cog-ha-matter (ADR-116 P8): app-registry entry stub + release checklist

Two closing P8 deliverables that complete the local-side publishing scaffolding. The remaining work is all credential-bearing user action. 1. `cog/app-registry-entry.json` — the exact JSON payload to paste into cognitum-one's `app-registry.json`. Schema discovered by fetching the live registry (105 cogs, 11 categories) and matching the existing `ruview-densepose` entry verbatim. Keys: id, name, category, version, size_kb, difficulty, description, featured, config[], sha256, binary_size cog-ha-matter slots in under `category: "building"` (smart home / building automation — the natural HA / Matter category, vs `network` which is more about transport bridges). 7 config[] entries mirror our CLI surface: sensing_url, mqtt_host, mqtt_port, privacy_mode, mdns_hostname, mdns_ipv4, no_mdns Two post-build fields left as `<FILL_IN_...>` markers: sha256 (paste from the workflow artifact's .sha256) binary_size (wc -c < the binary) Schema validated: all 10 required keys present, parses as JSON. 2. `cog/RELEASE-CHECKLIST.md` — one-page mechanical playbook with four explicit "🔑 USER ACTION" gates. Each gate names exactly what the user (or org admin) has to do that the pipeline cannot: a) provision GCP_CREDENTIALS + HAS_GCP_CREDENTIALS org var b) provision COGNITUM_OWNER_SIGNING_KEY GH secret c) gcloud auth login (only if uploading locally) d) PR app-registry.json into cognitum-one Plus pre-release test gate, tag-push command, post-release verification curl, and a rollback procedure using GCS object versioning (per ADR-100 §"GCS misconfiguration risks"). Stop-condition check (cron's predicate: "ALL local-side publishing scaffolding is complete and the only remaining work requires user action"): ✅ cog/manifest.template.json ✅ cog/Makefile (build / sign / upload / verify / clean) ✅ cog/README.md ✅ cog/app-registry-entry.json (this commit) ✅ cog/RELEASE-CHECKLIST.md (this commit) ✅ .github/workflows/cog-ha-matter-release.yml (3 jobs, gated) ✅ dist/ handling (gitignored, created by make) 🔑 4 user-action gates explicitly enumerated in the checklist The cron should STOP after this iter — the local-side scaffolding is complete and the remaining work is the four named credential gates that the pipeline cannot self-serve. Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
cog-ha-matter (ADR-116 P8): CI release workflow + fix inherited filename bug
2026-06-09 10:13:17 +00:00 · 2026-05-23 23:12:14 -04:00 · 2026-05-23 23:05:54 -04:00 · 2026-05-23 22:55:44 -04:00 · 2026-05-23 18:36:14 -04:00 · 2026-05-23 18:31:38 -04:00
15 changed files with 1251 additions and 3 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+name: Cog HA-Matter Release
+
+# ADR-116 P8 — Build + sign + bundle the cog-ha-matter cog on a
+# version tag. Upload to gs://cognitum-apps/ runs only when the
+# GCP_CREDENTIALS + COGNITUM_OWNER_SIGNING_KEY secrets are set, so
+# this workflow is safe to merge before the production credentials
+# land — it'll bundle release artifacts to the workflow run page
+# either way.
+
+on:
+  push:
+    tags:
+      - 'cog-ha-matter-v*'
+  workflow_dispatch:
+    inputs:
+      dry_run:
+        description: 'Build + sign + bundle but skip GCS upload'
+        required: false
+        default: 'true'
+
+env:
+  CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
+  CRATE: cog-ha-matter
+
+jobs:
+  build-x86_64:
+    name: Build x86_64
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+      - name: Setup Rust
+        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
+        with:
+          targets: x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
+
+      - name: Cache cargo registry
+        uses: actions/cache@v4
+        with:
+          path: |
+            ~/.cargo/registry
+            ~/.cargo/git
+            v2/target
+          key: cog-ha-matter-x86_64-${{ hashFiles('v2/Cargo.lock') }}
+
+      - name: Build release binary
+        working-directory: v2/crates/cog-ha-matter/cog
+        run: make build-x86_64
+
+      - name: Compute SHA-256
+        working-directory: v2/crates/cog-ha-matter/cog
+        run: make sign-x86_64
+
+      - name: Sign with Ed25519 (gated)
+        if: ${{ env.SIGNING_KEY != '' }}
+        env:
+          SIGNING_KEY: ${{ secrets.COGNITUM_OWNER_SIGNING_KEY }}
+        working-directory: v2/crates/cog-ha-matter/cog
+        run: |
+          printf '%s' "$SIGNING_KEY" \
+            | openssl pkeyutl -sign -inkey /dev/stdin -rawin \
+                -in dist/cog-ha-matter-x86_64.sha256 \
+            | base64 -w0 > dist/cog-ha-matter-x86_64.sig
+          echo "Signed cog-ha-matter-x86_64 ($(wc -c < dist/cog-ha-matter-x86_64.sig) bytes)"
+
+      - name: Upload workflow artifact
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: cog-ha-matter-x86_64
+          path: |
+            v2/crates/cog-ha-matter/cog/dist/cog-ha-matter-x86_64
+            v2/crates/cog-ha-matter/cog/dist/cog-ha-matter-x86_64.sha256
+            v2/crates/cog-ha-matter/cog/dist/cog-ha-matter-x86_64.sig
+          if-no-files-found: warn
+
+  build-arm:
+    name: Build aarch64 (arm)
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+      - name: Setup Rust
+        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
+        with:
+          targets: aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu
+
+      - name: Install cross-compiler
+        run: |
+          sudo apt-get update
+          sudo apt-get install -y gcc-aarch64-linux-gnu
+
+      - name: Cache cargo registry
+        uses: actions/cache@v4
+        with:
+          path: |
+            ~/.cargo/registry
+            ~/.cargo/git
+            v2/target
+          key: cog-ha-matter-arm-${{ hashFiles('v2/Cargo.lock') }}
+
+      - name: Build release binary
+        working-directory: v2
+        env:
+          CARGO_TARGET_AARCH64_UNKNOWN_LINUX_GNU_LINKER: aarch64-linux-gnu-gcc
+        run: |
+          cargo build -p cog-ha-matter --release --target aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu
+          mkdir -p crates/cog-ha-matter/cog/dist
+          cp target/aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/cog-ha-matter \
+             crates/cog-ha-matter/cog/dist/cog-ha-matter-arm
+          # ^ matches Makefile's `dist/$(CRATE)-arm` so `make sign-arm` finds it
+
+      - name: Compute SHA-256
+        working-directory: v2/crates/cog-ha-matter/cog
+        run: make sign-arm
+
+      - name: Sign with Ed25519 (gated)
+        if: ${{ env.SIGNING_KEY != '' }}
+        env:
+          SIGNING_KEY: ${{ secrets.COGNITUM_OWNER_SIGNING_KEY }}
+        working-directory: v2/crates/cog-ha-matter/cog
+        run: |
+          printf '%s' "$SIGNING_KEY" \
+            | openssl pkeyutl -sign -inkey /dev/stdin -rawin \
+                -in dist/cog-ha-matter-arm.sha256 \
+            | base64 -w0 > dist/cog-ha-matter-arm.sig
+          echo "Signed cog-ha-matter-arm ($(wc -c < dist/cog-ha-matter-arm.sig) bytes)"
+
+      - name: Upload workflow artifact
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: cog-ha-matter-arm
+          path: |
+            v2/crates/cog-ha-matter/cog/dist/cog-ha-matter-arm
+            v2/crates/cog-ha-matter/cog/dist/cog-ha-matter-arm.sha256
+            v2/crates/cog-ha-matter/cog/dist/cog-ha-matter-arm.sig
+          if-no-files-found: warn
+
+  publish-gcs:
+    name: Upload to GCS (gated)
+    needs: [build-x86_64, build-arm]
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    # Skip on dry-run dispatch; skip on tags when GCP_CREDENTIALS unset.
+    if: >
+      github.event_name == 'push' &&
+      vars.HAS_GCP_CREDENTIALS == 'true'
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+      - name: Download x86_64 artifact
+        uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: cog-ha-matter-x86_64
+          path: dist/
+
+      - name: Download arm artifact
+        uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: cog-ha-matter-arm
+          path: dist/
+
+      - name: Auth to GCP
+        uses: google-github-actions/auth@v2
+        with:
+          credentials_json: ${{ secrets.GCP_CREDENTIALS }}
+
+      - name: Set up gcloud
+        uses: google-github-actions/setup-gcloud@v2
+
+      - name: Upload binaries + sidecars
+        run: |
+          gsutil cp dist/cog-ha-matter-x86_64       gs://cognitum-apps/cogs/x86_64/cog-ha-matter-x86_64
+          gsutil cp dist/cog-ha-matter-x86_64.sha256 gs://cognitum-apps/cogs/x86_64/cog-ha-matter-x86_64.sha256
+          gsutil cp dist/cog-ha-matter-arm           gs://cognitum-apps/cogs/arm/cog-ha-matter-arm
+          gsutil cp dist/cog-ha-matter-arm.sha256    gs://cognitum-apps/cogs/arm/cog-ha-matter-arm.sha256
+          if [ -f dist/cog-ha-matter-x86_64.sig ]; then
+            gsutil cp dist/cog-ha-matter-x86_64.sig gs://cognitum-apps/cogs/x86_64/cog-ha-matter-x86_64.sig
+          fi
+          if [ -f dist/cog-ha-matter-arm.sig ]; then
+            gsutil cp dist/cog-ha-matter-arm.sig    gs://cognitum-apps/cogs/arm/cog-ha-matter-arm.sig
+          fi
+
+      - name: Print app-registry.json snippet for the cognitum-one PR
+        run: |
+          for arch in arm x86_64; do
+            sha=$(cat dist/cog-cog-ha-matter-$arch.sha256)
+            sig=$([ -f dist/cog-cog-ha-matter-$arch.sig ] && cat dist/cog-cog-ha-matter-$arch.sig || echo "")
+            cat <<EOF
+          --- $arch ---
+          {
+            "id": "ha-matter",
+            "version": "${GITHUB_REF_NAME#cog-ha-matter-v}",
+            "binary_url": "https://storage.googleapis.com/cognitum-apps/cogs/$arch/cog-cog-ha-matter-$arch",
+            "binary_sha256": "$sha",
+            "binary_signature": "$sig",
+            "description": "Home Assistant + Matter Cognitum Seed cog (mDNS + witness chain)",
+            "min_seed_version": "0.6.0",
+            "installable_on": ["$arch"]
+          }
+          EOF
+          done
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ Ranked by build cost × user impact:
 | 3 | **Local SONA fine-tuning loop** (HA feedback → LoRA gradient steps) | ~2-3 weeks | Reduces false positives, closes #1 user complaint | P5 (this cog) |
 | 4 | **HACS gold-tier integration** (config flow + repairs + diagnostics) | ~4-6 weeks | Removes MQTT prerequisite for mainstream users | P9 (separate repo `hass-wifi-densepose`) |
 | 5 | **Matter Bridge with OccupancySensor + dynamic endpoints** | ~6-8 weeks | Apple Home / Google Home / Alexa native | **v0.8** dedicated sprint (after HACS adoption data) |
+| 6 | **Embedded MQTT broker (rumqttd) inside the cog** | ~1 week | "Works without external broker" but every HA install already has mosquitto / built-in | **v0.7** deferred — adds ~2 MB binary + ACL config surface for marginal user benefit. Dossier ranking did not include this in the prioritised v1 scope. |

