Decision: browser-side admin is not wanted. `BROWSER_SIGNIN_SCOPE` stays
`sensing:read`, and the escalate-on-demand design sketched while this was open
is not being built. Destructive operations — training, model delete, recording
delete — keep their home in the CLI, where `--admin` is explicit and typed by a
person. Routing them through a browser would mean either asking every user to
consent to delete capability in order to watch a stream, or building a second
consent flow to avoid that.
Consequences, now settled rather than open:
- The UI's admin controls are unreachable from a Cognitum browser session, and
that is intended. The manual token-paste field is unchanged and still carries
whatever authority the pasted token has, so nothing that worked before stops
working.
- REMOVED the client-side step-up redirect from ui/services/api.service.js. It
caught an RFC 6750 challenge that can never be issued to a browser, and it
ended in `return new Promise(() => {})` — so if any other 401 had ever grown
that header, every caller awaiting it would have hung forever with no error
and no timeout. Dead code with a trap in it is worse than no code.
- KEPT ADMIN_REVERIFY_SECS as a server-side backstop. Fail-closed and free, so
if the requested scope is ever widened the freshness requirement is already
in place. Documented at its definition as a backstop specifically so nobody
reads its passing tests as evidence the control is exercised — the tests
reach it through a crate-internal seam that mints an admin cookie the real
flow does not produce.
ADR-271 also stops hedging on the session TTL: chosen is A at one hour. Option B
(server-side refresh-token store) is not built, and the ADR now names the
residual instead of implying it is closed — within one hour a revoked Cognitum
grant still reads sensing data through an existing browser session. There is no
introspection endpoint, so nothing short of B closes that, and one hour is the
size of the hole we accepted.
Adds `the_cookie_max_age_matches_the_session_expiry`, which the previous ADR
revision asked for and nobody had written: Max-Age and the payload's `exp` are
two independent expressions of one lifetime, and drift means either the browser
presents a session we reject or we hold authority the browser discarded.
Verified: workspace 176 suites clean, UI 22, api.service.js parses.
Co-Authored-By: Ruflo & AQE
All three deferred findings from the qe-court round. Each fix is guarded by a
test confirmed to FAIL against the old behaviour.
P1 — JWKS: self-inflicted stall, and a blocking fetch on a tokio worker.
`fetched_at` advances only on SUCCESS, and the only rate limiter sat behind
`if fresh`. So once the TTL elapsed after the last successful fetch, `fresh`
was permanently false, the limiter was never consulted, and EVERY request
performed its own blocking 3s-timeout fetch. A Pi that loses WAN stalled
itself 300s later with no attacker present; an attacker could force the same
state by flooding tokens with an unknown `kid`.
Now: `last_attempt_at` is recorded BEFORE every fetch regardless of outcome,
and gates the stale path too; a stale-but-present key is served rather than
erroring, which is the offline tolerance this module always claimed.
Measured by the new test: 26 outbound fetches before, 1 after.
Kept as TWO independent limiters. Merging them looks tidy and is wrong — a
routine refetch would then suppress the unknown-`kid` path for 30s and delay
pickup of a key rotation inside the TTL. I made that mistake first; two
existing tests caught it.
The blocking call also now runs in `spawn_blocking` at the verify boundary,
matching what `main.rs` already does for the token exchange, where the comment
reads "the same mistake this codebase had to fix in jwks.rs". The hot
verification path had never been given the same treatment. A panicked task
fails closed.
P2 — session lifetime, per decision: 1 hour, plus step-up.
SESSION_TTL_SECS 12h -> 1h, and privileged (`sensing:admin`) actions now
require the user to have authenticated within ADMIN_REVERIFY_SECS (5 min),
tracked by a new `auth_time` claim. Reads ride the full session; only the
routes where a stale session does damage are re-verified, so a dashboard whose
main use is watching a live stream does not re-auth hourly.
`auth_time` is `#[serde(default)]`, so a cookie issued before the field existed
reads as 0 — infinitely stale. Such a session keeps working for reads and
cannot perform privileged actions. Fail-closed and self-healing on next sign-in.
The refusal carries an RFC 6750 `WWW-Authenticate` error code, because the
client's correct response differs from a plain 401: the user IS signed in and
needs to prove it again. `api.service.js` acts on that and redirects through
`/oauth/start` — otherwise a stale-session delete surfaces as a generic
"Request failed" with no hint that signing in again fixes it.
