Files
ruvnet--RuView/v2/crates/homecore-hap/src/pair_verify.rs
T

333 lines
13 KiB
Rust

//! Server-side HAP Pair-Verify M1-M4.
#![cfg_attr(not(feature = "hap-server"), allow(dead_code))]
use std::sync::Arc;
use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, Signer, VerifyingKey};
use x25519_dalek::{PublicKey, StaticSecret};
use zeroize::{Zeroize, Zeroizing};
use crate::crypto::{hkdf_sha512, open_labeled, seal_labeled, SessionKeys};
use crate::error::HapError;
use crate::pairing::PairingStore;
use crate::protocol::{
encode_items, error_response, Tlv8, TLV_ENCRYPTED_DATA, TLV_ERROR_AUTHENTICATION,
TLV_IDENTIFIER, TLV_PUBLIC_KEY, TLV_SIGNATURE, TLV_STATE,
};
struct AwaitM3 {
controller_public: [u8; 32],
accessory_public: [u8; 32],
shared_secret: Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>,
session_key: Zeroizing<[u8; 32]>,
}
enum Phase {
Idle,
AwaitM3(AwaitM3),
}
pub(crate) struct AuthenticatedSession {
pub(crate) controller_id: String,
pub(crate) admin: bool,
pub(crate) keys: SessionKeys,
}
pub(crate) struct PairVerifyResponse {
pub(crate) body: Vec<u8>,
pub(crate) authenticated: Option<AuthenticatedSession>,
pub(crate) terminal: bool,
}
pub(crate) struct PairVerify {
store: Arc<PairingStore>,
phase: Phase,
}
impl PairVerify {
pub(crate) fn new(store: Arc<PairingStore>) -> Self {
Self {
store,
phase: Phase::Idle,
}
}
pub(crate) fn handle(&mut self, request: &[u8]) -> Result<PairVerifyResponse, HapError> {
let tlv = Tlv8::parse(request)?;
let state = tlv
.byte(TLV_STATE)
.ok_or_else(|| HapError::Protocol("Pair-Verify requires one-byte State".into()))?;
match state {
1 => self.m1(&tlv),
3 => self.m3(&tlv),
_ => Err(HapError::Protocol(
"Pair-Verify state is out of sequence".into(),
)),
}
}
fn m1(&mut self, tlv: &Tlv8) -> Result<PairVerifyResponse, HapError> {
if !matches!(self.phase, Phase::Idle) {
return Err(HapError::Protocol("Pair-Verify M1 was replayed".into()));
}
if !self.store.is_paired()? {
return Ok(PairVerifyResponse {
body: error_response(2, TLV_ERROR_AUTHENTICATION),
authenticated: None,
terminal: true,
});
}
let controller_public: [u8; 32] =
required_exact(tlv, TLV_PUBLIC_KEY, 32, "controller Curve25519 public key")?
.try_into()
.expect("length checked");
let mut secret_bytes = Zeroizing::new([0u8; 32]);
getrandom::getrandom(secret_bytes.as_mut())
.map_err(|error| HapError::Protocol(format!("generate X25519 secret: {error}")))?;
let secret = StaticSecret::from(*secret_bytes);
let accessory_public = PublicKey::from(&secret).to_bytes();
let shared = secret.diffie_hellman(&PublicKey::from(controller_public));
if !shared.was_contributory() {
return Ok(PairVerifyResponse {
body: error_response(2, TLV_ERROR_AUTHENTICATION),
authenticated: None,
terminal: true,
});
}
let shared_secret = Zeroizing::new(shared.to_bytes());
let accessory_id = self.store.accessory_id()?;
let signing_key = self.store.signing_key()?;
let mut accessory_info = Zeroizing::new(Vec::with_capacity(32 + accessory_id.len() + 32));
accessory_info.extend_from_slice(&accessory_public);
accessory_info.extend_from_slice(accessory_id.as_bytes());
accessory_info.extend_from_slice(&controller_public);
let signature = signing_key.sign(&accessory_info).to_bytes();
let plaintext = Zeroizing::new(encode_items([
(TLV_IDENTIFIER, accessory_id.as_bytes()),
(TLV_SIGNATURE, signature.as_slice()),
]));
let session_key = Zeroizing::new(hkdf_sha512(
b"Pair-Verify-Encrypt-Salt",
shared_secret.as_ref(),
b"Pair-Verify-Encrypt-Info",
)?);
let encrypted = seal_labeled(&session_key, b"PV-Msg02", &plaintext)?;
self.phase = Phase::AwaitM3(AwaitM3 {
