Files
ruvnet--RuView/ui/services/api.service.js
T
Dragan Spiridonov 56327d0931 decide: browser sessions are read-only permanently; drop the dead step-up client
Decision: browser-side admin is not wanted. `BROWSER_SIGNIN_SCOPE` stays
`sensing:read`, and the escalate-on-demand design sketched while this was open
is not being built. Destructive operations — training, model delete, recording
delete — keep their home in the CLI, where `--admin` is explicit and typed by a
person. Routing them through a browser would mean either asking every user to
consent to delete capability in order to watch a stream, or building a second
consent flow to avoid that.

Consequences, now settled rather than open:

- The UI's admin controls are unreachable from a Cognitum browser session, and
  that is intended. The manual token-paste field is unchanged and still carries
  whatever authority the pasted token has, so nothing that worked before stops
  working.

- REMOVED the client-side step-up redirect from ui/services/api.service.js. It
  caught an RFC 6750 challenge that can never be issued to a browser, and it
  ended in `return new Promise(() => {})` — so if any other 401 had ever grown
  that header, every caller awaiting it would have hung forever with no error
  and no timeout. Dead code with a trap in it is worse than no code.

- KEPT ADMIN_REVERIFY_SECS as a server-side backstop. Fail-closed and free, so
  if the requested scope is ever widened the freshness requirement is already
  in place. Documented at its definition as a backstop specifically so nobody
  reads its passing tests as evidence the control is exercised — the tests
  reach it through a crate-internal seam that mints an admin cookie the real
  flow does not produce.

ADR-271 also stops hedging on the session TTL: chosen is A at one hour. Option B
(server-side refresh-token store) is not built, and the ADR now names the
residual instead of implying it is closed — within one hour a revoked Cognitum
grant still reads sensing data through an existing browser session. There is no
introspection endpoint, so nothing short of B closes that, and one hour is the
size of the hole we accepted.

Adds `the_cookie_max_age_matches_the_session_expiry`, which the previous ADR
revision asked for and nobody had written: Max-Age and the payload's `exp` are
two independent expressions of one lifetime, and drift means either the browser
presents a session we reject or we hold authority the browser discarded.

Verified: workspace 176 suites clean, UI 22, api.service.js parses.

Co-Authored-By: Ruflo & AQE
2026-07-23 14:47:31 +02:00

178 lines
5.5 KiB
JavaScript

// API Service for WiFi-DensePose UI
import { API_CONFIG, buildApiUrl } from '../config/api.config.js';
import { backendDetector } from '../utils/backend-detector.js';
export class ApiService {
constructor() {
this.authToken = null;
this.requestInterceptors = [];
this.responseInterceptors = [];
}
// Set authentication token
setAuthToken(token) {
this.authToken = token;
}
// Add request interceptor
addRequestInterceptor(interceptor) {
this.requestInterceptors.push(interceptor);
}
// Add response interceptor
addResponseInterceptor(interceptor) {
this.responseInterceptors.push(interceptor);
}
// Build headers for requests
getHeaders(customHeaders = {}) {
const headers = {
...API_CONFIG.DEFAULT_HEADERS,
...customHeaders
};
if (this.authToken) {
headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${this.authToken}`;
}
return headers;
}
// Process request through interceptors
async processRequest(url, options) {
let processedUrl = url;
let processedOptions = options;
for (const interceptor of this.requestInterceptors) {
const result = await interceptor(processedUrl, processedOptions);
processedUrl = result.url || processedUrl;
processedOptions = result.options || processedOptions;
}
return { url: processedUrl, options: processedOptions };
}
// Process response through interceptors
async processResponse(response, url) {
let processedResponse = response;
for (const interceptor of this.responseInterceptors) {
processedResponse = await interceptor(processedResponse, url);
}
return processedResponse;
}
// Generic request method
async request(url, options = {}) {
try {
// Process request through interceptors
const processed = await this.processRequest(url, options);
// Determine the correct base URL (real backend vs mock)
let finalUrl = processed.url;
if (processed.url.startsWith(API_CONFIG.BASE_URL)) {
const baseUrl = await backendDetector.getBaseUrl();
finalUrl = processed.url.replace(API_CONFIG.BASE_URL, baseUrl);
}
// Make the request
const response = await fetch(finalUrl, {
...processed.options,
headers: this.getHeaders(processed.options.headers)
});
// Process response through interceptors
const processedResponse = await this.processResponse(response, url);
// NOTE: there is deliberately no step-up re-authentication branch here.
//
// An earlier revision caught the server's RFC 6750 "reauthentication
// required" challenge and redirected to /oauth/start. That challenge can
// never be issued to a browser: browser sign-in requests `sensing:read`
// only and always will (see BROWSER_SIGNIN_SCOPE), so no browser session
// holds `sensing:admin`, so the freshness gate the challenge announces is
// never reached. Admin work goes through the CLI or a pasted bearer.
//
// Removed rather than left inert, because it was not merely dead — it
// ended in a promise that never settles. If any other 401 ever grew that
// header, every caller awaiting this would hang forever with no error.
// The server-side guard stays as a fail-closed backstop; the client has
// nothing to do about a flow that does not exist.
// Handle errors
if (!processedResponse.ok) {
const error = await processedResponse.json().catch(() => ({
message: `HTTP ${processedResponse.status}: ${processedResponse.statusText}`
}));
throw new Error(error.message || error.detail || 'Request failed');
}
// Parse JSON response
const data = await processedResponse.json().catch(() => null);
return data;
} catch (error) {
// Only log if not a connection refusal (expected when DensePose API is down)
if (error.message && !error.message.includes('Failed to fetch')) {
console.error('API Request Error:', error);
}
throw error;
}
}
// GET request
async get(endpoint, params = {}, options = {}) {
const url = buildApiUrl(endpoint, params);
return this.request(url, {
method: 'GET',
...options
});
}
// POST request
async post(endpoint, data = {}, options = {}) {
const url = buildApiUrl(endpoint);
return this.request(url, {
method: 'POST',
body: JSON.stringify(data),
...options
});
}
// PUT request
async put(endpoint, data = {}, options = {}) {
const url = buildApiUrl(endpoint);
return this.request(url, {
method: 'PUT',
body: JSON.stringify(data),
...options
});
}
// DELETE request
async delete(endpoint, options = {}) {
const url = buildApiUrl(endpoint);
return this.request(url, {
method: 'DELETE',
...options
});
}
}
// Create singleton instance
export const apiService = new ApiService();
// Storage key shared with the QuickSettings "API Access" panel.
export const API_TOKEN_STORAGE_KEY = 'ruview-api-token';
// Apply a previously-saved bearer token at module load — before app init
// dispatches its first request — so a configured RUVIEW_API_TOKEN works from
// the very first /api/v1/* call. The server only ever checks the
// `Authorization: Bearer` header (see bearer_auth.rs) — this intentionally
// never puts the token in a URL query string.
try {
const storedToken = localStorage.getItem(API_TOKEN_STORAGE_KEY);
if (storedToken) apiService.setAuthToken(storedToken);
} catch { /* storage unavailable (private browsing etc.) */ }