi-rs seam (cdylib+rlib, build.rs runs napi_build::setup): thin #[napi] wrappers over rvcsi-runtime — rvcsiVersion / nexmonShimAbiVersion / nexmonDecodeRecords / inspectCaptureFile / eventsFromCaptureFile / exportCaptureToRfMemory + an RvcsiRuntime streaming class. Everything that crosses the boundary is a validated/normalized rvCSI struct serialized to JSON (D6). deny(clippy::all). - @ruv/rvcsi npm package (package.json + index.js + index.d.ts + README + __test__/api.test.cjs) — curated JS surface that JSON-parses the addon's output into plain CsiFrame/CsiWindow/CsiEvent/SourceHealth/CaptureSummary objects; lazy native-addon load with a helpful "not built" error. - rvcsi-cli — the `rvcsi` binary: record (Nexmon dump → .rvcsi, validating), inspect, replay, stream, events, health, calibrate (v0 baseline), export ruvector. 7 tests exercising every subcommand against in-memory captures. - rvcsi-cli no longer depends on rvcsi-node (a binary can't link the napi addon); the shared logic moved to rvcsi-runtime. .gitignore: ignore the generated *.node / binding.js / binding.d.ts / npm/ under rvcsi-node. All rvcsi crates: build together OK, clippy-clean, 140 unit/integration tests + 2 doctests, 0 failures (core 29, dsp 28, events 18, adapter-file 20+1, adapter-nexmon 9, ruvector 20+1, runtime 10, cli 7). https://claude.ai/code/session_01CdYAPvRTjcch6YrYf42n1z |
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6432dfbd2d |
feat(rvcsi): rvcsi-adapter-file (.rvcsi capture/replay) + rvcsi-ruvector (RF memory)
- rvcsi-adapter-file (ADR-095 FR1/FR10, D9): the `.rvcsi` JSONL capture format (CaptureHeader line + one CsiFrame per line), FileRecorder, FileReplayAdapter (a CsiSource — deterministic replay, preserves timestamps/ordering/validation verbatim, carries an unenforced replay_speed for the daemon/CLI), read_all(). 20 unit tests + 1 doctest. - rvcsi-ruvector (ADR-095 FR8, D8) — standin for the production RuVector binding: deterministic embeddings (window_embedding = 32 resampled mean_amplitude bins + 32 resampled phase_variance bins + [motion_energy, presence_score, quality_score, ln1p(frame_count)], L2-normalized, dim 68; event_embedding = 10-wide kind one-hot + confidence + ln1p(evidence count), dim 12), cosine_similarity, the RfMemoryStore trait + value objects (EmbeddingId/RecordKind/SimilarHit/ DriftReport), and InMemoryRfMemory + JsonlRfMemory (file-backed append log, identical query semantics, latest-baseline-per-room-wins on reopen). 20 unit tests + 1 doctest. All rvcsi crates build and test together: core 29, dsp 28, events 18, adapter-file 20(+1), adapter-nexmon 9, ruvector 20(+1) — 124 unit + 2 doc tests, 0 failures. forbid(unsafe_code) everywhere except rvcsi-adapter-nexmon (FFI). https://claude.ai/code/session_01CdYAPvRTjcch6YrYf42n1z |
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1e684cb208 |
feat(rvcsi): rvcsi-core + napi-c Nexmon shim + crate skeletons (ADR-095/096)
First implementation milestone for the rvCSI edge RF sensing runtime:
- rvcsi-core — the foundation: CsiFrame/CsiWindow/CsiEvent normalized schema,
ValidationStatus, AdapterProfile, CsiSource plugin trait, id newtypes +
IdGenerator, RvcsiError, and the validate_frame pipeline (length/finiteness/
subcarrier/RSSI/monotonicity hard checks + multiplicative quality scoring →
Accepted/Degraded/Recovered/Rejected). 29 unit tests, forbid(unsafe_code).
- rvcsi-adapter-nexmon — the napi-c boundary: native/rvcsi_nexmon_shim.{c,h}
(the only C in the runtime, allocation-free, bounds-checked, parses/writes a
byte-defined "rvCSI Nexmon record" — a normalized superset of the nexmon_csi
UDP payload), compiled via build.rs + cc, wrapped by a documented ffi module
and a NexmonAdapter implementing CsiSource. 9 tests round-tripping through C.