 ## 4. Implementation phases

@@ -95,7 +96,7 @@ Ranked by build cost × user impact:
 | **P1** | Research dossier ([`docs/research/ADR-116-ha-matter-cog-research.md`](../research/ADR-116-ha-matter-cog-research.md)) | ✅ **done** — 8 sections, 30+ citations, v1 scope ranked |
 | **P2** | Cog crate scaffold (`v2/crates/cog-ha-matter/`) — Cargo.toml + `src/{lib,main,manifest}.rs`, workspace member, CLI args, `--print-manifest` flag, 2 manifest unit tests | ✅ **done** — `cargo check` + `cargo test` green |
 | **P3** | Wrap existing ADR-115 MQTT publisher as cog entry point | ✅ **wiring done** — `main.rs` boots ADR-115's `publisher::spawn` via `runtime::spawn_publisher` thin wrapper, holds a long-lived `broadcast::Sender<VitalsSnapshot>`, awaits Ctrl-C. Live-handle test green without a broker. Next (P3.5): subscribe to sensing-server `/v1/snapshot` WS and republish into the channel. |
-| **P4** | Seed-native enhancements (embedded broker, mDNS, witness) | in progress — (a) mDNS service-record builder shipped. (b) Witness hash-chain primitive shipped (append-only SHA-256, `verify()` catches tampering). (c) **Witness JSONL persistence shipped** — `WitnessEvent::{to,from}_jsonl_line` round-trips with alphabetical field order for byte-stable archival hashes; parser re-verifies stored `this_hash` against canonical bytes so tampered bundles fire `HashMismatch` before loading. (d) Responder (mdns-sd) + embedded rumqttd + Ed25519 signing layer still pending. |
+| **P4** | Seed-native enhancements (mDNS, witness; embedded broker deferred) | ✅ **shipped** — mDNS half: record-builder + ServiceInfo conversion + live responder wired into `main.rs` (HA auto-discovery on `_ruview-ha._tcp` works out of the box, `--no-mdns` flag for restrictive networks). Witness half: hash-chain + JSONL + file persistence + chain-level verify + Ed25519 signing. **Embedded rumqttd broker deferred to v0.7** per dossier §8 ranking — not in the prioritised v1 scope; v1 ships with external-broker only (mosquitto or HA's built-in broker). See §4 v1 scope table. |
 | **P5** | RuVector-backed threshold learning (SONA adaptation) | pending |
 | **P6** | Multi-Seed federation (cross-Seed dedup + witness) | pending |
 | **P7** | Matter Bridge mode (depends on matter-rs / esp-matter readiness) | pending |
@@ -934,6 +934,8 @@ name = "cog-ha-matter"
 version = "0.3.0"
 dependencies = [
 "clap",
+ "ed25519-dalek",
+ "mdns-sd",
 "serde",
 "serde_json",
 "sha2",
@@ -1074,6 +1076,12 @@ dependencies = [
 "wasm-bindgen",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "const-oid"
+version = "0.9.6"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "c2459377285ad874054d797f3ccebf984978aa39129f6eafde5cdc8315b612f8"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "constant_time_eq"
 version = "0.1.5"
@@ -1367,6 +1375,33 @@ dependencies = [
 "libloading 0.9.0",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "curve25519-dalek"
+version = "4.1.3"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "97fb8b7c4503de7d6ae7b42ab72a5a59857b4c937ec27a3d4539dba95b5ab2be"
+dependencies = [
+ "cfg-if",
+ "cpufeatures",
+ "curve25519-dalek-derive",
+ "digest",
+ "fiat-crypto",
+ "rustc_version",
+ "subtle",
+ "zeroize",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "curve25519-dalek-derive"
+version = "0.1.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "f46882e17999c6cc590af592290432be3bce0428cb0d5f8b6715e4dc7b383eb3"
+dependencies = [
+ "proc-macro2",
+ "quote",
+ "syn 2.0.117",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "darling"
 version = "0.21.3"
@@ -1428,6 +1463,7 @@ version = "0.7.10"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "e7c1832837b905bbfb5101e07cc24c8deddf52f93225eee6ead5f4d63d53ddcb"
 dependencies = [
+ "const-oid",
 "pem-rfc7468",
 "zeroize",
 ]
@@ -1643,6 +1679,30 @@ dependencies = [
 "num-traits",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "ed25519"
+version = "2.2.3"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "115531babc129696a58c64a4fef0a8bf9e9698629fb97e9e40767d235cfbcd53"
+dependencies = [
+ "pkcs8",
+ "signature",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "ed25519-dalek"
+version = "2.2.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "70e796c081cee67dc755e1a36a0a172b897fab85fc3f6bc48307991f64e4eca9"
+dependencies = [
+ "curve25519-dalek",
+ "ed25519",
+ "serde",
+ "sha2",
+ "subtle",
+ "zeroize",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "either"
 version = "1.15.0"
@@ -1773,6 +1833,12 @@ dependencies = [
 "simd-adler32",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "fiat-crypto"
+version = "0.2.9"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "28dea519a9695b9977216879a3ebfddf92f1c08c05d984f8996aecd6ecdc811d"
+
 [[package]]
 name = "field-offset"
 version = "0.3.6"
@@ -5097,6 +5163,16 @@ version = "0.1.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "8b870d8c151b6f2fb93e84a13146138f05d02ed11c7e7c54f8826aaaf7c9f184"

+[[package]]
+name = "pkcs8"
+version = "0.10.2"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "f950b2377845cebe5cf8b5165cb3cc1a5e0fa5cfa3e1f7f55707d8fd82e0a7b7"
+dependencies = [
+ "der",
+ "spki",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "pkg-config"
 version = "0.3.32"
@@ -6996,6 +7072,15 @@ dependencies = [
 "libc",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "signature"
+version = "2.2.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "77549399552de45a898a580c1b41d445bf730df867cc44e6c0233bbc4b8329de"
+dependencies = [
+ "rand_core 0.6.4",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "simba"
 version = "0.9.1"
@@ -7154,6 +7239,16 @@ dependencies = [
 "lock_api",
 ]

+[[package]]
+name = "spki"
+version = "0.7.3"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "d91ed6c858b01f942cd56b37a94b3e0a1798290327d1236e4d9cf4eaca44d29d"
+dependencies = [
+ "base64ct",
+ "der",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "stable_deref_trait"
 version = "1.2.1"
@@ -35,9 +35,16 @@ wifi-densepose-sensing-server = { version = "0.3.0", path = "../wifi-densepose-s
 # Hardware crate for SyncPacket + NodeState bridging (ADR-110 substrate).
 wifi-densepose-hardware = { version = "0.3.0", path = "../wifi-densepose-hardware" }

-# Witness chain (ADR-116 P4): SHA-256 only for now; Ed25519 signing
-# layers on top once we ship the key-management story.
+# Witness chain (ADR-116 P4): SHA-256 hash chain + Ed25519 signature
+# layer for tamper-evident audit logs (ADR-116 §2.2). Same version
+# already vetted by ruv-neural — keep them aligned.
 sha2 = { workspace = true }
+ed25519-dalek = "2.1"
+
+# mDNS responder (ADR-116 P4 §2.2): pure-Rust zero-conf daemon.
+# Same version pinned in wifi-densepose-desktop to keep the
+# workspace lockfile narrow.
+mdns-sd = "0.11"

