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ADR-290: VEIL end-to-end hardware implementation program (multi-provider firmware)

Field Value
Status Proposed — P4 scaffolding (build-only); portable core validated on host
Date 2026-08-09
Parent ADR-288 (VEIL shield), ADR-289 (harness), ADR-282 (L0L5 evidence ladder)
Location firmware/privshield/
Relates to firmware/esp32-csi-node/ (the CSI sensor/attacker node), ADR-280 (governed actuation), ADR-141 (attestation)

0. PROOF discipline

The only artifact validated here is the portable C core (firmware/privshield/core/): a host test (make test) checks energy conservation, reversibility, wrong-key failure, and — pinned — that its SplitMix64 key schedule is byte-identical to the Rust crate's PRNG. That is build/host-level evidence, not silicon. Every per-provider adapter is a build-only scaffold with TODO(hw) markers: SYNTHETIC / L0, no captured log, no MEASURED claim. Nothing in this ADR asserts VEIL works on real hardware; it asserts a plan and a shared core to get there (P5).

1. Context

ADR-288 shipped VEIL as a deterministic, no-radio Rust model, and the 20252026 SOTA sweep (ADR-288 §sota) confirmed the mechanism's family is real and standard-permitted. The open question left was "does this run on real WiFi hardware, and on which?" — including the user asks: can OpenWRT / open WiFi software implement it, and can ESP32 help scramble signals? Answering requires committing to the platform reality rather than assuming a uniform "firmware" target.

2. Decision

Stand up firmware/privshield/ as a multi-provider E2E program around one shared, validated core:

  1. A portable C shield core (core/veil_shield.{h,c}) — the keyed Givens-rotation obfuscation, no_std-friendly C99 (no malloc/libc I/O), with a SplitMix64 key schedule matching the Rust crate so on-air behavior is identical everywhere and every adapter links the same math. Host-tested.
  2. Per-provider adapters, each built and graded by a hardware research agent, honest about what its stack can actually touch:
    • openwifi/ (open PHY/MAC on SDR/FPGA) — the highest-capability path and the one that can host the keyed-reversible design end-to-end (protector + AP-side compensation). Carries the P5 measurement protocol (MEASUREMENT.md) that yields the first MEASURED result with a witness.
    • openwrt/ (Linux mac80211, mt76/ath9k…) — the commodity path. Sounding-cadence randomization, MU-group and stream-mapping control are feasible from the driver/hostapd; the per-packet unitary on the LTF spatial mapping is firmware-deep on most parts. Partial.
    • nexmon/ (Broadcom/Cypress C firmware patches) — the commodity C-firmware route; the read path is proven (Wi-BFI/nexmon_csi), the transmit report-shaping path is research-grade/partial.
    • esp32/ (ESP-IDF) — not a feedback protector (the beamforming path is a closed blob): ESP32 shapes CSI read, not transmitted feedback. Its legitimate roles are a sensing detector (trigger the AP-side shield) and an RIS controller (drive an external reconfigurable surface to scramble the sensing direction — the honest way ESP32 "helps scramble", via an external surface, not its own PHY).
  3. Compliance stance carried into hardware: every control shapes the node's own standards-conformant emission and preserves energy; the ESP32 decoy/cover-traffic idea is documented as legally sensitive / not recommended precisely because it edges toward the interference line.

Per-provider feasibility grades live in each subdir README and the top-level feasibility matrix; they are the answer to the "which hardware" question.

3. What this explicitly is NOT

  • Not validated firmware. No adapter has run on silicon; there is no witness. The scaffolds compile-shaped, not compile-guaranteed on their toolchains (which are absent in this environment).
  • Not a claim that ESP32 can shield beamforming feedback — it cannot; it is a detector/RIS-controller only.
  • Not jamming, on any platform. Compliant waveform shaping only.
  • Not a MEASURED result. That is P5, gated on a captured log.

4. Consequences

  • One validated core, four honest provider scaffolds, and a concrete P5 measurement plan — a real path from model to silicon, with the effort/blocker reality made explicit per platform.
  • The shared core keeps every future hardware result consistent with the crate and with each other.
  • Scope stays inside firmware/privshield/; no other crate/firmware is touched (the existing esp32-csi-node remains the sensor/attacker node).

5. Validation

cd firmware/privshield/core && make test    # host: energy/reversibility/PRNG parity
# per-provider builds require their toolchains (ESP-IDF, OpenWRT SDK, Nexmon,
# Vivado) and real hardware — see each subdir's BUILD/INTEGRATION notes.