- Workspace registration in v2/Cargo.toml (8 new members + napi/cc workspace
deps) and compiling skeletons for rvcsi-dsp, rvcsi-events, rvcsi-adapter-file,
rvcsi-ruvector, rvcsi-node (napi-rs cdylib + build.rs napi_build::setup) and
rvcsi-cli (`rvcsi` binary) — to be filled in by the implementation swarm.
cargo build -p rvcsi-core -p rvcsi-adapter-nexmon -p rvcsi-node -p rvcsi-cli: OK
cargo test -p rvcsi-core -p rvcsi-adapter-nexmon: 38 passed, 0 failed
https://claude.ai/code/session_01CdYAPvRTjcch6YrYf42n1z
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7f5a692632 |
feat(nvsim): full simulator stack — Rust crate, dashboard, server, App Store, Ghost Murmur [ADR-089/090/091/092/093]
Squashed merge of feat/nvsim-pipeline-simulator (29 commits). ## Shipped - ADR-089 nvsim crate (Accepted) — 50/50 tests, ~4.5 M samples/s, pinned witness cc8de9b01b0ff5bd… - ADR-092 dashboard implementation (Implemented) — 8/12 §11 gates ✅, 4/12 ⚠ (external infra) - ADR-093 dashboard gap analysis (Implemented) — 21/21 catalogued gaps closed - Plus ADR-090 (proposed conditional) and ADR-091 (proposed research-only) ## Live deploy https://ruvnet.github.io/RuView/nvsim/ ## Infra - nvsim-server Dockerfile + GHCR publish workflow (.github/workflows/nvsim-server-docker.yml) - axe-core + Playwright cross-browser CI (.github/workflows/dashboard-a11y.yml) - gh-pages auto-deploy workflow already in place (preserves observatory + pose-fusion siblings) Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net> |
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17509a2a41 |
feat(ruvector,signal,sensing-server): ADR-084 Passes 1/1.5/2/3 — RaBitQ similarity sensor implementation (#435)
* feat(ruvector): ADR-084 Pass 1 — sketch module foundation
Implements Pass 1 of ADR-084 (RaBitQ similarity sensor): a thin
RuView-flavored API over `ruvector_core::quantization::BinaryQuantized`,
exposed at `wifi_densepose_ruvector::{Sketch, SketchBank, SketchError}`.
API surface:
- `Sketch::from_embedding(&[f32], sketch_version: u16)` — sign-quantize
a dense embedding into a 1-bit-per-dim packed sketch.
- `Sketch::distance` — hamming distance with schema-mismatch error.
- `Sketch::distance_unchecked` — hot-path variant for sketches already
validated as same-schema.
- `SketchBank::insert/topk/novelty` — bank with caller-assigned u32 IDs,
schema locked at first insert, novelty = min_distance / embedding_dim.
Schema versioning (`sketch_version: u16` + `embedding_dim: u16`) prevents
silent comparisons across embedding-model generations. Bumping the model
forces re-sketch of the candidate bank.
Pass 1 establishes the API and unit-test foundation. Acceptance criteria
(8x-30x compare-cost reduction, 90% top-K coverage, <1pp accuracy regression)
are measured per-site in Passes 2-5.
Validated:
- 12 new tests pass (sketch construction, hamming, top-K ordering,
schema lock, schema rejection, novelty)
- cargo test --workspace --no-default-features → 1,551 passed, 0 failed,
8 ignored (was 1,539 before; +12 new tests)
- ESP32-S3 on COM7 still streaming live CSI (cb #117300)
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
* bench(ruvector): ADR-084 acceptance — sketch-vs-float compare cost
Adds sketch_bench measuring the first ADR-084 acceptance criterion
(8x-30x compare cost reduction) at three dimensions and a realistic
top-K@k=8 over 1024 sketches.
Measured (Windows host, criterion --warm-up 1s --measurement 3s):
compare_d512:
float_l2: 197.03 ns/op
float_cosine: 231.17 ns/op
sketch_hamming: 4.56 ns/op → 43-51x speedup
topk_d128_n1024_k8:
float_l2_topk: 47.59 us
sketch_hamming: 6.34 us → 7.5x speedup
Pair-wise compare exceeds the 8-30x acceptance criterion by an order
of magnitude. Top-K is at 7.5x — close to the threshold; the sort
dominates at this bank size, which is a Pass 1.5 optimization
opportunity (partial-sort heap for small K).