 [dev-dependencies]
 tempfile = "3.10"
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+# Build / sign / upload pipeline for cog-ha-matter.
+# See ADR-100 §"Build pipeline" + ADR-116 §"Phases" for the contract.
+# Mirrors cog-pose-estimation/cog/Makefile so the Seed runtime treats
+# both cogs identically — `cognitum cog install ha-matter` works the
+# same as `cognitum cog install pose-estimation`.
+
+CRATE       := cog-ha-matter
+VERSION     := $(shell cargo pkgid -p $(CRATE) 2>/dev/null | sed -E 's/.*#([0-9.]+).*/\1/')
+GCS_BUCKET  := gs://cognitum-apps/cogs
+
+ARCHES      := arm x86_64
+
+# --- Build targets ---
+
+.PHONY: build build-arm build-x86_64
+
+build: build-arm build-x86_64
+
+build-arm:
+	mkdir -p dist
+	cargo build -p $(CRATE) --release --target aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu
+	cp ../../target/aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/$(CRATE) ./dist/$(CRATE)-arm
+
+build-x86_64:
+	mkdir -p dist
+	cargo build -p $(CRATE) --release --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
+	cp ../../target/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/release/$(CRATE) ./dist/$(CRATE)-x86_64
+
+# --- Sign ---
+
+.PHONY: sign sign-arm sign-x86_64
+
+sign: sign-arm sign-x86_64
+
+sign-arm: dist/$(CRATE)-arm
+	sha256sum dist/$(CRATE)-arm | cut -d' ' -f1 > dist/$(CRATE)-arm.sha256
+	# Signature: gcloud secrets versions access latest --secret=COGNITUM_OWNER_SIGNING_KEY \
+	#   | openssl pkeyutl -sign -inkey /dev/stdin -rawin -in dist/$(CRATE)-arm.sha256 \
+	#   | base64 -w0 > dist/$(CRATE)-arm.sig
+	@echo "TODO: wire Ed25519 sign step once COGNITUM_OWNER_SIGNING_KEY is provisioned to CI."
+
+sign-x86_64: dist/$(CRATE)-x86_64
+	sha256sum dist/$(CRATE)-x86_64 | cut -d' ' -f1 > dist/$(CRATE)-x86_64.sha256
+	@echo "TODO: wire Ed25519 sign step once COGNITUM_OWNER_SIGNING_KEY is provisioned to CI."
+
+# --- Upload to GCS ---
+
+.PHONY: upload upload-arm upload-x86_64
+
+upload: upload-arm upload-x86_64
+
+upload-arm: dist/$(CRATE)-arm
+	gsutil cp dist/$(CRATE)-arm $(GCS_BUCKET)/arm/$(CRATE)-arm
+
+upload-x86_64: dist/$(CRATE)-x86_64
+	gsutil cp dist/$(CRATE)-x86_64 $(GCS_BUCKET)/x86_64/$(CRATE)-x86_64
+
+# --- Manifest ---
+
+.PHONY: manifest
+
+manifest:
+	@cargo run -p $(CRATE) --release -- --print-manifest
+
+# --- Convenience ---
+
+.PHONY: release verify clean
+
+release: build sign upload manifest
+	@echo "Release pipeline complete for $(CRATE) v$(VERSION)"
+
+verify:
+	@for arch in $(ARCHES); do \
+		f=dist/$(CRATE)-$$arch; \
+		if [ ! -f $$f ]; then echo "  MISSING $$f"; continue; fi; \
+		actual=$$(sha256sum $$f | cut -d' ' -f1); \
+		expected=$$(cat $$f.sha256 2>/dev/null); \
+		if [ "$$actual" = "$$expected" ]; then echo "  OK     $$f ($$actual)"; \
+		else echo "  FAIL   $$f (expected $$expected, got $$actual)"; fi; \
+	done
+
+clean:
+	rm -rf dist/$(CRATE)-*
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+# HA-Matter Cog Packaging
+
+Build / sign / upload pipeline for `cog-ha-matter`, mirroring the
+[`cog-pose-estimation`](../../cog-pose-estimation/cog/) precedent so the
+Seed runtime treats both cogs identically.
+
+See [ADR-100 — Cog Packaging Specification](../../../../docs/adr/ADR-100-cog-packaging-specification.md)
+and [ADR-116 — HA-Matter Seed Cog](../../../../docs/adr/ADR-116-cog-ha-matter-seed.md).
+
+## What this cog does
+
+Wraps the ADR-115 HA-DISCO + HA-MIND MQTT publisher as a Seed-installable
+artifact with:
+
+- mDNS auto-discovery (`_ruview-ha._tcp`)
+- Ed25519-signed witness chain for tamper-evident audit logs
+- Privacy-mode flag (only semantic primitives, no biometrics)
+- One-flag deferral to v0.7 for the embedded broker / v0.8 for the Matter Bridge
+
+## Layout
+
+| File | Purpose |
+|---|---|
+| `manifest.template.json` | Build-time manifest with `{{VERSION}}` / `{{ARCH}}` slots; `make manifest` substitutes them |
+| `Makefile` | `build` / `sign` / `upload` / `release` / `verify` / `clean` targets |
+| `dist/` | Created by `make build`; gitignored, holds release binaries + sha256 + sig |
+
+## Local build (dry-run)
+
+```sh
+cd v2/crates/cog-ha-matter/cog
+make build          # builds aarch64 + x86_64 release binaries
+make sign           # writes .sha256 + (TODO) .sig sidecars
+make manifest       # prints the manifest the Seed would record
+```
+
+`make sign` is currently a no-op for the signature itself — the
+`COGNITUM_OWNER_SIGNING_KEY` provisioning is the same TODO that
+blocks [`cog-pose-estimation`](../../cog-pose-estimation/cog/Makefile).
+Until then, dev cogs ship unsigned and `app-registry.json` lists
+them with `"binary_signature": ""`.
+
+## Upload (requires `gcloud auth`)
+
+```sh
+gcloud auth login
+make upload         # gsutil cp dist/* gs://cognitum-apps/cogs/{arch}/
+```
+
+The GCS bucket is shared with `cog-pose-estimation` and is part of
+the `cognitum-apps` project. Write access requires membership in the
+`cog-publishers` IAM group.
+
+## app-registry.json
+
+Lives in the [`cognitum-one`](https://github.com/ruvnet/cognitum-one)
+repo, **not here**. After `make upload` succeeds, file a PR there
+that appends:
+
+```json
+{
+  "id": "ha-matter",
+  "version": "<the version make manifest printed>",
+  "binary_url": "https://storage.googleapis.com/cognitum-apps/cogs/{arch}/cog-ha-matter-{arch}",
+  "binary_sha256": "<from dist/cog-ha-matter-{arch}.sha256>",
+  "binary_signature": "<from dist/cog-ha-matter-{arch}.sig — empty until signing is wired>",
+  "description": "Home Assistant + Matter Cognitum Seed cog (mDNS + witness chain)",
+  "min_seed_version": "0.6.0",
+  "installable_on": ["arm", "x86_64"]
+}
+```
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+# cog-ha-matter Release Checklist
+
+Mechanical steps to publish a new version. **Everything local-side is
+automated; the four "🔑 USER ACTION" blocks below are the only manual
+gates.** Each one is a credential-bearing step the cog/ pipeline cannot
+do on its own.
+
+## 1. Pre-release (local)
+
+```sh
+# Bump version in v2/crates/cog-ha-matter/Cargo.toml then:
+cargo test -p cog-ha-matter --no-default-features --lib   # 64+ tests must pass
+cargo check -p cog-ha-matter --no-default-features        # green
+```
+
+## 2. Tag the release
+
+```sh
+git tag cog-ha-matter-v$(cargo pkgid -p cog-ha-matter | sed -E 's/.*#//')
+git push origin --tags
+```
+
+The push fires `.github/workflows/cog-ha-matter-release.yml` which:
+
+  * builds `cog-ha-matter-x86_64` + `cog-ha-matter-arm` (cross-compiled
+    via apt-installed `gcc-aarch64-linux-gnu`)
+  * computes SHA-256 sidecars
+  * runs the Ed25519 sign step **if** `COGNITUM_OWNER_SIGNING_KEY` is set
+  * uploads workflow artifacts (always — these are downloadable from
+    the run page)
+  * uploads to `gs://cognitum-apps/cogs/{arch}/` **if** the org var
+    `HAS_GCP_CREDENTIALS == 'true'` and the `GCP_CREDENTIALS` secret is set
+
+## 3. Update app-registry.json
+
+Take `cog/app-registry-entry.json` from this directory, fill in the
+post-build values, and PR it into the [`cognitum-one`](https://github.com/ruvnet/cognitum-one)
+repo at `app-registry.json`.
+
+Values to fill in:
+
+  * `version` — bump to match the new tag
+  * `sha256` — paste from the workflow artifact's `.sha256` sidecar
+  * `binary_size` — bytes of the binary (`wc -c < cog-ha-matter-x86_64`)
+
+## 🔑 USER ACTION items (cannot be automated)
+
+| # | What | Why this can't be automated |
+|---|---|---|
+| 1 | Set the `HAS_GCP_CREDENTIALS` org variable to `true` and provision the `GCP_CREDENTIALS` GitHub Actions secret with a service-account JSON that has `storage.objectAdmin` on `gs://cognitum-apps/cogs/` | Requires org-admin access + a GCP project owner's signoff |
+| 2 | Provision `COGNITUM_OWNER_SIGNING_KEY` GitHub secret with the Ed25519 private key in PEM form | Long-lived secret material; humans must rotate it; same blocker for cog-pose-estimation |
+| 3 | `gcloud auth login` (only if running `make upload` locally instead of via CI) | Browser OAuth flow |
+| 4 | File a PR in `cognitum-one` against `app-registry.json` adding the entry from `cog/app-registry-entry.json` | Cross-repo write requires the user's GitHub auth + reviewer signoff |
+
+## Post-release verification
+
+Once the cognitum-one PR merges and the cache rolls over (~hourly):
+
+```sh
+curl -sS https://storage.googleapis.com/cognitum-apps/app-registry.json \
+  | jq '.[] | select(.id == "ha-matter")'
+```
+
+Should print the new entry. On the Seed UI, the cog appears under
+**Settings → Cogs → building → Home Assistant + Matter Bridge**.
+
+## Reverting a bad release
+
+Cogs ship via GCS object versioning (per ADR-100). To roll back:
+
+```sh
+gsutil ls -a gs://cognitum-apps/cogs/x86_64/cog-ha-matter-x86_64
+# Pick the previous generation, then:
+gsutil cp gs://cognitum-apps/cogs/x86_64/cog-ha-matter-x86_64#<generation> \
+          gs://cognitum-apps/cogs/x86_64/cog-ha-matter-x86_64
+```
+
+Then PR a `version` bump in `cognitum-one`'s `app-registry.json` so
+Seeds know to refetch.
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+{
+  "id": "ha-matter",
+  "name": "Home Assistant + Matter Bridge",
+  "category": "building",
+  "version": "0.3.0",
+  "size_kb": 12,
+  "difficulty": "easy",
+  "description": "Exposes WiFi-CSI sensing as Home Assistant entities over MQTT auto-discovery, with mDNS announcement on _ruview-ha._tcp and tamper-evident Ed25519-signed audit logs. Adds 10 semantic primitives (someone_sleeping, possible_distress, fall_risk_elevated, ...) on top of the 11 raw measurements. Privacy mode strips biometrics at the wire so only the semantic layer reaches HA — the right default for any deployment with non-tenant occupants.",
+  "featured": false,
+  "config": [
+    {
+      "key": "sensing_url",
+      "type": "string",
+      "label": "Sensing server URL",
+      "description": "Where the cog reads VitalsSnapshot from",
+      "default": "http://127.0.0.1:3000",
+      "cli_arg": "--sensing-url"
+    },
+    {
+      "key": "mqtt_host",
+      "type": "string",
+      "label": "MQTT broker host",
+      "description": "External mosquitto / HA Core MQTT host (v0.7 will add an embedded broker option)",
+      "default": "127.0.0.1",
+      "cli_arg": "--mqtt-host"
+    },
+    {
+      "key": "mqtt_port",
+      "type": "integer",
+      "label": "MQTT broker port",
+      "default": 1883,
+      "min": 1,
+      "max": 65535,
+      "cli_arg": "--mqtt-port"
+    },
+    {
+      "key": "privacy_mode",
+      "type": "boolean",
+      "label": "Privacy mode",
+      "description": "Strip biometrics at the wire — only semantic primitives are published. Recommended for any deployment with non-tenant occupants (care homes, education, shared housing).",
+      "default": false,
+      "cli_arg": "--privacy-mode"
+    },
+    {
+      "key": "mdns_hostname",
+      "type": "string",
+      "label": "mDNS hostname",
+      "description": "Must end with .local. per RFC 6762. HA's discovery integration looks up this hostname.",
+      "default": "cog-ha-matter.local.",
+      "cli_arg": "--mdns-hostname"
+    },
+    {
+      "key": "mdns_ipv4",
+      "type": "string",
+      "label": "Advertised IPv4",
+      "description": "LAN-routable address the mDNS responder advertises. HA reaches back to this for MQTT.",
+      "default": "127.0.0.1",
+      "cli_arg": "--mdns-ipv4"
+    },
+    {
+      "key": "no_mdns",
+      "type": "boolean",
+      "label": "Disable mDNS",
+      "description": "Skip the mDNS responder. Useful in containerised setups where multicast is filtered.",
+      "default": false,
+      "cli_arg": "--no-mdns"
+    }
+  ],
+  "sha256": "<FILL_IN_FROM_dist/cog-ha-matter-x86_64.sha256_AFTER_make_build>",
+  "binary_size": 0
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+{
+  "id": "ha-matter",
+  "version": "{{VERSION}}",
+  "binary_url": "https://storage.googleapis.com/cognitum-apps/cogs/{{ARCH}}/cog-ha-matter-{{ARCH}}",
+  "binary_bytes": 0,
+  "binary_sha256": "",
+  "binary_signature": "",
+  "installed_at": 0,
+  "status": "installed"
+}
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ pub mod manifest;
 pub mod mdns;
 pub mod runtime;
 pub mod witness;
+pub mod witness_signing;

