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https://github.com/ruvnet/RuView
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Dragan Spiridonov
6300b1cbd2
Closes the hole measured in 7d6d6694. Before, with RUVIEW_API_TOKEN set, a real
handshake carrying no credential:
/ws/sensing 101 · /ws/introspection 101 · /api/v1/stream/pose 101
(/api/v1/models correctly 401)
After, same server, same handshake:
/ws/sensing 401 · /ws/introspection 401 · /api/v1/stream/pose 401
bearer on the upgrade -> 101
POST /api/v1/ws-ticket then ?ticket=<value> -> 101
the same ticket replayed -> 401
a bogus ticket -> 401
POST /api/v1/ws-ticket unauthenticated -> 401
Two ways in, matching what each client can actually do:
- Native clients (Python, Rust CLI, TS MCP) send a normal Authorization header
on the upgrade. They were never browser-constrained; forcing them through a
ticket would add a round-trip and a second credential path for nothing.
- Browsers cannot set that header, so they exchange their credential at
POST /api/v1/ws-ticket — an ordinary request, where they can — for a 30s
single-use ticket passed as ?ticket=.
A ticket inherits the issuing principal's scopes, so a sensing:read session
cannot mint one that outranks itself, and it is not a REST credential: pinned
by a test that `?ticket=` on /api/v1/models is still 401.
ESCAPE HATCH (RUVIEW_WS_LEGACY_UNAUTHENTICATED=1) restores the old behaviour
for deployments that cannot update server and UI in lockstep. It is a migration
aid, not a supported configuration, and it says so on every boot in a warning
that names the actual exposure ("the live sensing stream — presence, pose and
vital signs — is readable by anyone who can reach this port"). Its blast radius
is exactly the WebSocket paths: a test pins that it does not weaken REST.
The flag is read once at construction, so a mid-flight environment change
cannot silently open these paths on a running server.
SUPERSEDES the PR #1313 test `enabled_exempts_pose_stream_websocket`, which
asserted the old exemption. Its reasoning about browsers was correct; the
conclusion was not. Renamed and inverted rather than deleted, with the history
in the doc comment — and the half that still matters (the WebSocket rule must
not leak to other /api/v1/* paths) is kept.
Deployments with auth OFF see no change at all — pinned by a test.
Tests: 522 passed in the sensing server (9 new WS-gating, 12 ticket-store).
STILL OUTSTANDING for ADR-272: the browser UI does not yet fetch a ticket, so
it needs the escape hatch until ui/services/api.service.js is updated. That is
the next commit, not a permanent state.
Co-Authored-By: Ruflo & AQE