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
* perf(ruvector): ADR-084 Pass 1.5 — partial-sort heap in SketchBank::topk
Replace `sort_by_key + truncate` (O(n log n)) with a fixed-size max-heap
(O(n log k)) for top-K queries when n > k. Fast path when n ≤ k stays
on the simple sort.
Bench at d=128, n=1024, k=8 (Windows host, criterion 3s measurement):
Before (sort + truncate): 6.34 µs/op
After (heap): 3.83 µs/op -39.4% / +1.65× faster
Combined with the 32× memory shrink and 47.6 µs → 3.83 µs total path
saving:
topk_d128_n1024_k8 vs float_l2_topk:
Pass 1 sort_by_key: 47.59 µs / 6.34 µs = 7.5× speedup
Pass 1.5 heap: 47.59 µs / 3.83 µs = 12.4× speedup
Now over the ADR-084 acceptance criterion of 8× minimum. Heap pays off
strictly more at larger n; benchmark at n=4096 is a Pass-2 follow-up.
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
* feat(signal): ADR-084 Pass 2 — sketch-prefilter for EmbeddingHistory::search
Adds `EmbeddingHistory::with_sketch(...)` and `search_prefilter(query, k,
prefilter_factor)`. The prefilter sketches the query, hamming-ranks the
parallel sketch array to take the top `k * prefilter_factor` candidates,
then refines those with exact cosine and returns the top-K.
`EmbeddingHistory::new(...)` is unchanged — sketches are opt-in via the
new constructor. `search_prefilter` falls back to brute-force `search`
when sketches are disabled, so callers never see incorrect results.
ADR-084 acceptance criterion empirically validated:
Synthetic 128-d AETHER-shape, n=256, 16 queries:
k=8, prefilter_factor=4 → 78.9% top-K coverage (FAIL <90%)
k=8, prefilter_factor=8 → ≥90% top-K coverage (PASS)
k=16, prefilter_factor=8 → ≥90% top-K coverage (PASS)
The factor=4 default that I'd planned in Pass 1 falls below the 90% bar
on uniform-random synthetic data. Production callers should use **8**
unless their embeddings carry enough structure (real AETHER traces
likely will) to clear the bar at lower factors. Documented in the
search_prefilter docstring and asserted in
test_search_prefilter_topk_coverage_meets_adr_084.
FIFO eviction now drains the parallel sketches array in lockstep —
test_search_prefilter_evicts_sketches_on_fifo guards against the two
arrays drifting (which would silently corrupt top-K via index
mismatch).
Validated:
- cargo test --workspace --no-default-features → 1,554 passed,
0 failed, 8 ignored (was 1,551; +3 new prefilter tests)
- ESP32-S3 on COM7 still streaming live CSI (cb #3200)
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
* bench(signal): ADR-084 Pass 2 — end-to-end search_prefilter speedup
Measures EmbeddingHistory::search_prefilter (sketch + cosine refine)
vs the brute-force EmbeddingHistory::search baseline at three realistic
AETHER bank sizes, with the empirically validated prefilter_factor=8.
Measured (Windows host, criterion --warm-up 1s --measurement 3s):
d=128, k=8:
n=256 brute_force_cosine = 31.98 us, prefilter = 13.78 us → 2.3x
n=1024 brute_force_cosine = 110.4 us, prefilter = 16.64 us → 6.6x
n=4096 brute_force_cosine = 507.4 us, prefilter = 66.37 us → 7.6x
Speedup grows with bank size (sketch overhead is fixed; brute-force
scales linearly with n). At n=4k the prefilter approaches the 8x
ADR-084 acceptance criterion; at n=10k+ (realistic multi-day
deployment banks) it crosses cleanly. Below n=512 the brute-force
path is already cheap (sub-50 us) so the prefilter's narrower wins
don't materially affect the hot path.
Coverage acceptance (≥90% top-K agreement) is exercised in the
unit-test suite, not the bench. The bench measures cost only.
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
* feat(signal): ADR-084 Pass 3 — EmbeddingHistory::novelty primitive
Adds the cluster-Pi novelty-sensor primitive: `EmbeddingHistory::novelty(query)`
returns `Option<f32>` in [0.0, 1.0] where 0.0 = exact-match-in-bank
and 1.0 = no-overlap. Returns None when sketches are disabled so
callers can fall back gracefully (existing `EmbeddingHistory::new`
constructor stays sketch-disabled).
This is the building block of the cluster-Pi novelty gate
described in ADR-084 §"cluster-Pi novelty sensor": each sensor node
maintains a bank of recent feature vectors, the gate scores the
incoming frame's novelty against the bank, and the heavy CNN /
pose-model wake gate consumes the score.
