VEIL (Verifiable Emission-shaping for Identity-Leakage prevention) is the countermeasure counterpart to BFLD (ADR-118/121): where BFLD detects when beamforming feedback becomes identifying, VEIL shapes a node's own outgoing feedback so an unauthorized passive sniffer cannot re-identify people, while a legitimate receiver that shares the per-session key sees an unchanged link. Mechanism: identity leaks through the fine cross-subcarrier phase structure of a compressed beamforming report; throughput rides the dominant beam direction. These are (mostly) separable subspaces. VEIL composes extra keyed Givens rotations (the report's native primitive) over the fine subspace only. The rotation is orthogonal (energy-preserving -> not jamming), keyed per session (the AP inverts it -> throughput preserved), and fresh each session (a sniffer cannot average it back -> re-identification collapses to chance). Contents: - v2/crates/wifi-densepose-privshield: deterministic, dependency-free, WASM-ready pure-compute leaf implementing the attacker-vs-protector experiment, the four compliant controls, a throughput model, a machine-checkable "not jamming" compliance audit, and a pinned witness. 29 tests + doctest pass; clippy -D warnings clean; builds for wasm32-unknown-unknown. - docs/research/privacy-shield: 8-file research bundle (SOTA, threat model, design, compliance/regulatory, experiment protocol, market, roadmap). - docs/adr/ADR-288: formal decision record. Reference results (SYNTHETIC / L0, N=16 identities): passive re-ID accuracy 100% shield-off -> 7.8% shield-on (chance 6.25%); modeled throughput ratio 98.0%; emission energy ratio 1.000000 (compliant). All defense numbers are SYNTHETIC until a two-node hardware capture with a witness exists. Compliant waveform controls only; never jamming (47 U.S.C. 333/302a analysis in the bundle). Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WEXNqzs7UsfNFBcP5yW21p
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04 — Compliance and Regulatory Line
Non-negotiable: VEIL uses compliant waveform controls and never jams. This file states the legal basis for that line and why every VEIL control falls on the compliant side of it. It is engineering analysis, not legal advice; a deployment in a given jurisdiction needs its own regulatory review.
1. The statutory line (United States)
The prohibition is on interfering with others' transmissions, not on how you shape your own signal.
| Authority | What it prohibits |
|---|---|
| 47 U.S.C. §333 | Willful or malicious interference with any licensed/authorized radio station or U.S. Government station |
| 47 U.S.C. §302a(b) | Manufacture, import, marketing, sale, or operation of non-compliant devices (jammers cannot be certified — their sole purpose is interference) |
| 47 U.S.C. §301 | Requires a license/authorization to transmit; a jammer can never be authorized |
| 47 U.S.C. §501 / §503 | Criminal penalties and forfeitures; FCC cites fines up to $112,500 per violation, no exemptions for business/residence/vehicle |
The distinguishing element of jamming is intent to interfere plus effect on a third party's link. A device that shapes its own standards-conformant emission — staying within transmit-power and spectral-mask limits, still type-certifiable — is not a jammer.
2. Why each VEIL control is compliant
| Control | Compliance argument |
|---|---|
| Keyed precoder rotation | Orthogonal ⇒ preserves the report's energy exactly ⇒ adds no power on top of anyone's signal. It is still a valid precoder within the 802.11 feedback format. Machine-checked: energy ratio = 1.000000 (compliance module) |
| Feedback quantization / dither | Reports angles the standard already allows, at the standard's resolution; sub-step dither stays within the quantization envelope. No emission change beyond the node's own frame |
| Sounding-cadence randomization | Chooses when the node sends its own NDP soundings, within permitted timing. Sending fewer/jittered soundings never interferes with another station |
| MU-group / stream-mapping shuffle | Rearranges the node's own spatial mapping; a normal in-spec transmit choice |
None of the four transmits to prevent another station from communicating; none adds out-of-mask energy; each passes normal type certification. Contrast a jammer, whose defining purpose is to emit energy that denies others service.
3. The energy-conservation proof as a compliance artifact
VEIL turns "not jamming" from a promise into a checked property. The
compliance::ComplianceReport audits each protection step:
input_energy = ‖report_before‖²
output_energy = ‖report_after‖²
energy_ratio = output_energy / input_energy # ≈ 1.0 for a rotation
energy_conserving = |energy_ratio − 1| ≤ 1e-2
adds_interfering_energy = false # by construction
is_compliant = energy_conserving ∧ ¬adds_interfering_energy
A regulator, an auditor, or the runtime attestation layer (ADR-141) can read the report and verify the shield is a waveform-shaping control, not an interference source. On the reference experiment the measured ratio is 1.000000.
4. Jurisdictional notes
- EU (GDPR framing). Covert WiFi body-sensing of vital signs is sensitive health data and "almost certainly illegal under GDPR," but effectively unenforceable (receivers are undetectable) — which is precisely why a technical control is needed. VEIL as a transmit-side control does not itself raise GDPR issues; it reduces the personal data an attacker can derive.
- RF-emission rules are jurisdiction-specific. The energy-preserving property is the portable core of the compliance argument, but power/mask/timing limits differ by region and band; a deployment must confirm local rules.
- Deliberate transmit-nulling toward a located sniffer (steering a spatial null at a known passive receiver) is still the node's own emission and adds no interference, but is more aggressive and should get explicit regulatory review before field use. It is not part of the default VEIL profile.
Sources
- 47 U.S.C. §333: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/333
- 47 U.S.C. §302a: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/302a
- FCC Jammer Enforcement: https://www.fcc.gov/general/jammer-enforcement · https://www.fcc.gov/enforcement/areas/jammers
- FCC Cell/GPS Jamming guidance: https://www.fcc.gov/general/cell-phone-and-gps-jamming
- FCC 14-92 enforcement order: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-14-92A1.pdf
Caveat: FCC pages were cross-verified against Cornell LII; this is engineering analysis, not legal advice.