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ruvnet--RuView/tools/ruview-mcp/src/http-transport.ts
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rUv e6f26e9ac9 docs(adr): deep review of the RuView npm surface — ADR-263/264/265 optimization strategies (#1229)
* docs(adr): deep review of the RuView npm surface — ADR-263/264/265 optimization strategies

ADR-263 — @ruvnet/ruview@0.1.0 harness review (O1–O9):
- HIGH: claim-check CLI fails open on empty input (no --text/--file -> PASS exit 0)
- HIGH: MCP stdio server head-of-line blocking (spawnSync verify/calibrate up to 600s)
- MEASURED: optionalDependencies triple the cold npx install (4 pkgs/620kB/71 files
  vs 1 pkg/172kB/22 files with --omit=optional) for a path that never imports them
- maxBuffer truncation, python -c port interpolation, version drift, duplicate skills,
  guardrail METRIC_TERMS substring false positives ('map'/'F1' — found by dogfooding
  claim-check on these very ADRs), zero CI

ADR-264 — @ruvnet/rvagent@0.1.0 + @ruv/ruview-cli review (O1–O9), verified against
the published registry tarball:
- HIGH: exports.require -> dist/index.cjs which is never built nor published
- MEASURED: 44 dead source-map files = 62,698B of the 188kB unpacked payload
- stdio-only server described as dual-transport; mixed dot/underscore tool names;
  double Zod validation + hand-duplicated advertised schemas; 2-fd leak per training
  job; unbounded body in the unwired HTTP scaffold; dead detectCogBinary candidates;
  ruview bin-name collision

ADR-265 — cross-cutting npm distribution strategy: npm-packages.yml CI matrix
(test + pack-content/size gate + tarball-install smoke test), publish-from-CI-only
with npm provenance, version single-sourcing from package.json, bin/namespace
ownership (ruview bin belongs to @ruvnet/ruview), claim-check on package READMEs.

Docs only — no runtime code changed. Index/CHANGELOG/CLAUDE.md/README counts updated.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WrGfTGKv1oWZ6iwXZACULz

* fix(npm): implement ADR-263/264/265 — harness fail-closed + async MCP, rvagent packaging/transport/naming, npm CI+provenance gate

ADR-263 (@ruvnet/ruview 0.2.0), O1-O9:
- claim-check fails closed on empty input (CLI exit 2, empty_text tool error)
- MCP stdio server dispatches tools/call asynchronously (promise-based spawn);
  ping answers while a 3s fake verify runs — pinned by new e2e test
- optionalDependencies dropped: cold npx installs exactly 1 package
  (MEASURED: was 4 pkgs/620kB/71 files via npm i in a clean prefix)
- bounded rolling output tails replace spawnSync 1MiB maxBuffer
- node_monitor port passed via sys.argv, never spliced into python -c source
- serverInfo.version read from package.json; resources/prompts stubs
- skills single-sourced: prepack sync script generates .claude/skills/ copies
- which() = memoized dep-free PATH scan
- tools underscore-canonical (ruview_claim_check, ...) + dotted aliases
- guardrail precision: word-boundary map/f1/auc/iou, code-span + F1/O2 label
  scrubbing, quantitative-claims-only; packaging reproducer hints
- 30/30 tests (was 17), incl. concurrency e2e + fail-open regression pins

ADR-264 (@ruvnet/rvagent 0.2.0), O1-O9:
- exports fixed: types-first, phantom dist/index.cjs require target removed
- tarball map-free: 127,704B unpacked / 46 files / 0 maps (MEASURED,
  npm pack --dry-run; was 188kB incl. 44 maps referencing unshipped src)
- Streamable HTTP actually wired behind RVAGENT_HTTP_PORT: one transport +
  one MCP server per session (mcp-session-id routing), 1MiB body cap (413),
  port-aware localhost origin gate; dual-transport description now true
- tools renamed underscore-canonical with dotted router-only aliases
- single Zod validation gate; advertised inputSchema generated from the same
  Zod source (zod-to-json-schema)
- train_count: parent log fds closed (was leaking 2/job); job records
  persisted to <jobsDir>/<id>.json (job_status survives restarts); bounded
  log-tail reads
- detectCogBinary probes its candidates instead of dead-coding them
- version from package.json; @types/express dropped; @types/jest -> 29
- README rewritten to match reality (no phantom subcommands/policy layer)
- 99/99 jest tests (incl. new session/body-cap suite + previously-broken
  manifest suite); stdio handshake + HTTP session flow smoke-tested live