Wiring novelty into sensing-server's NodeState happens in a
follow-up — that's a ~50-line surgical change touching main.rs that
deserves its own commit. This patch lands the primitive + tests so
the wiring is straightforward.
Three regression tests added:
- test_novelty_returns_none_without_sketches
(graceful fallback when bank is sketch-less)
- test_novelty_zero_for_exact_match_one_for_empty_bank
(semantic boundaries)
- test_novelty_decreases_as_bank_grows_around_query
(gradient direction — guards against reversed comparator)
Validated:
- cargo test --workspace --no-default-features → 1,557 passed,
0 failed, 8 ignored (was 1,554; +3 new novelty tests)
- ESP32-S3 on COM7 still streaming live CSI (cb #7600)
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
* feat(sensing-server): ADR-084 Pass 3 — wire novelty into NodeState
Wires the EmbeddingHistory::novelty primitive (Pass 3 prior commit)
into the per-node frame ingestion path on the cluster Pi. Each
incoming CSI frame now updates a per-node sketch bank of the last
6.4 s of feature vectors and produces a novelty score in [0.0, 1.0]
that downstream model-wake gates can consume.
Two NodeState structs were touched (one in types.rs and a
refactoring-leftover duplicate in main.rs that the call site uses);
both gain feature_history + last_novelty_score fields and an
update_novelty helper that:
- truncates / zero-pads incoming amplitudes to NOVELTY_VECTOR_DIM (56)
- scores novelty *before* inserting (so a frame doesn't see itself)
- FIFO-evicts when the bank reaches NOVELTY_HISTORY_CAPACITY (64)
Wired at the per-node ESP32 frame path in main.rs:3772 (immediately
before frame_history.push_back). Existing call sites that operate on
the singleton SensingState (not per-node) intentionally untouched —
they will be wired in a follow-up alongside the WebSocket update
envelope's novelty_score field.
Two new unit tests in novelty_tests:
- first_frame_yields_max_novelty_then_zero_on_repeat
(semantic boundaries: empty bank = 1.0, exact repeat = 0.0)
- handles_short_and_long_amplitude_vectors
(truncate / zero-pad robustness across hardware variants)
Validated:
- cargo test --workspace --no-default-features → 1,559 passed,
0 failed, 8 ignored (was 1,557; +2 new novelty tests)
- ESP32-S3 on COM7 still streaming live CSI (cb #3900)
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
* hardening(ruvector): L2 from PR #435 review — overflow on >u16::MAX dims
Pass 1.6 hardening, addressing L2 finding from the security review on
PR #435 (https://github.com/ruvnet/RuView/pull/435#issuecomment-4321285519):
The original `Sketch::from_embedding` used `debug_assert!` for the
`embedding.len() <= u16::MAX` invariant, which compiled out in release
builds. A caller passing a 65,536+ -dim embedding would silently
truncate the dimension count via `as u16` cast — two over-long inputs
would then compare as same-dimensional rather than as 64k vs 70k, and
the dimension confusion would not surface anywhere.
Two-part fix:
- `from_embedding` (infallible) now SATURATES `embedding_dim` to
`u16::MAX` rather than truncating. Two over-long inputs still get
packed bit-correctly by `BinaryQuantized` and the saturated dim is
consistent across both, so they compare predictably (just with an
upper-bounded distance).
- `try_from_embedding` (new, fallible) returns
`Err(SketchError::EmbeddingDimOverflow{got, max})` when the input
exceeds `u16::MAX`. Use this when an over-long input should fail
loudly rather than be silently saturated.
- New error variant `SketchError::EmbeddingDimOverflow` with the
observed `got` and the `max` (`u16::MAX as usize`).
- New regression test `try_from_embedding_rejects_over_long_input`
asserts both paths: try_ → Err, infallible → saturate.
Validated:
- 13 sketch unit tests pass (was 12; +1 for L2 boundary).
- cargo test --workspace --no-default-features → 1,560 passed,
0 failed, 8 ignored (was 1,559; +1).
- ESP32-S3 on COM7 streaming live CSI (cb #100, fresh boot RSSI -48 dBm).
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
* hardening(ruvector,signal): L1+L3 from PR #435 review
Two follow-ups to the security review on PR #435:
L1 — Defensive `if let Some(...)` for SketchBank::topk heap peek.
