Files
ruvnet--RuView/v2/crates/wifi-densepose-sensing-server/Cargo.toml
T
Dragan Spiridonov 7d6d66941a feat(ws): single-use WebSocket ticket store (ADR-272 groundwork)
Audit finding this exists to close — verified empirically, not inferred. With
RUVIEW_API_TOKEN set (operator believes auth is ON), a real WebSocket handshake
carrying NO credential:

  /ws/sensing         -> 101 Switching Protocols
  /ws/introspection   -> 101 Switching Protocols
  /api/v1/stream/pose -> 101 Switching Protocols
  /api/v1/models      -> 401   (control: REST is correctly gated)

The REST control plane is locked while the DATA plane — live presence, pose and
vitals — is open to anyone who can reach the port. Two of those paths sit
outside PROTECTED_PREFIX entirely; the third is the documented EXEMPT_PATHS
entry. The exemption was reasonable when added (a browser cannot set
Authorization on an upgrade) but its blast radius is larger than it looks, and
phase 3 sharpened the contrast by making REST genuinely strong.

(To be precise about what was proven: the handshake is accepted. A payload
frame was not captured in that window, so this is "the connection is
established without a credential", not "data was read".)

This commit adds only the store; wiring it into the middleware is a breaking
change for browser clients and lands with the UI update.

Design notes:
- Single use. `consume` REMOVES the entry, so a replay of the same URL fails
  even inside the TTL. This is what makes a credential-in-a-query tolerable:
  by the time it reaches an access log or a Referer header, it is spent.
- 30-second TTL. Long enough for a page to open a socket; too short to harvest.
- It is not the credential. It authorizes one WebSocket. It cannot be replayed
  against /api/v1/*, cannot be refreshed, and carries no reusable identity.
- The grant captures the ISSUING principal's scopes, so a WebSocket inherits
  exactly the authority of the credential that asked for it — a sensing:read
  session cannot mint a ticket that outranks itself.
- Capped at 512 outstanding, self-healing as tickets expire, so an
  authenticated but misbehaving caller cannot grow the map without bound.
- In-memory because that is correct, not merely convenient: a ticket surviving
  a restart would outlive the server that vouched for it.

Native clients (Python, Rust CLI, TS MCP) are NOT browsers and will send a
normal Authorization header on the upgrade instead — tickets would add a
round-trip and a second credential path for no benefit.

12 tests: single-use enforced, replay refused, expiry refused AND pruned,
unknown ticket refused, 256-bit unpredictability, grant carries issuer scopes,
cap enforced and self-healing, and query parsing including `?myticket=x` not
being read as `?ticket=x`.