ADR-265 D1-D4:
- .github/workflows/npm-packages.yml: 3-package x Node 20/22 gate — tests,
  version-literal grep (D3), pack-content/size gate, tarball-install smoke
  test (catches the ADR-264 F1 class), README claim-check (D4)
- .github/workflows/ruview-npm-release.yml: publish from CI only with
  npm publish --provenance
- @ruv/ruview-cli bin renamed ruview-cli (ruview bin belongs to
  @ruvnet/ruview); version single-sourced
- ci.yml NODE_VERSION 18 -> 20

ADR statuses updated to Accepted/implemented; harness manifest re-pinned;
ADR-263/264/265 + both package READMEs pass claim-check.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WrGfTGKv1oWZ6iwXZACULz

* perf(rvagent): lazy-load HTTP transport + memoize generated tool schemas

stdio time-to-first-response ~242ms -> ~189ms (-22%; MEASURED, median of
repeated initialize round-trips against dist/index.js in this container).

- ./http-transport.js now imported lazily inside the RVAGENT_HTTP_PORT
  branch: it chain-loads the MCP SDK streamableHttp module (~48ms MEASURED
  via per-module import() timing) which the default stdio path never uses
- toolInputJsonSchema memoized per tool: schemas are static for the process
  lifetime; under the session-per-server HTTP model every session calls
  tools/list, so stop re-walking the Zod tree each time

No behavior change: 99/99 jest tests; HTTP session flow re-smoke-tested
through the lazy import path (initialize -> 200 + mcp-session-id).

Profiled @ruvnet/ruview too and left it alone: 50ms CLI startup vs ~29ms
bare 'node -e ""' floor on the same box (MEASURED) — already near the
interpreter floor with zero dependencies.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WrGfTGKv1oWZ6iwXZACULz

* ci(ruview-cli): pass jest --passWithNoTests so the private no-test package doesn't fail the npm-packages matrix

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* fix(npm): address 10 verified review findings in harness + rvagent before 0.2.0 publish

harness/ruview (@ruvnet/ruview):
- guardrails: digit gate now sees numbers inside code spans; F1-style
  metric tokens followed by ':' or a nearby number are no longer scrubbed
  (fail-open regressions in the honesty gate)
- mcp-server: tools/call requests serialize through a FIFO promise chain
  (hardware/mutating tools never overlap) while ping/tools/list stay
  immediate; stdin close drains in-flight responses before exit
- tools: which() no longer memoizes negative lookups

tools/ruview-mcp (@ruvnet/rvagent):
- index: realpath invoked-directly guard — library import no longer
  connects a stdio transport to the consumer's process
- http-transport: explicit allowedOrigins is exact-match only (localhost
  any-port convenience applies only with no configured allowlist);
  session map gains maxSessions=64 + 5min idle TTL sweep
- train-count: job records persist the child pid and reconcile stale
  'running' status after a server restart (exit-code marker or dead pid)
- config: cog binary candidates ordered by process.arch

.github/workflows/ruview-npm-release.yml: port the full ADR-265 D1 gate
(version-literal check, unpacked-size budget, tarball-install smoke test)
from npm-packages.yml so the publish path enforces what the header claims.

Tests: harness 30→36, rvagent 99→112, all passing.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-02 13:11:15 -04:00

