Files
ruvnet--RuView/docs/adr/ADR-167-ddd-bounded-contexts.md
T
rUv 42dcf49f4d fix(adr): resolve duplicate ADR numbers + close ADR-080 security + ADR-154 M1 signal backlog (#1051)
* fix(signal): circular phase variance for ghost-tap guard (ADR-154 §7.4 #1)

`phase_variance` computed a LINEAR sample variance over phase angles that
wrap at ±π, so a tightly-clustered set straddling the branch cut reported
spuriously HIGH dispersion — false-tripping the `> TAU` ghost-tap guard on
real, tightly-clustered CIR taps.

Replace with Mardia's circular variance V = 1 − R̄, bounded [0,1] and
invariant to where the cluster sits on the circle. Re-derive the guard
against the bounded metric via a named const
`GHOST_TAP_CIRCULAR_VARIANCE_MAX` (the old TAU-scaled threshold is
meaningless on [0,1]).

Grade: metric fix MEASURED; threshold value DATA-GATED — a clean single-path
ramp also sweeps the circle, so V alone cannot separate clean from
unsanitized without labelled frames. Conservative default (0.99) errs toward
never false-rejecting, strictly more permissive at the wrap boundary than the
buggy linear guard.

Fails-on-old test: `phase_variance_circular_not_fooled_by_branch_cut` —
inlines the old linear variance to show it exceeds TAU on wrap-straddling
phases while circular V≈0 and the guard no longer trips. Plus
`phase_variance_circular_is_bounded_and_extremal` (V∈[0,1], V≈0 identical,
V≈1 uniform).

cargo test -p wifi-densepose-signal --no-default-features --features cir --lib
→ 432 passed, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* fix(signal): pin Welford n=0/n=1 finiteness guard (ADR-154 §7.4 #10)

The shared `WelfordStats` (field_model.rs, used by longitudinal.rs and others)
relies on `count < 2` guards in `variance`/`sample_variance`/`std_dev`/
`z_score` to stay finite at the boundaries. The guards existed but the n=0
boundary was UNTESTED — exactly the §4 divide-by-(n−1) family the ADR groups
this with.

Add `welford_finite_at_n0_and_n1` asserting every statistic is finite and
returns the documented sentinel (0.0) at n=0 and n=1, plus load-bearing doc
comments on the two guards.

Fails-on-old proof: with the `sample_variance` guard removed, the test FAILS
with "attempt to subtract with overflow" at the `(self.count - 1)` underflow
(0usize − 1); `variance` would similarly yield 0.0/0.0 = NaN. The guard is
restored; the test pins it so a future regression is caught.

Grade: MEASURED (boundary finiteness is asserted; the guard is the §4-family
fix made testable).

cargo test -p wifi-densepose-signal --no-default-features --lib field_model
→ 22 passed, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* refactor(signal): de-magic adversarial thresholds + boundary tests (ADR-154 §7.4 #13)

Lift the bare numeric literals buried in `check`/`check_consistency` into
named, documented module consts (FIELD_MODEL_GINI_VIOLATION=0.8,
ENERGY_RATIO_HIGH_VIOLATION=2.0, ENERGY_RATIO_LOW_VIOLATION=0.1,
CONSISTENCY_ACTIVE_FRACTION_OF_MEAN=0.1, SCORE_W_* weights). VALUES UNCHANGED —
each const equals the original literal; only names + pinning tests are new.

Grade: DATA-GATED. The operating values stay empirical (defensible values need
labelled spoofed/clean CSI — Wi-Spoof, §6.2/§7.3). The de-magicking +
characterization tests are MEASURED: `tuning_consts_unchanged_from_literals`,
`energy_ratio_high_boundary`, `energy_ratio_low_boundary`,
`field_model_gini_boundary`, `consistency_active_fraction_boundary` pin the
decision boundaries at/just-below/just-above each threshold, so a future
data-driven retune is a visible, tested change.

Fails-on-change proof: bumping ENERGY_RATIO_HIGH_VIOLATION 2.0→3.0 makes
`energy_ratio_high_boundary` FAIL (restored). Operating values explicitly
NOT changed.

cargo test -p wifi-densepose-signal --no-default-features --lib ruvsense::adversarial
→ 20 passed, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* refactor(signal): de-magic coherence drift/gate thresholds (ADR-154 §7.4 #9)

Lift the bare detection literals in `coherence.rs::classify_drift`
(DRIFT_STABLE_SCORE=0.85, DRIFT_STEP_CHANGE_MAX_STALE=10) and the
`coherence_gate.rs` Default impl (DEFAULT_ACCEPT_THRESHOLD=0.85,
DEFAULT_REJECT_THRESHOLD=0.5, DEFAULT_MAX_STALE_FRAMES=200,
DEFAULT_PREDICT_ONLY_NOISE=3.0) into named, documented consts. VALUES
UNCHANGED. The gate already exposed these via GatePolicyConfig (config seam);
this names + pins the defaults.