controller_public,
accessory_public,
shared_secret,
session_key,
});
Ok(PairVerifyResponse {
body: encode_items([
(TLV_STATE, [2].as_slice()),
(TLV_PUBLIC_KEY, accessory_public.as_slice()),
(TLV_ENCRYPTED_DATA, encrypted.as_slice()),
]),
authenticated: None,
terminal: false,
})
}
fn m3(&mut self, tlv: &Tlv8) -> Result<PairVerifyResponse, HapError> {
let Phase::AwaitM3(state) = std::mem::replace(&mut self.phase, Phase::Idle) else {
return Err(HapError::Protocol(
"Pair-Verify M3 arrived without M1".into(),
));
};
match self.finish_m3(tlv, state) {
Ok(authenticated) => Ok(PairVerifyResponse {
body: encode_items([(TLV_STATE, [4].as_slice())]),
authenticated: Some(authenticated),
terminal: true,
}),
Err(_) => Ok(PairVerifyResponse {
body: error_response(4, TLV_ERROR_AUTHENTICATION),
authenticated: None,
terminal: true,
}),
}
}
fn finish_m3(&self, tlv: &Tlv8, state: AwaitM3) -> Result<AuthenticatedSession, HapError> {
let encrypted = tlv
.get(TLV_ENCRYPTED_DATA)
.filter(|value| (17..=4096).contains(&value.len()))
.ok_or_else(|| HapError::Protocol("invalid Pair-Verify encrypted data".into()))?;
let mut plaintext =
Zeroizing::new(open_labeled(&state.session_key, b"PV-Msg03", encrypted)?);
let sub_tlv = Tlv8::parse(&plaintext)?;
let controller_id_bytes = sub_tlv
.get(TLV_IDENTIFIER)
.filter(|value| !value.is_empty() && value.len() <= 64)
.ok_or_else(|| HapError::Protocol("invalid controller identifier".into()))?;
let controller_id = std::str::from_utf8(controller_id_bytes)
.map_err(|_| HapError::Protocol("controller identifier is not UTF-8".into()))?
.to_owned();
let signature_bytes: [u8; 64] =
required_exact(&sub_tlv, TLV_SIGNATURE, 64, "controller signature")?
.try_into()
.expect("length checked");
let pairing = self
.store
.get(&controller_id)?
.ok_or_else(|| HapError::Protocol("unknown controller pairing".into()))?;
let key = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&pairing.public_key)
.map_err(|_| HapError::Protocol("persisted controller key is invalid".into()))?;
let mut controller_info =
Zeroizing::new(Vec::with_capacity(32 + controller_id_bytes.len() + 32));
controller_info.extend_from_slice(&state.controller_public);
controller_info.extend_from_slice(controller_id_bytes);
controller_info.extend_from_slice(&state.accessory_public);
key.verify_strict(&controller_info, &Signature::from_bytes(&signature_bytes))
.map_err(|_| HapError::Protocol("controller transcript signature rejected".into()))?;
let keys = SessionKeys::derive(&state.shared_secret)?;
plaintext.zeroize();
Ok(AuthenticatedSession {
controller_id,
admin: pairing.admin,
keys,
})
}
}
fn required_exact<'a>(
tlv: &'a Tlv8,
kind: u8,
length: usize,
name: &str,
) -> Result<&'a [u8], HapError> {
tlv.get(kind)
.filter(|value| value.len() == length)
.ok_or_else(|| HapError::Protocol(format!("{name} must contain {length} bytes")))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::crypto::RecordLayer;
use crate::pairing::{ControllerPairing, SetupCode};
use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
fn setup() -> (tempfile::TempDir, Arc<PairingStore>, SigningKey) {
let directory = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let store = PairingStore::create(
directory.path().join("pairings.json"),
SetupCode::parse("518-26-003").unwrap(),
Some("AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF".into()),
)
.unwrap();
let controller = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[0x44; 32]);
store
.add_initial(ControllerPairing {
controller_id: "controller-1".into(),
public_key: controller.verifying_key().to_bytes(),