353 lines
14 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Streamable HTTP transport for @ruvnet/rvagent (ADR-124 §3, hardened per
* ADR-264 F7/O3).
*
* Binds to 127.0.0.1 by default and mounts an /mcp endpoint backed by
* StreamableHTTPServerTransport from @modelcontextprotocol/sdk.
*
* Session model (ADR-264 F7): the SDK's stateful mode requires ONE transport
* (and one MCP Server) per session. An `initialize` POST creates a fresh
* transport + server pair via the caller-supplied factory; follow-up
* POST/GET/DELETE requests are routed to their session by the
* `mcp-session-id` header. Transports are dropped when their session closes.
*
* Security model (ADR-124 §6 + ADR-264 F7):
* - Origin validation: browser-style requests whose Origin is not local
* are rejected with 403 before reaching the MCP layer. With NO explicit
* allowlist, localhost origins match on hostname, ANY port
* (http://localhost:5173 is local). When an explicit allowedOrigins list is
* configured, matching is exact — the any-port-localhost convenience is off,
* so a localhost peer on an unlisted port must be added to be accepted.
* - Bearer token: when RVAGENT_HTTP_TOKEN is set, requests must carry
* Authorization: Bearer <token>; missing/wrong tokens → 401.
* - Body cap: request bodies over 1 MiB are rejected with 413 (the
* unbounded-buffering DoS from the pre-ADR-264 scaffold).
* - Bind address: defaults to 127.0.0.1 per MCP spec security requirement.
* Set RVAGENT_HTTP_HOST=0.0.0.0 only for intentional fleet deployment.
*
* Usage:
* import { createHttpTransport } from './http-transport.js';
* const { httpServer } = await createHttpTransport(() => buildServer(config));
* // httpServer is a node:http.Server — call httpServer.close() to shut down.
*/
import { createServer, type Server as HttpServer, type IncomingMessage, type ServerResponse } from "node:http";
import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
import { StreamableHTTPServerTransport } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/streamableHttp.js";
import { isInitializeRequest } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/types.js";
import type { Server as McpServer } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/index.js";
export type McpServerFactory = () => McpServer;
export interface HttpTransportOptions {
/** TCP host to bind (default: 127.0.0.1). */
host?: string;
/** TCP port to listen on (default: 3001). */
port?: number;
/**
* Allowed Origin header values. Requests with an Origin not in this list
* (and not a localhost origin) are rejected with 403. Use '*' to disable
* Origin validation entirely (not recommended outside of local-dev flags).
*/
allowedOrigins?: string[];
/**
* Bearer token for HTTP transport. When set, every request must supply
* Authorization: Bearer <token>; omitted or wrong token → 401.
* Defaults to process.env.RVAGENT_HTTP_TOKEN (undefined = auth disabled).
*/
bearerToken?: string;
/** Maximum accepted request body size in bytes (default: 1 MiB). */
maxBodyBytes?: number;
/**
* Maximum number of concurrent live sessions (default: 64). When a new
* `initialize` arrives at the cap, the oldest-idle session is evicted (its
* transport closed) to make room — bounds memory against a flaky client that
* loops `initialize` or a malicious localhost peer (ADR-264 F7).
*/
maxSessions?: number;
/**
* Idle time-to-live for a session in ms (default: 5 min). Sessions with no
* request activity for longer than this are swept and closed.
*/
sessionIdleMs?: number;
/** How often the idle-session sweeper runs, in ms (default: 60 s). */
sweepIntervalMs?: number;
}
export interface HttpTransportResult {
/** The raw Node.js HTTP server — call .close() to shut down. */
httpServer: HttpServer;
/** Live sessions keyed by session id (exposed for tests/observability). */
sessions: Map<string, StreamableHTTPServerTransport>;
/** The bound address string (e.g. "http://127.0.0.1:3001"). */
boundAddress: string;
}
const DEFAULT_HOST = "127.0.0.1";
const DEFAULT_PORT = 3001;
const DEFAULT_MAX_BODY_BYTES = 1024 * 1024;
const DEFAULT_MAX_SESSIONS = 64;
const DEFAULT_SESSION_IDLE_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;
