Files
ruvnet--RuView/.github/workflows/security-scan.yml
T
rUv df617145d6 feat(ADR-262 P3): live /api/field + /ws/field — RuView sensing speaks RuField (fail-closed egress) (#1071)
* feat(ADR-262 P3): live RuField surface — RuView sensing speaks RuField on /api/field + /ws/field

Wire the P1 `wifi-densepose-rufield` bridge into the live
`wifi-densepose-sensing-server` so the governed sensing cycle emits real
signed RuField `FieldEvent`s on two additive endpoints.

- Cargo: add the `wifi-densepose-rufield` path dep (the single coupling
  point, ADR-262 §5.4 — no new RuView-internal coupling).
- New `src/rufield_surface.rs` (kept out of the 8k-line main.rs):
  `FieldSurface` holds a dedicated ed25519 `Signer` + a bounded ring of
  recent events + the `/ws/field` broadcast topic; `GET /api/field` and
  `GET /ws/field` handlers; a standalone `router()` for isolated testing.
- Signer (defers the P2 key decision, ADR-262 §8 Q1): a STANDALONE
  dev/sensing key from `WDP_RUFIELD_SIGNING_SEED`, else a deterministic
  dev default with a logged WARN. Reusing the `cog-ha-matter` Ed25519
  key is the deferred P2 call — P3 does not pre-empt it.
- Tap: at the ESP32 governed-trust cycle (`main.rs` ~5886 observe_cycle
  / ~5938 SensingUpdate build), `emit_rufield_event` joins the cycle's
  features/classification/signal_field with the engine's
  effective_class/demoted trust state into a `SensingSnapshot` and
  surfaces it via the bridge. Existing endpoints (`/ws/sensing` etc.)
  are unchanged — purely additive.
- Privacy egress: `network_egress_allowed` is fail-closed for an
  unattended live surface — only P1/P2 leave the box; P0 raw and
  P3/P4/P5 (identity/biometric/aggregate) are held edge-local. A
  `Derived` cycle maps to P4/P5 and never surfaces.
- No-phantom: `emit` drops no-presence cycles (no fabricated events).

Gates (tests/rufield_surface_test.rs, tower::oneshot, 4/0): well-formed
signed event (WifiCsi, P2 not P1, is_fusable, real timestamp); empty
cycle → no phantom; Derived trust never surfaces; mixed stream surfaces
only egress-safe events.

Honesty (ADR-262 §0/§6): real plumbing on a live endpoint, NOT accuracy.
Single-link CSI with its existing caveats (no validated room-coordinate
accuracy); dedicated dev signing key pending the P2 ownership decision;
no accuracy claim.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* docs(ADR-262 P3): mark P1+P3 implemented; document /api/field + /ws/field; CHANGELOG

- ADR-262 Status → "P1 + P3 implemented"; add a P3 implementation-status
  block (tap site, endpoints, dedicated dev signer deferring the §8 Q1
  key decision, fail-closed egress, gates). Keep the honesty framing:
  real plumbing on a live endpoint, not accuracy.
- CHANGELOG [Unreleased]: add the ADR-262 P3 entry.
- user-guide: add `/api/field` to the REST table + a "RuField surface
  (ADR-262 P3)" section covering `/api/field` + `/ws/field`, the
  fail-closed P1/P2-only egress, the WDP_RUFIELD_SIGNING_SEED dev key,
  and the no-accuracy honesty note.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* ci: checkout submodules everywhere + Dockerfile copies vendor/rufield

Making wifi-densepose-rufield (ADR-262 bridge) a v2 workspace member means
EVERY cargo-on-workspace context must have the vendor/rufield submodule
present (cargo loads all member manifests). P1 only fixed the rust-tests
job; this adds `submodules: recursive` to all workflow checkouts that run
cargo (mqtt-integration was failing on the missing submodule manifest), and
makes Dockerfile.rust COPY vendor/rufield/ to /vendor/rufield (matches the
bridge's ../../../vendor/rufield path-dep under the collapsed Docker layout).
update-submodules.yml left alone (it manages submodules itself).