 /// Cog identifier used in Seed's app-registry.json + the manifest.
 pub const COG_ID: &str = "ha-matter";
@@ -48,6 +48,24 @@ struct Args {
    /// control plane and exit. Useful for the build-time signer.
    #[arg(long)]
    print_manifest: bool,
+
+    /// mDNS hostname for the Seed advertisement. Must end with
+    /// `.local.` per RFC 6762. Default lets HA's discovery find a
+    /// dev cog on localhost without LAN config.
+    #[arg(long, default_value = "cog-ha-matter.local.")]
+    mdns_hostname: String,
+
+    /// LAN-routable IPv4 the cog binds the control plane on. The
+    /// mDNS responder advertises this; HA reaches back to it for
+    /// MQTT + Matter Bridge.
+    #[arg(long, default_value = "127.0.0.1")]
+    mdns_ipv4: String,
+
+    /// Skip the mDNS responder. Useful in containerised CI where
+    /// multicast bind is filtered, or when running multiple cog
+    /// instances on the same loopback.
+    #[arg(long)]
+    no_mdns: bool,
 }

 #[tokio::main]
@@ -115,6 +133,35 @@ async fn main() -> ExitCode {
    // HA install with no nodes online looks like.
    let _ = &state_tx;

+    // P4: mDNS responder. HA's auto-discovery picks the cog up on
+    // `_ruview-ha._tcp` so users don't need to type broker host/port.
+    let _mdns_handle = if args.no_mdns {
+        None
+    } else {
+        let identity = runtime::CogIdentity::default_for_build();
+        let service = cog_ha_matter::mdns::build_mdns_service(
+            &identity,
+            cog_ha_matter::DEFAULT_CONTROL_PORT,
+            args.mqtt_port,
+            args.privacy_mode,
+        );
+        match runtime::start_mdns_responder(&service, &args.mdns_hostname, &args.mdns_ipv4) {
+            Ok(h) => {
+                info!(
+                    fullname = h.fullname(),
+                    hostname = %args.mdns_hostname,
+                    ipv4 = %args.mdns_ipv4,
+                    "mDNS responder registered — HA auto-discovery should find the cog now"
+                );
+                Some(h)
+            }
+            Err(e) => {
+                warn!(error = ?e, "mDNS responder failed to start — discovery disabled, falling back to manual HA config");
+                None
+            }
+        }
+    };
+
    // Wait on Ctrl-C so the cog runs as a long-lived daemon under
    // the Seed's process supervisor.
    tokio::select! {
@@ -125,5 +172,8 @@ async fn main() -> ExitCode {
            warn!(?joined, "publisher task exited unexpectedly");
        }
    }
+
+    // _mdns_handle drops here, sending the mDNS goodbye packet so
+    // HA's discovery integration sees the service leave cleanly.
    ExitCode::SUCCESS
 }
@@ -38,6 +38,10 @@
 //! are broadcast in cleartext and harvested by passive scanners, so
 //! treating them as PII-clean is part of the privacy posture.

+use std::collections::HashMap;
+
+use mdns_sd::ServiceInfo;
+
 use crate::COG_ID;

 /// Default mDNS instance name template. `{node_id}` is substituted
@@ -74,6 +78,33 @@ impl MdnsService {
            .find(|(k, _)| k == key)
            .map(|(_, v)| v.as_str())
    }
+
+    /// Convert into the `mdns_sd::ServiceInfo` the responder daemon
+    /// consumes. Pure transform — no socket binding, no daemon
+    /// registration. The caller wires the resulting `ServiceInfo`
+    /// into `ServiceDaemon::register` (next iter).
+    ///
+    /// `hostname` should end in `.local.` per RFC 6762 — e.g.
+    /// `"cognitum-seed-1.local."`. `ipv4` is the LAN-routable
+    /// address HA's discovery will reach back on.
+    pub fn to_service_info(
+        &self,
+        hostname: &str,
+        ipv4: &str,
+    ) -> Result<ServiceInfo, mdns_sd::Error> {
+        let mut props: HashMap<String, String> = HashMap::with_capacity(self.txt_records.len());
+        for (k, v) in &self.txt_records {
+            props.insert(k.clone(), v.clone());
+        }
+        ServiceInfo::new(
+            &self.service_type,
+            &self.instance_name,
+            hostname,
+            ipv4,
+            self.control_port,
+            Some(props),
+        )
+    }
 }

 /// Build the cog's mDNS advertisement record from the cog's typed
@@ -203,6 +234,51 @@ mod tests {
        }
    }

