mirror of
https://github.com/ruvnet/RuView
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Claude
006a66ca20
Adds an `optimize` module that replaces the hand-picked shield config with a
derived, robustness-verified optimum, and hardens the experiment so the
collapse is proven to be signal-level, not classifier-level.
Model changes:
- throughput.rs: add a feedback-airtime term (cost rises with feedback bits)
alongside the falling quantization residual, giving a genuine interior
throughput optimum in feedback resolution.
- attacker.rs: add a selectable distance metric (Euclidean + Cosine) so the
optimizer can require the collapse to hold under multiple classifiers.
- experiment.rs: thread the attacker metric through; build the channel once.
optimize.rs:
- optimal_feedback_bits / spec_optimal_feedback_bits: throughput-best resolution
(3 bits unconstrained, matching DySPAN-2026; 5 bits within the 802.11 {5,7,9}
set).
- min_givens_passes: smallest mixing budget that collapses re-ID robustly across
both metrics AND N in {16,32}.
- pareto_frontier and hyper_optimize.
Findings and adopted defaults:
- Proven-minimum robust passes = 48; the hand-picked 112 was 2.3x over-
provisioned. Rotation mixing is keyed (never signaled), so extra passes are
throughput-free -> ship 96 (2x margin).
- Feedback resolution 5 bits (spec-optimal), down from 7.
- ShieldConfig::default() now equals hyper_optimize()'s output; a test guards
against drift.
Net vs. the original: strictly better on BOTH privacy and throughput.
Reference (SYNTHETIC/L0, N=16): re-ID 100% shield-off -> 4.7% shield-on
(chance 6.25%, below chance), throughput 97.6%, energy ratio 1.000000. 35 tests
+ doctest pass; clippy -D warnings clean; builds for wasm32.
Docs: new docs/research/privacy-shield/08-optimization.md; updated bundle
README/03/05/07 and ADR-288 with the derived operating point.
Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WEXNqzs7UsfNFBcP5yW21p
84 lines
4.1 KiB
Markdown
84 lines
4.1 KiB
Markdown
# 07 — Implementation and Roadmap
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---
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## 1. What ships in this bundle
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- **Reference crate** `v2/crates/wifi-densepose-privshield` (VEIL): a
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deterministic, dependency-free, WASM-ready pure-compute leaf implementing the
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full attacker-vs-protector experiment, the four compliant controls, the
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throughput model, the compliance audit, the `optimize` hyper-optimizer, and a
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byte-stable proof. 35 tests + doctest pass; builds for
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`wasm32-unknown-unknown`; clippy-clean.
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- **This research bundle** (`docs/research/privacy-shield/`).
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- **[ADR-288](../../adr/ADR-288-veil-privacy-shield-compliant-waveform.md)** — the
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formal decision record.
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The crate is intentionally a **leaf with no internal RuView dependencies**
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(mirrors `wifi-densepose-aether`), so it can be reasoned about, fuzzed, and
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ported independently, and so it can never accidentally acquire a path to a radio.
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---
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## 2. Reuse map (how VEIL composes with existing RuView)
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| Existing subsystem | Relationship |
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| **BFLD** (ADR-118/120/121, `wifi-densepose-bfld`) | Detection layer. Its `identity_risk_score` is the natural trigger for VEIL's `SensingDetector` — detect leakage, then shield |
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| **Privacy control plane** (ADR-141) | VEIL protection steps emit `ComplianceReport`s that fit the runtime-attestation model (which mode, which actions, which fields) |
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| **Active sensing / governed actuation** (ADR-280) | VEIL is a defensive `SensingAction`: a governed, privacy-ceiling-bounded emission-shaping action the control plane can schedule |
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| **Givens/beamforming primitives** | VEIL reuses the report's native Givens-rotation structure rather than inventing a new transform |
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| **Deterministic proof discipline** (`nvsim`, `archive/v1/verify.py`) | VEIL's `proof` module follows the same pinned-witness pattern |
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---
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## 3. Phased rollout
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| Phase | Deliverable | Evidence class |
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| **P1 — reference model (this PR)** | Crate + experiment + docs + ADR | SYNTHETIC (cargo test) |
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| **P2 — sensitivity study** | Sweep N, noise, resolution, mixing; add a learned attacker to confirm signal-level collapse | SYNTHETIC |
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| **P3 — BFLD integration** | Wire `identity_risk` → `SensingDetector` → shield engage; emit attestation | SYNTHETIC + integration tests |
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| **P4 — firmware feedback shaping** | Implement keyed fine-subspace rotation + cadence randomization in ESP32/Nexmon feedback path | build + hardware |
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| **P5 — two-node hardware measurement** | Wi-BFI attacker vs. VEIL protector on real silicon; iperf throughput; captured log | **MEASURED** (with witness) |
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| **P6 — deployment profiles** | Per-segment profiles (SCIF, boardroom, ward) with regulatory review | operational |
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No defense claim graduates from SYNTHETIC to MEASURED without a captured
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boot/runtime log (CLAUDE.md hardware rule).
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---
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## 4. Open problems (tracked honestly)
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1. **Real-hardware separability.** Comm and identity information are only
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*approximately* separable on real radios; the true throughput cost of full
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identity hiding may exceed the model's ~2%. P2/P5 must bound it.
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2. **Within-session motion leakage.** A fixed per-session rotation does not
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obfuscate coarse motion within one capture window. Needs stronger cadence
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randomization or amplitude shaping; currently a stated non-goal for the re-ID
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metric.
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3. **Active adversary (A2).** An attacker that transmits its own soundings is
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only partially addressed by cadence control; a MAC-layer non-response policy
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is needed.
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4. **Key management.** The per-session rotation key must be derived from the
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negotiated link secret; VEIL's PRNG is explicitly *not* cryptographic and must
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not be used for real key material.
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5. **Regulatory review per jurisdiction.** The energy-conservation argument is
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portable, but power/mask/timing limits and any transmit-nulling profile need
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local review before field use.
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---
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## 5. Validation commands
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```bash
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# Reference experiment + all unit/proof/doc tests
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cargo test -p wifi-densepose-privshield --no-default-features
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# WASM portability (leaf builds with no radio path)
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cargo build -p wifi-densepose-privshield --target wasm32-unknown-unknown
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# Lints
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cargo clippy -p wifi-densepose-privshield --all-targets
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```
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