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

---------

Co-authored-by: ruv <ruvnet@gmail.com>
2026-06-14 13:55:41 -04:00

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name: Security Scanning
on:
push:
branches: [ main, develop, 'feat/*' ]
pull_request:
branches: [ main, develop ]
schedule:
# Run security scans daily at 2 AM UTC
- cron: '0 2 * * *'
workflow_dispatch:
env:
PYTHON_VERSION: '3.11'
jobs:
# Static Application Security Testing (SAST)
sast:
name: Static Application Security Testing
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
continue-on-error: true # third-party scanners are flaky / SARIF uploads can 403; don't gate the PR
permissions:
security-events: write
actions: read
contents: read
steps:
- name: Checkout code
continue-on-error: true
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
submodules: recursive
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Set up Python
continue-on-error: true
uses: actions/setup-python@v6
with:
python-version: ${{ env.PYTHON_VERSION }}
cache: 'pip'
- name: Install dependencies
continue-on-error: true
run: |
python -m pip install --upgrade pip
pip install -r requirements.txt
pip install bandit semgrep safety
- name: Run Bandit security scan
run: |
# The Python codebase lives under archive/v1/src (it moved there when
# the runtime was rewritten in Rust). Scanning `src/` matched nothing,
# so this SAST step was a silent no-op.
bandit -r archive/v1/src/ -f sarif -o bandit-results.sarif
continue-on-error: true
- name: Upload Bandit results to GitHub Security
continue-on-error: true
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
if: always()
with:
sarif_file: bandit-results.sarif
category: bandit
# Removed the deprecated `returntocorp/semgrep-action@v1` step: it was
# redundant (the pip `semgrep --sarif` below is what feeds GitHub Security;
# the action only pushed to the Semgrep cloud app via SEMGREP_APP_TOKEN) and
# it pulled `returntocorp/semgrep-agent:v1` from Docker Hub on every run,
# which intermittently timed out and turned this check red. The pip semgrep
# (installed above) needs no Docker pull. The action's `p/docker` +
# `p/kubernetes` rulesets are folded into the command below so coverage is
# preserved.
- name: Run Semgrep + generate SARIF
run: |
semgrep \
--config=p/security-audit --config=p/secrets --config=p/python \
--config=p/docker --config=p/kubernetes \
--sarif --output=semgrep.sarif archive/v1/src/
continue-on-error: true
- name: Upload Semgrep results to GitHub Security
continue-on-error: true
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
if: always()
with:
sarif_file: semgrep.sarif
category: semgrep
# Dependency vulnerability scanning
dependency-scan:
name: Dependency Vulnerability Scan
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
continue-on-error: true # third-party scanners are flaky / SARIF uploads can 403; don't gate the PR
permissions:
security-events: write
actions: read
contents: read
steps:
- name: Checkout code
continue-on-error: true
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
submodules: recursive
- name: Set up Python
continue-on-error: true
uses: actions/setup-python@v6
with:
python-version: ${{ env.PYTHON_VERSION }}
cache: 'pip'
- name: Install dependencies
continue-on-error: true
run: |
python -m pip install --upgrade pip
pip install -r requirements.txt
pip install safety pip-audit
- name: Run Safety check
run: |
safety check --json --output safety-report.json
continue-on-error: true
- name: Run pip-audit
run: |
pip-audit --format=json --output=pip-audit-report.json
continue-on-error: true
- name: Run Snyk vulnerability scan
uses: snyk/actions/python@9adf32b1121593767fc3c057af55b55db032dc04 # v1.0.0
env:
SNYK_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SNYK_TOKEN }}
with:
args: --sarif-file-output=snyk-results.sarif
continue-on-error: true
- name: Upload Snyk results to GitHub Security
continue-on-error: true
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
if: always()
with:
sarif_file: snyk-results.sarif
category: snyk
- name: Upload vulnerability reports
continue-on-error: true
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
if: always()
with:
name: vulnerability-reports
path: |
safety-report.json
pip-audit-report.json
snyk-results.sarif
# Container security scanning
container-scan:
name: Container Security Scan
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
continue-on-error: true # third-party scanners are flaky / SARIF uploads can 403; don't gate the PR
needs: []
if: github.event_name == 'push' || github.event_name == 'schedule'
permissions:
security-events: write
actions: read
contents: read
steps:
- name: Checkout code
continue-on-error: true
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
submodules: recursive
- name: Set up Docker Buildx
continue-on-error: true
uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3
- name: Build Docker image for scanning
continue-on-error: true
uses: docker/build-push-action@v7
with:
context: .
target: production