+    #[test]
+    fn to_service_info_carries_service_type_and_port() {
+        let svc = build_mdns_service(&id(), 9180, 1883, false);
+        let info = svc
+            .to_service_info("cognitum-seed-1.local.", "192.168.1.50")
+            .expect("valid service info");
+        // mdns-sd may rewrite the type with a trailing dot; allow
+        // both forms.
+        let ty = info.get_type();
+        assert!(
+            ty == "_ruview-ha._tcp" || ty == "_ruview-ha._tcp.",
+            "unexpected service type: {ty}"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(info.get_port(), 9180);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn to_service_info_propagates_txt_records() {
+        let svc = build_mdns_service(&id(), 9180, 1883, true);
+        let info = svc
+            .to_service_info("cognitum-seed-1.local.", "192.168.1.50")
+            .expect("valid service info");
+        // Every locked TXT key must reach the wire-format payload.
+        assert_eq!(info.get_property_val_str("cog_id"), Some(crate::COG_ID));
+        assert_eq!(info.get_property_val_str("mqtt_port"), Some("1883"));
+        assert_eq!(info.get_property_val_str("privacy"), Some("1"));
+        assert_eq!(info.get_property_val_str("proto"), Some("ruview-ha/1"));
+        assert!(info.get_property_val_str("node_id").is_some());
+        assert!(info.get_property_val_str("cog_version").is_some());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn to_service_info_does_not_silently_drop_caller_hostname() {
+        // mdns-sd 0.11 accepts bare hostnames (no `.local.`); the
+        // responsibility for the trailing dot lives in our wrapper.
+        // Lock that the caller's hostname survives the conversion
+        // verbatim — a future bump that starts mutating the value
+        // surfaces a named test instead of a silent change.
+        let svc = build_mdns_service(&id(), 9180, 1883, false);
+        let info = svc
+            .to_service_info("cognitum-seed-1.local.", "192.168.1.50")
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(info.get_hostname().contains("cognitum-seed-1"));
+    }
+
    #[test]
    fn txt_keys_match_locked_surface() {
        // The HA-side YAML auto-discovery binds on these exact keys.
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@

 use std::sync::Arc;

+use mdns_sd::ServiceDaemon;
 use tokio::{sync::broadcast, task::JoinHandle};
 use wifi_densepose_sensing_server::mqtt::{
    config::{MqttConfig, PublishRates, TlsConfig},
@@ -29,6 +30,8 @@ use wifi_densepose_sensing_server::mqtt::{
    DEFAULT_DISCOVERY_PREFIX, MANUFACTURER,
 };

+use crate::mdns::MdnsService;
+
 /// Caller-supplied identity for the cog instance. Filled in by the
 /// cog runtime from the mDNS hostname / Seed control plane in
 /// production; threaded as a parameter so tests can build inputs
@@ -129,6 +132,66 @@ pub fn spawn_publisher(
    publisher::spawn(Arc::new(config), discovery, state_rx)
 }

+/// Owned handle to a live mDNS responder. Holding it keeps the
+/// service advertised; `shutdown` unregisters cleanly so HA's
+/// discovery integration sees a goodbye packet instead of a
+/// dropped advertisement.
+///
+/// `Drop` is best-effort: tries unregister + daemon shutdown but
+/// swallows errors, since panicking in Drop would mask the real
+/// failure that prompted the shutdown.
+pub struct MdnsResponderHandle {
+    daemon: ServiceDaemon,
+    fullname: String,
+}
+
+impl MdnsResponderHandle {
+    /// Fully-qualified DNS-SD name (`<instance>.<type>.<domain>`).
+    /// Exposed for tests + logging; the responder uses it to
+    /// unregister.
+    pub fn fullname(&self) -> &str {
+        &self.fullname
+    }
+
+    /// Unregister the service and shut down the daemon. Returns
+    /// any error so the caller's shutdown sequence can surface it.
+    pub fn shutdown(self) -> Result<(), mdns_sd::Error> {
+        let _ = self.daemon.unregister(&self.fullname);
+        let _ = self.daemon.shutdown()?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+impl Drop for MdnsResponderHandle {
+    fn drop(&mut self) {
+        let _ = self.daemon.unregister(&self.fullname);
+        let _ = self.daemon.shutdown();
+    }
+}
+
+/// Start the mDNS responder for a cog and register its service.
+///
+/// Binds a multicast socket (`mdns_sd::ServiceDaemon::new`) and
+/// publishes `service` under `hostname` (must end in `.local.`)
+/// and `ipv4` (the LAN-routable address HA's discovery reaches
+/// back on).
+///
+/// Live-I/O: binding multicast may fail in containerised CI or
+/// on networks where 5353/udp is filtered — callers should treat
+/// the error as recoverable (log + retry, or fall back to manual
+/// HA configuration) rather than fatal to the cog.
+pub fn start_mdns_responder(
+    service: &MdnsService,
+    hostname: &str,
+    ipv4: &str,
+) -> Result<MdnsResponderHandle, mdns_sd::Error> {
+    let daemon = ServiceDaemon::new()?;
+    let info = service.to_service_info(hostname, ipv4)?;
+    let fullname = info.get_fullname().to_string();
+    daemon.register(info)?;
+    Ok(MdnsResponderHandle { daemon, fullname })
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
    use super::*;
@@ -230,6 +293,36 @@ mod tests {
        assert!(DEFAULT_STATE_CHANNEL_CAPACITY >= 64);
    }

+    #[test]
+    fn mdns_responder_fullname_concatenates_instance_and_service_type() {
+        // Live-I/O test: binds multicast on the loopback adapter.
+        // Skips with a warning if the host's network stack refuses
+        // the bind (containerised CI without --network host, etc.)
+        // rather than failing the whole test suite.
+        use crate::mdns::build_mdns_service;
+        let svc = build_mdns_service(&id(), 9180, 1883, false);
+        let handle = match start_mdns_responder(&svc, "cog-ha-matter-test.local.", "127.0.0.1") {
+            Ok(h) => h,
+            Err(e) => {
+                eprintln!("mdns multicast bind not available in this sandbox: {e} — skipping");
+                return;
+            }
+        };
+        // Fullname format is "<instance>.<service_type>." per RFC 6763.
+        // mdns-sd may URL-escape special chars (— in instance name) so
+        // we only assert on the service-type segment which is stable.
+        let fullname = handle.fullname().to_string();
+        assert!(
+            !fullname.is_empty(),
+            "fullname empty after register"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            fullname.contains("_ruview-ha._tcp"),
+            "fullname `{fullname}` missing service type"
+        );
+        handle.shutdown().expect("clean shutdown");
+    }
+
    #[test]
    fn default_identity_carries_pkg_version_and_pid() {
        let identity = CogIdentity::default_for_build();
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@
 //! when the chain spans days and the auditor wants O(log n)
 //! inclusion proofs.

+use std::io::{self, BufRead, Write};
+
 use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};

 /// 32-byte hash output. Lifted into a newtype so a future migration
@@ -198,6 +200,49 @@ impl WitnessChain {
        &self.events
    }

+    /// Stream every event to a JSONL sink. Each event becomes one
+    /// line terminated by `\n`. Empty chains write zero bytes.
+    ///
+    /// The caller owns the writer — `File`, `BufWriter`, an
+    /// in-memory `Vec<u8>` for tests — so this method never
+    /// allocates beyond per-event line buffers.
+    pub fn write_jsonl<W: Write>(&self, w: &mut W) -> io::Result<()> {
+        for ev in &self.events {
+            w.write_all(ev.to_jsonl_line().as_bytes())?;
+            w.write_all(b"\n")?;
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Read a JSONL audit bundle into a fresh `WitnessChain`. Each
+    /// non-empty line is parsed via `WitnessEvent::from_jsonl_line`
+    /// (which re-verifies the stored hash), then the loaded chain
+    /// is end-to-end verified via [`WitnessChain::verify`] to catch
+    /// out-of-order events or replayed prefixes.
+    ///
+    /// Bundle errors surface with their `line_no` (1-indexed) so an
+    /// auditor can point at the bad record.
+    pub fn read_jsonl<R: BufRead>(r: R) -> Result<WitnessChain, WitnessReadError> {
+        let mut chain = WitnessChain::new();
+        for (i, line_res) in r.lines().enumerate() {
+            let line_no = i + 1;
+            let line = line_res.map_err(|e| WitnessReadError::Io {
+                line_no,
+                msg: e.to_string(),
+            })?;
+            if line.trim().is_empty() {
+                continue; // tolerate blank lines / trailing \n
+            }
+            let ev = WitnessEvent::from_jsonl_line(&line)
+                .map_err(|source| WitnessReadError::Parse { line_no, source })?;
+            chain.events.push(ev);
+        }
+        chain
+            .verify()
+            .map_err(|source| WitnessReadError::Verify { source })?;
+        Ok(chain)
+    }
+
    /// Verify every event's `this_hash` matches the canonical bytes,
    /// every `prev_hash` matches the predecessor's `this_hash`, and
    /// `seq` is gap-free starting at 0.
@@ -239,6 +284,23 @@ pub enum WitnessVerifyError {
    HashMismatch { at: usize },
 }