Grade: DATA-GATED. Operating values stay empirical (defensible Z-score
thresholds need labelled stable/drifting coherence traces). De-magicking +
boundary tests are MEASURED: `classify_drift_stable_score_boundary`,
`classify_drift_stale_count_boundary` pin the at/just-below/just-above
decisions; `drift_consts_unchanged_from_literals` /
`gate_default_consts_unchanged_from_literals` pin the values. Operating values
explicitly NOT changed.

cargo test -p wifi-densepose-signal --no-default-features --lib ruvsense::coherence
→ 40 passed, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* docs(adr-154): mark §7.4 P1 backlog cleared — Milestone-1 (#1,#10 RESOLVED; #9,#13 DATA-GATED)

Update ADR-154 §7.4 backlog rows #1, #9, #10, #13 with commit refs + grades,
the §7.4 intro count (four P1 items cleared, ~41 P2/P3 remain), the
Horizon-ledger one-liner (Milestone-1 DONE), and the §8 honest-limits #1 line
(metric now correct; threshold still DATA-GATED). Add CHANGELOG [Unreleased]
entry.

Grades: #1 RESOLVED (MEASURED metric / DATA-GATED threshold), #10 RESOLVED
(MEASURED), #9 & #13 RESOLVED-PARTIAL (DATA-GATED — de-magicked + boundary
tested, operating values unchanged).

Validation: cargo test --workspace --no-default-features → 2057 passed, 0
failed; wifi-densepose-signal lib → 442 passed (no-default + --features cir);
python archive/v1/data/proof/verify.py → VERDICT: PASS, hash f8e76f21…46f7a
UNCHANGED (CIR ghost-tap guard is not on the deterministic proof path).

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* fix(sensing-server): stop leaking internal errors in HTTP responses (ADR-080 #2)

Six handlers in `main.rs` serialized the internal error `Display` straight
into the JSON response body, leaking server internals to any client (ADR-080
finding #2, CWE-209; reframed onto the Rust boundary by ADR-164 G11):

  - edge_registry_endpoint: a panicked spawn_blocking `JoinError`
    ("task … panicked") in a 500, and the raw upstream error in a 503
  - delete_model / delete_recording / start_recording: std::io::Error
    strings carrying OS detail / filesystem paths
  - calibration_start / calibration_stop: the FieldModel error chain

New `error_response` module: `internal_error` / `internal_error_json` /
`upstream_unavailable` log the full detail server-side only (tagged with a
correlation id) and return a generic body
(`{"error":"internal_error","correlation_id":…}`) — no `panicked`, no file
paths, no Debug chain. The correlation id lets an operator join a client
report to the exact server log line without ever shipping the detail.

Pinned by 5 error_response tests, incl. a leak-substring guard
(internal_error_body_does_not_leak_detail) verified to FAIL on the reverted
old body (returns the panic message / path / "os error"). The HOMECORE sweep
(ADR-161) covered homecore-server, not this crate.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* test(sensing-server): pin XFF-immunity + no-query-token (ADR-080 #1, #3)

Findings #1 (XFF-spoofing bypass) and #3 (JWT-in-URL, CWE-598) were logged
against the Python v1 API but are VERIFIED ABSENT on the current Rust
sensing-server, so they get regression tests rather than redundant fixes:

  - #1 XFF: there is no IP-based rate-limiter or IP-allowlist to bypass, and
    neither security middleware reads a forwarded header. Added
    bearer_auth::xff_header_never_affects_auth_decision (spoofed
    X-Forwarded-For never flips a 401<->200 decision) and
    host_validation::forwarded_headers_never_bypass_host_allowlist (spoofed
    X-Forwarded-Host: localhost never lets Host: evil.com past the allowlist).

  - #3 JWT-in-URL: require_bearer reads the token only from the Authorization
    header; WS handlers take no query token; the sole Query extractor
    (EdgeRegistryParams) is a non-secret refresh flag. Added
    bearer_auth::query_string_token_is_never_accepted — ?token= / ?access_token=
    in the URL never authenticates (stays 401) while the header path still 200s.
    Verified to FAIL when a query-token path is injected into require_bearer.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* docs(adr-080): mark P0 security findings #1-#3 RESOLVED; close ADR-164 G11

- ADR-080: Status note + per-finding closure (#1 XFF and #3 JWT-in-URL
  verified absent + regression-pinned; #2 leaked errors fixed via the
  error_response module). Records the v1-vs-Rust boundary distinction
  explicitly: v1 paths remain archived; this closure governs the shipped
  Rust sensing-server.
- ADR-164: Gap Register G11 and the Open/Gated Backlog entry marked
  RESOLVED with the fix + branch reference.
- CHANGELOG: [Unreleased] -> ### Security entry covering all three findings.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

* docs(adr): renumber 6 displaced ADRs to resolve duplicate-number collisions (ADR-164 G1)

Resolves the 5 duplicate ADR numbers (6 displaced files) flagged by ADR-164
Gap Register item G1. Canonical keeper per number = first file committed at
that number (date tie-broken by inbound cross-reference count / parent-appendix
relationship). Displaced files renumbered to the next free numbers (166-171):

