Files
ruvnet--RuView/v2/crates/homecore-plugins/src/permissions.rs
T
ruv 0ca903b497 feat(homecore-plugins): enforce plugin signature + capability isolation (ADR-162 P4/P5)
ADR-161 honestly relabelled the manifest's wasm_module_hash / wasm_module_sig /
publisher_key as "(P4 — not yet enforced)" and the homecore_permissions claims
as deferred P5 authority isolation. This makes both real and tested.

P4 (signature/integrity verification, SECURITY):
- New `verify` module: SHA-256 module-hash check + Ed25519 signature
  verification over the digest against publisher_key, with a PluginPolicy
  trust allowlist and an explicit AllowUnsigned dev escape hatch (loud warn).
  Secure default rejects unsigned / unknown-publisher / tampered modules.
- Reuses the in-repo cog-ha-matter::witness_signing Ed25519 pattern; sha2 is a
  workspace dep, ed25519-dalek/hex/base64 already in the lock — no new external
  dep tree (only new edges in homecore-plugins).
- WasmtimeRuntime::load_plugin verifies before instantiation; legacy load_wasm
  retained for trusted/test modules.

P5 (authority/capability isolation, SECURITY):
- New `permissions` module: PermissionSet distilled from homecore_permissions
  (state:write:<glob> or bare entity glob). hc_state_set now consults it and
  returns a typed -3 to the guest on an undeclared write (no host panic).

Tests (fail on old code, which had no load_plugin/verify and an unchecked
hc_state_set): tampered module rejected; valid sig from trusted key loads;
valid sig from untrusted key rejected; unsigned rejected by default and loads
only under AllowUnsigned; light.* plugin writes light.kitchen but is denied
lock.front_door; no-permission plugin can write nothing. Real deterministic
keypair signs real bytes.

Manifest doc updated: P4/P5 now ENFORCED (was "not yet enforced").

homecore-plugins --features wasmtime: 32 passed (lib 23, integration 9), 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-06-12 01:33:52 -04:00