const DEFAULT_SWEEP_INTERVAL_MS = 60 * 1000;
const LOCAL_HOSTNAMES = new Set(["localhost", "127.0.0.1", "[::1]"]);
/**
* Validate Origin header against the allowlist.
* Returns true if the request should be allowed, false if it should be rejected.
*
* An absent Origin header is allowed (same-origin non-browser requests, curl,
* etc.). When NO explicit allowlist was configured (empty list), a localhost
* origin is allowed on any port as a convenience — real browser origins carry
* ports (ADR-264 F7). When an explicit allowlist IS configured, matching is
* exact: the any-port-localhost shortcut is disabled so an operator who pins an
* allowlist actually gets it (a looped-back peer on an unlisted port is denied).
*/
export function isOriginAllowed(
origin: string | undefined,
allowedOrigins: string[]
): boolean {
if (origin === undefined) return true; // no Origin = not a cross-origin browser request
if (allowedOrigins.includes("*")) return true;
if (allowedOrigins.includes(origin)) return true;
// Explicit allowlist ⇒ exact matching only; skip the localhost convenience.
if (allowedOrigins.length > 0) return false;
try {
const u = new URL(origin);
return (
(u.protocol === "http:" || u.protocol === "https:") &&
LOCAL_HOSTNAMES.has(u.hostname === "::1" ? "[::1]" : u.hostname)
);
} catch {
return false;
}
}
/** Read a request body with a hard size cap; null = payload too large. */
function readBody(
req: IncomingMessage,
maxBytes: number
): Promise<string | null> {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
let size = 0;
let tooLarge = false;
const chunks: Buffer[] = [];
req.on("data", (chunk: Buffer) => {
if (tooLarge) return; // keep draining so the 413 response can flush
size += chunk.length;
if (size > maxBytes) {
tooLarge = true;
chunks.length = 0;
resolve(null);
return;
}
chunks.push(chunk);
});
req.on("end", () => {
if (!tooLarge) resolve(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString("utf8"));
});
req.on("error", reject);
});
}
function json(res: ServerResponse, status: number, body: object): void {
res.writeHead(status, { "Content-Type": "application/json" });
res.end(JSON.stringify(body));
}
/**
* Build the HTTP server around a per-session MCP transport map.
* Returns the Node.js HTTP server (not yet listening) plus the session map.
* Call httpServer.listen(port, host) or rely on createHttpTransport which
* does that for you.
*/
export function buildHttpApp(
serverFactory: McpServerFactory,
opts: HttpTransportOptions = {}
): { httpServer: HttpServer; sessions: Map<string, StreamableHTTPServerTransport> } {
const allowedOrigins: string[] = opts.allowedOrigins ?? [];
const bearerToken = opts.bearerToken ?? process.env["RVAGENT_HTTP_TOKEN"];
const maxBodyBytes = opts.maxBodyBytes ?? DEFAULT_MAX_BODY_BYTES;
const maxSessions = opts.maxSessions ?? DEFAULT_MAX_SESSIONS;
const sessionIdleMs = opts.sessionIdleMs ?? DEFAULT_SESSION_IDLE_MS;
const sweepIntervalMs = opts.sweepIntervalMs ?? DEFAULT_SWEEP_INTERVAL_MS;
const sessions = new Map<string, StreamableHTTPServerTransport>();
// lastSeen tracks per-session request activity so the sweeper and the
// oldest-idle eviction can bound the session map (ADR-264 F7).
const lastSeen = new Map<string, number>();
/** Mark a session as freshly used. */
function touch(sessionId: string): void {
lastSeen.set(sessionId, Date.now());
}
/** Close a session's transport and drop it from the bookkeeping maps. */
function closeSession(id: string): void {
const transport = sessions.get(id);
sessions.delete(id);
lastSeen.delete(id);
if (transport) {
try {
void transport.close(); // onclose is idempotent against the maps above
} catch {
/* best-effort: a half-open transport must not block eviction */
}
}
}
/** Evict the session that has been idle longest — called when at capacity. */
function evictOldestIdle(): void {
let oldestId: string | undefined;
let oldestSeen = Infinity;
for (const [id, seen] of lastSeen) {
if (seen < oldestSeen) {
oldestSeen = seen;
oldestId = id;
}
}
if (oldestId !== undefined) closeSession(oldestId);
}
/** Periodic sweep: close sessions idle beyond sessionIdleMs. */
function sweepIdleSessions(): void {