  050 keeps provisioning-tool-enhancements (5 refs vs 1)
    -> ADR-166-quality-engineering-security-hardening
  052 keeps tauri-desktop-frontend (parent ADR)
    -> ADR-167-ddd-bounded-contexts (its appendix)
  147 keeps nvidia-cosmos/OccWorld (the actual ADR, has Status header)
    -> ADR-168-benchmark-proof (proof companion, no Status)
    -> ADR-169-adam-mode-light-theme (was untracked)
  148 keeps drone-swarm-control-system (committed #862)
    -> ADR-170-yoga-mode-pose-system (was untracked)
  149 keeps public-community-leaderboard-huggingface (committed 16:47 vs 17:38)
    -> ADR-171-swarm-benchmarking-evaluation-methodology

Updates in-file `# ADR-NNN` headers and intra-file self-references (yoga-modes

* docs(adr): repoint inbound cross-references to renumbered ADRs (166-171)

Follow-up to the ADR renumbering (ADR-164 G1). Updates every inbound reference
that pointed at a displaced ADR, disambiguating shared numbers by title/slug so
only references to the DISPLACED topic move and keeper references stay put.

ADR-168 (was 147 benchmark-proof): README, CHANGELOG, user-guide,
  proof-of-capabilities, research docs 00/03 — all path/label refs updated.
ADR-169 (was 147 adam-mode) / ADR-170 (was 148 yoga-mode): docs/adr/README index.
ADR-171 (was 149 swarm-benchmarking): all ruview-swarm eval code+docs
  (Cargo.toml, evals/, eval_swarm.rs, metrics/mod/report/runner.rs), research
  doc 03 (every §-ref matched ADR-171 sections, not AetherArena), 00-system-review,
  series README, CHANGELOG, and ADR-148's forward/"open issues" pointers.
ADR-166 (was 050 quality-engineering / security-hardening): disambiguated from the
  ADR-050 provisioning KEEPER by topic. The HMAC/secure_tdm, directory-traversal,
  bind-address, and OTA-PSK-auth references in code comments
  (wifi-densepose-hardware Cargo.toml + secure_tdm.rs, sensing-server main.rs) and
  in ADR-052-tauri / ADR-167 all describe the security-hardening ADR -> ADR-166.
ADR-167 (was 052 ddd-appendix): inbound appendix references.

Index/registry updates: docs/adr/README.md, gap-analysis/census.md (rows +
header count), gap-analysis/lens-findings.md (collision table marked RESOLVED),
and ADR-164 Gap Register G1 marked RESOLVED with the full renumber map.

Keeper references deliberately untouched: all ADR-147 OccWorld code, all ADR-148
drone-swarm code/docs, all ADR-149 AetherArena refs (incl. ADR-150's SSL/resampling
refs, which ADR-150 explicitly binds to the AetherArena benchmark), ADR-050
provisioning refs, ADR-052 tauri refs. The frozen GitHub blob URLs in
docs/adr/.issue-177-body.md (pinned to an old branch) are left as historical.

Comment-only code edits; no behavior change. wifi-densepose-hardware compiles
clean; the sensing-server build's sole blocker is the pre-existing upstream
midstreamer-temporal-compare@0.2.1 registry crate, unrelated to these edits.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>
2026-06-13 14:31:38 -04:00

