Files
ruvnet--RuView/v2/crates/wifi-densepose-sensing-server
Dragan Spiridonov 89cceaf835 fix(auth): close P1/P2/P3 — JWKS stall, 12h session, cookie shadowing
All three deferred findings from the qe-court round. Each fix is guarded by a
test confirmed to FAIL against the old behaviour.

P1 — JWKS: self-inflicted stall, and a blocking fetch on a tokio worker.

`fetched_at` advances only on SUCCESS, and the only rate limiter sat behind
`if fresh`. So once the TTL elapsed after the last successful fetch, `fresh`
was permanently false, the limiter was never consulted, and EVERY request
performed its own blocking 3s-timeout fetch. A Pi that loses WAN stalled
itself 300s later with no attacker present; an attacker could force the same
state by flooding tokens with an unknown `kid`.

Now: `last_attempt_at` is recorded BEFORE every fetch regardless of outcome,
and gates the stale path too; a stale-but-present key is served rather than
erroring, which is the offline tolerance this module always claimed.
Measured by the new test: 26 outbound fetches before, 1 after.

Kept as TWO independent limiters. Merging them looks tidy and is wrong — a
routine refetch would then suppress the unknown-`kid` path for 30s and delay
pickup of a key rotation inside the TTL. I made that mistake first; two
existing tests caught it.

The blocking call also now runs in `spawn_blocking` at the verify boundary,
matching what `main.rs` already does for the token exchange, where the comment
reads "the same mistake this codebase had to fix in jwks.rs". The hot
verification path had never been given the same treatment. A panicked task
fails closed.

P2 — session lifetime, per decision: 1 hour, plus step-up.

SESSION_TTL_SECS 12h -> 1h, and privileged (`sensing:admin`) actions now
require the user to have authenticated within ADMIN_REVERIFY_SECS (5 min),
tracked by a new `auth_time` claim. Reads ride the full session; only the
routes where a stale session does damage are re-verified, so a dashboard whose
main use is watching a live stream does not re-auth hourly.

`auth_time` is `#[serde(default)]`, so a cookie issued before the field existed
reads as 0 — infinitely stale. Such a session keeps working for reads and
cannot perform privileged actions. Fail-closed and self-healing on next sign-in.

The refusal carries an RFC 6750 `WWW-Authenticate` error code, because the
client's correct response differs from a plain 401: the user IS signed in and
needs to prove it again. `api.service.js` acts on that and redirects through
`/oauth/start` — otherwise a stale-session delete surfaces as a generic
"Request failed" with no hint that signing in again fixes it.

P3 — cookie shadowing.

`read_cookie` returned the FIRST match, and RFC 6265 §5.4 sends longer-`Path`
cookies first. Cookies are not isolated by port or scheme, so any other service
on the host — or a plain-HTTP MITM injecting Set-Cookie — could plant
`ruview_session=<their own validly signed session>; Path=/ui`. The victim sent
both, the attacker's first, and it verified because it genuinely was signed:
silent session takeover, with `/oauth/status` reporting the attacker's account.

The signature was doing its job throughout, which is why "it's signed" never
answered this. `__Host-` would, but requires `Secure`, and RuView is routinely
reached over plain HTTP on a LAN.

So both credential paths now accept only when EXACTLY ONE candidate verifies.
An attacker can still cause a refusal by planting a second valid cookie — a
nuisance — but no longer a takeover. Planting junk changes nothing, so this
does not become a trivial DoS.

Tests: +1 jwks (26-vs-1 fetch amplification), +4 step-up, +4 shadowing, +1
duplicate-name reader. Mutation-verified: reverting the stale-path guard gives
26 fetches; reverting to first-match cookie reads fails
`a_shadowing_cookie_cannot_silently_take_over_the_session`.

Verified: workspace 176 suites clean under CI flags, ruview-auth 62+25+2 with
--all-features, UI 22.

ADR-271: P1/P2/P3 marked RESOLVED with the analysis retained, since it explains
why each fix has the shape it does.

Co-Authored-By: Ruflo & AQE
2026-07-23 13:13:42 +02:00
..

wifi-densepose-sensing-server

Crates.io Documentation License

Lightweight Axum server for real-time WiFi sensing with RuVector signal processing.