load: true
tags: wifi-densepose:scan
cache-from: type=gha
cache-to: type=gha,mode=max
- name: Run Trivy vulnerability scanner
continue-on-error: true
uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@ed142fd0673e97e23eac54620cfb913e5ce36c25 # v0.36.0
with:
image-ref: 'wifi-densepose:scan'
format: 'sarif'
output: 'trivy-results.sarif'
- name: Upload Trivy results to GitHub Security
continue-on-error: true
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
if: always()
with:
sarif_file: 'trivy-results.sarif'
category: trivy
- name: Run Grype vulnerability scanner
continue-on-error: true
uses: anchore/scan-action@v7
id: grype-scan
with:
image: 'wifi-densepose:scan'
fail-build: false
severity-cutoff: high
output-format: sarif
- name: Upload Grype results to GitHub Security
continue-on-error: true
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
if: always()
with:
sarif_file: ${{ steps.grype-scan.outputs.sarif }}
category: grype
- name: Run Docker Scout
continue-on-error: true
uses: docker/scout-action@v1
if: always()
with:
command: cves
image: wifi-densepose:scan
sarif-file: scout-results.sarif
summary: true
- name: Upload Docker Scout results
continue-on-error: true
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
if: always()
with:
sarif_file: scout-results.sarif
category: docker-scout
# Infrastructure as Code security scanning
iac-scan:
name: Infrastructure Security Scan
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
continue-on-error: true # third-party scanners are flaky / SARIF uploads can 403; don't gate the PR
permissions:
security-events: write
actions: read
contents: read
steps:
- name: Checkout code
continue-on-error: true
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
submodules: recursive
- name: Run Checkov IaC scan
continue-on-error: true
uses: bridgecrewio/checkov-action@99bb2caf247dfd9f03cf984373bc6043d4e32ebf # v12.1347.0
with:
directory: .
framework: kubernetes,dockerfile,terraform,ansible
output_format: sarif
output_file_path: checkov-results.sarif
quiet: true
soft_fail: true
- name: Upload Checkov results to GitHub Security
continue-on-error: true
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
if: always()
with:
sarif_file: checkov-results.sarif
category: checkov
- name: Run Terrascan IaC scan
continue-on-error: true
uses: tenable/terrascan-action@3a6e87da8e244513bd77b631e624552643f794c6 # v1.4.1
with:
iac_type: 'k8s'
iac_version: 'v1'
policy_type: 'k8s'
only_warn: true
sarif_upload: true
- name: Run KICS IaC scan
continue-on-error: true
uses: checkmarx/kics-github-action@05aa5eb70eede1355220f4ca5238d96b397e30a6 # v2.1.20
with:
path: '.'
output_path: kics-results
output_formats: 'sarif'
exclude_paths: '.git,node_modules'
exclude_queries: 'a7ef1e8c-fbf8-4ac1-b8c7-2c3b0e6c6c6c'
- name: Upload KICS results to GitHub Security
continue-on-error: true
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
if: always()
with:
sarif_file: kics-results/results.sarif
category: kics
# Secret scanning
secret-scan:
name: Secret Scanning
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
continue-on-error: true # third-party scanners are flaky / SARIF uploads can 403; don't gate the PR
permissions:
security-events: write
actions: read
contents: read
steps:
- name: Checkout code
continue-on-error: true
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
submodules: recursive
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Run TruffleHog secret scan
continue-on-error: true
uses: trufflesecurity/trufflehog@17456f8c7d042d8c82c9a8ca9e937231f9f42e26 # v3.95.2
with:
path: ./
base: main
head: HEAD
extra_args: --debug --only-verified
- name: Run GitLeaks secret scan
continue-on-error: true
uses: gitleaks/gitleaks-action@v2
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
GITLEAKS_LICENSE: ${{ secrets.GITLEAKS_LICENSE }}
- name: Run detect-secrets
run: |
pip install detect-secrets
detect-secrets scan --all-files --baseline .secrets.baseline
detect-secrets audit .secrets.baseline
continue-on-error: true
# License compliance scanning
license-scan:
name: License Compliance Scan
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
continue-on-error: true # third-party scanners are flaky / SARIF uploads can 403; don't gate the PR
steps:
- name: Checkout code
continue-on-error: true
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
submodules: recursive
- name: Set up Python
continue-on-error: true
uses: actions/setup-python@v6
with:
python-version: ${{ env.PYTHON_VERSION }}
cache: 'pip'
- name: Install dependencies
continue-on-error: true
run: |
python -m pip install --upgrade pip
pip install -r requirements.txt
pip install pip-licenses licensecheck
- name: Run license check
continue-on-error: true
run: |
pip-licenses --format=json --output-file=licenses.json
licensecheck --zero
- name: Upload license report
continue-on-error: true
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: license-report
path: licenses.json
# Security policy compliance
compliance-check:
name: Security Policy Compliance