626 lines
26 KiB
Markdown

# ADR-167 Appendix: DDD Bounded Contexts — Tauri Desktop Frontend
> Appendix to [ADR-052](ADR-052-tauri-desktop-frontend.md). Renumbered from ADR-052
> to ADR-167 to resolve the ADR-052 duplicate-number collision (per ADR-164 Gap Register
> G1); the parent decision remains ADR-052.
This document maps out the domain model for the RuView Tauri desktop application
described in ADR-052. It defines bounded contexts, their aggregates, entities,
value objects, and the domain events flowing between them.
## Context Map
```
+-------------------+ +---------------------+ +--------------------+
| | | | | |
| Device Discovery |------>| Firmware Management |------>| Configuration / |
| | | | | Provisioning |
+-------------------+ +---------------------+ +--------------------+
| | |
| | |
v v v
+-------------------+ +---------------------+ +--------------------+
| | | | | |
| Sensing Pipeline |<------| Edge Module | | Visualization |
| | | (WASM) | | |
+-------------------+ +---------------------+ +--------------------+
Relationship types:
-----> Upstream/Downstream (upstream publishes events, downstream consumes)
<----- Conformist (downstream conforms to upstream's model)
```
---
## 1. Device Discovery Context
**Purpose**: Find, identify, and monitor ESP32 CSI nodes on the local network.
**Upstream of**: Firmware Management, Configuration, Sensing Pipeline, Visualization
### Aggregates
#### `NodeRegistry` (Aggregate Root)
Maintains the authoritative list of all known nodes. Merges discovery results
from multiple strategies (mDNS, UDP probe, HTTP sweep) and deduplicates by MAC
address.
| Field | Type | Description |
|-------|------|-------------|
| `nodes` | `Map<MacAddress, Node>` | All discovered nodes keyed by MAC |
| `scan_state` | `ScanState` | Idle, Scanning, Error |
| `last_scan` | `DateTime<Utc>` | Timestamp of last completed scan |
**Invariant**: No two nodes may share the same MAC address. If a node is
discovered via multiple strategies, the most recent data wins.
**Persistence**: The registry is persisted to `~/.ruview/nodes.db` (SQLite via
`rusqlite`). On startup, all previously known nodes are loaded as `Offline` and
reconciled against a fresh discovery scan. This means the app **remembers the
mesh** across restarts — critical for field deployments where nodes may be
temporarily powered off.
#### `Node` (Entity)
| Field | Type | Description |
|-------|------|-------------|
| `mac` | `MacAddress` (VO) | IEEE 802.11 MAC address (unique identity) |
| `ip` | `IpAddr` | Current IP address (may change on DHCP renewal) |
| `hostname` | `Option<String>` | mDNS hostname |
| `node_id` | `u8` | NVS-provisioned node ID |
| `firmware_version` | `Option<SemVer>` | Firmware version string |
| `health` | `HealthStatus` (VO) | Online / Offline / Degraded |
| `discovery_method` | `DiscoveryMethod` (VO) | How this node was found |
| `last_seen` | `DateTime<Utc>` | Last successful contact |
| `tdm_config` | `Option<TdmConfig>` (VO) | TDM slot assignment |
| `edge_tier` | `Option<u8>` | Edge processing tier (0/1/2) |
### Value Objects
- `MacAddress` — 6-byte hardware address, formatted as `AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF`
- `HealthStatus` — enum: `Online`, `Offline`, `Degraded(reason: String)`
- `DiscoveryMethod` — enum: `Mdns`, `UdpProbe`, `HttpSweep`, `Manual`
- `TdmConfig``{ slot_index: u8, total_nodes: u8 }`
- `SemVer` — semantic version `major.minor.patch`
### Domain Events
| Event | Payload | Consumers |
|-------|---------|-----------|
| `NodeDiscovered` | `{ node: Node }` | Firmware Mgmt (check for updates), Visualization (add to mesh graph) |
| `NodeWentOffline` | `{ mac: MacAddress, last_seen: DateTime }` | Visualization (gray out node), Sensing Pipeline (remove from active set) |
| `NodeCameOnline` | `{ node: Node }` | Visualization (restore node), Sensing Pipeline (re-add) |
| `NodeHealthChanged` | `{ mac: MacAddress, old: HealthStatus, new: HealthStatus }` | Visualization (update indicator) |
| `ScanCompleted` | `{ found: usize, new: usize, lost: usize }` | Dashboard (update summary) |
### Anti-Corruption Layer
When receiving data from the ESP32 OTA status endpoint (`GET /ota/status`), the
response format is owned by the firmware and may change across firmware versions.
The ACL translates the raw JSON response into `Node` entity fields:
```rust
/// ACL: Translate ESP32 OTA status response to Node fields.
fn translate_ota_status(raw: &serde_json::Value) -> Result<NodePatch, AclError> {
NodePatch {
firmware_version: raw["version"].as_str().map(SemVer::parse).transpose()?,
uptime_secs: raw["uptime_s"].as_u64(),
free_heap: raw["free_heap"].as_u64(),
// Firmware may add fields in future versions — unknown fields are ignored
}
}
```
---