Overview

wifi-densepose-sensing-server is the operational backend for WiFi-DensePose. It receives raw CSI frames from ESP32 hardware over UDP, runs them through the RuVector-powered signal processing pipeline, and broadcasts processed sensing updates to browser clients via WebSocket. A built-in static file server hosts the sensing UI on the same port.

The crate ships both a library (wifi_densepose_sensing_server) exposing the training and inference modules, and a binary (sensing-server) that starts the full server stack.

Integrates wifi-densepose-wifiscan for multi-BSSID WiFi scanning per ADR-022 Phase 3.

Features

  • UDP CSI ingestion -- Receives ESP32 CSI frames on port 5005 and parses them into the internal CsiFrame representation.
  • Vital sign detection -- Pure-Rust FFT-based breathing rate (0.1--0.5 Hz) and heart rate (0.67--2.0 Hz) estimation from CSI amplitude time series (ADR-021).
  • RVF container -- Standalone binary container format for packaging model weights, metadata, and configuration into a single .rvf file with 64-byte aligned segments.
  • RVF pipeline -- Progressive model loading with streaming segment decoding.
  • Graph Transformer -- Cross-attention bottleneck between antenna-space CSI features and the COCO 17-keypoint body graph, followed by GCN message passing (ADR-023 Phase 2). Pure std, no ML dependencies.
  • SONA adaptation -- LoRA + EWC++ online adaptation for environment drift without catastrophic forgetting (ADR-023 Phase 5).
  • Contrastive CSI embeddings -- Self-supervised SimCLR-style pretraining with InfoNCE loss, projection head, fingerprint indexing, and cross-modal pose alignment (ADR-024).
  • Sparse inference -- Activation profiling, sparse matrix-vector multiply, INT8/FP16 quantization, and a full sparse inference engine for edge deployment (ADR-023 Phase 6).
  • Dataset pipeline -- Training dataset loading and batching.
  • Multi-BSSID scanning -- Windows netsh integration for BSSID discovery via wifi-densepose-wifiscan (ADR-022).
  • WebSocket broadcast -- Real-time sensing updates pushed to all connected clients at ws://localhost:8765/ws/sensing.
  • Static file serving -- Hosts the sensing UI on port 8080 with CORS headers.

Modules

Module Description
vital_signs Breathing and heart rate extraction via FFT spectral analysis
rvf_container RVF binary format builder and reader
rvf_pipeline Progressive model loading from RVF containers
graph_transformer Graph Transformer + GCN for CSI-to-pose estimation
trainer Training loop orchestration
dataset Training data loading and batching
sona LoRA adapters and EWC++ continual learning
sparse_inference Neuron profiling, sparse matmul, INT8/FP16 quantization
embedding Contrastive CSI embedding model and fingerprint index

Quick Start

# Build the server
cargo build -p wifi-densepose-sensing-server

# Run with default settings (HTTP :8080, UDP :5005, WS :8765)
cargo run -p wifi-densepose-sensing-server

# Run with custom ports
cargo run -p wifi-densepose-sensing-server -- \
    --http-port 9000 \
    --udp-port 5005 \
    --static-dir ./ui

Using as a library

use wifi_densepose_sensing_server::vital_signs::VitalSignDetector;

// Create a detector with 20 Hz sample rate
let mut detector = VitalSignDetector::new(20.0);

// Feed CSI amplitude samples
for amplitude in csi_amplitudes.iter() {
    detector.push_sample(*amplitude);
}

// Extract vital signs
if let Some(vitals) = detector.detect() {
    println!("Breathing: {:.1} BPM", vitals.breathing_rate_bpm);
    println!("Heart rate: {:.0} BPM", vitals.heart_rate_bpm);
}

Architecture

ESP32 ──UDP:5005──> [ CSI Receiver ]
                          |
                    [ Signal Pipeline ]
                    (vital_signs, graph_transformer, sona)
                          |
                    [ WebSocket Broadcast ]
                          |
Browser <──WS:8765── [ Axum Server :8080 ] ──> Static UI files
Crate Role
wifi-densepose-wifiscan Multi-BSSID WiFi scanning (ADR-022)
wifi-densepose-core Shared types and traits
wifi-densepose-signal CSI signal processing algorithms
wifi-densepose-hardware ESP32 hardware interfaces
wifi-densepose-wasm Browser WASM bindings for the sensing UI
wifi-densepose-train Full training pipeline with ruvector
wifi-densepose-mat Disaster detection module

License

MIT OR Apache-2.0