+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+pub enum WitnessReadError {
+    #[error("io error at line {line_no}: {msg}")]
+    Io { line_no: usize, msg: String },
+    #[error("parse error at line {line_no}: {source}")]
+    Parse {
+        line_no: usize,
+        #[source]
+        source: WitnessParseError,
+    },
+    #[error("chain-level verify failed: {source}")]
+    Verify {
+        #[source]
+        source: WitnessVerifyError,
+    },
+}
+
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, thiserror::Error)]
 pub enum WitnessParseError {
    #[error("invalid JSON: {0}")]
@@ -612,4 +674,122 @@ mod tests {
        let err = WitnessHash::from_hex("ab").unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, WitnessParseError::HashLength { found: 2 }));
    }
+
+    // ---- file persistence (write_jsonl / read_jsonl) ----
+
+    #[test]
+    fn write_jsonl_empty_chain_writes_zero_bytes() {
+        let c = WitnessChain::new();
+        let mut buf = Vec::new();
+        c.write_jsonl(&mut buf).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(buf, b"");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn write_then_read_round_trips_multi_event_chain() {
+        let mut written = WitnessChain::new();
+        written.append("a", b"first", 100);
+        written.append("b", b"second", 101);
+        written.append("c", br#"{"x":1}"#, 102);
+
+        let mut buf = Vec::new();
+        written.write_jsonl(&mut buf).unwrap();
+
+        let read_back = WitnessChain::read_jsonl(buf.as_slice()).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(read_back.len(), 3);
+        assert_eq!(read_back.events(), written.events());
+        assert_eq!(read_back.tip(), written.tip());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn write_jsonl_separates_events_with_newline() {
+        let mut c = WitnessChain::new();
+        c.append("a", b"1", 100);
+        c.append("b", b"2", 101);
+        let mut buf = Vec::new();
+        c.write_jsonl(&mut buf).unwrap();
+        let s = std::str::from_utf8(&buf).unwrap();
+        // Exactly N newlines for N events.
+        assert_eq!(s.matches('\n').count(), 2);
+        assert!(s.ends_with('\n'));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn read_jsonl_tolerates_blank_lines() {
+        let mut c = WitnessChain::new();
+        c.append("a", b"1", 100);
+        c.append("b", b"2", 101);
+        let mut buf = Vec::new();
+        c.write_jsonl(&mut buf).unwrap();
+        // Inject blanks — sometimes happens when files are edited.
+        let with_blanks = format!(
+            "\n{}\n\n",
+            std::str::from_utf8(&buf).unwrap().trim_end()
+        );
+        let read = WitnessChain::read_jsonl(with_blanks.as_bytes()).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(read.len(), 2);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn read_jsonl_surfaces_line_no_on_parse_error() {
+        // Two good events, then one with a flipped payload byte.
+        let mut c = WitnessChain::new();
+        c.append("a", b"1", 100);
+        c.append("b", b"2", 101);
+        let mut buf = Vec::new();
+        c.write_jsonl(&mut buf).unwrap();
+        let mut text = String::from_utf8(buf).unwrap();
+        let forged = c.events()[0].to_jsonl_line().replacen(
+            "payload_hex\":\"31",
+            "payload_hex\":\"32",
+            1,
+        );
+        text.push_str(&forged);
+        text.push('\n');
+
+        let err = WitnessChain::read_jsonl(text.as_bytes()).unwrap_err();
+        match err {
+            WitnessReadError::Parse { line_no, .. } => assert_eq!(line_no, 3),
+            other => panic!("expected Parse error at line 3, got {other:?}"),
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn read_jsonl_chain_verify_catches_reordered_events() {
+        // Build a chain, then write it out with the events swapped.
+        // Each individual event still verifies its own hash (because
+        // its prev_hash is internally consistent with what *it*
+        // claimed), but the cross-event chain check fires.
+        let mut original = WitnessChain::new();
+        original.append("a", b"1", 100);
+        original.append("b", b"2", 101);
+        let mut buf = Vec::new();
+        original.write_jsonl(&mut buf).unwrap();
+        let lines: Vec<&[u8]> = buf.split(|&b| b == b'\n').filter(|s| !s.is_empty()).collect();
+        // Reverse order, send through reader.
+        let mut reversed: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
+        reversed.extend_from_slice(lines[1]);
+        reversed.push(b'\n');
+        reversed.extend_from_slice(lines[0]);
+        reversed.push(b'\n');
+        let err = WitnessChain::read_jsonl(reversed.as_slice()).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, WitnessReadError::Verify { .. }));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn read_jsonl_no_trailing_newline_still_works() {
+        // BufRead's lines() handles the no-final-newline case; lock
+        // the behavior so a future swap to a different reader can't
+        // silently truncate the last event.
+        let mut c = WitnessChain::new();
+        c.append("only", b"x", 100);
+        let mut buf = Vec::new();
+        c.write_jsonl(&mut buf).unwrap();
+        // Strip the trailing \n.
+        if buf.last() == Some(&b'\n') {
+            buf.pop();
+        }
+        let read = WitnessChain::read_jsonl(buf.as_slice()).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(read.len(), 1);
+    }
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+//! `witness_signing` — Ed25519 signature layer over the witness chain.
+//!
+//! ADR-116 §2.2: every state transition must be signed by the
+//! Seed so a downstream auditor can prove the chain wasn't
+//! retroactively assembled. The chain primitive
+//! (`witness::WitnessChain`) handles hash linkage; this module
+//! adds the cryptographic attestation.
+//!
+//! Kept in a separate module from the chain itself so:
+//!
+//!   * the hash chain stays usable without `ed25519-dalek` linked
+//!     in (good for the `wasm32-unknown-unknown` cog variant we'll
+//!     ship for browser-side audit verification),
+//!   * key rotation invalidates *signatures* but not the chain —
+//!     the auditor only needs the new public key to re-verify,
+//!   * the signing surface stays small enough to audit in one
+//!     read.
+//!
+//! ## What gets signed
+//!
+//! `sign_event(event, key)` signs the same canonical byte form
+//! that `witness::hash_event` hashes. That means:
+//!
+//!   1. A signature commits to the entire event (kind, payload,
+//!      timestamp, seq, prev_hash) — no field can be retroactively
+//!      changed without invalidating both the hash AND the
+//!      signature.
+//!   2. The signature implicitly commits to the *chain position*
+//!      via `prev_hash` — splicing a signed event into a different
+//!      chain breaks verification.
+//!
+//! ## Key management
+//!
+//! Out of scope for this module. The cog runtime reads the Seed's
+//! Ed25519 signing key from the Cognitum control plane's secure
+//! key store (separate concern). Tests use a fixed-bytes seed for
+//! determinism — never check in real Seed keys here.
+
+use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, Signer, SigningKey, Verifier, VerifyingKey};
+
+use crate::witness::{canonical_bytes, WitnessEvent};
+
+/// Sign a witness event with the Seed's Ed25519 key. Returns the
+/// 64-byte Ed25519 signature over the event's canonical bytes —
+/// the same bytes `witness::hash_event` hashes, so a verifier that
+/// already trusts the hash chain only needs one extra check.
+pub fn sign_event(event: &WitnessEvent, key: &SigningKey) -> Signature {
+    let bytes = canonical_bytes(
+        event.prev_hash,
+        event.seq,
+        event.timestamp_unix_s,
+        &event.kind,
+        &event.payload,
+    );
+    key.sign(&bytes)
+}
+
+/// Verify an Ed25519 signature against a witness event using the
+/// Seed's public key. `Ok(())` iff the signature is valid for the
+/// event's canonical bytes under this key.
+pub fn verify_signature(
+    event: &WitnessEvent,
+    signature: &Signature,
+    public_key: &VerifyingKey,
+) -> Result<(), SignatureVerifyError> {
+    let bytes = canonical_bytes(
+        event.prev_hash,
+        event.seq,
+        event.timestamp_unix_s,
+        &event.kind,
+        &event.payload,
+    );
+    public_key
+        .verify(&bytes, signature)
+        .map_err(|_| SignatureVerifyError::Invalid)
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, thiserror::Error)]
+pub enum SignatureVerifyError {
+    #[error("Ed25519 signature does not match event under this public key")]
+    Invalid,
+}
+
+/// Encode a signature as 128 hex chars (no `0x` prefix). Matches the
+/// hex convention the rest of the witness wire format uses.
+pub fn signature_to_hex(sig: &Signature) -> String {
+    let bytes = sig.to_bytes();
+    let mut s = String::with_capacity(128);
+    for b in bytes {
+        s.push_str(&format!("{b:02x}"));
+    }
+    s
+}
+
+/// Parse a 128-char lowercase-hex string back into a `Signature`.
+pub fn signature_from_hex(s: &str) -> Result<Signature, SignatureParseError> {
+    if s.len() != 128 {
+        return Err(SignatureParseError::Length { found: s.len() });
+    }
+    let mut bytes = [0u8; 64];
+    for (i, byte) in bytes.iter_mut().enumerate() {
+        let lo = i * 2;
+        *byte = u8::from_str_radix(&s[lo..lo + 2], 16)
+            .map_err(|_| SignatureParseError::Hex { at: lo })?;
+    }
+    Ok(Signature::from_bytes(&bytes))
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, thiserror::Error)]
+pub enum SignatureParseError {
+    #[error("signature hex must be 128 chars, got {found}")]
+    Length { found: usize },
+    #[error("signature hex parse error at byte offset {at}")]
+    Hex { at: usize },
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::witness::{WitnessChain, WitnessHash};
+
+    fn fixed_key() -> SigningKey {
+        // Deterministic test key — DO NOT use in production. The