## 2. Firmware Management Context
**Purpose**: Flash, update, and verify firmware on ESP32 nodes.
**Upstream of**: Configuration (a fresh flash triggers provisioning)
**Downstream of**: Device Discovery (needs node list and serial port info)
### Aggregates
#### `FlashSession` (Aggregate Root)
Represents a single firmware flashing operation from start to completion. Each
session has a lifecycle: Created -> Connecting -> Erasing -> Writing -> Verifying ->
Completed | Failed.
| Field | Type | Description |
|-------|------|-------------|
| `id` | `Uuid` | Session identifier |
| `port` | `SerialPort` (VO) | Target serial port |
| `firmware` | `FirmwareBinary` (Entity) | The binary being flashed |
| `chip` | `ChipType` (VO) | Target chip (ESP32, ESP32-S3, ESP32-C3) |
| `phase` | `FlashPhase` (VO) | Current phase of the flash operation |
| `progress` | `Progress` (VO) | Bytes written / total, speed |
| `started_at` | `DateTime<Utc>` | When the session started |
| `error` | `Option<String>` | Error message if failed |
**Invariant**: Only one `FlashSession` may be active per serial port at a time.
#### `FirmwareBinary` (Entity)
| Field | Type | Description |
|-------|------|-------------|
| `path` | `PathBuf` | Filesystem path to the `.bin` file |
| `size_bytes` | `u64` | Binary size |
| `version` | `Option<SemVer>` | Extracted from ESP32 image header |
| `chip_type` | `Option<ChipType>` | Detected from image magic bytes |
| `checksum` | `Sha256Hash` (VO) | SHA-256 of the binary |
#### `OtaSession` (Aggregate Root)
Represents an over-the-air firmware update to a running node.
| Field | Type | Description |
|-------|------|-------------|
| `id` | `Uuid` | Session identifier |
| `target_node` | `MacAddress` | Target node MAC |
| `target_ip` | `IpAddr` | Target node IP |
| `firmware` | `FirmwareBinary` | The binary being pushed |
| `psk` | `Option<SecureString>` | PSK for authentication (ADR-166) |
| `phase` | `OtaPhase` | Uploading / Rebooting / Verifying / Done / Failed |
| `progress` | `Progress` | Upload progress |
#### `BatchOtaSession` (Aggregate Root)
Coordinates rolling firmware updates across multiple mesh nodes. Prevents all
nodes from rebooting simultaneously, which would collapse the sensing network.
| Field | Type | Description |
|-------|------|-------------|
| `id` | `Uuid` | Batch session identifier |
| `firmware` | `FirmwareBinary` | The binary being deployed |
| `strategy` | `OtaStrategy` | `Sequential`, `TdmSafe`, `Parallel` |
| `max_concurrent` | `usize` | Max nodes updating at once |
| `batch_delay_secs` | `u64` | Delay between batches |
| `fail_fast` | `bool` | Abort remaining on first failure |
| `node_states` | `Map<MacAddress, BatchNodeState>` | Per-node progress |
**Invariant**: In `TdmSafe` mode, adjacent TDM slots are never updated
concurrently. Even-slot nodes update first, then odd-slot nodes.
**Lifecycle**: `Planning → InProgress → Completed | PartialFailure | Aborted`
- `BatchNodeState` — enum: `Queued`, `Uploading(Progress)`, `Rebooting`, `Verifying`, `Done`, `Failed(String)`, `Skipped`
- `OtaStrategy` — enum:
- `Sequential` — one node at a time, wait for rejoin
- `TdmSafe` — update non-adjacent slots to maintain sensing coverage
- `Parallel` — all at once (development only)
### Value Objects
- `SerialPort``{ name: String, vid: u16, pid: u16, manufacturer: Option<String> }`
- `ChipType` — enum: `Esp32`, `Esp32s3`, `Esp32c3`
- `FlashPhase` — enum: `Connecting`, `Erasing`, `Writing`, `Verifying`, `Completed`, `Failed`
- `OtaPhase` — enum: `Uploading`, `Rebooting`, `Verifying`, `Completed`, `Failed`
- `Progress``{ bytes_done: u64, bytes_total: u64, speed_bps: u64 }`
- `Sha256Hash` — 32-byte hash
- `SecureString` — zeroized-on-drop string for PSK tokens
### Domain Events
| Event | Payload | Consumers |
|-------|---------|-----------|
| `FlashStarted` | `{ session_id, port, firmware_version }` | UI (show progress) |
| `FlashProgress` | `{ session_id, phase, progress }` | UI (update progress bar) |
| `FlashCompleted` | `{ session_id, duration_secs }` | Configuration (trigger provisioning prompt) |
| `FlashFailed` | `{ session_id, error }` | UI (show error) |
| `OtaStarted` | `{ session_id, target_mac, firmware_version }` | Discovery (mark node as updating) |
| `OtaCompleted` | `{ session_id, target_mac, new_version }` | Discovery (refresh node info) |
| `OtaFailed` | `{ session_id, target_mac, error }` | UI (show error) |
| `BatchOtaStarted` | `{ batch_id, strategy, node_count }` | UI (show batch progress) |
| `BatchNodeUpdated` | `{ batch_id, mac, state }` | UI (update per-node status), Discovery (refresh) |
| `BatchOtaCompleted` | `{ batch_id, succeeded, failed, skipped }` | UI (show summary), Discovery (full rescan) |
### Anti-Corruption Layer
The `espflash` crate has its own error types and progress reporting model. The
