Files
ruvnet--RuView/ui/sw.js
T
Dragan Spiridonov c72bbc15dd fix(auth): close /api/field bypass, two fail-opens, and a self-disarming test
Findings from a qe-court adversarial round (4 prosecutors across 2 vendors).
Each was verified against the code before being accepted; the ones below
reproduced, the rest are reported in the PR thread rather than acted on.

FATAL — `/api/field` was reachable with no credential, on both listeners.
The gate protected `/api/v1/*` by prefix. `/api/field` is the REST sibling of
`/ws/field` and serves the same signed FieldEvent stream — live presence, pose,
vitals. `/ws/field` was gated in this PR; its twin one path segment over was
not. Measured with RUVIEW_API_TOKEN set and no credential supplied:

    /api/v1/models  401      (control)
    /ws/field       401      (gated by this PR)
    /api/field      200      on :8080 AND :8765

Fixed by inverting the gate to deny-by-default with an explicit anonymous
allowlist (`/`, `/ui`, `/health`, `/oauth/`). A route added at a new path is
now gated because nobody exposed it, rather than exposed because nobody
protected it — the same inversion already applied to the scope gate.

FATAL — the wiring test disarmed itself exactly when it mattered.
`Server::start` returned an Option that all five tests turned into `return`,
so a server that failed to boot produced "5 passed" with zero assertions run,
and cargo swallows the skip line without --nocapture. The one test that
observes real wiring — the guard against both shipped bypasses — was silent
for any change that breaks startup, including a boot panic in the auth path.
It now panics with the child's stderr.

MAJOR — a malformed client-id list silently disabled the audience check.
An empty allowlist is the opt-out sentinel in verify.rs. `RUVIEW_OAUTH_CLIENT_IDS=","`
is non-empty, passes the guard, then filters to an empty Vec — turning the
audience boundary off with no log and admitting a token minted for any other
Cognitum product. Only a literal `*` may opt out now; anything else that parses
to nothing warns and falls back to the default. Same fail-open shape as the
scope denylist this PR already had to invert.

MAJOR — credentials were world-readable for a window on every refresh.
`fs::write` creates at 0666 & !umask (0644 by default), and both writers
chmodded afterwards. The existing permissions test asserted on the FINAL file
and passed throughout. Affected the CLI refresh token (rotated with reuse
detection — a thief who presents it first takes the session family) and the
browser session secret (the HMAC key for every session; stealing it forges any
account at any scope). Both now create with mode 0600 via OpenOptions.

MAJOR — ui/sw.js cached authenticated API responses.
Closing the /oauth/ leg left the /api/ leg open. `networkFirst` cached every
successful response, keyed by URL alone, purged by nothing at sign-out: sign in
as A, load sensing data, sign out, sign in as B, lose the network, and B is
served A's data with no authorization check. API responses are now network-only
— which is also the correct behaviour for a live sensing dashboard, where
replaying a stale reading can show a room occupied after the person left — plus
a cache purge on sign-out.

CI — 40 of ruview-auth's 87 tests never ran.
The workspace runs --no-default-features, which switches off the `login` and
`pkce` features. Measured: 47 tests vs 87. The whole interactive sign-in path —
credential storage, single-flight refresh, the file lock, the loopback callback
— was green locally and never executed in CI. Added an --all-features step.
(Checked the sensing-server for the same problem and did NOT find it:
bearer_auth's 49 and browser_session's 15 do run under CI flags.)

Tests: +2 wiring tests (one fails against the old gate with
"http port served /api/field to an anonymous caller", passes after), +3 UI
service-worker tests, +3 CLI scope tests, +1 temp-file permission test, +1
client-id parsing test. wifi-densepose-cli/src/auth.rs had zero tests and
builds its own scope string, so the library's least-privilege test said nothing
about what the CLI requests.

Verified: ruview-auth 61+25+2 pass (--all-features), sensing-server bearer_auth
50, browser_session 15, auth_wiring 7, workspace 25 suites clean, UI 22.