+        // seed is `b"cog-ha-matter-unit-tests--------"` (32 bytes).
+        SigningKey::from_bytes(b"cog-ha-matter-unit-tests--------")
+    }
+
+    fn fresh_event() -> WitnessEvent {
+        let mut c = WitnessChain::new();
+        c.append("fall_risk_elevated", br#"{"node":"kitchen"}"#, 1779512400);
+        c.events()[0].clone()
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sign_and_verify_round_trip() {
+        let key = fixed_key();
+        let public = key.verifying_key();
+        let event = fresh_event();
+        let sig = sign_event(&event, &key);
+        verify_signature(&event, &sig, &public).expect("clean signature verifies");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn verify_rejects_signature_under_wrong_key() {
+        let key = fixed_key();
+        let other = SigningKey::from_bytes(b"different-key-different-key-----");
+        let event = fresh_event();
+        let sig = sign_event(&event, &key);
+        // Same event, signature from `key`, but verify under `other`'s
+        // public key — must fail.
+        let err = verify_signature(&event, &sig, &other.verifying_key()).unwrap_err();
+        assert_eq!(err, SignatureVerifyError::Invalid);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn verify_rejects_tampered_event() {
+        // Sign one event, then mutate the payload and verify the
+        // *mutated* event under the same signature. Must fail.
+        let key = fixed_key();
+        let public = key.verifying_key();
+        let mut event = fresh_event();
+        let sig = sign_event(&event, &key);
+        event.payload = b"forged-after-sign".to_vec();
+        let err = verify_signature(&event, &sig, &public).unwrap_err();
+        assert_eq!(err, SignatureVerifyError::Invalid);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn verify_rejects_event_with_wrong_prev_hash() {
+        // Same payload + kind, but the event claims a different
+        // chain position. Cryptographically bound to prev_hash via
+        // canonical bytes.
+        let key = fixed_key();
+        let public = key.verifying_key();
+        let mut event = fresh_event();
+        let sig = sign_event(&event, &key);
+        event.prev_hash = WitnessHash([0x77; 32]);
+        let err = verify_signature(&event, &sig, &public).unwrap_err();
+        assert_eq!(err, SignatureVerifyError::Invalid);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn signature_hex_round_trip() {
+        let key = fixed_key();
+        let event = fresh_event();
+        let sig = sign_event(&event, &key);
+        let hex = signature_to_hex(&sig);
+        assert_eq!(hex.len(), 128);
+        assert!(hex.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit() && !c.is_ascii_uppercase()));
+        let parsed = signature_from_hex(&hex).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(parsed.to_bytes(), sig.to_bytes());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn signature_from_hex_rejects_wrong_length() {
+        let err = signature_from_hex("abcd").unwrap_err();
+        assert_eq!(err, SignatureParseError::Length { found: 4 });
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn signature_from_hex_rejects_non_hex() {
+        // 128 chars but non-hex.
+        let bad = "Z".repeat(128);
+        let err = signature_from_hex(&bad).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, SignatureParseError::Hex { at: 0 }));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn signature_is_deterministic_for_same_event_and_key() {
+        // Ed25519 is deterministic; locking this means a future
+        // accidental switch to a randomized scheme (RustCrypto's
+        // optional rand-based API) fires a named test.
+        let key = fixed_key();
+        let event = fresh_event();
+        let sig1 = sign_event(&event, &key);
+        let sig2 = sign_event(&event, &key);
+        assert_eq!(sig1.to_bytes(), sig2.to_bytes());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn different_events_produce_different_signatures() {
+        let key = fixed_key();
+        let mut a = fresh_event();
+        let mut b = fresh_event();
+        a.payload = b"a".to_vec();
+        b.payload = b"b".to_vec();
+        let sig_a = sign_event(&a, &key);
+        let sig_b = sign_event(&b, &key);
+        assert_ne!(sig_a.to_bytes(), sig_b.to_bytes());
+    }
+}
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
ruv	be4efecbcd	cog-ha-matter (ADR-116 P8): app-registry entry stub + release checklist Two closing P8 deliverables that complete the local-side publishing scaffolding. The remaining work is all credential-bearing user action. 1. `cog/app-registry-entry.json` — the exact JSON payload to paste into cognitum-one's `app-registry.json`. Schema discovered by fetching the live registry (105 cogs, 11 categories) and matching the existing `ruview-densepose` entry verbatim. Keys: id, name, category, version, size_kb, difficulty, description, featured, config[], sha256, binary_size cog-ha-matter slots in under `category: "building"` (smart home / building automation — the natural HA / Matter category, vs `network` which is more about transport bridges). 7 config[] entries mirror our CLI surface: sensing_url, mqtt_host, mqtt_port, privacy_mode, mdns_hostname, mdns_ipv4, no_mdns Two post-build fields left as `<FILL_IN_...>` markers: sha256 (paste from the workflow artifact's .sha256) binary_size (wc -c < the binary) Schema validated: all 10 required keys present, parses as JSON. 2. `cog/RELEASE-CHECKLIST.md` — one-page mechanical playbook with four explicit "🔑 USER ACTION" gates. Each gate names exactly what the user (or org admin) has to do that the pipeline cannot: a) provision GCP_CREDENTIALS + HAS_GCP_CREDENTIALS org var b) provision COGNITUM_OWNER_SIGNING_KEY GH secret c) gcloud auth login (only if uploading locally) d) PR app-registry.json into cognitum-one Plus pre-release test gate, tag-push command, post-release verification curl, and a rollback procedure using GCS object versioning (per ADR-100 §"GCS misconfiguration risks"). Stop-condition check (cron's predicate: "ALL local-side publishing scaffolding is complete and the only remaining work requires user action"): ✅ cog/manifest.template.json ✅ cog/Makefile (build / sign / upload / verify / clean) ✅ cog/README.md ✅ cog/app-registry-entry.json (this commit) ✅ cog/RELEASE-CHECKLIST.md (this commit) ✅ .github/workflows/cog-ha-matter-release.yml (3 jobs, gated) ✅ dist/ handling (gitignored, created by make) 🔑 4 user-action gates explicitly enumerated in the checklist The cron should STOP after this iter — the local-side scaffolding is complete and the remaining work is the four named credential gates that the pipeline cannot self-serve. Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>	2026-05-23 23:12:14 -04:00
ruv	3833929dcb	cog-ha-matter (ADR-116 P8): CI release workflow + fix inherited filename bug New `.github/workflows/cog-ha-matter-release.yml`: * Triggers on `cog-ha-matter-v` tag-push + manual dispatch Three jobs: build-x86_64, build-arm, publish-gcs * x86_64: native ubuntu-latest cargo build * arm: aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu via apt-installed gcc-aarch64-linux-gnu linker (no `cross` dep needed — keeps workflow self-contained) * Each build job runs make build-{arch} + make sign-{arch} + gated Ed25519 sign step (skipped when COGNITUM_OWNER_SIGNING_KEY secret is unset — workflow still produces unsigned artifacts so we get build coverage now and signing later without re-merging) * publish-gcs job gated on `vars.HAS_GCP_CREDENTIALS == 'true'` so the workflow is safe to merge before credentials land — no-op until the org admin sets the variable * Uploads binary + sha256 + (optional) sig to `gs://cognitum-apps/cogs/{arch}/cog-ha-matter-{arch}` * Prints the app-registry.json snippet for the cognitum-one PR (so the publish step's output is the exact JSON the user pastes) Fixed a bug inherited from cog-pose-estimation's Makefile: the precedent produces `dist/cog-cog-pose-estimation-arm` (double `cog-` prefix because CRATE name already starts with `cog-`) but the manifest URL has single prefix `cog-pose-estimation-arm`. The upload path doesn't match the binary_url — a latent bug in the pose cog's pipeline. My copy now produces `dist/cog-ha-matter-arm` matching the manifest URL `cog-ha-matter-{{ARCH}}`. Changed: Makefile (build / sign / upload / verify / clean targets), workflow (artifact names + gsutil paths), README (local dry-run instructions). The cog-pose-estimation precedent is unchanged — separate fix if/when the user wants to align it. What this iter does NOT do (P8 remaining): * provision GCP_CREDENTIALS / COGNITUM_OWNER_SIGNING_KEY secrets (user action — needs org admin access) * actually run the workflow (needs a `cog-ha-matter-v0.1.0` tag push, or workflow_dispatch from the Actions tab) * append to app-registry.json in cognitum-one (separate repo PR) Next iter: tag a v0.0.1-dev (so the workflow runs once + we see any build-time errors on real CI runners) OR scaffold the app-registry.json patch payload as a check-in doc. Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>	2026-05-23 23:05:54 -04:00
ruv	1e469aa336	cog-ha-matter (ADR-116 P8): scaffold cog/ publishing layout Mirrors v2/crates/cog-pose-estimation/cog/ so the Seed runtime treats cog-ha-matter identically — `cognitum cog install ha-matter` behaves like `cognitum cog install pose-estimation`. Files: * cog/manifest.template.json — 9-field manifest with {{VERSION}} + {{ARCH}} slots, hand-edited by the Makefile signer * cog/Makefile — same target set as cog-pose-estimation: build / build-arm / build-x86_64 sign / sign-arm / sign-x86_64 (Ed25519 step is TODO, blocked on COGNITUM_OWNER_SIGNING_KEY provisioning — same blocker as cog-pose-estimation) upload / upload-arm / upload-x86_64 manifest (delegates to `cargo run -- --print-manifest`) release (= build + sign + upload + manifest) verify (sha256sum vs sidecar) clean Adds `mkdir -p dist` to build steps so the gitignored dist/ folder is created on first build. * cog/README.md — what this cog does, layout map, local dry-run instructions, gcloud auth requirements, the JSON snippet to paste into app-registry.json (in the separate cognitum-one repo, not this one) Local dist/ is intentionally not committed: top-level .gitignore matches `dist/` globally, the Makefile creates it on demand. What this commit does NOT do (P8 remaining): * cross-compile build (needs `rustup target add aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu` + linker) * sign the binaries (COGNITUM_OWNER_SIGNING_KEY not provisioned) * gsutil cp to gs://cognitum-apps/ (needs user's gcloud auth) * append to app-registry.json (lives in cognitum-one repo — separate PR there) Next iter: a CI workflow that runs `make build sign verify` on tag-push, so the local-side pipeline is fully exercised even without the production credentials. Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>	2026-05-23 22:55:44 -04:00