The original `.expect("heap len == k > 0")` was mathematically
unreachable (k > 0 enforced at function entry, heap.len() >= k branch
guards), but a structural pattern makes the impossibility a type
property rather than a runtime invariant. Same hot-path cost; zero
panic risk in the production binary.
L3 — Guard `embedding_dim == 0` in `EmbeddingHistory::novelty`.
A 0-dim history is constructible via `with_sketch(0, ...)`; without
the guard the function returned `NaN` (min_d as f32 / 0.0), silently
poisoning every downstream gate (model-wake, anomaly-emit, etc).
Now returns Some(1.0) — fail-loud at "no comparison possible →
maximally novel," never NaN. New regression test
`test_novelty_zero_dim_history_returns_one_not_nan` pins it down.
Validated:
- cargo test --workspace --no-default-features → 1,561 passed,
0 failed, 8 ignored (was 1,560; +1 for the L3 NaN guard test).
- ESP32-S3 on COM7 streaming live CSI (cb #12400, RSSI fresh).
L4 (f64→f32 cast) is documentation-only and lands in a follow-up
patch; L8 (always-on novelty sensor) is an observation, not a fix.
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
* feat(sensing-server): ADR-084 Pass 3.5 — novelty_score on PerNodeFeatureInfo
Adds an optional `novelty_score: Option<f32>` field to
PerNodeFeatureInfo, the per-node WebSocket envelope shape. Mirrored
on both struct definitions (types.rs canonical + main.rs's
refactoring-leftover duplicate) so the schema is consistent.
`#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]` keeps existing
WebSocket consumers unaffected — old clients see no extra field
unless the server populates it. No PerNodeFeatureInfo literal
construction sites exist today (all `node_features: None`), so this
is a schema-only addition; live population from
`NodeState::last_novelty_score` lands in a Pass 3.6 follow-up that
also wires `node_features: Some(...)` at the per-node ESP32 frame
emit path.
Validated:
- cargo test --workspace --no-default-features → 1,561 passed,
0 failed, 8 ignored (no change; schema-only).
- ESP32-S3 on COM7 streaming live CSI (cb #2100, fresh boot).
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
* feat(sensing-server): ADR-084 Pass 3.6 — populate node_features with novelty_score
Wires `node_features: Some(...)` at the two per-node ESP32 frame
emit sites (formerly `node_features: None`). Adds a `build_node_features`
helper that constructs `Vec<PerNodeFeatureInfo>` from `s.node_states`,
including the per-node `last_novelty_score`.
This completes the Pass 3.x track — novelty score now flows from
NodeState → PerNodeFeatureInfo → SensingUpdate envelope → WebSocket
clients. Cluster-Pi UI / model-wake / anomaly-emit gates can read
it without round-tripping back to the server.
Three other call sites (singleton paths at 1772, 1911, 4170) keep
`node_features: None` for now — those are for the offline /
simulated paths that don't have per-node ESP32 state. They'll get
populated when their parent flows wire up real multi-node fanout.
Stale flag uses `ESP32_OFFLINE_TIMEOUT` (5s) — same threshold the
rest of the system uses to decide a node has dropped.
Validated:
- cargo test --workspace --no-default-features → 1,561 passed,
0 failed, 8 ignored (no change; integration test would be wire-
format diff in a follow-up).
- ESP32-S3 on COM7 streaming live CSI (cb #100, fresh boot,
RSSI -49 dBm).
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
* feat(ruvector): ADR-084 Pass 4 — WireSketch wire-format primitive
Adds `WireSketch::serialize` / `deserialize` for transmitting a
sketch + novelty score over any byte-stream channel — cluster↔cluster
mesh (ADR-066 swarm bridge when it exists), sensor→cluster-Pi UDP
(ADR-086 edge gate complement), gateway→cloud QUIC. Channel-agnostic
by design.
Wire layout (12-byte header + ceil(dim/8) bytes payload, little-endian):
[0..4] magic = 0xC5110084
[4..6] format_version = 1
[6..8] sketch_version (embedding-model schema)
[8..10] embedding_dim
[10..12] novelty_q15 (novelty * 32_767, saturated)
[12..] packed sketch bits
A 128-d AETHER sketch fits in exactly 28 bytes (12 header + 16 bits).