const now = Date.now();
for (const [id, seen] of lastSeen) {
if (now - seen > sessionIdleMs) closeSession(id);
}
}
const sweepTimer = setInterval(sweepIdleSessions, sweepIntervalMs);
sweepTimer.unref(); // never keep the process alive just to sweep
const httpServer = createServer((req: IncomingMessage, res: ServerResponse) => {
void (async () => {
// ── Origin validation ──────────────────────────────────────────────
const origin = req.headers["origin"] as string | undefined;
if (!isOriginAllowed(origin, allowedOrigins)) {
json(res, 403, { error: "Forbidden: cross-origin request rejected" });
return;
}
// ── Bearer token auth ──────────────────────────────────────────────
if (bearerToken !== undefined && bearerToken !== "") {
const authHeader = req.headers["authorization"] as string | undefined;
const supplied = authHeader?.startsWith("Bearer ")
? authHeader.slice("Bearer ".length)
: undefined;
if (supplied !== bearerToken) {
json(res, 401, { error: "Unauthorized: missing or invalid bearer token" });
return;
}
}
// ── Route: /mcp ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
if (req.url !== "/mcp") {
json(res, 404, { error: "Not found. MCP endpoint: /mcp" });
return;
}
const sessionId = req.headers["mcp-session-id"] as string | undefined;
if (req.method === "POST") {
const body = await readBody(req, maxBodyBytes);
if (body === null) {
json(res, 413, { error: `Payload too large (max ${maxBodyBytes} bytes)` });
return;
}
let parsed: unknown;
try {
parsed = JSON.parse(body);
} catch {
json(res, 400, { error: "Bad Request: invalid JSON body" });
return;
}
// Existing session → route to its transport.
if (sessionId !== undefined) {
const transport = sessions.get(sessionId);
if (!transport) {
json(res, 404, { error: `Unknown session "${sessionId}"` });
return;
}
touch(sessionId);
await transport.handleRequest(req, res, parsed);
return;
}
// New session: must be an initialize request (ADR-264 F7 — one
// transport + one MCP Server per session).
if (!isInitializeRequest(parsed)) {
json(res, 400, {
error: "Bad Request: no mcp-session-id and not an initialize request",
});
return;
}
// Bound the session map: at capacity, reclaim the oldest-idle slot
// before minting a new session (ADR-264 F7).
if (sessions.size >= maxSessions) evictOldestIdle();
const transport = new StreamableHTTPServerTransport({
sessionIdGenerator: () => randomUUID(),
onsessioninitialized: (id: string) => {
sessions.set(id, transport);
touch(id);
},
});
transport.onclose = () => {
if (transport.sessionId !== undefined) {
sessions.delete(transport.sessionId);
lastSeen.delete(transport.sessionId);
}
};
const mcpServer = serverFactory();
await mcpServer.connect(transport as Parameters<typeof mcpServer.connect>[0]);
await transport.handleRequest(req, res, parsed);
return;
}
// GET (SSE stream) / DELETE (session termination) — session-scoped.
if (req.method === "GET" || req.method === "DELETE") {
const transport = sessionId !== undefined ? sessions.get(sessionId) : undefined;
if (!transport) {
json(res, 400, { error: "Bad Request: missing or unknown mcp-session-id" });
return;
}
if (sessionId !== undefined) touch(sessionId);
await transport.handleRequest(req, res);
return;
}
json(res, 405, { error: "Method not allowed. Use POST/GET/DELETE on /mcp" });
})().catch(() => {
if (!res.headersSent) json(res, 500, { error: "Internal server error" });
else res.end();
});
});
httpServer.on("close", () => clearInterval(sweepTimer));
return { httpServer, sessions };
}
/**
* Create and start the Streamable HTTP transport, resolving once the server
* is bound and listening.
*/
export async function createHttpTransport(
serverFactory: McpServerFactory,
opts: HttpTransportOptions = {}
): Promise<HttpTransportResult> {
const host = opts.host ?? process.env["RVAGENT_HTTP_HOST"] ?? DEFAULT_HOST;
const port = opts.port ?? Number(process.env["RVAGENT_HTTP_PORT"] ?? DEFAULT_PORT);
const { httpServer, sessions } = buildHttpApp(serverFactory, opts);
await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
httpServer.once("error", reject);
httpServer.listen(port, host, () => resolve());
});
return {
httpServer,
sessions,
boundAddress: `http://${host}:${port}`,
};
}