P3 — cookie shadowing.
`read_cookie` returned the FIRST match, and RFC 6265 §5.4 sends longer-`Path`
cookies first. Cookies are not isolated by port or scheme, so any other service
on the host — or a plain-HTTP MITM injecting Set-Cookie — could plant
`ruview_session=<their own validly signed session>; Path=/ui`. The victim sent
both, the attacker's first, and it verified because it genuinely was signed:
silent session takeover, with `/oauth/status` reporting the attacker's account.
The signature was doing its job throughout, which is why "it's signed" never
answered this. `__Host-` would, but requires `Secure`, and RuView is routinely
reached over plain HTTP on a LAN.
So both credential paths now accept only when EXACTLY ONE candidate verifies.
An attacker can still cause a refusal by planting a second valid cookie — a
nuisance — but no longer a takeover. Planting junk changes nothing, so this
does not become a trivial DoS.
Tests: +1 jwks (26-vs-1 fetch amplification), +4 step-up, +4 shadowing, +1
duplicate-name reader. Mutation-verified: reverting the stale-path guard gives
26 fetches; reverting to first-match cookie reads fails
`a_shadowing_cookie_cannot_silently_take_over_the_session`.
Verified: workspace 176 suites clean under CI flags, ruview-auth 62+25+2 with
--all-features, UI 22.
ADR-271: P1/P2/P3 marked RESOLVED with the analysis retained, since it explains
why each fix has the shape it does.
Co-Authored-By: Ruflo & AQE
- sdkconfig.defaults.devkitc: header build command idf v5.2 -> v5.4
(source needs esp_driver_uart, IDF >=5.3 — same reason the PR fixed
the README refs)
- engine/lib.rs: separate doc comments — set_room_adapter's ADR-150
adapter/witness doc had merged into set_multistatic_config's doc
- ui: apply stored bearer token at api.service.js module load instead
of QuickSettings.init — services + dashboard tab dispatch their first
/api/v1/* requests before initializeEnhancements() runs, so the first
requests on every load went out without the Authorization header
- CHANGELOG: Unreleased entries for #1308/#1309/#1310
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
Replace Python FastAPI + WebSocket servers with a single 2.1MB Rust binary
(wifi-densepose-sensing-server) that serves all UI endpoints:
- REST: /health/*, /api/v1/info, /api/v1/pose/current, /api/v1/pose/stats,
/api/v1/pose/zones/summary, /api/v1/stream/status
- WebSocket: /api/v1/stream/pose (pose_data with 17 COCO keypoints),
/ws/sensing (raw sensing_update stream on port 8765)
- Static: /ui/* with no-cache headers
WiFi-derived pose estimation: derive_pose_from_sensing() generates 17 COCO
keypoints from CSI/WiFi signal data with motion-driven animation.
Data sources: ESP32 CSI via UDP :5005, Windows WiFi via netsh, simulation
fallback. Auto-detection probes each in order.
UI changes:
- Point all endpoints to Rust server on :8080 (was Python :8000)
- Fix WebSocket sensing URL to include /ws/sensing path
- Remove sensingOnlyMode gating — all tabs init normally
- Remove api.service.js sensing-only short-circuit
- Fix clearPingInterval bug in websocket.service.js
Also removes obsolete k8s/ template manifests.
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
- Add Python WebSocket sensing server (ws_server.py) with ESP32 UDP CSI
and Windows RSSI auto-detect collectors on port 8765
- Add Three.js Gaussian splat renderer with custom GLSL shaders for
real-time WiFi signal field visualization (blue→green→red gradient)
- Add SensingTab component with RSSI sparkline, feature meters, and
motion classification badge
- Add sensing.service.js WebSocket client with reconnect and simulation fallback
- Implement sensing-only mode: suppress all DensePose API calls when
FastAPI backend (port 8000) is not running, clean console output
- ADR-019: Document sensing-only UI architecture and data flow
- ADR-020: Migrate AI/model inference to Rust with RuVector ONNX Runtime,
replacing ~2.7GB Python stack with ~50MB static binary
- Add ruvnet/ruvector as upstream remote for RuVector crate ecosystem
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
Dragan Spiridonov