ACL translates these into domain events:
```rust
/// ACL: Translate espflash progress callbacks to domain FlashProgress events.
impl From<espflash::ProgressCallbackMessage> for FlashProgress {
fn from(msg: espflash::ProgressCallbackMessage) -> Self {
match msg {
espflash::ProgressCallbackMessage::Connecting => FlashProgress {
phase: FlashPhase::Connecting,
progress: Progress::indeterminate(),
},
espflash::ProgressCallbackMessage::Erasing { addr, total } => FlashProgress {
phase: FlashPhase::Erasing,
progress: Progress::new(addr as u64, total as u64),
},
// ... etc
}
}
}
```
---
## 3. Configuration / Provisioning Context
**Purpose**: Manage NVS configuration for ESP32 nodes — WiFi credentials, network
targets, TDM mesh settings, edge intelligence parameters, WASM security keys.
**Downstream of**: Device Discovery (needs serial port), Firmware Management (post-flash provisioning)
### Aggregates
#### `ProvisioningSession` (Aggregate Root)
Represents a single NVS write or read operation on a connected ESP32.
| Field | Type | Description |
|-------|------|-------------|
| `id` | `Uuid` | Session identifier |
| `port` | `SerialPort` (VO) | Target serial port |
| `config` | `NodeConfig` (Entity) | Configuration to write |
| `direction` | `Direction` | Read or Write |
| `phase` | `ProvisionPhase` | Generating / Flashing / Verifying / Done |
#### `NodeConfig` (Entity)
The full set of NVS key-value pairs for a single node. Maps directly to the
firmware's `nvs_config_t` struct (see `firmware/esp32-csi-node/main/nvs_config.h`).
| Field | Type | NVS Key | Description |
|-------|------|---------|-------------|
| `wifi_ssid` | `Option<String>` | `ssid` | WiFi SSID |
| `wifi_password` | `Option<SecureString>` | `password` | WiFi password |
| `target_ip` | `Option<IpAddr>` | `target_ip` | Aggregator IP |
| `target_port` | `Option<u16>` | `target_port` | Aggregator UDP port |
| `node_id` | `Option<u8>` | `node_id` | Node identifier |
| `tdm_slot` | `Option<u8>` | `tdm_slot` | TDM slot index |
| `tdm_total` | `Option<u8>` | `tdm_nodes` | Total TDM nodes |
| `edge_tier` | `Option<u8>` | `edge_tier` | Processing tier |
| `hop_count` | `Option<u8>` | `hop_count` | Channel hop count |
| `channel_list` | `Option<Vec<u8>>` | `chan_list` | Channel sequence |
| `dwell_ms` | `Option<u32>` | `dwell_ms` | Hop dwell time |
| `power_duty` | `Option<u8>` | `power_duty` | Power duty cycle |
| `presence_thresh` | `Option<u16>` | `pres_thresh` | Presence threshold |
| `fall_thresh` | `Option<u16>` | `fall_thresh` | Fall detection threshold |
| `vital_window` | `Option<u16>` | `vital_win` | Vital sign window |
| `vital_interval_ms` | `Option<u16>` | `vital_int` | Vital sign interval |
| `top_k_count` | `Option<u8>` | `subk_count` | Top-K subcarriers |
| `wasm_max_modules` | `Option<u8>` | `wasm_max` | Max WASM modules |
| `wasm_verify` | `Option<bool>` | `wasm_verify` | Require WASM signature |
| `wasm_pubkey` | `Option<[u8; 32]>` | `wasm_pubkey` | Ed25519 public key |
| `ota_psk` | `Option<SecureString>` | `ota_psk` | OTA pre-shared key |
**Invariant**: `tdm_slot < tdm_total` when both are set.
**Invariant**: `channel_list.len() == hop_count` when both are set.
**Invariant**: `10 <= power_duty <= 100`.
#### `MeshConfig` (Entity)
A mesh-level configuration that generates per-node `NodeConfig` instances.
Corresponds to ADR-044 Phase 2 (config file provisioning).
| Field | Type | Description |
|-------|------|-------------|
| `common` | `NodeConfig` | Shared settings (WiFi, target IP, edge tier) |
| `nodes` | `Vec<MeshNodeEntry>` | Per-node overrides (port, node_id, tdm_slot) |
```rust
pub struct MeshNodeEntry {
pub port: String,
pub node_id: u8,
pub tdm_slot: u8,
// All other fields inherited from common
}
```
**Invariant**: `tdm_total` is automatically computed as `nodes.len()`.
### Value Objects
- `ProvisionPhase` — enum: `Generating`, `Flashing`, `Verifying`, `Completed`, `Failed`
- `Direction` — enum: `Read`, `Write`
- `Preset` — enum: `Basic`, `Vitals`, `Mesh3`, `Mesh6Vitals` (ADR-044 Phase 3)
### Domain Events
| Event | Payload | Consumers |
|-------|---------|-----------|
| `NodeProvisioned` | `{ port, node_id, config_summary }` | Discovery (trigger re-scan), UI (show success) |
| `NvsReadCompleted` | `{ port, config: NodeConfig }` | UI (populate form) |
| `ProvisionFailed` | `{ port, error }` | UI (show error) |
| `MeshProvisionStarted` | `{ node_count }` | UI (show batch progress) |
| `MeshProvisionCompleted` | `{ success_count, fail_count }` | UI (show summary) |
---
## 4. Sensing Pipeline Context
**Purpose**: Control the sensing server process, receive real-time CSI data, and
manage the signal processing pipeline.
**Downstream of**: Device Discovery (needs node IPs for data attribution)
### Aggregates
#### `SensingServer` (Aggregate Root)
Represents the managed sensing server child process.