Deserializer is paranoid by design — every untrusted byte buffer
gets validated against:
- length floor (>= header bytes)
- length ceiling (WIRE_SKETCH_MAX_BYTES = 9 KiB; defends against
memory-exhaustion attacks via claimed-but-impossible large dims)
- magic match
- format_version supported
- embedding_dim → payload bytes consistency
A malformed UDP packet from a non-RuView sender produces a typed
`WireSketchError` (variant per failure class), never a panic.
Re-exported from lib.rs alongside `Sketch` / `SketchBank`.
Seven new tests:
- wire_serialize_round_trip (correctness)
- wire_rejects_short_buffer (length floor)
- wire_rejects_oversized_buffer (length ceiling, DoS guard)
- wire_rejects_bad_magic (cross-protocol confusion guard)
- wire_rejects_unsupported_format_version (forward-compat)
- wire_rejects_payload_size_mismatch (header/body consistency)
- wire_envelope_size_for_aether_128d (sizing contract: 28 bytes)
Validated:
- cargo test --workspace --no-default-features → 1,568 passed,
0 failed, 8 ignored (was 1,561; +7 wire-format tests).
- ESP32-S3 on COM7 streaming live CSI (cb #15100, RSSI -48 dBm).
Pass 4's wire-format primitive ships first; the channel that
carries it (ADR-066 swarm-bridge or ADR-086 sensor→Pi gate) is
out-of-scope for this commit and tracked separately.
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
* feat(ruvector): ADR-084 Pass 5 — privacy-preserving event log + L4 docstring
Pass 5 — `PrivacyEventLog` and `NoveltyEvent` types in a new
`wifi_densepose_ruvector::event_log` module. Each event stores
`(timestamp, sketch_bytes, sketch_version, embedding_dim, novelty,
witness_sha256)` — explicitly NOT the raw float embedding. The
witness is SHA-256 of the WireSketch serialization (12-byte header +
packed bits + q15 novelty), making events content-addressable: two
pushes of the same `(sketch, novelty)` produce byte-identical
witnesses, enabling dedup at the receiver and verifier.
Privacy properties (ADR-084 §"Privacy-preserving event log"):
1. Non-invertibility — 1-bit sign quantization is lossy; an attacker
with read access cannot reconstruct the source CSI / embedding.
2. Content addressing — `(sketch_version, witness)` is fully qualified.
3. Bounded memory — fixed capacity ring; misbehaving senders cannot
exhaust receiver memory.
Seven new tests:
- push_grows_until_capacity_then_fifo_evicts
- zero_capacity_log_silently_drops_pushes (no-op stub case)
- witness_is_deterministic_for_same_sketch_and_novelty
(witness must NOT depend on timestamp)
- witness_differs_for_different_novelty_scores
- find_by_witness_returns_most_recent_match
- find_by_witness_returns_none_on_miss
- event_does_not_carry_raw_embedding (structural privacy guarantee)
L4 hardening (PR #435 security review) — the `f64 → f32` cast in
NodeState::update_novelty now has a docstring noting the boundary
behaviour: `f64::INFINITY` survives as `f32::INFINITY`, `f64::NAN`
propagates as `f32::NAN`. Neither panics. CSI amplitudes from healthy
firmware are well within f32 finite range.
Validated:
- cargo test --workspace --no-default-features → 1,575 passed,
0 failed, 8 ignored (was 1,568; +7 event-log tests).
- ESP32-S3 on COM7 streaming live CSI (cb #2800, RSSI -52 dBm).
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
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f49c722764 |
chore(repo): rename rust-port/wifi-densepose-rs → v2/ (flatten to one level) (#427)
The Rust port lived two directories deep (rust-port/wifi-densepose-rs/) without any sibling under rust-port/ that warranted the extra level. Move the whole workspace up to v2/ to match v1/ (Python) at the same depth and shorten every cd / build command across the repo. git mv preserves history for all tracked files. 60 files updated for path references (CI workflows, ADRs, docs, scripts, READMEs, internal .claude-flow state). Two manual fixes for relative-cd paths in CLAUDE.md and ADR-043 that became wrong after the depth change (cd ../.. → cd ..). Validated: - cargo check --workspace --no-default-features → clean (after target/ nuke; the gitignored target/ was carried by the OS rename and had hard-coded old paths in build scripts) - cargo test --workspace --no-default-features → 1,539 passed, 0 failed, 8 ignored (same totals as pre-rename) - ESP32-S3 on COM7 → still streaming live CSI (cb #40300, RSSI -64 dBm) After-merge follow-up: contributors should `rm -rf v2/target` once and let cargo regenerate from the new path. |