Co-Authored-By: Ruflo & AQE
2026-07-22 18:41:34 +02:00

139 lines
6.2 KiB
TOML

[package]
name = "wifi-densepose-sensing-server"
version = "0.3.4"
edition.workspace = true
description = "Lightweight Axum server for WiFi sensing UI with RuVector signal processing"
license.workspace = true
authors = ["rUv <ruv@ruv.net>", "WiFi-DensePose Contributors"]
repository.workspace = true
documentation = "https://docs.rs/wifi-densepose-sensing-server"
keywords = ["wifi", "sensing", "server", "websocket", "csi"]
categories = ["web-programming::http-server", "science"]
readme = "README.md"
[lib]
name = "wifi_densepose_sensing_server"
path = "src/lib.rs"
[[bin]]
name = "sensing-server"
path = "src/main.rs"
[dependencies]
# Web framework
axum = { workspace = true }
tower-http = { version = "0.6", features = ["fs", "cors", "set-header"] }
tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["full", "process"] }
futures-util = "0.3"
ruvector-mincut = { workspace = true }
# Serialization
serde = { workspace = true }
serde_json.workspace = true
# Logging
tracing.workspace = true
tracing-subscriber = { workspace = true }
# Time
chrono = { version = "0.4", features = ["serde"] }
# CLI
clap = { workspace = true }
# Multi-BSSID WiFi scanning pipeline (ADR-022 Phase 3)
wifi-densepose-wifiscan = { version = "0.3.0", path = "../wifi-densepose-wifiscan" }
# Signal processing with RuvSense pose tracker (accuracy sprint).
# default-features = false drops the optional ndarray-linalg/BLAS chain so that
# `--no-default-features` at the workspace root can produce a Windows-friendly
# build without vcpkg/openblas (issue #366, #415).
wifi-densepose-signal = { version = "0.3.1", path = "../wifi-densepose-signal", default-features = false }
# Hardware crate — SyncPacket decoder for ADR-110 §A0.12 mesh-aligned timestamps.
wifi-densepose-hardware = { version = "0.3.0", path = "../wifi-densepose-hardware" }
# Governed streaming engine (ADR-135..146): fusion + privacy demotion +
# WorldGraph belief + deterministic witness. The live server data runs through
# this as a governed path whose Restricted-class decision strips per-node raw
# amplitudes from the live publish; full output gating is a tracked follow-up —
# see engine_bridge.rs ("Honest scope of the live-path governance").
wifi-densepose-engine = { version = "0.3.0", path = "../wifi-densepose-engine" }
wifi-densepose-worldgraph = { version = "0.3.0", path = "../worldgraph/wifi-densepose-worldgraph" }
wifi-densepose-bfld = { version = "0.3.1", path = "../wifi-densepose-bfld", default-features = false }
wifi-densepose-geo = { version = "0.1.0", path = "../worldgraph/wifi-densepose-geo" }
# ADR-262 P3: live RuField surface. The thin anti-corruption bridge that turns
# this server's governed sensing cycle into signed RuField `FieldEvent`s on
# `/api/field` + `/ws/field`. It path-deps the standalone `vendor/rufield`
# submodule (it is the single coupling point — ADR-262 §5.4) and pulls in no
# RuView internal crate, so the dep surface added here is just the bridge.
wifi-densepose-rufield = { version = "0.3.0", path = "../wifi-densepose-rufield" }
# midstream — real-time introspection / low-latency tap (ADR-099 D1).
# Two crates only, on purpose: scheduler / neural-solver / strange-loop are
# explicitly out of scope of ADR-099 (D5).
midstreamer-temporal-compare = "0.2" # DTW / LCS / Edit-Distance pattern matching
midstreamer-attractor = "0.2" # Lyapunov + regime classification
# ADR-102: Edge Module Registry — fetch the canonical Cognitum cog catalog
# at `https://storage.googleapis.com/cognitum-apps/app-registry.json`,
# cache with TTL, surface via /api/v1/edge/registry. ureq is the smallest
# blocking HTTP client we can use without dragging a tokio HTTP stack in;
# rustls is enabled implicitly via the `tls` default feature.
ureq = { version = "2", default-features = false, features = ["tls", "json"] }
sha2 = "0.10"
thiserror = "1"
# ADR-271 — Cognitum OAuth access-token verification. Reuses the `ureq`
# transport above rather than pulling a second HTTP stack: `ruview-auth`'s
# JWKS fetch sits behind a trait, and its default feature is the ureq one.
ruview-auth = { path = "../ruview-auth" }
# ADR-272 — unpredictable single-use WebSocket tickets.
rand = "0.8"
# ADR-115 §3.8 — MQTT publisher (HA-DISCO).
# Gated behind the `mqtt` feature so the default binary stays small for users
# who don't need Home Assistant integration. `rumqttc` is the chosen Rust MQTT
# client (ADR-115 §10 references). `rustls` is preferred over openssl on
# Windows to keep parity with the rest of the workspace (`ureq` above also
# uses rustls).
rumqttc = { version = "0.24", default-features = false, features = ["use-rustls"], optional = true }
[features]
default = []
# Enables the ADR-115 §2 MQTT auto-discovery publisher. Without this feature
# all `--mqtt-*` CLI flags still parse (cli.rs declares them unconditionally),
# but enabling `--mqtt` at runtime logs a `WARN` and the publisher is a no-op.
mqtt = ["dep:rumqttc"]
# ADR-115 §3.11 — Matter Bridge (HA-FABRIC). Same gating principle: flags
# parse unconditionally; the bridge is a no-op without this feature.
# matter-rs is added in P7; intentionally absent in P1 to keep the dep
# surface small until the SDK choice is validated.
matter = []
[dev-dependencies]
tempfile = "3.10"
# `tower::ServiceExt::oneshot` for in-process Router tests (bearer_auth).
tower = { workspace = true }
# ADR-115 P9 — micro-benchmarks for MQTT hot paths + semantic bus.
# Heavy dep tree (~80 transitive crates) so it's dev-only; benches live
# behind --features mqtt because they bench the mqtt module.
criterion = { version = "0.5", features = ["html_reports"] }
# ADR-115 P9 — property-based fuzzing for the wire-boundary security
# audit. Catches edge cases the example-based unit tests would miss
# (random Unicode, control chars, etc.). Pinned to a small version that
# doesn't pull in proptest-derive (we don't need it).
proptest = { version = "1.5", default-features = false, features = ["std"] }
# ADR-271 — sign real ES256 tokens so the middleware's OAuth path is exercised
# end to end (router → middleware → verifier), not just mocked at the seam.
# Keys are generated at test runtime; none are committed.
jsonwebtoken = "9"
p256 = { version = "0.13", features = ["ecdsa", "pkcs8"] }
base64 = "0.21"
[[bench]]
name = "mqtt_throughput"
harness = false
required-features = ["mqtt"]