admin: true,
})
.unwrap();
(directory, Arc::new(store), controller)
}
#[test]
fn full_m1_through_m4_authenticates_transcript_and_derives_record_keys() {
let (_directory, store, controller_signing) = setup();
let mut server = PairVerify::new(store.clone());
let controller_secret = StaticSecret::from([0x33; 32]);
let controller_public = PublicKey::from(&controller_secret).to_bytes();
let m1 = encode_items([
(TLV_STATE, [1].as_slice()),
(TLV_PUBLIC_KEY, controller_public.as_slice()),
]);
let m2 = Tlv8::parse(&server.handle(&m1).unwrap().body).unwrap();
let accessory_public: [u8; 32] = m2.get(TLV_PUBLIC_KEY).unwrap().try_into().unwrap();
let shared = controller_secret.diffie_hellman(&PublicKey::from(accessory_public));
let session_key = hkdf_sha512(
b"Pair-Verify-Encrypt-Salt",
shared.as_bytes(),
b"Pair-Verify-Encrypt-Info",
)
.unwrap();
let accessory_sub_tlv = Tlv8::parse(
&open_labeled(
&session_key,
b"PV-Msg02",
m2.get(TLV_ENCRYPTED_DATA).unwrap(),
)
.unwrap(),
)
.unwrap();
let accessory_id = accessory_sub_tlv.get(TLV_IDENTIFIER).unwrap();
let accessory_signature: [u8; 64] = accessory_sub_tlv
.get(TLV_SIGNATURE)
.unwrap()
.try_into()
.unwrap();
let mut accessory_info = Vec::new();
accessory_info.extend_from_slice(&accessory_public);
accessory_info.extend_from_slice(accessory_id);
accessory_info.extend_from_slice(&controller_public);
VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&store.accessory_public_key().unwrap())
.unwrap()
.verify_strict(
&accessory_info,
&Signature::from_bytes(&accessory_signature),
)
.unwrap();
let controller_id = b"controller-1";
let mut controller_info = Vec::new();
controller_info.extend_from_slice(&controller_public);
controller_info.extend_from_slice(controller_id);
controller_info.extend_from_slice(&accessory_public);
let signature = controller_signing.sign(&controller_info).to_bytes();
let sub_tlv = encode_items([
(TLV_IDENTIFIER, controller_id.as_slice()),
(TLV_SIGNATURE, signature.as_slice()),
]);
let encrypted = seal_labeled(&session_key, b"PV-Msg03", &sub_tlv).unwrap();
let m3 = encode_items([
(TLV_STATE, [3].as_slice()),
(TLV_ENCRYPTED_DATA, encrypted.as_slice()),
]);
let result = server.handle(&m3).unwrap();
assert_eq!(Tlv8::parse(&result.body).unwrap().byte(TLV_STATE), Some(4));
let authenticated = result.authenticated.unwrap();
assert_eq!(authenticated.controller_id, "controller-1");
let mut accessory_records = RecordLayer::accessory(authenticated.keys);
let encrypted_record = accessory_records.encrypt(b"response").unwrap();
assert!(!encrypted_record
.windows(8)
.any(|window| window == b"response"));
}
#[test]
fn all_zero_key_replay_and_tamper_fail_closed() {
let (_directory, store, _) = setup();
let mut server = PairVerify::new(store);
let zero_key = encode_items([
(TLV_STATE, [1].as_slice()),
(TLV_PUBLIC_KEY, [0u8; 32].as_slice()),
]);
let response = Tlv8::parse(&server.handle(&zero_key).unwrap().body).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
response.byte(crate::protocol::TLV_ERROR),
Some(TLV_ERROR_AUTHENTICATION)
);
let controller_secret = StaticSecret::from([9; 32]);
let controller_public = PublicKey::from(&controller_secret).to_bytes();
let m1 = encode_items([
(TLV_STATE, [1].as_slice()),
(TLV_PUBLIC_KEY, controller_public.as_slice()),
]);
let _ = server.handle(&m1).unwrap();
assert!(server.handle(&m1).is_err());
let tampered = encode_items([
(TLV_STATE, [3].as_slice()),
(TLV_ENCRYPTED_DATA, [0u8; 17].as_slice()),
]);
let response = server.handle(&tampered).unwrap();
assert!(response.authenticated.is_none());
}
}