| Field | Type | Description |
|-------|------|-------------|
| `state` | `ServerState` (VO) | Stopped / Starting / Running / Stopping / Crashed |
| `config` | `ServerConfig` (VO) | Port configuration, log level, model paths |
| `pid` | `Option<u32>` | OS process ID when running |
| `started_at` | `Option<DateTime<Utc>>` | Start timestamp |
| `log_buffer` | `RingBuffer<LogEntry>` | Last N log lines |
| `ws_url` | `Option<Url>` | WebSocket URL for live data |
**Invariant**: Only one `SensingServer` process may be managed at a time.
#### `SensingSession` (Entity)
An active connection to the sensing server's WebSocket for receiving real-time data.
| Field | Type | Description |
|-------|------|-------------|
| `connection_state` | `WsState` | Connecting / Connected / Disconnected |
| `frames_received` | `u64` | Total CSI frames received this session |
| `last_frame_at` | `Option<DateTime<Utc>>` | Timestamp of last received frame |
| `subscriptions` | `HashSet<DataChannel>` | Which data streams are active |
### Value Objects
- `ServerState` — enum: `Stopped`, `Starting`, `Running`, `Stopping`, `Crashed(exit_code: i32)`
- `ServerConfig``{ http_port: u16, ws_port: u16, udp_port: u16, model_dir: PathBuf, log_level: Level }`
- `LogEntry``{ timestamp: DateTime, level: Level, target: String, message: String }`
- `DataChannel` — enum: `CsiFrames`, `PoseUpdates`, `VitalSigns`, `ActivityClassification`
- `WsState` — enum: `Connecting`, `Connected`, `Disconnected(reason: String)`
### Domain Events
| Event | Payload | Consumers |
|-------|---------|-----------|
| `ServerStarted` | `{ pid, ports: ServerConfig }` | UI (enable sensing view), Discovery (start health polling via WS) |
| `ServerStopped` | `{ exit_code, uptime_secs }` | UI (disable sensing view) |
| `ServerCrashed` | `{ exit_code, last_log_lines }` | UI (show crash report) |
| `CsiFrameReceived` | `{ node_id, timestamp, subcarrier_count }` | Visualization (update charts) |
| `PoseUpdated` | `{ persons: Vec<PersonPose> }` | Visualization (draw skeletons) |
| `VitalSignUpdate` | `{ node_id, bpm, breath_rate }` | Visualization (update vitals chart) |
| `ActivityDetected` | `{ label, confidence }` | Visualization (show activity) |
---
## 5. Edge Module (WASM) Context
**Purpose**: Upload, manage, and monitor WASM edge processing modules running
on ESP32 nodes.
**Downstream of**: Device Discovery (needs node IPs and WASM capability info)
**Upstream of**: Sensing Pipeline (WASM modules emit edge-processed events)
### Aggregates
#### `ModuleRegistry` (Aggregate Root)
Tracks all WASM modules across all nodes.
| Field | Type | Description |
|-------|------|-------------|
| `modules` | `Map<(MacAddress, ModuleId), WasmModule>` | Per-node module inventory |
#### `WasmModule` (Entity)
| Field | Type | Description |
|-------|------|-------------|
| `id` | `ModuleId` (VO) | Node-assigned module identifier |
| `name` | `String` | Filename of the uploaded `.wasm` |
| `size_bytes` | `u64` | Module size |
| `status` | `ModuleStatus` (VO) | Loaded / Running / Stopped / Error |
| `node_mac` | `MacAddress` | Which node this module runs on |
| `uploaded_at` | `DateTime<Utc>` | Upload timestamp |
| `signed` | `bool` | Whether the module has an Ed25519 signature |
### Value Objects
- `ModuleId` — string identifier assigned by the node firmware
- `ModuleStatus` — enum: `Loaded`, `Running`, `Stopped`, `Error(String)`
### Domain Events
| Event | Payload | Consumers |
|-------|---------|-----------|
| `ModuleUploaded` | `{ node_mac, module_id, name, size }` | UI (refresh list) |
| `ModuleStarted` | `{ node_mac, module_id }` | UI (update status) |
| `ModuleStopped` | `{ node_mac, module_id }` | UI (update status) |
| `ModuleUnloaded` | `{ node_mac, module_id }` | UI (remove from list) |
| `ModuleError` | `{ node_mac, module_id, error }` | UI (show error) |
### Anti-Corruption Layer
The ESP32 WASM management HTTP API (`/wasm/*` on port 8032) returns raw JSON
with firmware-specific field names. The ACL normalizes these:
```rust
/// ACL: Translate ESP32 WASM list response to domain WasmModule entities.
fn translate_wasm_list(raw: &[serde_json::Value]) -> Vec<WasmModule> {
raw.iter().filter_map(|entry| {
Some(WasmModule {
id: ModuleId(entry["id"].as_str()?.to_string()),
name: entry["name"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown").to_string(),
size_bytes: entry["size"].as_u64().unwrap_or(0),
status: match entry["state"].as_str() {
Some("running") => ModuleStatus::Running,
Some("stopped") => ModuleStatus::Stopped,
Some("loaded") => ModuleStatus::Loaded,
other => ModuleStatus::Error(
format!("Unknown state: {:?}", other)
),
},
// ...
})
}).collect()
}
```
---