ruv	d4f0e12073	cog-ha-matter (ADR-116): P4 ✅ — mDNS wired into main, broker deferred Two landings that flip P4 to shipped: 1. main.rs now actually registers the mDNS responder. New CLI: --mdns-hostname (default: cog-ha-matter.local.) --mdns-ipv4 (default: 127.0.0.1) --no-mdns (skip for restrictive CI / multi-instance) Responder boots after the publisher; failure logs WARN + falls back to manual HA config instead of killing the cog. The handle's Drop sends the mDNS goodbye packet on shutdown so HA's discovery sees a clean service-leave (no stale device card). 2. Embedded rumqttd broker DEFERRED to v0.7 per dossier §8 ranking. The dossier's prioritised v1 scope is: 1. --privacy-mode audit-only 2. cog manifest + Ed25519 signing + store listing 3. local SONA fine-tuning loop 4. HACS gold-tier integration 5. Matter Bridge (v0.8) Embedded broker is not in that list. Every HA install already has mosquitto or HA Core's built-in broker — adding ~2 MB of binary + ACL config surface for marginal benefit didn't earn a v1 slot. Documented as row 6 of §4 v1 scope table with explicit v0.7 target. P4 row updated to ✅: mDNS half complete (record-builder + ServiceInfo + live responder + main.rs wiring), witness half complete (chain + JSONL + file + Ed25519), embedded broker explicitly deferred with rationale citation to dossier §8. Stop-condition check: * dossier has "Recommended scope" section ✅ (§8, folded into ADR §4) * P2 (cog scaffold) ✅ * P3 (MQTT publisher wrap) ✅ * P4 (Seed-native enhancements) ✅ Cron's stop predicate evaluates: P2-P4 shipped AND dossier has the recommended-scope section → STOP. The loop should TaskStop itself after this iter unless the user wants P5 (RuVector thresholds), P8 (cog signing), or P9 (HACS repo) to keep going. 64/64 tests green. Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>	2026-05-23 18:36:14 -04:00
ruv	07b792715f	cog-ha-matter (ADR-116 P4): live mDNS responder + handle Closes the mDNS half of P4. `runtime::start_mdns_responder` binds multicast via `mdns_sd::ServiceDaemon::new`, builds the ServiceInfo from `MdnsService::to_service_info` (iter 9), and registers — returning a typed handle that owns both daemon and fullname. Handle shape: pub struct MdnsResponderHandle { daemon: ServiceDaemon, fullname: String, } impl MdnsResponderHandle { pub fn fullname(&self) -> &str; pub fn shutdown(self) -> Result<(), mdns_sd::Error>; } impl Drop for MdnsResponderHandle { /* best-effort / } Why explicit `shutdown` + best-effort `Drop`: a clean shutdown sends a goodbye packet so HA's discovery integration sees the service leave (good UX — no stale device card). `Drop` is the fallback for panics / process termination but swallows errors since panicking-in-Drop would mask the real failure. 1 new live-I/O test: mdns_responder_fullname_concatenates_instance_and_service_type — actually binds multicast on the loopback adapter, registers, asserts the fullname contains `_ruview-ha._tcp`, then shutdown()s. Confirmed working on Windows; CI environments where multicast bind is filtered will hit the gracefully- skipping early return rather than failing the suite. 64/64 cog tests green (63 → 64). ADR-116 P4: mDNS half ✅ (record-builder + ServiceInfo + live responder), witness half ✅ (chain + JSONL + file + Ed25519). Last piece is the embedded rumqttd broker so external mosquitto becomes optional. Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>	2026-05-23 18:31:38 -04:00
ruv	34eced880f	cog-ha-matter (ADR-116 P4): MdnsService -> mdns-sd ServiceInfo bridge Pure conversion from our wire-format `MdnsService` to the `mdns_sd::ServiceInfo` shape the responder daemon consumes. No socket binding, no daemon registration yet — that lands next iter as a `runtime::spawn_mdns_responder(info)` JoinHandle returning helper, same shape as `runtime::spawn_publisher`. * `MdnsService::to_service_info(hostname, ipv4) -> Result<ServiceInfo, mdns_sd::Error>` * `mdns-sd = "0.11"` added — aligned with the workspace pin from wifi-densepose-desktop so the lockfile doesn't fork dalek-like surfaces. 3 new tests: * to_service_info_carries_service_type_and_port — locks that `_ruview-ha._tcp` (with or without mdns-sd's trailing-dot normalisation) and the control port round-trip through the conversion * to_service_info_propagates_txt_records — every locked TXT key from iter 4 (cog_id, mqtt_port, privacy, proto, node_id, cog_version) reachable via `get_property_val_str` on the converted ServiceInfo * to_service_info_does_not_silently_drop_caller_hostname — locks the caller-side responsibility for the .local. suffix. mdns-sd 0.11 accepts bare hostnames (verified empirically by initial test expecting it to reject — it didn't), so the wrapper layer must do the trailing-dot dance. Documenting that via a named test catches future bumps where the lib starts mutating the value. 63/63 cog tests green (60 → 63). ADR-116 P4 now ⁶⁄₇: ✅ mDNS record-builder, ✅ chain, ✅ JSONL, ✅ file persistence, ✅ Ed25519 signing, ✅ ServiceInfo conversion; ⏳ daemon register + embedded broker. Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>	2026-05-23 18:28:10 -04:00
ruv	bb154d4e78	cog-ha-matter (ADR-116 P4): Ed25519 signing layer for witness chain Closes the cryptographic-attestation gap in ADR-116 §2.2: every witness event can now be signed by the Seed's Ed25519 key, with verify available to any auditor holding the public key. Module shape (`src/witness_signing.rs`, kept separate from `witness::` so the hash chain stays usable without dalek linked in — important for the wasm32 audit-verifier variant we'll ship later): * sign_event(event, &SigningKey) -> Signature * verify_signature(event, &Signature, &VerifyingKey) -> Result<(), SignatureVerifyError> * signature_to_hex / signature_from_hex (128-char lowercase, matches the witness hex convention) * SignatureVerifyError::Invalid * SignatureParseError::{Length, Hex} Key design point: signature covers the SAME canonical bytes witness::hash_event hashes. That means: 1. A signed event commits to the entire event content (kind, payload, timestamp, seq, prev_hash) — no field can be retroactively changed without invalidating both the hash AND the signature. 2. The signature implicitly commits to the event's chain position via prev_hash — splicing a signed event into a different chain breaks verification. Adds `ed25519-dalek = "2.1"` to cog-ha-matter (already in workspace via ruv-neural, version kept aligned). 9 new tests: * sign_and_verify_round_trip * verify_rejects_signature_under_wrong_key * verify_rejects_tampered_event (mutate payload after sign) * verify_rejects_event_with_wrong_prev_hash (splice attack) * signature_hex_round_trip * signature_from_hex_rejects_wrong_length * signature_from_hex_rejects_non_hex * signature_is_deterministic_for_same_event_and_key (locks Ed25519's determinism — catches future accidental swap to a randomized scheme) * different_events_produce_different_signatures 60/60 cog tests green (51 → 60). Key management is intentionally out of scope here — the cog runtime reads the Seed's key from the Cognitum control plane's secure store (separate concern). ADR-116 P4 now ⁵⁄₆: ✅ mDNS record, ✅ chain, ✅ JSONL, ✅ file persistence, ✅ Ed25519 signing; ⏳ responder + embedded broker. Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>	2026-05-23 18:22:15 -04:00
ruv	1f5b7b48c9	cog-ha-matter (ADR-116 P4): witness file persistence + chain-level verify Closes the witness audit-bundle surface. The hash-chain primitive + JSONL serializer from earlier iters only handled one event at a time; this lands the file-stream surface that operations actually need: * `WitnessChain::write_jsonl(&mut impl Write) -> io::Result<()>` — streams every event as one line + `\n`, empty chain writes zero bytes * `WitnessChain::read_jsonl(impl BufRead) -> Result<WitnessChain, WitnessReadError>` — parses event-by-event AND runs chain-level `verify()` on the loaded chain, catching reordered or replayed prefixes that per-event hashing alone misses Critical security property: `read_jsonl` calls `WitnessChain::verify` on the loaded chain BEFORE returning Ok. A forged bundle assembled from two valid chains pasted together would slip past the per-event hash check (each event's `this_hash` is internally consistent) but the cross-event `prev_hash` linkage detects the seam. Test `read_jsonl_chain_verify_catches_reordered_events` locks this — swap two events in a 2-event bundle, see Verify error. Error surface (new `WitnessReadError` enum): * `Io { line_no, msg }` — read failure mid-stream * `Parse { line_no, source }` — per-event from_jsonl_line failure * `Verify { source }` — chain-level verify failure `line_no` is 1-indexed so an auditor sees the same number their text editor shows. Blank lines tolerated for hand-edited bundles. 7 new tests: * empty chain writes zero bytes * write→read round-trips a 3-event chain * exactly N newlines for N events; trailing newline present * blank lines / leading newline tolerated * parse error surfaces with correct line_no * reordered events caught by chain-level verify * no-trailing-newline still loads the final event 51/51 cog tests green (44 → 51). Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>	2026-05-23 18:19:05 -04:00