169 lines
6.2 KiB
Rust

//! Plugin authority / capability isolation (ADR-162, P5).
//!
//! Wasmtime already gives a plugin **memory** isolation — it cannot read
//! another plugin's linear memory. It does NOT, by itself, stop a plugin
//! from using a host import to write any entity it likes. Before this fix
//! `hc_state_set` happily let any plugin write `lock.front_door` or
//! `alarm_control_panel.*`, and the manifest's `homecore_permissions`
//! claims were parsed but **never consulted** (ADR-161 deferred P5).
//!
//! This module adds **authority isolation**: a plugin may only write
//! entities its manifest declared. The host import consults a
//! [`PermissionSet`] before applying any state write and returns a typed
//! error to the guest (it does **not** panic the host) on a violation.
//!
//! ## Permission grammar
//!
//! Each entry in `homecore_permissions` is one of:
//!
//! * a bare entity glob — `"light.*"`, `"light.kitchen"`, `"*"`;
//! * the explicit capability form `"state:write:<glob>"` (the form the
//! ADR-128 manifest doc shows), e.g. `"state:write:sensor.*"`.
//!
//! A glob supports a single trailing `*` (HA-style domain wildcards:
//! `light.*` matches every `light` entity) and a leading-or-bare `*`
//! (`*` = everything). Exact strings match exactly. A plugin with **no**
//! `state:write` entries can write **nothing** — the secure default.
use crate::manifest::PluginManifest;
/// The set of entity-write permissions a plugin holds, distilled from its
/// manifest `homecore_permissions` at load time.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub struct PermissionSet {
/// Glob patterns the plugin may write (state:write authority). Empty =
/// the plugin may write nothing.
write_globs: Vec<String>,
}
impl PermissionSet {
/// Build a permission set from a manifest's `homecore_permissions`.
///
/// Only `state:write` authority is modelled here (the host import this
/// gates is `hc_state_set`). A bare glob (`"light.*"`) is treated as a
/// write grant; the explicit `"state:write:<glob>"` form is also
/// accepted. Other capability strings (`state:read:*`, future verbs)
/// are ignored for write-gating purposes.
pub fn from_manifest(manifest: &PluginManifest) -> Self {
let mut write_globs = Vec::new();
for claim in &manifest.homecore_permissions {
let claim = claim.trim();
if let Some(glob) = claim.strip_prefix("state:write:") {
write_globs.push(glob.trim().to_string());
} else if claim.starts_with("state:read:") {
// read authority — not relevant to write gating.
} else if !claim.is_empty() {
// Bare glob — treat as a write grant.
write_globs.push(claim.to_string());
}
}
Self { write_globs }
}
/// An all-allowing set (equivalent to a `"*"` grant). Used by the
/// legacy permission-free `WasmtimeRuntime::load_wasm` path so existing
/// callers/tests that do not supply a manifest keep working; the
/// permission-gated path uses [`Self::from_manifest`].
pub fn allow_all() -> Self {
Self {
write_globs: vec!["*".to_string()],
}
}
/// May this plugin write the given entity id (e.g. `"light.kitchen"`)?
pub fn may_write(&self, entity_id: &str) -> bool {
self.write_globs.iter().any(|g| glob_matches(g, entity_id))
}
/// Number of write-grant globs (0 = can write nothing).
pub fn write_grant_count(&self) -> usize {
self.write_globs.len()
}
}
/// Match `entity_id` against a single glob pattern.
///
/// Supported forms:
/// * `"*"` → matches anything.
/// * `"light.*"` → trailing wildcard: any id with the `light.` prefix.
/// * `"light.kitchen"` → exact match.
fn glob_matches(pattern: &str, entity_id: &str) -> bool {
if pattern == "*" {
return true;
}
if let Some(prefix) = pattern.strip_suffix('*') {
return entity_id.starts_with(prefix);
}
pattern == entity_id
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn manifest_with(perms: &[&str]) -> PluginManifest {
PluginManifest {
domain: "p".into(),
name: "P".into(),
version: "1".into(),
documentation: None,
iot_class: None,
config_flow: false,
integration_type: None,
dependencies: vec![],
requirements: vec![],
wasm_module: None,
wasm_module_hash: None,
wasm_module_sig: None,
publisher_key: None,
min_homecore_version: None,
host_imports_required: vec![],
homecore_permissions: perms.iter().map(|s| s.to_string()).collect(),
cog_id: None,
}
}
#[test]
fn domain_glob_allows_same_domain_only() {
let ps = PermissionSet::from_manifest(&manifest_with(&["light.*"]));
assert!(ps.may_write("light.kitchen"));
assert!(ps.may_write("light.bedroom"));
assert!(!ps.may_write("lock.front_door"));
assert!(!ps.may_write("alarm_control_panel.home"));
}
#[test]
fn no_permissions_can_write_nothing() {
let ps = PermissionSet::from_manifest(&manifest_with(&[]));
assert_eq!(ps.write_grant_count(), 0);
assert!(!ps.may_write("light.kitchen"));
assert!(!ps.may_write("sensor.temp"));
}
#[test]
fn explicit_state_write_form_is_honored() {
let ps = PermissionSet::from_manifest(&manifest_with(&["state:write:sensor.*"]));
assert!(ps.may_write("sensor.temp"));
assert!(!ps.may_write("light.kitchen"));
}
#[test]
fn read_grants_do_not_confer_write() {
let ps = PermissionSet::from_manifest(&manifest_with(&["state:read:lock.*"]));
assert!(!ps.may_write("lock.front_door"));
}
#[test]
fn exact_entity_grant_is_scoped() {
let ps = PermissionSet::from_manifest(&manifest_with(&["light.kitchen"]));
assert!(ps.may_write("light.kitchen"));
assert!(!ps.may_write("light.bedroom"));
}
#[test]
fn wildcard_grants_everything() {
let ps = PermissionSet::from_manifest(&manifest_with(&["*"]));
assert!(ps.may_write("lock.front_door"));
}
}