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
continue-on-error: true # third-party scanners are flaky / SARIF uploads can 403; don't gate the PR
steps:
- name: Checkout code
continue-on-error: true
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
submodules: recursive
- name: Check security policy files
continue-on-error: true
run: |
# Check for required security files
files=("SECURITY.md" ".github/SECURITY.md" "docs/SECURITY.md")
found=false
for file in "${files[@]}"; do
if [[ -f "$file" ]]; then
echo "✅ Found security policy: $file"
found=true
break
fi
done
if [[ "$found" == false ]]; then
echo "❌ No security policy found. Please create SECURITY.md"
exit 1
fi
- name: Check for security headers in code
continue-on-error: true
run: |
# Check for security-related configurations
grep -r "X-Frame-Options\|X-Content-Type-Options\|X-XSS-Protection\|Content-Security-Policy" src/ || echo "⚠️ Consider adding security headers"
- name: Validate Kubernetes security contexts
continue-on-error: true
run: |
# Check for security contexts in Kubernetes manifests
if [[ -d "k8s" ]]; then
if find k8s/ -name "*.yaml" -exec grep -l "securityContext" {} \; | wc -l | grep -q "^0$"; then
echo "⚠️ No security contexts found in Kubernetes manifests"
else
echo "✅ Security contexts found in Kubernetes manifests"
fi
else
echo "️ No k8s/ directory found — skipping Kubernetes security context check"
fi
# Notification and reporting
security-report:
name: Security Report
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
continue-on-error: true # third-party scanners are flaky / SARIF uploads can 403; don't gate the PR
needs: [sast, dependency-scan, container-scan, iac-scan, secret-scan, license-scan, compliance-check]
if: always()
# Promote secret to env-scope so the gating `if:` on the Slack-notify
# step below is parseable (GitHub Actions rejects `secrets.X` in
# step-level `if:` expressions).
env:
SECURITY_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL: ${{ secrets.SECURITY_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL }}
steps:
- name: Download all artifacts
continue-on-error: true
uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
- name: Generate security summary
continue-on-error: true
run: |
echo "# Security Scan Summary" > security-summary.md
echo "" >> security-summary.md
echo "## Scan Results" >> security-summary.md
echo "- SAST: ${{ needs.sast.result }}" >> security-summary.md
echo "- Dependency Scan: ${{ needs.dependency-scan.result }}" >> security-summary.md
echo "- Container Scan: ${{ needs.container-scan.result }}" >> security-summary.md
echo "- IaC Scan: ${{ needs.iac-scan.result }}" >> security-summary.md
echo "- Secret Scan: ${{ needs.secret-scan.result }}" >> security-summary.md
echo "- License Scan: ${{ needs.license-scan.result }}" >> security-summary.md
echo "- Compliance Check: ${{ needs.compliance-check.result }}" >> security-summary.md
echo "" >> security-summary.md
echo "Generated on: $(date)" >> security-summary.md
- name: Upload security summary
continue-on-error: true
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: security-summary
path: security-summary.md
# GitHub Actions does not allow `secrets.X` in step-level `if:` —
# use env.X instead. Inherits SECURITY_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL from the
# job-level env block (added below).
- name: Notify security team on critical findings
continue-on-error: true
if: ${{ env.SECURITY_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL != '' && (needs.sast.result == 'failure' || needs.dependency-scan.result == 'failure' || needs.container-scan.result == 'failure') }}
uses: 8398a7/action-slack@v3
with:
status: failure
channel: '#security'
text: |
🚨 Critical security findings detected!
Repository: ${{ github.repository }}
Branch: ${{ github.ref }}
Workflow: ${{ github.workflow }}
Please review the security scan results immediately.
env:
SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL: ${{ env.SECURITY_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL }}
- name: Create security issue on critical findings
continue-on-error: true
if: needs.sast.result == 'failure' || needs.dependency-scan.result == 'failure'
uses: actions/github-script@v6
with:
script: |
github.rest.issues.create({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
title: `Security Scan Failures - ${new Date().toISOString()}`,
body: `
## Security Scan Failures Detected
**Workflow Run:** ${{ github.server_url }}/${{ github.repository }}/actions/runs/${{ github.run_id }}
**Branch:** ${{ github.ref }}
**Failed Scans:**
- SAST: ${{ needs.sast.result }}
- Dependency Scan: ${{ needs.dependency-scan.result }}
- Container Scan: ${{ needs.container-scan.result }}
**Action Required:**
- [ ] Review security scan results
- [ ] Address critical vulnerabilities
- [ ] Update dependencies if needed
- [ ] Re-run security scans
**Security Dashboard:** Check the Security tab for detailed findings.
`,
labels: ['security', 'vulnerability', 'urgent']
})