Co-Authored-By: Ruflo & AQE
2026-07-23 11:48:59 +02:00

203 lines
7.4 KiB
JavaScript

// RuView Service Worker - Offline caching for the dashboard shell
// Strategy: Network-first for API calls, Cache-first for static assets
// Bumped from v1: an older SW cached `/oauth/status` cache-first, so browsers
// that ran it hold a permanently signed-out answer. `activate` deletes every
// cache whose name is not CACHE_NAME, so bumping is what evicts it from clients
// already in the field. Bump again if a future change poisons the cache.
const CACHE_NAME = 'ruview-v2';
// Requests whose response depends on the caller's credentials. These must never
// be served from the Cache API.
//
// The Cache API is NOT the HTTP cache: it ignores `Cache-Control` completely, so
// the `no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate` the server already sends on
// `/oauth/status` has no effect here. A cached signed-out response was returned
// to the page forever, and only a hard reload — which bypasses the service
// worker entirely — showed the true state. (ADR-271.)
const NEVER_CACHE_PREFIXES = ['/oauth/'];
// What may be served cache-first. Previously cache-first was the *catch-all* for
// everything outside `/api/` and `/health/`, which meant any endpoint added at a
// new path was frozen on first response. An allowlist fails safe instead: an
// unrecognised path goes to the network untouched.
const STATIC_ASSET = /\.(?:js|mjs|css|html|json|png|jpe?g|gif|svg|ico|webp|woff2?|ttf|map)$/i;
const SHELL_ASSETS = [
'/',
'/index.html',
'/style.css',
'/app.js',
'/config/api.config.js',
'/components/TabManager.js',
'/components/DashboardTab.js',
'/components/HardwareTab.js',
'/components/LiveDemoTab.js',
'/components/SensingTab.js',
'/components/PoseDetectionCanvas.js',
'/services/api.service.js',
'/services/websocket.service.js',
'/services/health.service.js',
'/services/sensing.service.js',
'/services/pose.service.js',
'/services/stream.service.js',
'/utils/backend-detector.js',
'/utils/keyboard-shortcuts.js',
'/utils/perf-monitor.js',
'/utils/toast.js',
'/utils/theme-toggle.js',
'/utils/command-palette.js',
'/utils/activity-log.js',
'/utils/data-export.js',
'/utils/fullscreen.js',
'/utils/connection-status.js',
'/utils/mobile-nav.js'
];
// Install - cache shell assets
self.addEventListener('install', (event) => {
event.waitUntil(
caches.open(CACHE_NAME).then((cache) => {
return cache.addAll(SHELL_ASSETS).catch((err) => {
// Don't fail install if some assets are missing (dev mode)
console.warn('[SW] Some assets failed to cache:', err);
});
})
);
self.skipWaiting();
});
// Activate - clean old caches
self.addEventListener('activate', (event) => {
event.waitUntil(
caches.keys().then((keys) => {
return Promise.all(
keys
.filter((key) => key !== CACHE_NAME)
.map((key) => caches.delete(key))
);
})
);
self.clients.claim();
});
// Fetch - network-first for API, cache-first for static
self.addEventListener('fetch', (event) => {
const { request } = event;
const url = new URL(request.url);
// Skip non-GET requests
if (request.method !== 'GET') return;
// Skip WebSocket upgrade requests
if (request.headers.get('Upgrade') === 'websocket') return;
// Skip cross-origin requests
if (url.origin !== self.location.origin) return;
// Credentialed endpoints: hands off entirely. Not networkFirst — that still
// writes a copy into the cache, which would be replayed the moment the server
// is briefly unreachable, silently reinstating a stale sign-in state.
if (NEVER_CACHE_PREFIXES.some((prefix) => url.pathname.startsWith(prefix))) {
// Signing out is the one moment we know cached data belongs to a session
// that is ending. Observed, not intercepted — the request itself still goes
// straight to the network. `waitUntil` keeps the worker alive for the purge
// even though the navigation is what the browser is really waiting on.
if (url.pathname === '/oauth/logout') {
event.waitUntil(purgeNonShell());
}
return;
}
// API calls: network-first with cache fallback
if (url.pathname.startsWith('/api/') || url.pathname.startsWith('/health/')) {
event.respondWith(networkFirst(request));
return;
}
// Static assets and the app shell: cache-first with network fallback.
if (request.mode === 'navigate' || STATIC_ASSET.test(url.pathname)) {
event.respondWith(cacheFirst(request));
}
// Anything else is left alone and goes to the network as normal.
});
async function cacheFirst(request) {
// `ignoreSearch` so the shell is a single entry. Sign-in redirects back to
// `/ui/?signed_in=<ms>`, which would otherwise mint a fresh cache entry per
// sign-in and never hit any of them again.
const cached = await caches.match(request, { ignoreSearch: true });
if (cached) return cached;
try {
const response = await fetch(request);
if (response.ok) {
const cache = await caches.open(CACHE_NAME);
// Store under the search-less URL to match how it is looked up above.
const key = new URL(request.url);
key.search = '';
cache.put(key.toString(), response.clone());
}
return response;
} catch {
// Return offline fallback for HTML navigation
if (request.headers.get('Accept')?.includes('text/html')) {
const fallback = await caches.match('/index.html');
if (fallback) return fallback;
}
return new Response('Offline', { status: 503, statusText: 'Service Unavailable' });
}
}
/**
* Network-only, with an explicit offline signal.
*
* This used to cache every successful `/api/` response and replay it whenever
* the network failed. Two things are wrong with that now:
*
* 1. **Authorization.** API responses are per-user once auth is on, but the
* cache is keyed by URL alone and nothing purges it at sign-out. Sign in as
* A, load sensing data, sign out, sign in as B, lose the network — B is
* served A's data with no authorization check at all. That is the same
* defect class as the cached `/oauth/status`: the Cache API happily outlives
* the session that produced its contents.
* 2. **Correctness.** This is a live sensing dashboard. Replaying a stale pose
* or presence reading as if it were current is its own defect — it can show
* a room as occupied after the person has left.
*
* The offline shell (HTML/CSS/JS) is still cached; only the data is not. If
* offline data replay is wanted back, it needs a per-session cache key and a
* purge on sign-out, not a URL-keyed shared cache.
*/
async function networkFirst(request) {
try {
return await fetch(request);
} catch {
return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: 'offline' }), {
status: 503,
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }
});
}
}
/**
* Drop everything except the static shell.
*
* Called when the user signs out. Belt-and-braces: nothing user-specific should
* be in the cache after the `networkFirst` change above, but a cache populated
* by an OLDER worker on this browser can still hold API responses, and that
* worker's entries survive into this one under the same name.
*/
async function purgeNonShell() {
const cache = await caches.open(CACHE_NAME);
const keys = await cache.keys();
await Promise.all(
keys
.filter((req) => {
const p = new URL(req.url).pathname;
return p.startsWith('/api/') || p.startsWith('/health/');
})
.map((req) => cache.delete(req))
);
}