## 6. Visualization Context
**Purpose**: Render real-time and historical sensing data — CSI heatmaps, pose
skeletons, vital sign charts, mesh topology graphs.
**Downstream of**: Sensing Pipeline (receives data events), Device Discovery (needs
node metadata for labeling)
This context is **purely presentational** and contains no domain logic. It
transforms domain events from other contexts into visual representations.
### Aggregates
None — this context is a **Query Model** (CQRS read side). It subscribes to
domain events and projects them into view models.
### View Models
#### `DashboardView`
| Field | Source Context | Description |
|-------|---------------|-------------|
| `nodes` | Device Discovery | Node cards with health, version, signal quality |
| `server` | Sensing Pipeline | Server status, uptime, port info |
| `recent_activity` | All contexts | Timeline of recent events |
#### `SignalView`
| Field | Source Context | Description |
|-------|---------------|-------------|
| `csi_heatmap` | Sensing Pipeline | Subcarrier amplitude x time matrix |
| `signal_field` | Sensing Pipeline | 2D signal strength grid |
| `activity_label` | Sensing Pipeline | Current classification |
| `confidence` | Sensing Pipeline | Classification confidence |
#### `PoseView`
| Field | Source Context | Description |
|-------|---------------|-------------|
| `persons` | Sensing Pipeline | Array of detected person skeletons |
| `zones` | Sensing Pipeline | Active zones in the sensing area |
#### `VitalsView`
| Field | Source Context | Description |
|-------|---------------|-------------|
| `breathing_rate_bpm` | Sensing Pipeline | Per-node breathing rate time series |
| `heart_rate_bpm` | Sensing Pipeline | Per-node heart rate time series |
#### `MeshView`
| Field | Source Context | Description |
|-------|---------------|-------------|
| `nodes` | Device Discovery | Positioned nodes for graph layout |
| `edges` | Device Discovery | Inter-node visibility/connectivity |
| `tdm_timeline` | Device Discovery | TDM slot schedule visualization |
| `sync_status` | Sensing Pipeline | Per-node sync status with server |
---
## Cross-Context Event Flow
```
NodeDiscovered
Device Discovery ─────────────────────────────────> Firmware Management
│ │
│ NodeDiscovered │ FlashCompleted
│ NodeHealthChanged │
├──────────────────> Visualization v
│ Configuration
│ NodeDiscovered │
├──────────────────> Sensing Pipeline │ NodeProvisioned
│ │
│ v
│ Device Discovery
│ (re-scan triggered)
│ NodeDiscovered
└──────────────────> Edge Module (WASM)
│ ModuleUploaded, ModuleStarted
v
Sensing Pipeline
│ CsiFrameReceived, PoseUpdated, VitalSignUpdate
v
Visualization
```
## Implementation Notes
1. **Event Bus**: Domain events are dispatched via Tauri's event system
(`app_handle.emit("event-name", payload)`). The frontend subscribes using
`listen("event-name", callback)`. This provides natural cross-context
communication without coupling contexts directly.
2. **State Isolation**: Each bounded context maintains its own `State<'_, T>`
managed by Tauri. Contexts do not share mutable state directly — they
communicate exclusively through events.
3. **Module Organization**: Each bounded context maps to a Rust module under
`src/commands/` and `src/domain/`:
```
src/
commands/ # Tauri command handlers (application layer)
discovery.rs # Device Discovery context commands
flash.rs # Firmware Management context commands
ota.rs # Firmware Management context commands
provision.rs # Configuration context commands
server.rs # Sensing Pipeline context commands
wasm.rs # Edge Module context commands
domain/ # Domain models (pure Rust, no Tauri dependency)
discovery/
mod.rs
node.rs # Node entity, MacAddress VO
registry.rs # NodeRegistry aggregate
events.rs # Discovery domain events
firmware/
mod.rs
binary.rs # FirmwareBinary entity
flash.rs # FlashSession aggregate
ota.rs # OtaSession aggregate
events.rs
config/
mod.rs
nvs.rs # NodeConfig entity
mesh.rs # MeshConfig entity
provision.rs # ProvisioningSession aggregate
events.rs
sensing/
mod.rs
server.rs # SensingServer aggregate
session.rs # SensingSession entity
events.rs
wasm/
mod.rs
module.rs # WasmModule entity
registry.rs # ModuleRegistry aggregate
events.rs
acl/ # Anti-corruption layers
ota_status.rs # ESP32 OTA status response translator
wasm_api.rs # ESP32 WASM API response translator
espflash.rs # espflash crate adapter
```
4. **Testing Strategy**: Domain modules under `src/domain/` have no Tauri
dependency and can be tested with standard `cargo test`. Command handlers
under `src/commands/` require Tauri test utilities for integration testing.
5. **Shared Kernel**: The `MacAddress`, `SemVer`, and `SecureString` value objects
are shared across contexts. They live in a `src/domain/shared.rs` module.
This is acceptable because they are immutable value objects with no behavior
beyond validation and formatting.